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I am very pleased to have had the opportunity to translate Professor Claus 
Dierksmeier’s monograph, Qualitative Freiheit: Selbstbestimmung in weltbürgerli-
cher Verantwortung (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2016) from the original German 
into American English. The tremendous breadth and depth of this work nonetheless 
presented some unusual challenges for the translator, both because of the manner in 
which, for large parts of it, the author connects a quite technical discussion of the 
intricacies of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century German philosophy with 
a more contemporary discourse on globalization ethics and also because of its inter-
disciplinary nature – the discussion seamlessly gliding back and forth between top-
ics within metaphysics, ethics, political theory, and economics. In translating such a 
work, it soon became apparent that it was neither possible nor desirable to employ 
the kind of consistency in the translation of technical terms that one might expect 
from, say, the translation of a treatise by a long-since-departed eighteenth-century 
philosopher or an academic journal article by a contemporary economist. These 
challenges have, however, been circumvented by the fact that our author took a very 
active role in the translation process. The initial drafts of this translation were thor-
oughly reviewed and amended by Professor Dierksmeier, while that subsequent 
iteration was further reviewed and amended by the translator. Professor Dierksmeier’s 
(American) wife, Laura, also thoroughly reviewed the manuscript, so as to convert 
some of the native inflections of the (English) translator into terms and expressions 
more familiar to an American readership. The final version of this translation thus 
emerged as the result of a “dialectical process” and is one in which all involved are 
now confident that all technical terminology, either for which there is no direct – 
natural – English equivalent or which could – potentially – prove ambiguous (hence 
admitting of mistranslation), has upon each specific occasion of its use and in accor-
dance with its particular context been translated with the best possible English- 
language term to convey the author’s meaning and intension.
In translating the discussions of the work of Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte constituting the first quarter of this study, I was fortunate enough to have at 
my disposal for consultation authoritative translations of the works of all of these 
authors. The publication in the same year as the German-language version of this 
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monograph of the Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy volume within The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant series meant that it was possible 
for all quotations from Kant to follow these highly regarded Cambridge Edition 
translations. These editions translate Kant with a rigorous terminological consis-
tency and an emphasis on literalness. As previously discussed, I do not consider 
these to be desirable virtues in translating Professor Dierksmeier himself when he is 
speaking in his own voice. But since these editions both aim to recreate – as far as 
is possible – for the English-language reader the experience of reading Kant in the 
original and are now employed within the vast majority of English-language Kant 
scholarship, I decided to ensure that all of the quotations from Kant conform with 
those in the Cambridge Edition translations. The English translations of Fichte’s 
works have (so far) not enjoyed the same uniform format, and a good many of his 
works (especially those composed after 1800) have yet to be translated into English. 
Nonetheless – in the vast majority of cases – where good-quality recent translations 
already exist, those translations have similarly been employed here. Mostly, that has 
meant quoting from Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) – but Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1993) and J.  G. Fichte and the Atheism Dispute (1798–1800) 
(Routledge, 2010) have also been quoted from where appropriate.
In spite of the guidance that the aforementioned works could provide, however, 
probably the greatest challenge facing this translation was the translation of the 
German Recht, the multifarious compound nouns including this term, and the adjec-
tives derived from it, such as, e.g., rechtlich and rechtmäßig. Whereas “ein Recht 
auf” and the plural “Rechte” quite evidently correspond to the English “a right to” 
and “rights,” respectively, there is no English term that naturally and unambigu-
ously corresponds to “das Recht” in quite the same way. One possibility would of 
course be to translate “das Recht” as “law,” just as the term Naturrecht would seem 
most obviously translated as “natural law” and the adjective widerrechtlich most 
adequately translated as “unlawful.” Nonetheless, translators of the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century German philosophy almost invariably reject this solution, fear-
ing its capacity to obscure the conceptual connection between “das Recht” and “die 
Rechte,” as well as due to concern about the ambiguous instances of the term Recht 
(where it is not clear whether the former or the latter sense is intended) within the 
writings of their long-since-departed authors. Accordingly, a consensus seems to 
have arisen among such translators that “das Recht” is most adequately translated 
simply as “right.” And indeed, this is the approach taken within the Cambridge 
Edition translations of Kant’s Rechtslehre, the translations of Fichte’s Grundlage 
des Naturrechts and Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (as is of course 
apparent from their respective titles, Foundations of Natural Right and Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right), and the translation of K. C. F. Krause’s Das Urbild der 
Menschheit – which remains to this day the only one of Krause’s works to have ever 
been published in English translation. The price that is paid for consistency and lack 
of ambiguity, however, is that this solution can, at times, lead to phrases and expres-
sions which sound unduly abstract and unnatural in English (and, indeed, this is 
something that readers may possibly perceive as they read through some of the 
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quotations from Kant and Fichte within this volume). Whereas this may well be a 
price worth paying when translating long-departed authors who we are hardly able 
to ask about the precise meaning of any potentially ambiguous expression they 
employ, it soon became clear that using the same approach to translating those pas-
sages in which Professor Dierksmeier speaks within his own voice to show what 
Kant and Fichte are able to offer contemporary discussions within political theory 
and economics would produce an English-language discourse sounding intolerably 
artificial and unnatural. This problem was, however, fortunately obviated by the fact 
that Professor Dierksmeier is very much still alive and, as such, he could decide for 
himself about the most appropriate translation of these terms within the specific 
contexts in which they are employed. A pragmatic approach has thus been adopted 
here, with the result that although “das Recht” and “rechtlich” are translated as 
“right” and “rightful” within discussions of their use within eighteenth-century 
philosophical texts, when the discussion turns to contemporary sociopolitical and 
economic questions, the terms are – where appropriate – more often than not trans-
lated as “law” and “lawful” or “legal,” respectively. Hopefully this pragmatic 
approach has resulted in a text that will prove accessible to both historians of phi-
losophy and those more interested in contemporary sociopolitical questions.
Another potential problem facing this translation concerned the most adequate 
translation of the terms Verstand, verständig, and Verständigkeit on the one hand 
and the terms Vernunft, vernünftig, and Vernünftigkeit on the other. The former 
terms are typically used to describe the kind of thinking employed within mathe-
matics, whereas the latter terms are typically used to describe the kind of thinking 
we employ when addressing moral questions – as well as the problems of metaphys-
ics. This becomes an ossified technical distinction within the works of Kant as well 
as his late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophical successors. As English- 
language scholars of these figures will be well aware, however, it has long since 
been established by almost unanimous consensus that, when translating Kant or 
Hegel, for example, these terms are best captured by the distinction between under-
standing and reason. Hence such scholars would no doubt expect to find “Verstand” 
translated as “understanding,” “verständig” as “understandable,” “vernünftig” as 
“rational,” and “Vernünftigkeit” as “rationality.” Once eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
century philosophy enters into a serious discourse with twentieth-century political 
theory and economics, however, the aforementioned orthodoxy can no longer be 
maintained. The problem emerges insofar as more recent rational choice theorists, 
utility theorists, or game theorists – or anyone who reduces the human being to the 
homo economicus model – precisely use the adjective “rational” to describe self- 
interested utility-maximizing behavior which conforms to, and can be predicted in 
terms of, mathematical algorithms. Within a discourse upon such theories, verstän-
dig thus becomes synonymous with the German adjective “rational” and is thus, 
obviously, best translated as “rational,” and “Verständigkeit” thus becomes synony-
mous with “Rationalität” and is thus best translated as “rationality.” Within this 
study, therefore, the vitally important distinction between Verstand and Vernunft 
had to be expressed within terms perhaps contrary to the expectations of English- 
language scholars of German philosophy in order to prevent that important 
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 distinction from being lost. Accordingly, within this translation, one frequently 
finds “Verstand” translated as “ratio,” “verständig” as “rational,” and “Verständigkeit” 
as “rationality.” Meanwhile, “Vernunft” is still – as everyone would expect – trans-
lated as “reason,” but “vernünftig” is translated as “reasonable” and “Vernünftigkeit” 
as “reasonableness.” Exceptions to this rule occur only within the discussions of 
specific passages from Kant and Fichte within the first sections of the text; other-
wise it is applied throughout the whole of the book. Again, I hope that these deci-
sions have resulted in a text that will be accessible and understandable by all of the 
various audiences for which it is intended and directed.
Finally, I would like to thank Hans Földeak and the late Christina Stockinger for 
assisting me with some of the initial drafts of this translation. I would also like to 
thank the American University in Cairo for providing me with faculty support grants 
enabling me to spend two summers in Tübingen to work on this translation.
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1.1  Why Think About Freedom?
Freedom is a fascinating idea. It empowers and encourages all human beings 
towards a dignified life. More and more individuals and institutions appeal to the 
idea of freedom in order to overturn repressive life-circumstances. No one needs to 
explain the value of freedom to the oppressed. Wherever freedom is absent in prac-
tice, it is seldom lacking a cherished place in theory. The institutionalized con-
sciousness of freedom, political liberalism, often grows in synch with the obstacles 
facing freedom.
But to identify and combat the lack of freedom is easier than shaping liberties 
already won. Wherever the harsh, black shadow of oppression is swept aside, the 
bright white light of freedom is refracted within the prism of the most multifarious 
ideas of liberty. The black and white of freedom fighters becomes replaced by the 
more nuanced ideological tinges of open societies. Within their colorful array of 
social and political blueprints, there resides both opportunities and dangers for lib-
eralism. For within open societies, the once unquestioning urge for freedom now 
inexorably gives rise to the urgent question: Which freedom and whose freedom is 
to be upheld when the freedoms of some collide with the freedoms of others?
Freedom is constantly called upon to strengthen or to weaken certain conven-
tions, to commend or to condemn individual, corporate, and collective practices, 
and to legitimize as well as to criticize political systems. Defenders just as much as 
detractors of the status quo alike, by invoking the selfsame ideal, are bringing to 
Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are 
not free.
John F. Kennedy
A genuine liberal will emphasize as crucial the complete 




light tensions within the idea of freedom. Does the freedom of the environmental 
campaigner have priority over economic freedom or vice versa? Does that of the 
champion of direct democracy have priority over that of the friends of parliamentary 
representation? Should religious liberty have priority over the freedoms of nonbe-
lievers? Ought we to prioritize the freedom of those living today over that of coming 
generations? How are we to deal with the ecological damage and social side effects 
that unfettered economic freedom produces? How is economic freedom related to 
political freedom? Do they require and strengthen one another, or does the one in 
fact undermine the other? Might there be an excess of certain freedoms?
These questions stimulate vital deliberations: Do we adequately grasp the idea of 
freedom as such when equating it with a decrease of limitations and an increase in 
options? Or does freedom have immanent boundaries? Must even rules of fairness 
and commands of responsibility be considered as a diminution of freedom? Or do 
they rather articulate a desire for a freedom in and for sustainable ways of living? 
Are voluntarily chosen commitments negations or manifestations of freedom?
In short, as soon as freedom no longer fights with constraint and compulsion, 
liberalism begins to struggle with itself. Having eaten from the tree of knowledge 
and having learned the bitter lesson that the freedom of a few can ruin the presup-
positions for the freedom of others – of everyone – liberal thinking lost its inno-
cence. In its lack of social, moral, and ecological reflection today’s liberalism is 
confronted by its own original sin and deplores the loss of its former paradise of 
moral clarity. The haste with which many liberals these days reach for moral fig 
leaves bespeaks their embarrassed state of original ethical nakedness. From now on, 
it seems, the friends of freedom must make their home in a world endangered by 
freedom itself. Henceforth liberalism must live by the sweat of its brow and earn its 
bread through a reform of its own idea and ideal of freedom. The present work 
endeavors to contribute to this reform.
Reading this volume will be easier if one is from the outset clear about where this 
intellectual journey is going. For this reason, I would like, right at the beginning, to 
confess that this book is intended for various target-groups and therefore argues at 
different levels. The aims and tone of the presentation change precisely for this 
reason. First, I wish to give a new direction to the academic discourse concerning 
the philosophy of freedom. The main part of this book, up until and including Chap. 
4, is dedicated to this purpose. Second, I wish to provide momentum to a morally, 
socially, and ecologically sustainable liberalism, which is the focus of the last chap-
ter of the book. Both aspects, however, are essentially connected. The applied part 
requires academic foundations for its legitimacy and, conversely, the theory requires 
practical application in order to establish its relevance.
Yet those people who are theoretically dedicated to the idea of freedom are not 
always the same as those who practically care about the vicissitudes of liberalism. As 
a consequence, I have attempted to compose this study in such a way that it does not 
require everyone to work with academic meticulousness. All of the theoretical chapters 
therefore end with a section emphasizing their respective “results and implications.” 
Readers primarily interested in the practical consequences of my investigation will, by 
consulting these sections, be well prepared for their ultimate presentation in Chap. 5.
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The academic aim of the book is easily enough stated, but not so quickly cashed 
out. First of all I wish to clarify the idea of freedom conceptually by readjusting the 
common distinction between negative and positive freedom into the dialectical con-
ceptual dichotomy of quantitative and qualitative freedom (as is detailed in Sect. 
1.2). I describe this dichotomy as dialectical since a closer consideration of both 
categories shows that, first, earlier theories of freedom are able to be conclusively 
traced back to those two categorical determinations whereby, second, a hierarchical 
ordering and prioritizing of quantitative and qualitative aspects arise so that, third, 
it becomes clear how the one uniform idea of freedom can be legitimately differenti-
ated – from place to place as well as from one time to another – within different 
ways of living freely.
The perspective of quantity and quality chosen here is not entirely new.1 Mainly 
we find the quantitative preoccupation championed in theories of “negatively- 
liberal,” libertarian or neo-liberal origin.2 Conversely, the conception of qualitative 
freedom has some similarities with the concept of “positive freedom” (about which 
there is more in Sect. 1.2.3), although it is to be clearly distinguished from it as a 
result of its important procedural dimension. Qualitative freedom does not wish to 
stipulate ex cathedra which freedoms should apply to certain people and certain 
groups, but rather authorizes those respectively affected to come to an agreement 
themselves about that stipulation – in forms which could be justified in the name and 
interest of the freedom of all mankind. This aspect – the irreversible globality of the 
idea of freedom – is something which I shall expound on presently (in Sect. 1.1.1).
1 Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), Erich Fromm (1890–1980), and Theodor Adorno (1903–1969) talk 
of qualitative aspects of freedom, but not in a technical sense. In these thinkers, the concept of 
‘qualitative freedom’ surfaces only occasionally but is not systematically worked out. Certainly, 
even as early as 1979, Charles Taylor introduced “qualitative discriminations” within the philoso-
phy of freedom, but he did not extend these ideas into a self-contained theory, see Charles Taylor, 
“What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” in Alan Ryan & Isaiah Berlin, The Idea of Freedom: 
Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 177–
193. It should also be noted that, unlike what might be supposed by judging the book by its cover, 
Matthew Kramer in no way arrives at a theory of qualitative freedom, but rather attempts to trace 
back all qualitative dimensions of the idea of freedom to quantitative aspects (“the perimeter of a 
person’s latitude,” “the extent,” “the numerical expressions,” etc.) and then trace these back to a 
theory of negative freedom (“the sheer physical proportions”) (Matthew H. Kramer, The Quality of 
Freedom [New York: Oxford University Press, 2003], 7–11). Yet in theoretical philosophy (looking 
for an alternative to debates about determinism versus indeterminism) the concept of qualitative 
freedom has already been tried out in Thomas Buchheim, Unser Verlangen nach Freiheit kein 
Traum sondern Drama mit Zukunft (Hamburg: Meiner, 2006). In regard to the practical philosophy 
in the foreground of this investigation and in systematic opposition to conceptions of quantitative 
freedom, the conception of qualitative freedom has up to now, as far as I am aware, not yet been 
worked out. I myself have, however, already sketched my own position in some essays, above all 
in: Claus Dierksmeier, “Qualitative oder quantitative Freiheit,” Rechtsphilosophische Hefte 12 
(2007), 107–119; as well as in Claus Dierksmeier, “Welche Freiheit?”, Liberal, Vierteljeahreshefte 
für Politik und Kultur 4 (2010), 9–13; and in Claus Dierksmeier and Michael Pirson, “The Modern 
Corporation and the Idea of Freedom,” Philosophy in Management, 9:3, 2010, 5–25.
2 For a definition and critique of “negative freedom” see Sect. 1.2. For the use of “neoliberal” see 
note 119.
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The sociological, economic, and political aims of this study are connected in 
their intention of realigning liberalism: from a theory often only insufficiently 
reflecting upon its moral, social, and ecological responsibility to a conception which 
makes the idea of freedom’s immanent cosmopolitan obligation the center of its 
argumentative elaboration. I discuss this motivation in more detail in the following 
two sections of this chapter.
1.1.1  Freedom and Globality
Our little blue planet is home to all humankind – and is also increasingly perceived 
as such. Yesterday’s surroundings (Umwelt) are increasingly turning into today’s 
lifeworlds (Mitwelt), which noticeably impacts upon all local activities. Our actions 
here and now influence the living conditions of distant peoples and future genera-
tions. In addition to tribal leaders and local communities, regional subcultures and 
nation states, communes and clans, sheikdoms and states, fanatics and fundamental-
ists, ever more novel actors appear upon the world stage: Colossi of business and 
luminaries of science, media and militia, donors and sponsors, refuges and rock-
stars, hackers and whistleblowers, social networks as well as civil society move-
ments all enter in the action and flux of the world. No longer restricted to the local 
level, the strands of activity so initiated mesh into a fabric ever more difficult to 
penetrate. The mutable stasis of formerly stable powers yields increasingly to the 
immutable dynamics of fluctuating forces. Thus the global exchange of commodi-
ties, information and people changes the face of the earth with breath-taking speed.
Humanity communicates, travels, and trades more freely today than ever before. 
One has ever easier access to news, commodities, and contacts. Global information, 
encounters, and incitements, which, still in the late nineteenth century, were the 
prerogative of a few learned travelers like Alexander von Humboldt, are now a mat-
ter of course to a constantly increasing number of world citizens. Speeded up by 
exponentially increasing exchange of information, innovative conventions rapidly 
take root. In the blink of an eye, lifestyles and idols from the most obscure corners 
of the planet or internet populate our global consciousness. The broadening of the 
views and insights as well as the increasing exchange of world-views (Weltbilder) 
and self-images (Selbstbilder) have encouraged and empowered many to liberate 
themselves from obsolete ways of life, to try other paths, and to begin something 
new: both within their communities and also by turning their backs upon them. – It 
is evident that this enhances the freedom of many, although, obviously, not all 
people.
This gain in options has a price. That the new communication media levels phys-
ical distances is one person’s blessing and another’s curse: Little remains private, 
practically nothing is local anymore; and where the citizens of this world are not 
controlling their information, their informational self-determination becomes a con-
1 Introduction
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stantly endangered good. Likewise, economic freedom in a global economy, unre-
strained by global governance contains enormous opportunities, but also serious 
risks: If left unprotected against the ice-cold wind of global profit seeking, many 
biological systems vanish, customs disappear, political orders fall, and languages 
die out.
Although there has always existed a cross-cultural exchange of commodities and 
information, our age differs dramatically from previous epochs. We live in a world 
no longer only of globalization, but rather of globality. In a world that in many 
respects is already cosmopolitan, since we increasingly devise private activities, 
local business dealings, and national politics with reference to their worldwide 
reception. Like it or loathe it, our interests are bound up with the interests of other 
persons and states. The domestic affairs of distant countries have long since devel-
oped into matters of national security. And the crises of the global commons (the 
over-fishing of the seas, the warming of the climate, the consumption of fossil fuels, 
etc.) are transforming yesterday’s national foreign policy into today’s global domes-
tic politics (Weltinnenpolitik).3 History has made us all cosmopolitans.
Whether by means of global epidemics or as a result of the epilepsies of the 
world market – we cannot but acknowledge that our actions produce remote effects 
as unforeseeable as they are unintended. Although single processes of globalization 
can still be slowed, stopped, and even reversed, this does not hold for the general 
trend. The breadth and depth globalization has already assumed compels us already 
to think in terms of the category of globality: A calculation on the planetary scale, 
the assessment of a long chain of consequences, an anticipation of world-wide 
developments. Therefore, whether we slow or stop any future impetus towards glo-
balization, the fundamental change of paradigm remains: away from locally 
bounded economic and political bookkeeping and towards the perspective of 
globality.
Wherever the later significance of our activities surpasses our earlier intentions, 
we must face the following: Whatever we now bequeath the planet might be fully 
deciphered only in the future, but the responsibility for our message to coming gen-
erations already rests with us presently. This situation – the globality and intertem-
porality of the consequences of our actions  – changes radically how freedom is 
experienced, perceived, and conceived. The extension of its responsibility towards 
the planetary as well as the future dimension forces itself upon the contemporary 
consciousness as an imperative of sustainability. Since freedom has an effect beyond 
the culturally familiar boundaries of space and time, it also must itself be evaluated 
beyond them. Whoever acts globally must act with cosmopolitan responsibility.
3 See Peter Dudy, Menschenrechte zwischen Universalität und Partikularität: Eine Interdisziplinäre 
Studie zur Idee der Weltinnenpolitik (Münster: Lit, 2002); Scott Jasper, ed., Securing Freedom in 
the Global Commons (Stanford, Califoria, 2010); and Kirstin-Maike Müller, Konzepte einer 
Weltinnenpolitik (Hamburg: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität 
Hamburg, 1999).
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Global crises and problems force humanity to search for common solutions. The 
implementation of these solutions, however, often demands global institutions, and 
those institutions usually only work efficiently when founded upon common val-
ues. Yet, the more the current search for global moral criteria increases, the more 
suspicion many sense in regard to the values so summoned. Some shun every uni-
versalism and fear it might produce a global world order with uniform procedures 
crushing all cherished diversity. For reasons of cultural sensibility and moral empa-
thy, should we not rather prefer the regional over the universal imperative? Should 
we not therefore support a cultural relativism of values and norms?
Certainly, an enforced world-monoculture that with uniform procedures did vio-
lence to all diversity is undesirable. In the age of globality, however, a relativistic 
stance, according to which each and everyone sees only their own norms as valid, is 
just as inappropriate. Wherever human beings interact, there is the threat of conflicts 
which require arbitration. Only at the utmost risk to our surroundings (Umwelt) and 
lifeworld (Mitwelt) can we live out our freedom without coordination. Only at the 
cost of the deepest mistrust on all sides can freedom dismiss all bounds and refuse 
every universal stricture. Where everyone is at once party and judge there is a threat 
of eternal strife. Each increase in the possibility of conflict enhances the yearning 
for the reality of arbitration.
In lockstep with the effects of private as well as collective politico-economic 
activity, the law must thus gradually develop beyond the bounds of national legal 
systems. And since every judiciary requires a legislative body and this, in turn, 
requires an executive, economic globalization creates the demand for a politically 
lawful globalization.4 Yet, at the same time, laws and courts on their own cannot put 
things right. As the sword of the law often proves too short and at other times too 
coarse a weapon, juridical coercion (Zwang) must be supported by moral impulse 
(Drang). Actions reflect attitudes – and thus up to now no legal-system has sur-
vived, which was not also morally legitimated, complemented, and differentiated. 
Law and morals, although distinct, can only be successful when they are working 
together.
We thus have to consider what mediates between the particular and the universal, 
between families and state, between morality and law. The intermediary level of 
civil-society must be investigated in its own moral forms, differing from context to 
context. Whether freedom be granted in societies, organized in companies, chan-
neled by networks, charged within movements, whether it manifests itself in trends, 
rites, or customs, in each such case and scenario, it comes with a certain, specific 
responsibility: an ethical dimension, which while closely corresponding with moral-
ity and right, does not culminate within them. Only when this intermediary level of 
ethicality (Sittlichkeit) is likewise included, can fair and sustainable structures for 
mankind’s economic networking and political striving be established (aufzubauen) 
and  – catering differently to different contexts and cultures  – extended 
(auszubauen).
4 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006).
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Freedom must be balanced and differentiated by responsibility in three differing 
ways: On the micro-level of individual morality, on the meso-level of social conven-
tions and norms, as well as on the macro-level of general law. All three levels – 
those of the individual, those of the associations, as well as those of 
governments – point towards the cosmopolitan framework they operate in. What 
affects all must also be effected by and in the interests of all. More than ever before, 
our thinking today therefore requires a moral compass for cosmopolitan questions, 
which adjusts and aligns morality, ethicality (Sittlichkeit), and law, notwithstanding 
their necessary functional differences. Our joint world requires a unifying ethos 
(Ethos).
While it was hitherto the hallmark of moral idealists to call for a use of freedom 
according to universalizable maxims, as if we were accountable to “the entire 
world,” now even self-declared realists recognize as the bellwether of the present 
that our enlightened self-interest increasingly overlaps with the precepts of moral 
cosmopolitanism. In amazement, the hardcore empiricist notices how an idealistic 
ethic (Ethik) proves itself to be a realistic methodology. In politics and economics, 
as well as in ecology and culture, it turns out time and time again that freedom 
endures only when used with cosmopolitan responsibility. Ethics features increas-
ingly as a strategy of sustainability.
Then again, one person’s god is another person’s idol; truth over here equals 
heresy over there. The more intense the cultural exchange and the pace of social 
change become, the more sharply we confront the problem that regional customs, 
religious traditions, and the conventions of the past no longer enjoy ubiquitous and 
unquestioned authority. Every thrust of globalization narrows the scope of tradi-
tional ethics. And, with every increase in plurality, our life suffers the loss of long 
familiar bonds. To prevent the growing difference of individual norms resulting in 
an increasing indifference to all values, we urgently need to determine to which ethi-
cal standards we are to hold fast to in the future.
Universalist philosophers have forever attempted to outline precisely such goals 
and principles with authority for all of humankind. However, these attempts often 
suffered from two problems; from principle objections against their theoretical 
validity and from pragmatic doubts about their practical efficacy. On principle it 
was asked: Why, actually, should rules drawn up within one place or time also be 
valid in another? Pragmatically it was objected: How could values neatly drafted on 
the drawing board of pure thinking at all be adequate to the multi-colored fabric of 
our multi-faceted life?
Whoever wants to respond to the fact of our global existence and with a world-
wide ethical pact must answer both objections. Can we find principles with the 
power to resolve – not only familiar – but also completely unprecedented problems? 
In order to motivate, as well as to legitimate global action we require an ethic that 
unlocks the past for the present, instead of one which, in its glance towards yester-
year, obstructs the path towards the future. At the same time, the factual divergence 
of norms found upon this planet is neither to be crushed nor concealed. We thus 
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require an ethic in harmony with the different cultures and traditions of this world. 
The era of unilateral nationalism is over in politics just as much as in moral 
 philosophy. The world needs universalism and difference; that is the cosmopolitan 
mandate, to which current theories in globalization ethics have to correspond.5
This book argues that, in this age of late modernity, such an ethic is best sought 
in the results of a qualitatively oriented idea of freedom. That may seem surprising: 
For does not every human being have a different view of freedom? Is not freedom 
therefore an idea that divides rather than unites? Is there really (only) one idea of 
freedom, which could be just as global and as differentiated as the very problems it 
aims to solve? Moreover we should consider: Why make freedom so central? Why 
burden the (too narrow?) shoulders of liberalism with the extensive topic of global-
ization? Do not Western attitudes thus become the measure of all things, with politi-
cal predilections influencing our choice of principle, and occidental values from the 
outset suppressing the polyphony of the cosmopolitan symphony? I do not think so.
Within the ranks of all values proclaimed around the globe, freedom deserves a 
special place. Certainly, there are cultures which, according to their explicit self- 
understanding, are not based upon the idea of freedom. Yet everyone implicitly 
claims freedom qua self-determination, even and especially when the liberty to lead 
one’s life as one sees fit is denied. Even individuals and groups ascribing to com-
pletely illiberal modes of life place importance upon doing so autonomously. Any 
commitment to values, not least fanatical ones, becomes absurd when enforced. De 
facto therefore even fundamentalists lay claim to freedom: as and for self- 
determination. Consequently, they have no convincing reason to deny others theo-
retically the very same autonomy they themselves make use of practically. Since 
this individual freedom cannot be consistently denied, it must consequently be 
granted to others: All the liberal thinkers reconstructed within this book agree about 
that. For to recognize what one claims for oneself, and to approve what there is no 
good reason to militate against, is but the very nature of reason. In this indirectly 
self-justifying structure, the idea of freedom is unique, and thus recommends itself 
for the clarification of cross-cultural moral questions of value.
While the idea of freedom is invoked worldwide, people understand it extremely 
differently from one place to the next. No universal form seems to correspond to its 
global employment. Not everyone understands the same thing by freedom – quite 
the contrary. The genesis and validity of the idea of freedom appear severed; in 
places where freedom reigns in the kingdom of ideas, it does not necessarily mani-
fest itself also in practice. Due to this variety of the understanding of freedom (both 
proclaimed and lived) and in the face of rising challenges and controversies pro-
duced by globalization, it is high time for a reassessment of the idea of freedom.
5 See Anthony Appiah Kwame, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (London: 




Not incidentally, the discourse about the essence and value of freedom takes 
place globally.6 Some propagate an “Eastern” understanding of freedom (inner, 
spiritual freedom from dependencies and material desires) against a flatly  hedonistic 
“Western” liberalism.7 Others locate the decisive rupture among conceptions of 
freedom, not so much between East and West, but rather between a conservative 
Northern and a progressive Southern ideal of freedom.8 For example, within writ-
ings dealing with the philosophy of liberation, it is common to contrast the emanci-
patory ideas of freedom of the Global South against the North’s conceptions of 
freedom, which are often perceived as conservative.9 Does one therefore have to 
think about the planet as divided into different hemispheres of freedom, with the 
Northwest in the role of the insensitive egoist? Hardly. The struggle for the idea of 
freedom is not only a fight between states and regions, but also one well within 
those cultural spheres.10
Even within the northwestern zone, stylized by such geographical schemes as the 
universal malefactor, one nevertheless finds extreme differences of opinion con-
cerning how freedom is actually constituted. Angloamerican bestselling authors like 
Jeremy Rifkin and George Lakoff are good examples. Rifkin describes and sup-
ports, for instance, a tension between European (i.e. attractive and sustainable) and 
American (i.e. unattractive and ruthless) views about freedom.11 The emphatic dis-
6 For details see Rolf Steltemeier, Liberalismus: Ideengeschichtliches Erbe und politische Realität 
einer Denkrichtung (Baden-Baden, 2015).
7 See Joseph Mitsuo Kitagawa, Spiritual Liberation and Human Freedom in Contemporary Asia 
(New York: Peter Lang, 1990).
8 See José Luis Rebellato, La Encrucijada De La Ětica: Neolibaralismo, Conflicto Norte-Sur, 
Liberación (Montevideo: Multiversidad Franciscana de América Latina: Nordan Comunidad, 
1995).
9 See the contributions in Mabel Moraña, Enrique D. Dussel & Carlos A. Jáuregui, eds., Coloniality 
at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) as 
well as in Carlos A. Jáuregui & Mabel Moraña, Colonialidad Y Critica En América Latina: Bases 
Para Un Debate (Puebla, Mexico: Universidad de las Américas Puebla, 2007); Kamilamba Kande 
Mutsaku, Desarrollo y Liberación: Utopias Posibles Para Africa y América (México, D.F. Tec de 
Monterrey, Campus Estado de México: Porrúa, 2003) and Robert Taylor, ed., The Idea of Freedom 
in Asia and Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
10 See Oded Balaban and Anan Erev, The Bounds of Freedom: About the Eastern and Western 
Approaches to Freedom (New York: P. Lang, 1995).
11 Within this discourse there is a rather schematic attitude that “Americans hold a negative defini-
tion of what it means to be free and, thus, secure. For us, freedom has long been with autonomy. If 
one is autonomous, he or she is not dependent on others or vulnerable to circumstances outside of 
his or her control. To be autonomous, one needs to be propertied. The more wealth one amasses, 
the more independent one is in the world. One is free by becoming self-reliant and an island unto 
oneself. With wealth comes exclusivity, and with exclusivity comes security. [...] For Europeans, 
freedom is not found in autonomy but in embeddedness. To be free is to have access to a myriad of 
interdependent relationships with others. The more communities one has access to, the more 
options and choices one has for living a full and meaningful life. With relationships comes inclu-
sivity, and with inclusivity comes security” (J. Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision 
of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream [New York: Polity, 2004], 13). See also: 
Mark Leohard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (London & New York: Fourth Estate, 2005).
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tinction between a rather compassionately-relational theory of freedom and a 
harshly-absolute one is, however, also found within the USA itself. Lakoff, for 
example, derives precisely this distinction from a conflict between the ideals of 
freedom of the Democrats and Republicans.12
Such schemata are extremely limited in terms of their cognitive value; they fail 
to do justice to the phenomena in question by disguising overly the internal diversity 
of opinions within the described camps. It would, however, also be mistaken to 
believe that one gets closer to the truth by further differentiating through ever sub-
tler subdivisions, for example, by distinguishing within the USA between the 
Republicanism of the coastal states and that of the inland states, and then again by 
differentiating between the urban, suburban, and provincial strata of the population, 
or by distinguishing along the lines of religious communities,13 or breaking things 
down historically (along, e.g. the conflict lines of the American civil war).14 This all 
seems as pointless as it is laborious.
Supporters of different concepts of freedom exist in every culture, after all.15 
There is no region upon the earth so homogenous that each and all of its proponents 
of liberal view-points would neatly agree upon one single conception of freedom.16 
So, the fact that, in spite of their obvious unsuitableness, attempts at geographical 
clustering continue to put in an appearance, indicates, above all, an unsatisfied need 
for orientation in matters concerning freedom. Just as horoscopes react – though 
miserably ineptly – to a genuine striving for meaning within the human heart, those 
cultural-morphological derivations correspond to a similar type of need for clarity 
about the idea of freedom. My work aims to respond to this very yearning for order 
and orientation.
1.1.2  Freedom and Everyday Life
Our everyday life is shot through with the implications of our ideas about freedom. 
The prevalent conceptions of freedom diverge not only theoretically, but also lead to 
tangible practical differences. Intellectual indifference concerning questions of 
freedom thus translates, willingly or unwillingly, into an affirmation of predominant 
types of freedom. Whoever remains undecided still decides  – namely for the 
12 See George Lakoff, Whose Freedom? The Battle over America’s Most Important Idea (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).
13 See John G. Sperling & Suzanne Helburn, The Great Divide: Retro Vs. Metro America (Sausalito: 
PoliPoint Press, 2004).
14 See Eric Foner, ed., Voices of Freedom: A Documentary History (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 
2011).
15 See Svetlana Boym, Another Freedom: The Alternative History of an Idea (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2010).




established set of freedoms. Whoever withdraws from the discussion about freedom 
through poses of neutrality in no way displays impartial equanimity, but rather takes 
a partisan stand for the status quo. Abstention supports the currently dominant ideas 
of freedom, and is just as worthy of criticism or in need of justification as the stand-
points that it strengthens.
If, for example, some (politicians, for instance) reduce freedom to but a choice 
amongst given parties or others (economists, say) to merely a choice between extant 
options of consumption, liberal philosophy must come to the fore. It has to question 
the structures which admit precisely these and no other possibilities. Why reduce 
freedom to the very options granted by market and power? Why relate freedom only 
to choices within the system, and not also to the choice of the system itself? Why, 
moreover, limit freedom only to acts of choice and not also think about creating new 
options and changing others so as to create novel opportunities?
Which notions of freedom are we employing here respectively? Does, for 
instance, economic freedom at times constrain the freedom to enjoy unpolluted 
nature, the freedom for cultural self-creation, and non-conformist personal develop-
ment? And where then are our priorities? Which freedom and whose freedom should 
have precedence? A simple declaration of loyalty to the abstract idea of freedom 
does clearly not suffice but must translate into serious efforts at its conceptual con-
cretization. That is to say, the discourse concerning freedom has much more than 
merely an academic significance and hence cannot be confined to the ivory tower of 
academic debates. In the realm of freedom, the battle of ideas interconnects with the 
war between systems; and the critique of power showcases the power of critique.
The battle over freedom illustrates that and how ideas can change the world. 
Hardly ever is the practical effect of philosophy so evident as in the patent distinc-
tions within the organization of culture, politics, and business, which start from 
diverging conceptions of freedom (like, for example, in North and South America) 
or which are championed by different liberal parties such as, for example, by the 
liberally conservative VVD and the progressively liberal D66 in Holland.17 Thinking 
about our personal and political liberties cannot, therefore, be left only to profes-
sional thinkers. It is the calling of any and all citizens. The philosophical profession 
can enrich, stimulate, and broaden these reflections, however it cannot replace the 
civic discourse.
That is why in what follows I do not simply put forward a ready-made concep-
tion of philosophical liberalism. Rather I develop my position step by step by means 
of the reconstruction of important theories of freedom, first, through the approaches 
of Kant, Fichte, and Krause, as variations of liberalism in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, and then through the theories of Rawls and Hayek as well as 
Galbraith and Sen as representatives of the debates about freedom in the twentieth 
century and the present. As a result, readers are not simply spoon-fed the conception 
(of quantitative and qualitative freedom) introduced in this book. It rather gradually 
17 See Rudy Andeweg and Gale Irwin, Politics and Governance in the Netherlands (London & 
New York, 2009).
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emerges in front of their eyes as the result of following in the footsteps of some of 
the most important modern philosophies of freedom.
I am of the opinion that the idea of qualitative freedom here presented articulates 
well the contemporary consciousness of the problems of citizens with liberal lean-
ings. For some liberals these days feel more at home in the conservative camp 
because they prefer freedom to be expressed in terms of responsibility rather than 
license. Other friends of freedom move to the left because they recognize that free-
dom needs preconditions that the market is often unable to provide. Others question 
political liberalism for ecological reasons because it seems to ride roughshod over 
nature’s needs. Thus, the cause of freedom is more and more surrendered to those 
who aspire to a freedom, not moving towards, but rather moving away from respon-
sibility and ethical commitment. Political liberalism is thus threatened with moral 
hypothermia. Whoever fights for freedom just for his own interests or for the sake 
of material goods (namely financial goods) surely betrays the liberal flag as soon as 
these interests are able to be more adequately materialized elsewhere. Such friends, 
however, hurt liberalism more than any foes.
Critical voices from inside our open societies and extreme voices from outside 
both claim that without rigorous normative goals the acid bath of capitalist culture 
will disintegrate the liberal ideal into a multitude of hedonistic idols: Freedom 
would thus evaporate into the liberty to consume.18 Why however – those who do 
not consider themselves as belonging to the liberal camp will ask – should tradi-
tional values and morals be sacrificed in the name of such an idol at all? Why, for 
example, be unfaithful to God in order to serve Mammon? Why cut solidarity in 
order to make space for selfishness? Why push back decent and just modes of life 
for a vision of freedom orientated at a ruthless maximization of profits or a vora-
cious hunt for amusements?19 Why speak only of business freedom and not also of 
freedom from business?20 Why equate liberalism with capitalism?21
Why is there this tendency towards a moral depletion of liberalism? What drives 
the flight from values and the peculiarly materialist economic narrowness in liberal 
thinking? It seems to me that in the course of the last 250 years many of the liberal 
avant-garde have taken a disastrously wrong path. Their theories have distanced and 
alienated themselves from foundations which – if only they had been consistently 
spelled out – could have connected liberal philosophy with those very dimensions 
of ecological, social, and cultural sensibility and sustainability for the lack of which 
liberalism stands now everywhere accused.22
18 See Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988), 92–97.
19 See Crawford Brough Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973), 91.
20 See Lisa Maria Herzog, Freiheit gehört nicht nur den Reichen: Plädoyer für einen Zeitgemässen 
Liberalismus (München, 2014).
21 See Karl Hermann Flach, Noch eine Chance für die Liberalen; oder, die Zukunft der Freiheit: 
Eine Streitschrift (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer), 17.
22 See Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire the Revolt against the West and the Remaking of 
Asia (London: Allen Lane, 2012).
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That is to say, something rings true in these criticisms of liberal thought. Yet I am 
no pessimist. Up until now every crisis of liberalism has proven to be a chance for 
the revitalization of the idea of freedom.23 Self-complacency, much rather than criti-
cism, is a threat to liberalism. Where liberalism does not confront the critical 
demands of the present, the cozy milieu of liberal parties becomes suffocated by the 
uncanny fug of partisan liberals. In narcissistically embracing itself, liberalism con-
demns itself to autoerotic infertility and thus eventually to extinction. Fecundity, on 
the other hand, results from interaction with one’s other. Only they who seek out the 
other will find themselves. Only they who feel at home with alterity can house 
themselves. This is especially true of the intellectual eros of freedom. The idea of 
freedom must hence be more interested in its challengers than its sycophants.
The task, pursued throughout the whole of this book, of working towards a the-
ory of freedom doing justice to the globality and interculturality of our lives, results 
from these theoretical and practical aims. In a world in which the course of events 
rips apart once obligatory rules, the eternal and intercultural principles of philoso-
phers prove especially apt for establishing new reference points.24 From time imme-
morial, philosophy has made a noble virtue out of the necessity of thinking unaided 
by unquestioned certainties and unquestionable authorities.25 Where the implicit 
validity of morals and traditions cannot (any longer) be counted upon, the capacity 
to explicitly trace and competently criticize the presuppositions of legitimacy 
already inherent within social speech and action pays off. Thus does practice require 
philosophy.
Of course, theories alone cannot repair the world; but insofar as they show us new 
possibilities, they do herald the way to alternative realities.26 In view of the pressing 
global problems and the shockingly uninspired way in which the political world 
responds to them, the intellectual renewal of the idea of freedom and the search for 
a viable liberalism do indeed not seem to be idle undertakings. The very globality 
that challenges our contemporary notions of freedom thereby also provides us with 
a touchstone. At all times, human freedom has been conceptualized according to a 
framework which gave it meaning (Sinn), i.e. both significance and direction. Today 
this is especially necessary again. As, however, the ethical guidelines of orientation 
23 See Friedrich Naumann, Gegenwart und Zukunft des Liberalismus: Mit einer Federzeichnung 
nach einem Porträt Friedr. Naumanns von Schneider-Franken (München: Buchhandlung 
Nationalverein, 1911).
24 See Henry S.  Richardson & Paul Weithman, ed., Development and Main Outlines in Rawl’s 
Theory of Justice (New York: Garland, 1999) and Henry S. Richardson & Paul Weithman, ed., The 
Two Principles and their Justification (New York: Garland, 1999).
25 See Michel Foucault, Von der Freundschaft als Lebensweise: Michel Foucault im Gespräch 
(Berlin: Merve, 1984).
26 As Martha Nussbaum says, “theories are only one influence on people’s lives, but they are one 
influence (Martha Craven Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership [Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006], 223). She also tells us that “the 
answers to large philosophical questions have practical significance. They shape our sense of what 
is possible” (ibid. 415).
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of culture and religion are often formed and conditioned by the contexts to which 
they owe their generation, in our globalized world, merely local and regional stan-
dards will not suffice, and the question about unconditional, context- independent 
guidelines can no longer be postponed. Freedom must be related to values that can 
exert a unifying force over all borders and across every plurality. The idea of free-
dom thus leads to the project of a global ethos.
1.1.3  Freedom and Academic Philosophy
In the historical hit parade of philosophy, the idea of freedom is a golden oldie; 
and – especially because of the turbulent history of the previous century – in the past 
decades, debates concerning political and economic freedoms have been very ani-
mated. In most countries, analytic philosophy dominated the academic scene, and 
this holds true up to now in the Anglo-American world. In light of that it may well 
seem surprising that this investigation begins with a chapter about the metaphysics 
of freedom. Many analytic philosophers, after all, are hugely skeptical about meta-
physics. And since some of them are downright hostile to it, and denigrate in par-
ticular the theories of German Idealism, which we will be dealing with extensively 
later on, as “philosophically defunct”,27 our point of departure is in need of a brief 
defense.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy was shaped by 
positivist thinkers, then, towards the middle of that century, by linguistically ori-
ented schools, and finally, at the end of the century, by naturalist schools. Its most 
outstanding champions accordingly attempted to reduce time-honored philosophi-
cal problems and questions (such as, for example, about the essence of freedom) 
first to logical problems, then to linguistic problems and finally to problems of natu-
ral science.28
Popular within all analytic camps is the assumption that scientifically serious 
philosophizing only truly began with Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), so that the work 
of previous thinkers can at best be considered a quarry for contemporary intellectual 
constructions. Now, this opinion must of course not necessarily be uncritically 
accepted (angenommen), it certainly should be apprehended (ernst genommen) 
since it still continues to shape the attitude of many professional philosophers who 
are wont to banish all metaphysical systems of thought to the mythical infancy of 
actual philosophy (characterized by formal logic and the analysis of language). 
Exalted metaphysical reasoning must – in their eyes – be cut back to the boundaries 
of sober understanding. Scientific philosophizing has to either maintain itself only 
27 Brian Leiter, The Future for Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 23.
28 See Christopher Gefwert, Wittgenstein on Thought, Language and Philosophy: From Theory to 
Therapy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) and James F.  Peterman, Philosophy as Therapy: A 




within the ambit of the empirically observable and logically compelling29 or at least 
obediently subordinate itself to the predominate use of language and ideas.30 These 
demands have their downsides however.
These postulates have much more serious implications for the critique of society 
than their modest and scientifically sober sound lets on. Whoever produces political 
ideas like that of freedom only from measurable facts or the common use of lan-
guage slows down their social dynamic of development. Why? Because theories 
solely orientated at the given empirical or linguistic inventory shift the critique of 
what is given, i.e. at the status quo, into the private sphere. Only a philosophy com-
mitted to a normative tension of its concepts in respect to reality can center on the 
objective truth of critique.31 Positivism however – in its epistemological as well as 
its linguistic variant – knows only of subjective opinions. These either prevail in 
society and/or in the use of language, or they do not. Until they do, though, they are, 
positivistically speaking, virtually unreal and therefore as irrelevant as a strictly 
private language. Consequently a philosophical critique of ideas and society would 
be assigned roughly the same status as personal complaints about the weather. That 
theoretical exile of critique to the private sphere also promotes its banishment from 
public practices insofar as it incapacitates academic scholarship to promote counter-
factual ideals. Defused theories cannot lead to social explosions. Philosophy thus 
degenerates into affording anodyne indulgences to the established order.32
The permanently resonant assumption of, for example, the champions of the 
Vienna Circle, that philosophical controversy concerning ideas and principles is 
ultimately avoidable and could be therapized away by more exact terminological 
distinctions has in the meantime had its day.33 Today, even in the Anglo-American 
29 See Otto Neurath & Rainer Hegselmann, Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, Sozialismus und 
Logischer Empiricismus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine 
Erkenntnislehre (Berlin: Springer, 1918).
30 Representative of that is: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1953).
31 See Martha Craven Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice in Defense of Aristotelian 
Essentialism,” Political Theory 20:2 (1992), 202–246.
32 Herbert Marcuse’s critique put forward at the beginning of the 1960s, which states that linguistic 
philosophising too easily gives up its counterfactual potency is, mutatis mutandis, still valid. See 
Chapter 6  in Herbert Marcuse, Der Eindimensionale Mensch: Studien zur Ideologie der 
Fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft (Neuwied & Berlin: Luchterhand, 1967).
33 Ludwig Wittgenstein decisively contributed to this change of attitude (and thus to the fading of 
positivism even in analytic philosophy). Earlier on within his program of a logical purification 
formulated in his Tractatus he certainly made a sustained contribution to logical positivism (see 
Ludwig Wittgenstein & Bertrand Russell, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [London: Kegan Paul, 
1922]). He later deviated from this program, however, because he could only explain the logical 
inconsistency of language through the philosophical analysis of everyday language, including the 
evaluations and intuitions it comprises (see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
[Oxford: Blackwell, 1953]). For a detailed discussion see Wolfgang Kienzler, Wittgensteins Wende 
zu seiner Spätphilosophie 1930–1932: Eine historische und systematische Darstellung [Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997]). The fundamental assumption of Wittgenstein’s earlier philosophy 
that “the correct method of philosophy […] actually [would be] this: To say nothing other than 
what is able to be said, i.e. propositions of natural science” (TLP 6.53), eventually changed. The 
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world where analytic approaches have dominated the academic scene up to now, it 
is no longer believed that the “future for philosophy” lies in purely conceptual 
endeavors.34 – Ever fewer adhere to the view that the conflict about the idea of free-
dom could simply be resolved by linguistic distinctions.35 Although the philosophi-
cal investigation of language is still regarded as a very important means of 
philosophical cognition, it is no longer seen as the end of philosophical work. In its 
place, richer arguments have again moved into the center of philosophical think-
ing.36 An anthology about the philosophy of freedom designed for the Anglo- 
American market thus bluntly declares, for example, that:
Thirty to forty years ago, some philosophers believed that the controversies between 
negative- liberty theorists and positive-liberty theorists could be cleared up through a search 
for linguistic errors. Very few contemporary philosophers believe as much. Neither side in 
the negative/positive controversies is guilty of linguistic impropriety […]. Virtually every-
body now recognizes that the relevant considerations for one’s choice between negative- 
liberty doctrines and positive-liberty doctrines are moral and political values and 
theoretical-explanatory values (such as clarity, precision, and parsimony).37
This new spirit helps to bridge the gap, which for a long time had been said to be 
irreconcilable, between analytic and other traditions of philosophy. The decline of 
the analytic school’s claim to be its sole representative opens up space within aca-
demic philosophy for other methods, like the dialectical, hermeneutical, phenome-
nological, and deconstructive thinking defended in the approaches of Continental 
European, Latin-American, Asian, or African philosophy. In these traditions, there 
always predominated the procedure, now also acclaimed among analytic philoso-
phers, of making the method fit the facts and not vice versa.38 Never before were the 
chances of a methodological “crossover” in the discipline therefore so favorable. 
resultant position is that the deeper problems of our lives are neither condemned to silence (TLP 
6.52–57), nor said to begin only when and where all questions concerning the philosophy of lan-
guage are already answered, but rather must be grasped as the inevitable product of everyday lan-
guage when we win the “struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by language’s 
ways” (PU 109). This occurs as soon as we grasp how our language speaks for itself as a form of 
living (see PU 120–126). The philosophy of language in the spirit of the late Wittgenstein is there-
fore less the project of rejecting metaphysical questions as meaningless, but more the attempt to 
understand – through the probing exploration of meaningful speech – how the urgent problems of 
life arise as a result of the ‘inexpressible’ within language. Hence the late Wittgenstein too recog-
nizes that the ultimate questions of metaphysics cannot be avoided – which is not to say that they 
can necessarily be answered. For more details see Friedrich Glauner, Sprache und Weltbezug: 
Adorno, Heidegger, Wittgenstein (Freiburg: Alber, 309).
34 See Leiter, The Future for Philosophy.
35 See J. Norman, “Taking “Free Action” Too Seriously,” Ethics 101:3 (1991), 505–520.
36 See Judith N. Shklar and Bernard Yack, eds., Liberalism without Illusions: Essays on Liberal 
Theory and the Political Vision of Judith Shklar (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
37 See Ian Carter, Matthew Kramer & Hillel Steiner, Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2007).




Presently philosophers of all schools actively occupy themselves with mutual coop-
eration, in the common service of the joint cause.39
The theory of freedom profits from this situation. As a result of the methodologi-
cal relaxation in the philosophical discourse, it is finally possible to also let go of 
petrified positions. There are numerous unjustified prejudices to be eliminated, such 
as that the idea of “positive freedom” is primarily championed by continental 
 philosophers, while concepts of “negative freedom” are instead at home within the 
analytic camp (see Sect. 1.2); or that normative conceptions of freedom are typi-
cally harbored by the political left, while descriptive conceptions are said to tend to 
the political right – and more of this ilk.
My suggested application of the concepts of quantitative and qualitative free-
dom hopes to make the debate more flexible again, and proposes two revisions:
First, the debate about freedom should be clarified. Many of the usual labels – 
negative versus positive freedom, formal versus material freedom, procedural ver-
sus substantial freedom, idealistic versus materialistic conceptions of freedom, 
libertarian versus communitarian freedom, etc. – do less justice to the issue at hand 
then the more precise and appropriate disjunction between the quantity and quality 
of freedom. I hope to show that this very differentiation has implicitly been in play 
in the background of many theories of freedom, and that a lot is achieved by explic-
itly bringing it to the foreground. Communicating in accurately defined concepts 
can assist us in verifying whether we also think in clear categories.
Second, one has to shift from thinking of the predicates of freedom in terms of 
binary oppositions towards conceptualizing them dialectically (see Sect. 1.3.3). 
Instead of using attributes which strive in completely opposed directions and recip-
rocally cancel out their logical powers, more appropriate labels should be found for 
the idea of freedom, which are able to relate to one another productively and thus 
augment their respective forces. By means of the labels of quantitative and qualita-
tive freedom, still unencumbered by political connotations, I hope that a more inte-
grative idea of freedom can be achieved than before, namely a conception which can 
constructively resolve the tensions between freedom and responsibility as well as 
freedom and sustainability.
1.2  Why Not Negative Versus Positive Freedom?
In some writings on political and economic theory, in much popular philosophy, and 
in almost all party-political writings, the language of negative and positive freedom 
is still very much in use.40 It characterizes concepts of freedom according to whether 
39 See the interesting studies which Jack Reynolds has assembled about the current rapprochement 
between analytic and continental philosophy in Jack Reynolds, ed., Postanalytic and 
Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides (London: Continuum, 2010).
40 See for example: Detmar Doerring, Traktat Über Freiheit (München: Olzog, 2009) and Wolfgang 
Kersting, Verteidigung des Liberalismus (Hamburg: Murmann, 2009).
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they merely define themselves negatively – via the absence of coercion – or whether 
they also say something positively about freedom, with respect to its preconditions 
and aims. This kind of terminology has long since fallen out of favor within aca-
demic philosophy – and for good reason (for more about this, see Sect. 1.2.3). Yet it 
was only very recently that the corresponding insights also appeared within more 
popular publications.41 Before we proceed to elaborate the alternative favored here, 
i.e. the distinction between quantitative and qualitative freedom, we must hence 
briefly explain – first historically, then systematically – why we bypass the tradi-
tional distinction of negative versus positive freedom.
1.2.1  The History of the Distinction
A reference to their genealogy can illustrate how the concepts of negative and posi-
tive freedom in no way achieve what they intend. Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) is often 
cited as the spiritual father of this distinction.42 But he merely popularized expres-
sions he had found in the British Idealists, Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882) and 
Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924). They, in turn, were influenced by the work of 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), who had developed the distinction 
between (a) negative and formal freedom and (b) concrete and substantial freedom, 
in his engagement with the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814). So, 
this deceptively simple distinction carries a lot of historical baggage, and it may be 
surmised that precisely this excessive burden unduly hinders and trammels our 
thinking about freedom.
What was taking place when these concepts were first introduced? Hegel accused 
Fichte’s conception of human existence of possessing too little regard for the objec-
tive conditions of life and a too great regard to the purely ‘subjective spirit.’ He 
charged Fichte with establishing the essence of humanity (“I”) through the exclu-
sion of all contexts (which Fichte summarized coldly as “not-I”). But, according to 
Hegel, whoever seeks freedom principally in the negation of the world and environ-
ment it shares, transforms freedom itself into a “fury of destruction.” In its lack of 
positive commitments, negative freedom ends up merely centered on itself; theo-
retically this leads to formalistic emptiness and practically towards absurd ways of 
living – to a “fanaticism of destruction” of traditional orders.43 In what follows we 
41 For example, Udo di Fabio correctly stresses that the distinction between “negative” and “posi-
tive” does not achieve “the analytic level which is today both possible and necessary” (Udo di 
Fabio, Die Kultur der Freiheit (München: Beck, 2005), 81.
42 As well as the classic “Two Concepts of Liberty” see especially “From Hope and Fear Set Free” 
and “Political Ideas in the 20th Century” in Isaiah Berlin, Henry Hardy and Ian Harris, Liberty: 
Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
43 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegels Werke in 20 Bänden [Hereafter TWA] (Frankfurt and 




will examine whether this criticism is warranted, especially in regard to Fichte’s 
social philosophy (see Sect. 2.2.1) as well as in regard to the concept of freedom in 
general (see Chap. 3).
Later on, there arose a similar discussion in England, which was of formative 
importance for the current understanding of the concept of negative and positive 
freedom as well as stylistically instructive for current vulgar liberalism. There and 
then, the distinction became loaded with political significance. Under the leadership 
of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), James Mill (1773–1836) and David Ricardo 
(1772–1823), English social philosophy had granted priority to the concept of utility 
before the principle of freedom. The British utilitarians assigned freedom a func-
tional value, as opposed to an absolute one. They appreciated the license it granted 
to individuals to act in the manner that proves most utilitarian. Utility equals that 
which brings pleasure and avoids pain. Therefore, instead of reasoning about the 
proper quality of freedom, the utilitarians aimed at quantifying utility in the correct 
way. Utility had a materialistic odor and as such seemed more measurable than 
freedom or liberty which were suspected of undue idealistic tendencies.44 Liberalism 
smelled of vague philosophy, utilitarianism tasted of rigorous science.
The utilitarian surveying of freedom occurred as follows: Since total license 
would lead to chaos and thus to collective loss of benefits, a view toward aggregate 
social utility provides the best gauge for maximizing the average amount of indi-
vidual options. Herein the legislative apparatus proves helpful, which summarily 
coordinates the separate interests of people and prioritizes preferences according to 
the majority principle. There were of course concerns that a tyranny of the lowest 
common denominator could arise and prove hostile to freedom. Yet, without much 
further ado, James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill and a founding father of 
British utilitarianism, eliminated such concerns by means of a rhetorical device: 
“The community cannot have an interest opposite to its interest. To affirm this 
would be a contradiction in terms. The community within itself, and with respect to 
itself, can have no sinister interest.”45 A newfangled version of the old wisdom: 
Blessed is he who believes.
Herbert Spencer (1820–1908) already saw that this did not bode well for free-
dom. Hence he aimed to balance the principles of utility and liberty through the 
formation of a “liberal utilitarianism.”46 In the evaluation of liberties, direct consid-
erations of utility are to be pushed back in favor of the indirect pursuit of utility 
within liberal forms of living. Spencer assumed that the common good is best 
44 In this work, following the prevailing use of the English language, both concepts are treated as 
synonyms; it is for this reason also useful to refer to a study pars pro toto which pursues their 
etymological and political differences: David Hackett Fischer, Liberty and Freedom (OUP USA, 
2004).
45 James Mill, “Government” in Edwin A. Burtt, The English Philosophers: From Bacon to Mill 
(New York: The Modern Library, 1939), 861.
46 See D.  Weinstein, Equal Freedom and Utility: Herbert Spencer’s Liberal Utilitarianism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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enlarged when the individuals who contribute to society are given ample space to 
unfold their talents and pursue their interests. Utility and freedom could be recon-
ciled, if only the high utility of freedom – e.g. for the development of productive 
innovations  – were adequately recognized, and for this reason personal liberties 
would be protected by law.47 As before, utility thus remains the ultimate criterion 
from which freedom is assessed and estimated,48 although the legislator is no longer 
supposed to pursue benefits to society directly, but rather indirectly, with the help of 
liberal procedures.
A similar attempt to reconcile liberality and utility was undertaken by John 
Stuart Mill (1806–1873).49 In his Principles of Political Economics he too intercon-
nects liberty and utility. However, after first assessing the value of actions in their 
utility, and then in their contribution to human happiness, he appears ultimately 
undecided about what really comprises the latter. Mill’s concept of happiness 
includes demands for human rights, calls for women’s rights, and concerns about 
cultivated civility50 to such an extent as to discourage certain countervailing ideas of 
happiness: The coarser and more chauvinistic the people, the less their utility calculi 
find appreciation and consideration within Mill’s work. For John Stuart Mill could 
certainly not agree with Bentham’s proposition that, in respect to the promotion of 
happiness, the children’s game “pushpin” is just as good as “poetry,”51 and he 
instead declared that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satis-
fied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, 
are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the ques-
tion. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.”52 – A quite important 
insight in respect of the tendency of some modern economists to equate freedom 
simply with the fulfilment of preferences.
After having reduced all ethical criteria to but one (utility), John Stuart Mill dili-
gently attempted to rescue the principles of freedom and justice from his own radi-
calism – i.e. from their utilitarian challenge. Thus, however, the question emerges, 
47 This position receives renewed support within the work of current utilitarians: mutatis mutandis 
in the differentiation between utility as decision-making criteria and decision-making procedure, 
see for example: James Griffin, “The Distinction between Criterion and Decision Procedure: A 
Reply to Madison Powers,” Utilitas 6:2 (1994), 177–82.
48 See David Lyons, “Utility and Rights”in J, Roland Pennock & John W.  Chapman, Ethics, 
Economics and the Law (New York: New York University Press, 1982).
49 See the following: Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1987); John Charvet, A Critique of Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 95; and John Gray, “Mill’s and Other Liberalisms,” Critical Review 2:2–3 (1988), 
12–35.
50 See Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 346.
51 “Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and 
poetry.” Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Reward (London: R. Heward, 1830).
52 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Longman, 1864). See also: Dissertations and Discussions: 
Political, Philosophical and Historical: Reprinted Chiefly from the Edinburgh and Westminster 
Reviews (London: J. W. Parker, 1856), 389.
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which ultimately has priority in cases of conflict, the primary value (utility) or the 
secondary values (liberty, justice)?53 At this point, a reversal of the direction of 
argument, entailing a radical self-justification of freedom, seems to be in the air, 
however it is not seized upon. At long last, the utility citizens gain from legal secu-
rity constitutes the sole reason for all normative obligations, including those required 
in the name of protecting liberty. Mill’s defense of freedom thus remains orientated 
extrinsically around the inefficiency of excessive or contingent restrictions of liber-
ties, or, conversely, around the utility of their moderate and lawful provision. While 
the intrinsic value of freedom certainly shines through several passages of his work, 
Mill does not hold on to it. In short, Mill’s accomplishment is to foreshadow a path 
for freedom as a self-justifying principle, but his failure lies in not having walked 
down that alley.54
At any rate, this was how Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882) saw it. He thought the 
utilitarian founding of freedom allowed the promotion of a freedom “that can be 
enjoyed by one man or a set of men at the cost of freedom to others.”55 In contrast, 
Green declared that freedom is legitimized as well as limited by the autonomy it 
facilitates. With the concept of “positive freedom” Green attempted then to give 
expression to the social-democratic notion that everyone has the right to conditions 
that make his or her freedom realizable. However, not only this notion.56  – For 
Green, the concept of “positive freedom” had an internal as well as an external 
aspect. Green also adopted the following formula: “We do not mean merely free-
dom to do as we like irrespective of what it is that we like. […] When we speak of 
freedom as something to be highly priced, we mean a positive power or capacity of 
doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying.”57
The success of this formula proved fatal. The great popularity of this moral- 
philosophical dimension of Green’s theory with the protagonists of speculative ide-
alism belatedly appearing in England made the concept of “positive freedom” a 
welcome target for their opponents. They simply assumed that whoever differenti-
ates between a good and a bad use of freedom also separates a true and a false self 
within a human being, and demands that the true and higher self subjugate the lower 
and the false self – if necessary with the help of collectives.58
53 See Chin Liew Ten, ed., Mill’s On Liberty: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). See also the discussion with Peter Ulrich, Dorothea Bauer and Michael S. Assländer, 
eds., John Stuart Mill: Der Vergessene Politische Ökonom und Philosoph (Bern: Haupt, 2006).
54 John Rawls rates the beginnings of Mill’s project more highly in John Rawls and Barbara 
Herman, Lectures of the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 343, 366.
55 Thomas Hill Green and Richard Lewis Nettleship, Works of Thomas Hill Green (London & 
New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1889) III, 370.
56 Avital Simhony, “On Forcing Individuals to be Free: T. H. Green’s Liberal Theory of Positive 
Freedom,” Political Studies, 39:1 (1993), 303–320.
57 T. H. Green, ibid.
58 This suspicion persisted until the 1960s, such as within the works of Isaiah Berlin. See Melvin 
Richter, The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1964), 202.
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Such metaphysics quickly leads to totalitarianism. One only needs to also declare 
that the law is only obligated to protect ‘true’ freedom and not ‘false’ liberties. Then 
already one can ascribe to that state the care for the virtuous life of its citizens, even 
through compulsory measures. So it may seem that this theory legitimates the aboli-
tion of actual liberties in the name of ethical freedom. The bourgeois liberties 
(Abwehrfreiheiten) thus run the risk of being drowned in the holy waters of moral-
ity. Although this interpretation was a crude, even ludicrous caricature of most of 
the British Idealists, it did not arise without reason. Fichte’s legal and economic 
philosophy, for example, follows this pattern at times (see Sect. 2.2.3); and Stalinists 
as well as Nazis knew cleverly to use similar arguments in order to disguise their 
totalitarian objectives as expressions of such allegedly “higher freedom.”59
Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973), Friedrich August von Hayek (1889–1992), and 
Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997), who all found asylum within England and the USA in 
the 1930s, had had to watch from up close how in Germany and Russia the liberal 
heritage of the nineteenth century was thus redefined for the justification of illiberal 
collectivisms. No wonder they wanted to help to bring renewed prestige to the bour-
geois liberties, which, though guaranteed in the Anglo-American sphere, had mean-
while been discredited elsewhere as inimical to solidarity. Green’s concept of 
“positive freedom” fell victim to their concern. Without further ado, they declared it 
a gateway to that totalitarianism they had recently escaped only by a hair’s breadth 
and barricaded themselves behind the walls and ramparts of “negative freedom.”
Mises and Hayek above all rejected Green’s social-democratic orientation and 
defended the astonishing opinion that even the smallest step beyond the sphere of 
negative freedom would bring society irrevocably in the direction of compulsory 
socialism; a view to which, incidentally, Friedrich August von Hayek quite clearly 
did not hold when working out his social philosophy (see Sect. 3.1.4). Isaiah Berlin 
attacked from a different angle. While he expressly sympathized with Green’s social 
concerns (more about this later), he took issue with his metaphysics. He deemed 
Green’s concept of “positive freedom” to be based upon a “metaphysical doctrine of 
the two selves”; and Berlin feared that a dualistic fallacy allegedly contained therein, 
when politically applied, would leave the door wide open to illiberalism.60
Both interpretations, however, the socialistic as well as the metaphysical, do not 
do justice to T. H. Green.61 Green had by no means adhered to a metaphysical con-
ception of a divided self, but was rather expressly opposed to conceptions that 
proceed.
59 For more information about this see Stalin’s response to a statement of the British Foreign 
Minister in which he complained about the lack of freedom in Russia, which appeared in Pravda 
in 1951: http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv9n2/stalin.htm. See also Hans Freyer, 
Revolution von Rechts (Jena: E. Diedrichs, 1931).
60 For more information about this and the following, see Avital Simhony, “Beyond Negative and 
Positive Freedom: T. H. Green’s View of Freedom,” Political Theory 21:1 (1993), 28–54.
61 Maria Dimova-Cookson, “A New Scheme of Positive and Negative Freedom: Reconstructing 
T. H. Green on Freedom,” Political Theory 31:4 (2003), 508–32.
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as if there were really two characters in a man, empirical and intelligible, one determined 
by motives in which there is no freedom, the other determined by reason only in a way 
which excludes determination by motive and is free. In truth there is only one character.62
Due to certain predispositions and experiences, every character is differently 
formed and develops independent ideas of the good – in the plural.63 Every single 
human being follows a “varied nature of his view of the good”64; society as a whole 
must therefore allow that the good be pursued “in many different forms.”65 Therefore, 
it is not for the state to define how personal characters should be constituted and 
which ideas of the good they ought to aspire to. Rather Green understands “freedom 
in the positive sense” explicitly as “liberation of the powers of all men equally for 
contributions to the common good.”66 In personally assuming that burden (Bürde) of 
assuming responsibility on one’s own terms consists the dignity (Würde) of free-
dom. The state cannot and must not interfere here. “All that one man can do to make 
another better is to remove obstacles and supply conditions favorable to the forma-
tion of good character.”67
Whereas it is incumbent on the individuals freely to contribute to the common 
good, to society corresponds the obligation of making all individuals capable to take 
on this task. Consequently, the state should guarantee the material, health and peda-
gogical conditions required for reasonable autonomy.68 In this vein Green declares 
“the ideal of true freedom is the maximum power for all members of human society 
to make the most of themselves”; an expression which strongly reminds us today of 
Amartya Sen’s concept of capabilities (see Sect. 4.2.2).69 Positive freedom is thus 
afterwards employed by Green to denote capacitation for reasonable 
self-determination.70
The “reciprocal claim of all upon all”71 to assist with the acquisition of these very 
capabilities is, however, says Green to be qualified recursively, i.e. so that this 
demand can be maintained “without detraction from the opportunities of others” 
and thus not at all by means of totalitarian methods.72 The state may remove indi-
62 T. H. Green, “Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant” in Works of T. H. Green, II, 93.




66 Thomas Hill Green & Richard Lewis Nettleship, Works of Thomas Hill Green, III, 372.
67 Thomas Hill Green & A. C. Bradley, Prolegomena to Ethics, 308.
68 See Thomas Hill Green, Lectures of the Principles of Political Obligation (Longmans, Green & 
Co., 1941), 209.
69 This is why, for example, Amartya Sen also refers very affirmatively to Green’s concept of “posi-
tive freedom” (decidedly in contrast to Berlin’s interpretation of Green), see Sen, RF 586f. There 
is more about this is Chapter 2.3.1. note 151 as well as in Chapter 4.2.2.
70 Green & Nettleship, Works of Thomas Hill Green, III, 372.
71 Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 285.
72 See ibid., 354.
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vidual hindrances with the “realization of the capacity for beneficial exercise of 
rights” only insofar as it can do so “without defeating its own object by vitiating the 
spontaneous character of that capacity.”73 That is, the idea of freedom provides not 
only the foundations (Grund) but also the limits (Grenze) of social policy. Freedom 
is the measure of solidarity, not vice versa. Positive freedom (at least Green’s ver-
sion of it) is therefore far better than its reputation; and it is quite obviously not 
opposed to the fundamental rights defended by concepts of negative freedom.74 The 
legitimate concerns of theories of positive freedom need to be preserved within the 
conception of freedom elaborated here.
1.2.2  Current Use of the Concept of Freedom
The schism between negative and positive freedom is unsatisfactory not only his-
torically, but also systematically. The term negative freedom rather poorly describes 
the actual concerns of its supporters. They actually always want to protect some-
thing positive, namely, certain personal liberties.75 Let us zoom in on that more 
closely: The standard definition of freedom as “absence of physically coercive inter-
ference or invasion of an individual’s person and property”76 may be taken as typical 
of supporters of theories of negative freedom; and certainly it is representative of the 
positions of libertarians.77 This immediately shows that the element of negation 
emerges only secondarily, namely, against attacks upon a primarily posited – and 
thus previously to be positively defined – sphere of freedom. Whoever refuses to 
allow every substantial characterization of freedom to enter through the front door, 
must nevertheless allow it in by the back door. Whoever says “you are ‘free’ when 
you can constrain other people from constraining you”78 quite unconsciously defines 
negative freedom in terms of a positive good to be protected.79
This thought, suggested already by Hegel (§§ 5, 17 Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right), was vividly illustrated by Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924):
73 Green, Lectures of the Principles of Political Obligation, 210.
74 See John Christman, “Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom,” Ethics 101:2 (1991), 
343–59.
75 “The very idea of “negative liberty” […] is an incoherent idea; all liberties are positive, meaning 
liberties to do or to be something; and all require the inhibition of interference by others” (Martha 
Craven Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach [Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press], 65).
76 Murray Newton Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1982), 
215.
77 See Johan & Paul Hospers, Libertarianism: A Political Philosophy for Tomorrow (Los Angeles: 
Nash, 1971) and Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1988).
78 Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961), 56.
79 See Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: Regnery, 1972).
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[…] we all want freedom. Well then, what is freedom? ‘It means not being made to do or be 
anything. “Free” means “free from”.’ And are we to be quite free? ‘Yes, if freedom is good, 
we can not have too much of it.’ Then, if ‘free’ = ‘free from’, to be quite free is to be free 
from everything – free from other men, free from law, from morality, from thought, from 
sense, from – Is there anything we are not to be free from? To be free from everything is to 
be – nothing. Only nothing is quite free, and freedom is abstract nothingness. If in death we 
cease to be anything, then there first we are free, because there first we are – not.
Every one sees this is not the freedom we want. ‘“Free” is “free from”, but then I am to 
be free. It is absurd to think that I am to be free from myself. I am to be free to exist and to 
assert myself.’ Well and good; but this is not what we began with. Freedom now means the 
self-assertion which is nothing but self-assertion. It is not merely negative – it is also posi-
tive, and negative only so far as, and because, it is positive.
[…] Reflection shows us that what we call freedom is both positive and negative. There 
are then two questions – What am I to be free to assert? What am I to be free from?80
Bradley thus shows, on one hand, that negative freedom, in order not to be with-
out content, must, first, affirmatively relate to something, e.g. to the modern indi-
vidual bent upon self-determination.81 Second, it follows that negative and positive 
freedom are but two aspects of one and the same thing, namely a freedom determin-
ing itself by an inclusion and exclusion of its contents, a thought which at the time 
was also formulated by Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923) and became generally very 
popular within British Idealism.82
Negative freedom depends upon positive freedom, not only linguistically 
(sprachlich), but also objectively (sachlich); its internal focus rests in many ways 
upon external presuppositions. For the mere formation of an individual’s life plan, 
for instance, which can occur under the protection of negative freedom, certain 
characteristic preconditions are required (consistent and stable decision-making, 
discipline in the implementation, etc.).83 Its existence is partially dependent upon 
certain “positive” liberties (for instance, access to education and training). In the 
broader sense it also implies that one has at one’s disposal further fundamental 
goods (food, health care, etc.); and it is only positive freedom – according to the 
familiar terminology  – that grants everyone reliable access to these 
preconditions.84
Furthermore, freedom must be able to relate to and reify itself within objects.85 
In order to (negatively) protect it within these concrete relations, certain institutions 
80 Francis Herbert Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), 56f.
81 See Guido De Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), 
352.
82 “The higher sense of liberty, like the lower, involves freedom from some things as well as free-
dom to others” (Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State [Macmillan: London, 
1899], 127). Bosanquet suggests that negative freedom emancipates us only from being enslaved 
by others, whereas positive freedom emancipates us from being enslaved by ourselves.
83 See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 408.
84 See Stanley Isaac Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
181 and Raz, Morality, 407.
85 See Philippe van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 22.
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must (positively) be created. For instance, the protection of private property rests on 
the presupposition that things can be legally appropriated (in and through certain 
forms, such as by a law like the ‘ius primae occupationis’) so as to make lawful 
ownership possible. But these legally protected rights can mostly only be legiti-
mated and enforced if those disadvantaged by them also profit by the selfsame rules. 
Here, too, positive freedom (e.g. in form of the compensatory acts of distributive 
justice) is prior to negative freedom (e.g. in the protection of property in forms of 
transactional justice).86 Thus we can say: Without positive freedom there is no jus-
tice; without justice there is no functioning society; without society there is no pro-
tection of individual’s self-determination; thus without positive freedom there is no 
negative freedom.87
Many contemporary philosophers of freedom are consequently no longer asking 
whether to add elements of positive freedom to theories of negative freedom, but 
only which? Many follow Gerald MacCallum, who reinvented the wheel first 
designed by Hegel and the British Idealists. He declared – now however from a 
foundation of conceptual analysis instead of a metaphysical one  – that freedom 
never exists abstractly, but is always only socially mediated and constructed. In 
MacCallum’s understanding, freedom is “always (freedom) of something (an agent 
or agents, from something, to (do, not do, become or not become) something, it is a 
triadic relation.”88 One should therefore situate (socio-democratic) demands for the 
societal preconditions of personal autonomy within the principle of freedom instead 
of (like Isaiah Berlin) locating it outside of it.89 For MacCallum, the key question is 
hence not whether a certain hindrance to freedom would be caused by human action. 
“The only question is whether the difficulties can be removed by human 
arrangements.”90
The upshot is obviously not appreciated within libertarian circles – albeit for 
ideological rather than logical reasons. Yet, even libertarians have typically nothing 
against positive freedom, as long as it is understood strictly morally. The positive 
concretization of our freedom, by, for instance, moral commitments and virtues, 
does meet with their explicit consent. What they would like to avoid is merely social 
compulsion and governmental coercion. On this point, therefore, libertarians and 
friends of positive theories of freedom could actually amicably agree. An accord of 
harmonious consonance typically drowned out, though, by the many other disso-
nances between them.
86 See Gerald Allan Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
87 See Onora O’Neill, “Autonomy, Coherence, and Independence” in David Milligan and William 
Watts Miller, Liberalism, Citizenship, and Autonomy (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), 212–221.






Theories of positive freedom surpass the conceptual sphere of negative freedom 
in so many ways, in fact, that their central concern remains unclear to many libertar-
ians (and also to some liberals). Doctrines of positive freedom usually offer several 
of the following supplements to negative freedom: (1) the will’s commitment to 
rationality; (2) the will’s focus on moral laws and ethical values; (3) the collective 
orientation towards cultural and historical contexts; (4) the establishment of partici-
patory republican models of government; (5) the granting of certain pedagogical, 
cultural presuppositions of autonomous decision-making; as well as (6) the eco-
nomic presuppositions of private autonomy. Whoever rejects some of these aspects 
does not have to refuse them all; conversely, whoever stands for some of these 
dimensions does not need to fight for them all.91 And that prevents a uniform stance. 
While the supporters of negative freedom mostly march separately but strike 
together, proponents of positive freedom fail to form a coherent front. Their camp is 
united only in being disunited. They struggle amongst themselves just as fiercely as 
they fight supporters of theories of negative freedom. More poignantly formulated: 
The concept of negative freedom is clear but sterile; the idea of positive freedom is 
fertile but unclear.
This is borne out especially by the works of Isaiah Berlin. After he had unwill-
ingly become a neoliberal figurehead through his critique of Green’s positive free-
dom, he ostentatiously espoused social-democratic preferences; and thus he ended 
up being chastised both by the camp of positive freedom and by that of negative 
freedom: from the first, because of his original (supposedly libertarian) positions, 
and from the second, for his subsequent (supposedly not at all libertarian) pos-
tures.92 His oscillation between politically incompatible poles on the basis of ambig-
uous conceptual-theoretical commitments serves as a lesson in the misguided 
polarization between negative and positive freedom and therefore deserves particu-
lar attention here.
Widely noted was Berlin’s rejection of any such conception of positive freedom 
that would authorize a paternalistic state, in the name of ethical freedom, to carrying 
out all kinds of interventions into individual life plans. Yet while he centered this 
discussion on the opposition of negative and positive freedom, the case was not as 
clear-cut as Berlin pretended. One can neither subsume his political views (such as 
his harsh critique of laisser-faire politics and the social evils they cause) conclu-
sively under the concept of negative freedom, nor can all plausible alternatives to 
such a view simply be lumped under the label of positive freedom.
Berlin reduced the concept of positive freedom to but the single one interpreta-
tion, which he rejected, of a doctrinal exegesis on the part of the state of what is to 
be understood by freedom. With that, however, he disguises that it would be as 
completely conceivable to support a concept of freedom, which is by no means 
91 See Christman, “Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom.”
92 Along with the classic “Two Concepts of Liberty” see also “From Hope and Fear” and “Political 
Ideas in the 20th Century” in Isaiah Berlin, Henry Hardy and Ian Harris, Liberty: Four Essays.
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reduced to the aspects of negation, but incorporates positive aspects in a liberal way, 
based on the citizens’ negotiating for and with one another about how they wish to 
use their shared lifeworld for the benefit of the freedom of all. With Berlin’s concep-
tual means, this alternative model cannot be clearly differentiated from a morally 
paternalistic government (Tugendstaat). One cannot avoid the impression that 
Berlin even pays homage to the model of a “night-watchman state” 
(Nachtwächterstaat), although – ironically quite against his intentions – he decid-
edly rejected such a minimal state and rather favored a socially dynamic model of 
politics. Berlin regretted this impression and the libertarian appropriation of his 
thinking it invited, and attacked both in later years fiercely.93 In the following pas-
sage he retrospectively clarifies his position:
It is doubtless well to remember that belief in negative freedom is compatible with and (so 
far as ideas influence conduct) has played its part in, generating great and lasting social 
evils. […] Advocacy of non-interference (like ‘social’ Darwinism) was, of course, used to 
support politically and socially destructive policies which armed the strong, the brutal, and 
the unscrupulous against the humane and the weak, the able and ruthless against the less 
gifted and the less fortunate. […] The bloodstained story of economic individualism and 
unrestrained capitalist competition does not, I should have thought, today need stressing. 
Nevertheless, in view of the astonishing opinions which some of my critics have imputed to 
me, I should, perhaps have been wise to underline certain parts of my argument. I should 
have made even clearer that the evils of unrestricted laissez-faire, and of the social and legal 
systems that permitted and encouraged it, led to brutal violations of negative liberty – of 
basic human rights […]. And I should perhaps have stressed (save that I thought this too 
obvious to need saying) the failure of such systems to provide the minimum conditions in 
which alone any degree of significant negative liberty can be exercised by individuals or 
groups, and without which it is of little or no value to those who may theoretically possess 
it. For what are rights without the power to implement them? I had supposed that enough 
had been said by almost every serious modern writer concerned with this subject about the 
fate of personal liberty during the reign of unfettered economic individualism – […]. All 
this is notoriously true. Legal libertarians are compatible with the extremes of exploitation, 
brutality, and injustice. The case for intervention, by the state or other effective agencies, to 
secure conditions of both positive, and at least a minimum degree of negative, liberty for 
individuals, is overwhelmingly strong.94
Unsurprisingly this slap in the face produced a libertarian furor, especially since 
in this context Berlin also explicitly lends support to positive freedom in the sense 
of political autonomy:
Positive liberty, conceived as the answer to the question, ‘By whom am I to be governed?’, 
is a valid universal goal. I do not know why I should have been held to doubt this, or, for 
that matter, the further proposition, that democratic self-government is a fundamental 
93 This corrigendum produced bitter accusations from libertarians. Murray Rothbard especially 
criticized Berlin for his “assaults on laissez-faire” and let himself become carried away in the 
amusing accusation that, “Berlin goes on to attack such pure and consistent laissez-faire libertari-
ans as Cobden and Spencer on behalf of such confused and inconsistent classical liberals as Mill 
and de Tocqueville” (Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, 216).




human need, something valuable in itself, whether or not it clashes with the claims of nega-
tive liberty or of any other goal.
Against the background of these self-explanations, or rather, self-relativizations, 
one must reflect on whether there continues to be any merit to the distinction 
between negative and positive freedom. It actually seems more to hinder than to 
help the notions it is supposed to express. In my view, talk of negative versus posi-
tive freedom suggests a fundamental distinction where there is none, i.e. where in 
truth contingent differences are at stake like modes of realization (voluntariness 
versus enforceability) or fields of application (internal determination of the will 
versus its external exercise). Thus, the focus upon positive versus negative aspects 
in the debate about freedom obscures our view of the actually relevant categorical 
differences. These, however, can rather be found in the interplay between a quantita-
tive and qualitative orientation of freedom; an orientation that can be expressed both 
in negative and positive forms by rights concerning the defense of existing freedoms 
as well as counterfactual entitlements (Abwehrrechte wie durch Anspruchsrechte).
1.2.3  Some Outstanding Developments
Academic philosophy has distanced itself from the negative-positive schema for 
quite some time now, characterizing it as a false disjunction and attempting to trans-
form the awkward duality by trinomial models, enriched by e.g. a republican,95 a 
solidaristic96 or a psychological97 freedom98; and some of the authors discussed in 
subsequent chapters also take this path. In my opinion the works of Amartya Sen are 
the most convincing attempts in this direction, as they distinguish between a sub-
stantive freedom and a procedural freedom, i.e. between communitarian and liber-
tarian moments within the idea of freedom, in a persuasive attempt to synthesize 
them (see here Sect. 4.2.2).
Nonetheless, instead of repairing old machinery with new spare parts, I am sug-
gesting replacing it with something new. What has already been said concerning 
theories typically at home in the camp of negative or positive freedom is also true of 
these trinomial concepts. They can be far less confusingly reconstructed by means 
of arguments that predominantly locate the significance of freedom either in its 
quantitative or its qualitative dimension. For their concern is typically a question 
either of the number or the respective nature of options. The above mentioned third 
95 See Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
96 See Parijs, Real Freedom for All, 28.
97 See Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 58.
98 See Carter, Kramer & Steiner, Freedom; see also Virginia Hodgkinson, and Michael Foley, eds., 
The Civil Society Reader (Lebanon: Tufts University Press, 2009). In the German discourse this 
third aspect is mostly claimed to be “social freedom.” See Axel Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit – 
Grundriß einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 2011).
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aspects and perspectives can, in most cases, be integrated into one or the other per-
spective. Further, quantity and quality are sharp categories, not arbitrarily chosen 
labels. One may therefore expect that they, unlike other attributes, can also be 
brought into a clearly cognizable dialectical order so that their relationship turns out 
to be both more differentiated and less arbitrary than with the conventional dual or 
tripartite schemata.
From the outset we should note that the attributes of negative and quantitative, on 
the one hand, and positive and qualitative, on the other, do not fully correspond with 
one another. Especially in the sphere of positive freedom, the theory of qualitative 
freedom introduces an important differentiation. It differentiates between concep-
tions that analyze the structurally-abstract conception of qualitative freedom and 
others trying to establish its concretely-material design. This distinction is best 
expressed terminologically as one between the (structural) idea and the (particular) 
concepts of qualitative freedom, i.e. between a uniform guiding vision of freedom 
and its various forms of implementation. We will work out this distinction in more 
detail with the help of the philosophy of Kant (see Sect. 2.1.4) and Krause (see Sect. 
2.3.4). It will serve us throughout the entire book as a compass.
The incapacity of numerous other theories of freedom to distinguish clearly 
between the level of the idea and that of the concept appears to me to be a  fundamental 
problem within the current debate. It results in an inability to differentiate the pos-
tulate that one should at all be debating the quality of freedom from a plea for a 
certain form of qualitative freedom, which is partly to blame for the fear that vari-
ous liberals and almost all libertarians have for any step beyond the narrow confines 
of negative freedom. Since a clear-cut distinction between the philosophical idea of 
freedom and its political application has hitherto been lacking, the defense of the 
substantive nature of freedom in general was time and again falsely identified with 
the championing of certain (e.g. social-liberal) positions in particular.
Libertarians, for instance, like to accuse the supporters of positive freedom of a 
“confusion” between freedom and its accompanying values. Bruno Leoni (1913–
1967), for example, attributes a “semantic confusion” to all who infer possible lim-
its for negative freedom from seeing the earth as the common property of mankind, 
i.e. all who believe that one owes more to the freedom of others than merely abstain-
ing from infringing on it.99 Friedrich August von Hayek seconded this accusation 
with the claim that all thinkers who wish to enrich freedom through social justice 
fall victim to another “confusion” between freedom, on the one hand, and other 
desirable things like welfare, wealth, or a socially active government, on the oth-
er.100 Murray Rothbard (1926–1995) criticizes Isaiah Berlin for how his (revised) 
theory falls foul of the severe “confusion” that leads to the view that the community 
might owe substantial opportunities to the individual.101 Confused philosophers all 
99 See Leoni, Freedom and the Law, 54f.
100 See Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1960), 16ff.
101 See Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, 216.
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around; it only remains to ask: on which side of the controversy? For obviously 
what is at stake here is not a question of a Babylonian confusion of language, but 
rather a conflict of values underlying the differing usage of language.102 In the back-
ground of the diverging ways of speaking there are substantial questions like “which 
freedom” and “whose freedom”?
Abraham Lincoln already went straight to the heart of the matter a good 100 years 
before the debate about Berlin’s essay:
We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing. 
With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and 
the product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to do as 
they please with other men, and the product of other men’s labor. Here are two, not only 
different, but incompatible things, called by the same name – liberty. And it follows that 
each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and incompatible 
names – liberty and tyranny.
The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep’s throat, for which the sheep thanks the 
shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the same act as the destroyer of 
liberty, […]. Plainly the sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word 
liberty; and precisely the same difference prevails today among us human creatures.103
Whether one now reads this speech in its own historical context of the American 
civil war and the emancipation of slaves or with regard to current debates in global-
ization ethics about the economic enslavement of impoverished strata of popula-
tions, one thing remains the same: Supporters of positive freedom will constantly 
insist, along with Lincoln, that the question concerning the concept of freedom 
should not simply be decided by the “wolf’s dictionary” (ibid). The idea of freedom 
is therefore not contingently, but rather necessarily, controversial; normative aspects 
are included within its determination, not by mistake, but due to the need for value 
judgments.104
Precisely because the concept of freedom most appropriate for the here and now 
is constantly being fought over, the structural idea of freedom has to be outlined in 
such a way that it can integrate such differences, e.g. by rendering its ultimate con-
cretion, not through academic definitions, but through political procedures. Theories 
of positive freedom often lack, however, this dimension of procedural freedom, 
which is indispensable to all liberal practices, tending to concretize the idea of free-
dom ex cathedra. For this reason too there is no going back to the negative-positive 
dualism.
Once, however, one frees oneself from this staid manner of speaking, one will 
discover that the negative-positive distinction is much like a badly adjusted pair of 
glasses. As soon as one takes them off, optical illusions disappear. And there are 
many of them: Some authors loudly declare that they follow a purely negative con-
cept of freedom and thereby starkly misrepresent their own theory (as, for example, 
102 See Kramer, The Quality of Freedom, vii.
103 Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953) vol. 7.
104 See Christine Swanton, Freedom: A Coherence Theory (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 1–10.
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Hayek, see Sect. 3.2). Others are charged to hold certain views that their concept of 
positive freedom does not at all contain (as demonstrated by the unjustified criticism 
of Green), or find their theories employed in a way which they themselves reject 
(like Isaiah Berlin). These and other obscurities in the depiction of freedom are due 
to the poor focus of the negative-positive lens.
Philosophy, insofar as it wants to promote consistent action through consequent 
thinking and coherent speaking, may not idly pass by the possibility of unravelling 
tangled debates. Conceptual distinctions are the more efficacious and useful the 
more fundamental and truer to the phenomena they are. The categories of quantity 
and quality thus recommend themselves. They immediately signal their elementary 
meaning and at the same time they allow recourse to a broad methodological arsenal 
from the natural sciences (for the modelling of quantitative relations) as well as on 
the part of the humanities (as custodians of qualitative points of view). While – for-
mulating archetypically and with some exaggeration  – the former delimit their 
object of investigation through selective definitions according to criteria that are as 
objective and value-free as possible, the latter attempt to break down the phenomena 
studied by them through recourse to subjective experience and ideals.105
These methodological alliances and emphases in turn clarify the debate. It is by 
no means accidental that authors who follow the methodological ideal of natural 
science, above all neo-classically106 orientated economists, mostly attempt the 
extrinsic quantitative modelling of spheres of freedom (e.g. through game theory 
and rational choice theories107), while, conversely, authors in the humanities attempt 
to procure the idea of freedom with primarily qualitative methods. Both approaches 
bring different treasures to the surface. The question concerning which method 
should enjoy priority and how both ought to relate to one another must be decided 
105 Of course the comparison formulated here only provides a very crude orientation. The actual 
situation is in no way as polarized into opposed cognitive paths as was at one time claimed (as by 
Charles Percy Snow in Two Cultures [London, 1959]). Yet even with a differentiated view (as, for 
example, with Stefan Hornbostel, “Schism oder Diversifikation: Das Verhältnis von Natur-, Sozial- 
und Geisteswissenschaften” in M.  Dreyer, U.  Schmidt & K.  Dicke, eds., Geistes- und 
Sozialwissenschaften an der Universität von Morgen [Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 99–123]) 
the distinction remains between causally-explicating and contextually-reasoning methods (estab-
lished by Dilthey and Gadamer) characteristic of the relationship between natural sciences and the 
humanities – and thus it also retains relevance for the mental and physical characteristics of free-
dom, which are difficult to understand without some kind of phenomenological assistance. 
Concerning this see also: Buchheim, Unser Verlangen nach Freiheit kein Traum, sondern Drama 
mit Zukunft.
106 Traditionally, we understand by neoclassical economic-theory the type produced by and after 
Alfred Marshall (1842–1924). The concept neoclassical – brought into circulation by Thorstein 
Veblen – refers to a fusing of the system of “classical” economics (Smith, Ricardo, etc.) with the 
subsequent works of Austrian marginalism (Menger et al.). For more about this concept see Jurg 
Niehans, A History of Economic Theory: Classical Contributions, 1720–1980 (Baltimore & 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 159ff.
107 For further information about the role of game theory in the philosophy of freedom see Sect. 




by the phenomenon in question. In the course of our argumentation we have to grasp 
which categories capture most precisely the essence and reality of freedom and 
determine the methodological question accordingly.
1.3  How Should We Talk About Freedom?
Freedom is a necessarily contested idea.108 Hence we cannot simply pick up some 
definition of freedom and run with it towards issues of practical application. Rather 
one has first to clarify the effect of different concepts of freedom upon everyday 
life – morally, socially, politically, legally, and economically. One can do this in 
many different ways. I consider it most meaningful to follow the historical develop-
ment of the idea of freedom within previous centuries. The heated philosophical 
debates about the problems with freedom of the recent past clarify the very problem 
of freedom itself, namely, that the idea of freedom behaves like a lens and a prism 
at one and the same time. Depending on how one thinks about freedom, one either 
perceives different parts of the world (when freedom functions like a lens) or one 
sees the very same aspects in different colors (when freedom functions like a prism). 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that intellectuals confronting freedom’s role in 
society passionately talk at cross-purposes.
This linguistic confusion is in no way accidental. It rests on a disagreement about 
the mental frames and categories by which freedom is best grasped. Without tack-
ling this conceptual ambiguity, we can hardly hope for linguistic clarity. Therefore, 
I aim first to sketch the complex contours of the issue in order then to take in hand 
gradually the categorical construction of the idea of freedom. Upon a conceptual 
canvas unfurled in front of the reader I hope to make visible layer after layer of 
those meanings that shape and color our current understanding of freedom. That is 
why I proceed in a historical-systematic fashion, transforming the selected theories 
of the philosophy of freedom into a dialectical trajectory culminating in the present. 
Thereby a continuous thread of questions raised by Kant and his successors con-
nects up until their recent answers by contemporary philosophers. With every his-
torical step our train of thought is systematically enriched in order to culminate 
finally with present questions and problems – for instance within the framework of 
capability theory.
108 See B.  Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 
(1995), 167–198.
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1.3.1  Metaphysical Theories of Freedom
In the first part of this book a great deal of space is devoted to the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and his successors in order to consider their central 
idea that freedom is not negated but rather manifested by reasonable boundaries. 
That epochal insight was first formulated within the sphere of metaphysical sys-
tems. These metaphysics favored the formation and influenced the formulation of 
conceptions oriented at the critique of freedom by reason. Before one can set about 
morally interpreting or utilizing these conceptions of freedom in moral, political, 
legal, and economic philosophy, it is necessary to understand their innermost 
foundations.
But prior to that reconstruction of the metaphysical theories of freedom dis-
cussed here, I wish to say a few words in defense of this approach. In the meantime 
an ever growing number of analytically-schooled philosophers (like, e.g., Charles 
Taylor, Bert Dreyfus, Hans Sluga, Alva Noë, Sean Kelly, Mark Wrathall, Hans-John 
Glock and Gary Gutting, to name but a few) are certainly increasingly making use 
of texts from the speculative tradition and consider them to be instructive. Their 
influence, however, is hardly enough to enable us to proclaim cheerfully the hope 
that the gap between the two camps – previously declared to be forever insurmount-
able – is already bridged. Nor suffices the fact that in the camp of continental phi-
losophy most have learnt to express themselves with analytic jargon and impressively 
dress up their texts with an Anglo-American apparatus of footnotes. No, whoever 
wishes to tempt colleagues from the analytic bank into an intellectual current unfa-
miliar to them first must show what is to be found on the river’s other bank.
Yet far from imposing an onerous burden, the resulting pressure to present 
explicitly the relevance of speculative thought rather proves to be a blessing in 
 disguise for philosophy. The analytic sandblast has the power to bring forth the true 
reliefs of metaphysical arguments, which otherwise would remain hidden under 
veneers of language and the superficial incrustations of a hagiographic and histori-
cist patina. Philosophy benefits from having to explain nowadays why it, at times, 
opts for theorizing in opposition to apparent experience and the everyday use of 
language.109 To its challenge, metaphysics owes a welcome concentration on the 
essential.
In this vein, followers of metaphysical understandings of philosophy point out, 
for example, the indispensability of understanding philosophical trains of thought 
within their historical and systematic constellations: Whenever the contextual 
anchoring of certain ideas impacts their content, also thinkers who simply aim at 
breaking out intellectual building-blocks are well-advised to scan cautiously the 
foundations of the objects they excavate.110 Hence analytic philosophers proceeding 
109 See Josef Piper, Verteidigungsrede für die Philosophie (München, 1966).
110 See Dieter Henrich, Konstellationen: Probleme und Debatten am Ursprung der Idealistischen 
Philosphie (1789–1795) (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991).
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with historical attentiveness (today no longer a species on the side-lines), too, 
demand a minimum of constellation-research as well as philological expertise.111
Nevertheless, philosophers still differ about the more comprehensive question 
whether metaphysical foundations are not only hermeneutically relevant, but might 
also be substantially decisive in order to judge the correctness of certain philosophi-
cal positions. Here lies the actual point at issue; and since in what follows we give 
so much attention to the reconstruction of the idea of freedom during the history of 
German Idealism from Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) to Karl Christian Friedrich 
Krause (1781–1831) we do suppose that metaphysical thinking still has its legiti-
mate place within today’s philosophy. Yet such a claim can hardly be abstractly and 
universally proven, as if one could preliminarily clarify the function of metaphysics 
and then move on to more profane philosophical dealings. Instead metaphysical 
theory – just like any other theory – underlies the criteria of sound scholarliness, for 
example, the requirements of argumentative stringency and parsimony as well as 
textual plausibility and intellectual fecundity.112 Whoever in the battle of competing 
doctrines can produce consistent theories of roughly equal explanatory potential 
with fewer presuppositions will – as long as powerful paradigms do not stand in the 
way113 – win the day. The meaning and pertinence of metaphysical thinking is con-
sequently best evaluated through concrete examples.
The claim that a certain theorem cannot be detached from its metaphysical con-
text without losing content must be examined on a case by case basis; not only when 
this is put forward on the part of analytic philosophers as a knock-down argument,114 
but also when continental philosophers bear that claim as a magical shield, in order 
to defend themselves against the formal challenges of propositional logic. In both 
cases the potential of the employed foundations decides whether the respective 
metaphysical groundwork strengthens or weakens the ideas in question. Of course, 
not all metaphysical foundations ultimately impact the factual level of practical phi-
losophy. Their reconstruction is thus not always required. Some metaphysicians 
formulated ideas within their systems, which, outside of them, can just as easily 
convince.
But that is not true throughout. Whether for instance the function of freedom lies 
either in attributing value to an otherwise worthless world (as is claimed by episte-
mological libertarianism115) or in perceiving and realizing values inherent in the 
111 See Don Garret, “Philosophy and History in the History of Modern Philosophy,” in Leiter, ed., 
The Future for Philosophy (Oxford & New York, 2004). 58.
112 See Carter, Kramer & Steiner, Freedom, 5.
113 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962).
114 See Hans Reichenbach & Maria Reichenbach, Der Aufstieg der Wissenschaftlicheen Philosophie 
(Berlin-Grünewald: Herbig), 13, 82ff.
115 Epistemic, voluntative, and political libertarianism are not necessarily identical. The first denies 
that intrinsic values can reside within the world and can be derived from it (libertarian theory of 
knowledge). The second holds natural determinism and free will to be incompatible (incompatibal-
ism) and gives freedom precedence (libertarian theory of the will). Political libertarianism concen-
trates on the practically external freedom of human beings (libertarian theory of action) and would 
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world, this question is no idle speculation: The answer profoundly influences our 
everyday practice. In the first case, for example, there are no fundamental problems 
with an extensive exploitation of nature; in the second case the inherent value of 
nature places principled boundaries upon our use of the environment. The meta-
physical foundations of the arguments dealt with here thus do evidently have huge 
practical significance.
Sometimes  – e.g. with models which teleologically appropriate the historical 
present on behalf of a speculatively prescribed future (one thinks, for example, of 
the communist paradise promised by historical-dialectical materialism) – it appears 
unproblematic to dispose of the supporting metaphysical structures unceremoni-
ously. Now and then, on the other hand, the appeal to the counterfactual critical 
potential of morally-metaphysical ideas may deserve a more measured approach. Is 
there, for example, within the power of our freedom to critically question and nor-
matively surpass all extant options, a phenomenon which by and for itself requires 
metaphysical expression?116 Can freedom perhaps be adequately expressed only by 
an idea that necessarily points beyond any one of its implementations?117 These 
questions cannot yet be decided, but it can be said that the justification of metaphysi-
cal theories of freedom has to take place on a case by case basis – in constant critical 
adjustment with our intuition. The contribution of metaphysics to clarifying the idea 
of freedom has to be evaluated according to its theoretical power and  practical 
fecundity and not from anti- or pro-metaphysical predisposition. The analytic flail 
can thus help to separate the metaphysical wheat from the speculative chaff.
Conversely, some sensitivity to metaphysical thinking can be of use within ana-
lytic approaches. For speculative convictions have imperceptibly found their way 
into the attempts even of those thinkers whose proud claim it was to philosophize 
completely free of metaphysics (as, e.g. Rawls, see Sect. 3.2.2). Often, certain fun-
damental assumptions concerning the conditions of our everyday life, as well as the 
scientifically correct way of exploring them, enter into the structure of their theories 
of politics and economics. Those ontological and epistemological assumptions, 
however, which are not infrequently introduced ad hoc or simply presupposed, can 
often be only supported by arguments of a metaphysical nature.118
like to see these limited as little as possible, as, for instance, is the case in R. Malcom Murray & 
Jan Narveson, eds., Liberty, Games and Contracts: Jan Narveson and the Defence of Libertarianism 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
116 See David Christopher Schindler, The Perfection of Freedom: Schiller, Schelling and Hegel 
between the Ancients and the Moderns (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2012).
117 See Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1941).
118 John Gray, for instance, judges that “some useful variant of the idea of a real or rational will may 
survive the demise of the rationalist metaphysics […] in which it has traditionally been embed-
ded.” For some kind of “norm of human nature” is required by philosophical liberalism in order not 
to remain within empty abstractions. This “dependency of views of freedom on conceptions of 
man” is said to be honestly acknowledged by analytic philosophers (John Gray, Liberalism: Essays 
in Political Philosophy (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), 59f.).
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Nevertheless, while metaphysicians find themselves in a reflexive relationship to 
their own explicitly speculative axioms and mostly self-critically justify them, this is 
not always true of theories of analytic provenance. These are often shaken at their foun-
dations by the discovery of implicit metaphysical structures, especially insofar as the 
latter explicitly derive their claim to validity from their alleged distance to metaphysics. 
The analytic philosopher’s complaint about metaphysics then proves to be a boomer-
ang that hits home with all the more force. Whereas a short and direct path often leads 
from the metaphysics of freedom to a theory of freedom critically conscious of its own 
premises, many analytical-empirical theories reach that very destination by means of 
re-routing. For the former, the royal road of argumentative reconstruction stands open, 
for the latter only the winding paths of deconstruction. An insight succinctly formu-
lated already by Francis Herbert Bradley who remarked that, “so long as you refuse to 
read metaphysics, so long will metaphysical abstractions prey upon you.”119 Nolens 
volens, the analytical understanding is thus brought back to metaphysical reason.
1.3.2  Quantitative Theories of Freedom
While up until the middle of the nineteenth century Continental European philosophy 
anchored the idea of freedom metaphysically, the Anglo-American world has since 
the late eighteenth century turned towards empirically orientated ideas of freedom. 
Their aim was to adhere to what could be grasped through the senses alone and, as it 
were, to capture freedom physically. Not without reason. The long, bitter, religiously 
motivated, or at least theologically legitimated, civil wars had exhausted many. 
Everyone wanted to bring to an end that Christians were, in the name of their meta-
physical convictions, injuring one another in life and limb. Many thinkers thus wanted 
to bring about clarity and precision concerning who could place limits upon whom, 
how, and for what reason. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) already explained freedom 
thoroughly in physicalist terms: “By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper 
signification of the word, the absence of external impediments.”120 Water, Hobbes 
explained, “kept in by banks, or vessels” is not (any longer) free; water, which follows 
its own current, on the other hand, (still) is. Freedom is accounted for, therefore, not 
with a view to its content and inner direction, but is purely defined externally, via 
negationis, through the absence of corporeal coercion and physical influence:
LIBERTY, or FREEDOM, signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition; (by opposition, 
I mean external impediments of motion;) and may be applied no less to irrational, and inani-
mate creatures, than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move, 
but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some external 
body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are 
imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chains.121
119 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (London: Henry S. King & Co., 1876), 56.
120 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford, 1996), Chapter XIV.
121 Ibid., Chapter XXI.
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The inverse conclusion also follows. A man suffering mania or experiencing a 
drug-induced high, as long as he remains physically undisturbed, would have to be 
regarded as free. This interpretation is explicitly affirmed by Hobbes. He expressly 
does not want liberty to be understood as freedom of the mind (e.g. emancipation 
from such addiction), but rather as physical freedom – freedom to move. He there-
fore repeatedly defines “liberty in the proper sense” as “corporal liberty; that is to 
say, freedom from chains, and prison.” The physical possibilities of citizens “to 
choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life” constitutes, in his 
eyes, the kernel of freedom. Accordingly, society’s laws are felt to be “artificial 
chains”122; freedom can only exist beyond the latter in a sphere that is not (yet) ruled 
by law. The less one is restricted by such limits the freer one is. Thus understood, 
freedom means freedom from all limitations; it defines itself negatively by their 
absence. The fewer boundaries, the more freedom; the more freedom, the better; the 
result is a quantitative understanding of freedom.
The second part of the book investigates Rawls and Hayek, two representative 
supporters of quantitatively directed theories, which describe freedom in relation to 
its outer circumference and the number of enclosed options. Our explicit demand 
for freedom is thereby reinterpreted as the implicit wish to maximize the number of 
our choices. One thus wants to avoid recourse to the inwardness of freedom and 
sticks to the secure channel of mathematization in order to bring the ship of freedom 
safely into the harbor of the rule of law. Why risk engagement with subjective 
abysses and metaphysical maelstroms? Why abandon oneself to the winds of a 
speculative spirit and the constantly shifting currents of qualitative intuitions?
The characteristic model of this positivism of freedom (famous within the 
Chicago School of Economics and infamous outside of it) was provided by Jeremy 
Bentham (1748–1832): “You and your neighbor, suppose, are at variance: he has 
bound you hand and foot, or has fastened you to a tree: in this case you are certainly 
not at liberty as against him: on the contrary he has deprived you of your liberty.”123 
This form of arbitrary violence, according to Bentham, on average profits the crimi-
nal less than it costs the victim. That is why the legislator should interfere as a 
neutral trustee for the quantitative liberty of all. His regulatory power “cuts off on 
the one side or the other the portion of the subject’s liberty,” in order to maximize 
society’s aggregate amount of liberties.
Liberty then is of two or even more sorts, according to the number of quarters from whence 
coercion, which it is the absence of, may come: liberty as against the law, and liberty as 
against those … wrongdoers. In the same proportion and the same cause by which the one 
is increased, the other is diminished.
Both options – to act according to the law or against it – are not subjected to any 
substantial examination. One simply has to balance, at which intersection of both 
curves, the individuals come away, on average, with the most freedom. According 
122 Ibid., Chapter XXI, 6.




to the maximizing-orientated logic of quantity certain boundaries are to be placed 
upon individual freedom. The argument follows the geometrical schema of count-
less bodies in bounded space: If each one moves simply as it pleases that will 
unavoidably lead to unpleasant collisions. One therefore must set rules of coordina-
tion reinforced by coercion that (by here and there curtailing a little the individuals’ 
sphere of freedom) enlarge the total amount of compossible liberties (and thus, 
ultimately, everybody’s sphere of freedom).
For this insight, no moral reason is required, a calculating rationale suffices.124 The 
necessary system of regulation is hence presented as a legal structure detached from 
the – qualitative – debate about the good life. Everyone could accept its strictures (as 
has been said, again and again, from Thomas Hobbes to John Rawls) regardless of 
their ultimate moral or religious orientation, only because of a clever – quantitative – 
calculation of one’s own advantage, i.e. his or her private sphere of options.125 The 
liberal constitutional state can thus be justified, or so it seems, with minimal presup-
positions, as a mere means of maximizing individual options. This independence from 
normative guidelines recommends the quantitative conception of freedom, it is said, 
for cultural export and the legal governance of a continually globalizing world.126
All is not well, however. The model forces into the private sector each aspect that 
does not rhyme and chime with the logic of a quantitative growth in the individual’s 
range of options. Often the concrete contexts of everyday freedom are depreciated. 
The environment, society, and posterity (Umwelt, Mitwelt und Nachwelt) play only 
a marginal role in theories of quantitative freedom. Respect for others who are 
socially, economically, or medically weak, or legally underprivileged, or politically 
discriminated against, or regard for non-autonomous nature appears strikingly 
insincere in quantitatively orientated liberalisms. And that has systematic reasons.
The theory of quantitative freedom is orientated around the model of a rational 
exchange. When, however, one has reached the point where the respect for the other 
is conceptualized as a negation (qua limitation) of one’s own interests, one will grant 
this only insofar as one receives something similar in return. The conception of law 
within quantitative liberalism functions according to hypothetical, not categorical 
justifications; it motivates conditionally, not unconditionally. This holds true for 
positive and negative duties alike. One supports others when and only insofar as they 
can be obliged to give support of an equal quantitative value; otherwise one might 
withhold cooperation. Where no symmetrical exchange takes place, strictly speaking 
a reason for entering into society remains absent. How could one be obligated either 
to refrain from hurting or towards helping others, if as a rational utility- maximizer 
one gains nothing for oneself? We illustrate the problems that beset such approaches 
to constructing a robust philosophy of freedom by means of the work of Hayek (Sect. 
124 See Joel Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfilment: Philosophical Essays (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992).
125 See Mark E. Button, Contract, Culture and Citizenship: Transformative Liberalism from Hobbes 
to Rawls (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008).
126 See Milton Friedman & Rose D. Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980); Michael Novak, “Economics as Humanism,” First Things: A 
Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life 18:2 (1997).
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3.1) and Rawls (Sect. 3.2). For these problems invariably drive liberal thinking 
towards qualitative determinations of thought.
1.3.3  Qualitative Theories of Freedom
It is evident to everybody that a small amount of good choices is preferable to a 
large amount of unpleasant options. Let us imagine – following an example from 
the Nobel-prize winner Amartya Sen – two worlds, which in respect of the options 
for freedom present within them are numerically identical. The one contains the 
unattractive freedom to contract smallpox, while the other, as a result of political 
intervention and the subsequent eradication of the pathogen, enables the freedom of 
living without fear of that disease.127 Viewed quantitatively, i.e. with regard only to 
the amount of available options, both worlds are comparable. Qualitatively there is 
of course a stark difference: But this shows up solely in concepts of freedom orien-
tated around human weal and woe. Sheer quantity can hence hardly be the ultimate 
core of freedom. In the face of such a comparison, our reasoning by no means cal-
culates, but judges; it does not measure, it evaluates.
The idea of qualitative freedom represents the corresponding attempt to differen-
tiate meaningful from meaningless freedom. The question “Which freedom?” should 
predominate over the question “How much freedom?” The basic idea is: Only after 
we know about the goodness and quality of a certain option can we judge how much 
of this freedom we should grant to others and ourselves.128 Thereby a theory of 
qualitative freedom does not exclude the category of quantity, but rather includes it: 
while taking pre-eminence, it in no way intends to replace it. From a qualitative 
viewpoint, it is neither inevitably true to say “the more, the better”, nor, conversely, 
“less is more”. Rather our assessment will always proceed by saying “it depends”: 
upon which freedom or whose freedom is claimed, and in which context.
Heteronomy can destroy freedom, but can self-imposed boundaries? For exam-
ple, a promise that one friend gives to the other could be conceptualized – quantita-
tively – as a drastic reduction of the number of possible future behaviors to but one 
single one option: a disadvantage in need to be weighed up against the advantages 
offered by that friendship. Or – qualitatively – one can recognize in that promise a 
realization instead of a reduction of one’s own freedom. The individual can be proud 
of keeping his word to his friend. Loyalty need not be bought by utility, it can also 
express an attitude the promising party has to his friend and to the world at large. 
Similarly, one can conceive that autonomously provided limitations do not negate 
our freedom but rather manifest it – in favor of, for instance, our social, natural, and 
cultural environment.129 For often what matters to us is less the maximization of 
127 See Amartya Sen, RF 602.
128 See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 14.
129 See Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001).
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abstract options, and rather their concrete optimization, i.e. of the enabling and 
enhancement of particularly prized freedoms.130
The following chapters will show in detail that this idea of qualitative freedom 
has precursors and paragons in continental philosophy. Yet, the idea of a qualitative 
discussion of freedom also found and finds well-known supporters among Anglo- 
American thinkers. John Locke, for instance, already qualitatively distinguished 
liberty from license according to whether or not a certain option could co-exist with 
reasonable laws. According to Locke, a human being in the so-called ‘state of 
nature’ has neither the freedom “to destroy himself” nor the freedom “to harm 
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”131 Natural freedom aims at an 
appropriate, and not adverse, realization of human nature. Locke certainly shares 
Hobbes’ demand for extending individual freedom as far as possible, but does not 
go as far as regarding every governmental norm as a negation of liberty. It is more 
the case that he sees, in accordance with the natural law tradition of Stoicism, medi-
eval philosophy, and late scholasticism, that some normative functions of the state 
are able to augment the freedom of the individual:
For Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intel-
ligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of 
those under that law: could they be happier without it, the Law, as an useless thing, would 
of itself vanish; and that ill deserves the Name of Confinement which hedges us in only 
from Bogs and Precipices. So that, however it may be mistaken, the end of Law is not to 
abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge Freedom: for in all the states of created 
beings capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no Freedom: for Liberty is to be free 
from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where there is no law: But 
Freedom is not, as we are told, A Liberty for every man to do what he lists: (for who could 
be free, when every other Man’s Humour might domineer over him?) But a Liberty to dis-
pose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within 
the Allowance of those Laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary 
Will of another, but freely follow his own.132
By replacing the laws of the strong with the strength of laws, not freedom is 
reduced but its suppression. For Locke, therefore, freedom is not freedom from the 
state, but rather freedom via the state. While in Hobbes’ quantitative manner of think-
ing reasonable laws signify a loss of individual freedom, Locke understands them as 
beneficial to liberty. By stressing the reasonableness of governmental regulations, 
Locke puts a stop to all approaches which understand freedom as nothing more than 
the unobstructed realization of given preferences.
To replace this qualitative restriction with a quantitative procedure, that is, simply 
counting out and granting equal validity to all preferences, leads not to especially lib-
eral, but rather to especially absurd conditions. Crazy, cruel, or inhumane preferences 
are not the same as average, everyday preferences.133 Some options have less to do with 
130 See Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
131 John Locke, “The Second Treatise of Government,” in Peter Laslett, ed., Two Treatises of 
Government (Cambridge, 1960).
132 Ibid., 305f.
133 See Gray, Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy, 59.
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autonomy than others. For example, the freedom of religious self-expression, on the one 
hand, and the freedom to purchase groceries at any hour, on the other, are significantly 
dissimilar and should be treated differently by the state. Do we not therefore require a 
theory of freedom which can capture and evaluate such qualitative divergences?
But which determination could we give to the idea of freedom so that meaningful 
limitations are facilitated, but foreign, arbitrary, and illiberal curtailments are pre-
vented? In the quantitative logic, boundaries for individual freedom that serve to 
protect the freedom of all express unloved, albeit necessary, limitations on freedom, 
i.e. they are seen as a primary disadvantage to freedom, which only secondarily can 
be offset against the advantage of increased security or utility. From the qualitative 
point of view, they appear differently: as affirmative acts of an all-round realization 
of freedom. External limits and immanent boundaries are not alike. Metaphorically 
speaking: A wall constrains the freedom of movement in a different way than one’s 
own skin. One may eventually win freedom by tearing down a wall, but one will 
hardly win it by tearing up one’s own skin.
When the idea of qualitative freedom demands basic defensive rights (Abwehrrechte) 
(like freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of movement) against 
infringements upon these by third parties or the state, this occurs quite differently than 
in theories of quantitative freedom. Unlike the latter, the qualitative consideration 
does not resort to hypothetical calculations whereby if the granting of those rights 
appears generally useful then it is rational to impose corresponding restrictions. 
Instead the logic of qualitative freedom categorically takes up the issue: Because 
securing these protective rights makes it possible for citizens to undertake the inde-
pendent qualifications of their personal freedoms – within certain boundaries – they 
therefore are unconditionally called upon to grant each other these selfsame kinds of 
freedoms. The conditioned validity – depending on proofs of reciprocal utility – of the 
quantitatively liberal derivation of protecting freedoms from undue regulations is 
therefore surpassed by an unconditional logic in the qualitatively liberal approach.
The idea of qualitative freedom therefore also extends to asymmetrical relation-
ships. We owe the establishment and granting of their rights to freedom also to 
people from whom we receive nothing in return. Be they distantly living human 
beings or members of future generations, or be they severely handicapped or senile 
persons. Every single human being’s claim to freedom depends  – qualitatively 
observed – not on his or her equivalent contribution or utility, but rather is recog-
nized in and for itself: as the fundamental right of every person, as the universal 
human right. In this regard, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen continually pose 
the question concerning which capabilities human beings require in order to first 
and foremost transform abstract rights into concrete opportunities, or in what way 
the use of certain freedoms on our part obligates us to enable our fellow man to seize 
such freedoms.134
134 See Benedetta Giovanola, “Re-Thinking the Anthropological and Ethical Foundation of 
Economics and Business: Human Richness and Capabilities Enhancement,” Journal of Business 




At the same time, the idea of qualitative freedom is open to questions of moral 
commitments, ecological sustainability, social co-determination, and cultural sensi-
tivity. From the perspective of quantitative freedom all those issues register as exter-
nal limitations of private license until their utility is proven for the maintenance of 
the freedom of everyone. From the perspective of qualitative freedom, on the other 
hand, one has to consider whether and in which way these goals help us give mean-
ingful contours to freedom; thus, these objectives appear not necessarily as external 
limits, but can also be understood as internal boundaries of self-determination 
through which the true content and actual form of freedom comes to the fore.
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The history of the philosophy of freedom within the Continental European tradition 
is often treated as a historical and systematic development from Kant to Hegel (via 
Fichte and Schelling). In such presentations, Kant provides the intellectual point of 
departure for the construction of the idea of freedom. Fichte draws this point out 
into a line, with a theory of consciousness highlighting the subjective presupposi-
tion of the idea of freedom. In his philosophy of nature, Schelling adds to that pic-
ture a corresponding line, sketching its objective foundations. And Hegel transforms 
these two lines into a triangle by adding an absolute baseline that unites the subjec-
tive and objective angles.1 In drastically simplifying matters, this schema is both 
helpful and a hindrance.
What is helpful is the abstract demarcation of archetypal positions arising from 
an idea of freedom that critically examines itself. Actually, there is hardly any way 
of avoiding the questions which subjective and objective presuppositions freedom 
requires, as well as deliberation how they could be permanently reconciled. 
Accordingly, this triangular schema helps prevent us from either overlooking, or 
overemphasizing, certain perspectives. As the image correctly suggests, freedom as 
a whole is only in view when we look at the subjectively-inner and objectively-outer 
conditions together with the help of a theory that encompasses both aspects and 
relates them appropriately to one another.
Yet, this triangular illustration becomes a hindrance whenever it is held to be an 
accurate account of the philosophies it assimilates. In that regard, it caricatures 
those positions more than it characterizes them. The consistency of the schema sug-
gests, for example, that the philosophical systems represented by its constitutive 
lines are one-sided and complete, whereas the attractiveness of the philosophies of 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel up until today precisely consists in their many- sidedness 
and openness to alternative interpretations. For that reason alone, I am not following 
this conventional narrative sketch here.
1 See Richard Kroner’s classic Von Kant zu Hegel (Tübingen, 1921ff.).
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With my alternative selection of authors, I aim rather to open up that epoch of 
philosophy to questions demanded by contemporary thinking. Instead of expecting 
to find final answers in German Idealism, with the philosophies here collected, I 
wish to seek out the original questions to the problem of freedom. Therefore, I have 
not granted Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1832) the last word on meta-
physical freedom, but rather given this to the less well-known philosopher, Karl 
Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832). In terms of both its methods and its con-
tent, Krause’s philosophy offers more participatory and procedural openness than 
that of Hegel and his followers (as we shall see in Sect. 2.3.1). Its proximity to 
today’s thought is thus greater.2
The investigation begins with Kant’s philosophy, as it presents the central prob-
lem of a critically self-reflective theory of freedom. If freedom exempts itself from 
every external directive and questions all traditional values and commitments and is 
therefore ultimately only supported by itself, how can it be protected against its dis-
solution into arbitrariness and from a corresponding destruction of its own – e.g. 
cultural – presuppositions?
Fichte addressed this problem by first bringing before our eyes the abyss of free-
dom – its possibility of negating the whole world – and then trying to deduce all 
individual liberties from nothing but the idea freedom itself. Fichte will have us 
believe that freedom can only be protected from itself, by satisfying, in all of its 
manifestations, certain demands of rationality which are to regulate our lives down 
to the last detail. Hence the philosopher has to instruct the citizens how to use their 
freedoms correctly. The result is a directive liberalism.
A clear opposition against this position is formulated by the – even in Germany, 
unjustifiably forgotten – philosophy of Fichte’s student, Karl Christian Friedrich 
Krause (1781–1832). Krause, whose philosophy is to this day widely honored in the 
Spanish and Portuguese speaking world for setting the standard of a cosmopolitan 
liberalism, relies on freedom as method: Liberty should be promoted by liberal 
means. Consequently, the forms of freedom’s use ought to be defined less by the 
state, but rather determined by the citizens – through participatory and representa-
tive procedures. Instead of being freedom’s recipients the individuals should become 
its producers. Krause advocates a participative liberalism. All manifestations of 
freedom – for example, democratic procedures – must always critically be evaluated 
and reformed in the light of the idea of freedom. Krause thereby lifts the discussion 
to a level from which today’s philosophy of freedom must not slip.
2 For a more detailed discussion see Claus Dierksmeier, Der Absolute Grund des Rechts: Karl 




2.1  Reflexive Freedom (Immanuel Kant)
Kant’s philosophy of freedom had an impact second to none. He provided the basis 
for a thoroughly modern philosophy reflecting critically upon its own boundaries. 
His philosophy throws the subject of modernity back upon itself and makes it aware 
of the foundational power of its own thinking. Kant refers to reason questions previ-
ously decided by tradition and authority. Not only in the sphere of the theoretical 
philosophy and in questions of knowledge, Kant invokes the self-enlightenment of 
human existence as “human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority 
[Unmündigkeit]” (AA VIII 35)3; he likewise makes freedom the basis of his practi-
cal philosophy. In questions of action, too, Kant demands autonomous self- 
determination, by instigating a metaphysics of freedom in which the idea of freedom, 
applied to itself, grounds but also bounds the freedoms to be founded upon it.
Kant thereby lays the foundation for liberalism’s two opposing tendencies. 
Freedom as its own foundation – this notion is directed against the genuine oppo-
nents of liberal thinking, that is, against proponents of ethics who do not view free-
dom as the (highest) value. They learn from Kant’s philosophy that those values to 
which freedom is supposedly subordinated only become valued by means of self- 
determined recognition, i.e. through freedom  – and thus cannot reasonably be 
opposed to the idea of freedom. Freedom as its own boundary – that is directed 
against false friends of freedom who speak of a liberality that desires to respect no 
(other) values. They have to be taught that responsibility presents the flip side of 
freedom, and that therefore the observance of certain rules of moral, social, and 
ecological sustainability is a necessary consequence of each and every consistent 
liberalism.
2.1.1  How Much Metaphysics Does Freedom Require?
Kant’s doctrine of freedom covers a broad thematic spectrum: For him freedom is a 
moment of theoretical philosophy (pondering the possibility of freedom in a world 
governed by laws of nature) as well as of aesthetic theory (reflecting how in the 
experience of beauty our mental faculties enter into a non-coercive convergence). It 
plays a role in observations concerning the philosophy of history and the philosophy 
of nature (for example in musings about how the unintended effects of natural as 
well as sociological forces contribute to the flourishing of individual as well as col-
lective freedom), and the idea of freedom ultimately provides the foundations for 
Kant’s ethics through a theory of moral autonomy. How are these diverse 
perspectives on human freedom united? Which aspects of these notions are most 
relevant for contemporary political and economic philosophy?
3 Kant’s works are cited according to the Akademic Ausgabe (AA) (i.e. Kant’ Gesammelte 
Schriften) pagination. In all cases the Kant Camdridge Edition translations have been followed.
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A particularly appropriate perspective for this question arises from viewing his 
program of transcendental philosophy as that of a reason critically assuring itself 
about the conditions of its validity. To philosophize transcendentally means, accord-
ing to Kant, to pay attention to the necessary conditions constituting self- 
consciousness. We cannot understand anything about our environment and ourselves 
without recourse to certain fundamental assumptions. His project is to find out what 
these assumptions are and how they could be justified. Kant believes that the key to 
that lies in identifying structures that are “synthetic a priori.”4 By that, Kant means, 
above all, that no one lives self-sufficiently. Every person is dependent upon a natu-
ral as well as social environment. The subject thus co-determines the world of 
objects to which it is related, and which it – in Kant’s words – “synthesizes.” In this 
process, through the connection (synthesis) of appearances (i.e. of that which is 
“conditioned” by sensory perception) with spontaneous mental contributions (of the 
“unconditioned”) a subject becomes self-aware.
When a subject orients itself in the world by laws inferred from experience Kant 
speaks of syntheses a posteriori, in other cases of syntheses a priori. Only a synthe-
sis a priori, i.e. the process relating to the world based on nothing but mental struc-
tures, can generate timeless, certain knowledge. Those – and only those – fields of 
human practice (like morals and law), for which syntheses a priori can be con-
structed, allow norms that can be certified without recourse to personal experience; 
they alone generate universal directives for freedom.5
Subjectivity relies on contexts, as does personality on relations. Persons exist 
and experience themselves only within and by mean of relations with their fellow 
beings and environment. The theory of freedom must do justice to this fundamen-
tally relational essence of human beings; when followed through consistently to its 
ultimate conclusions it will thus lead to a context-orientated ethics.6 – All-important 
is, of course, how a subject relates itself to its world. To that question, Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason provides decisive directives. Kant wishes to establish 
commandments (synthetically practical propositions) a priori without recourse to 
specific experiences (AA V 31); more precisely, he wishes to establish their condi-
tions of possibility, and even more precisely: that very structure of reason that facili-
tates a reasonable human being’s ethical relation to self and other. He is searching 
for subjective universality as a form of interpersonally-universal validity.
The fundamentally decisive idea is as follows: Just as the theoretical cognizing 
of the true is no purely private matter, nor is the practical realizing of the good only 
a question of personal taste. We act freely, not arbitrarily; without outer compulsion, 
but not without inner directives. The true and the good are neither orientations that 
human beings simply fabricate nor orientations they simply find. Beyond subjective 
4 See Otfried Höffe, Immanuel Kant (München, 1983); translated as Otfried Höffe, Immanuel Kant 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1983).
5 See Claus Dierksmeier, Das Noumenon Religion: Eine Untersuchung zur Stellung der Religion 
im System der Praktischen Philosophie Kants (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997).
6 See Onora O’Neil, “Autonomy, Coherence, and Independence” in Milligan & Miller, eds., 
Liberalism, Citizenship, and Autonomy (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), 212–220.
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relativism and objective dogmatism, Kant locates a possible third way: a rule- 
governed generation of the true as well as the good on the part of reason; leading to 
interpersonally valid subjective certainties.
By identifying a third class of possible statements about the world, Kant already 
moves beyond the dichotomy idiosyncratic of later analytic philosophy of either 
empirical (synthetic a posteriori) or analytic (tautological) propositions. This 
advance occurs by means of the categories of the understanding which structure our 
experience. A consensus with intersubjective validity about certain necessary and, 
at the same time, non-trivial (synthetic a priori theoretical) propositions becomes 
possible according to Kant through the convergence of (conditioned) intuition and 
(unconditioned) concept through categories (mediating both). A given situation is 
brought under general “categories” by determinate “schemata” and thus conceived 
as possessing a structurally warranted validity surpassing the particular situation.7
For example, our understanding automatically supplies regular successions of 
events with predicates of causality. Unaware of our own contribution, when observ-
ing regular sequences, we transform them into connections of cause and effect. Our 
mind thus constructs from a “previously-subsequently” a “because-therefore,” and 
thereby claims something beyond what we observe with our eyes. We thus form a 
cognition which (synthetically) goes beyond the logical analysis of the elements 
causally connected here – with a claim to validity not only for us but for everyone.8 
Such truth-claims are, therefore, not merely a private affair.
Just as in our theoretical apperception of the world we are afflicted by avoidable 
error, so in our practical relations to the world we encounter inappropriate actions. 
What can be done in order to avoid or correct either? One must examine whether 
that which in the process of the categorization of experiences (e.g. in succession) 
raises a claim to necessary and universal validity (e.g. as causality) rests on univer-
sally acceptable foundations. A claim to universal validity can legitimately only be 
made when the conditions of possibility of our experience can be demonstrated as 
necessary conditions of experience as such, when therefore that which individuals 
cognize here and now can be grasped correctly by everyone at every time and place.
A structural analogue occurs in Kant’s practical philosophy. There, our refer-
ences to the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) are informed by the categories of freedom, 
which provide the decisive formal directives. They mediate the (unconditioned) 
moral law with the (conditioned) sensible reality, by structuring it according to 
(mediating) laws of freedom. The idea of the good, just like the notion of truth, is 
not merely a private conception. Likewise, Kant proceeds in analogy to the insights 
of his theoretical philosophy when pondering how to correct fallibility in human 
practice. Everybody must examine whether the condition of possibility of their free 
action conforms to the conditions of free action as such, i.e. whether their individual 
7 See Hans Bussmann, “Eine Systemanalytische Betrachtung des Schematismuskapitels in der 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft,” Kant-Studien 85:4 (1994), 396.
8 See John R. Silber, “Der Schematismus der Praktischen Vernunft,” Kant-Studien 56:3–4 (1965), 
253–73, 257 and Rüdiger Bubner “Was heißt Synthesis?” in Gerold Prauss, ed., Handlungstheorie 
und Transzendentalphilosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1986), 27–40.
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actions have a structure that is strictly universalizable (AA V 87). Thus Kant’s cat-
egorical imperative proclaims: “act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (AA V 160). 
Kant identifies in this commandment the foundation of moral goodness as such, 
which is why, according to him, “all imperatives of duty can be derived from this 
single imperative as from their principle” (AA IV 421).
Categories of freedom determine an activity formally so that, regardless of what 
aim is pursued, we can say that it stands (or does not stand) in contradiction to the 
demand of universal validity.9 Thus reason makes possible the imputation of human 
actions on the one hand (imputatio facti) and their ethical direction on the other. 
Interestingly, with Kant the imputation is based upon the direction – and not vice 
versa. And precisely this is the essential point of the Kantian doctrine of freedom:
Since persons can ethically determine themselves, only thus do they have the 
option not to execute a particular action. It is only because human beings can act 
ethically, that they are in a position to rise above natural impulses and instincts, and 
only then imputably act (ethically or unethically). Practical reason does hence not 
only judge our free actions, in the first place it makes them possible. If we never 
could act in conformity with the categorical imperative, then it would be completely 
impossible to act with genuine freedom, according to Kant.
Certainly, most people always presuppose their own freedom and make nearly all 
of their decisions premised on that assumption.10 This self-image is, however con-
fronted with the argument that, nevertheless, at times one may be compelled by 
inclinations or certain circumstances towards unethical actions. Such a lack of free-
dom is even loudly proclaimed every now and then; for example in order to excuse 
oneself from moral responsibility or to justify ethically repugnant behavior. Against 
this, Kant nevertheless maintains:
Suppose someone asserts of his lustful inclination that, when the desired object and the 
opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible to him; ask him whether, if gallows were 
erected in front of the house where he finds this opportunity and he would be hanged on it 
immediately after gratifying his lust, he would not then control his inclination”. (AA V 30)
Whoever beforehand maintained that he was thoroughly controlled by his incli-
nations would thus realize that he was nevertheless able to control them on at least 
this one occasion, thinks Kant. In such cases, persons ascribe to themselves a “nega-
tive freedom,” i.e. a “freedom-from.” Since, on this view, subjects can resist actions, 
they may legitimately be held accountable for them and juridical connections of 
freedom and responsibility between action and actor may be construed. Kant’s legal 
and political philosophy operates on this foundation of an uncontentious 
9 See Gerhard Schönrich, “Die Kategorien der Freiheit als handlungstheoretische Elementarbegriffe” 
in Gerold Prauss, ed., Handlungstheore und Transzendentalphilosophie (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1986), 246–270 and Susanne Bobzien, “Die Kategorien der Freiheit bei Kant” in 
H. Oberer & Seel, eds., Kant: Analyse, Probleme, Kritik (Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann, 
1988).
10 See Larry Krasnoff, “How Kantian is Constructivism?,” Kant-Studien 90:4 (2009), 385–409.
2 Metaphysics of Freedom
51
self-understanding – i.e., without intolerable metaphysical baggage; as we shall see, 
this is a significant intermediate result for modern liberalism.11
But does negatively-outer freedom of action suffice for moral-political concerns? 
To thematize questions of disposition and intention, does one not also need to talk 
about the freedom of the will to determine oneself ethically or unethically, i.e. about 
positively-inner freedom? Actually, one can object to Kant’s argument so far that 
the form of freedom referred to in the example of the gallows could itself possibly 
rest upon an unfree will. One could for instance allege that mere inclination – and 
not ethical freedom – is directing things. Has merely one preference (for a satisfac-
tion of certain wants) been replaced by another and stronger preference (to stay 
alive)? Perhaps, then, the human being only possesses the ‘freedom’ to follow what 
in any particular case is his strongest inclination and is however necessitated by his 
or her own nature.
Hence, Kant adds another example: If now however it should be demanded of the 
same man on pain of execution to destroy an honorable man through false testi-
mony, then one would venture to assert that – whether he would do it or not – it 
would be possible for him to overcome his love of life for the sake of another’s 
honor, although he certainly may not feel the slightest sensory (sinnliche) inclina-
tion or necessitation to do so. Who, Kant asks, does, however, not know about that 
ethical (sittliche) freedom that is morally proclaiming one should not slander the 
honorable man? And who would venture to predict with certainty in what way the 
person concerned would decide? Considering that for centuries human beings have 
again and again chosen martyrdom for moral reasons, one may here conclude: 
Reality proves possibility. We must theoretically realize that which those individu-
als realized practically so as not to underdetermine the idea of freedom.
In and for itself therefore negative freedom, that “freedom from,” which we daily 
ascribe to ourselves, remains dubious. Only positive “freedom for,” i.e. for the 
good – in the previously discussed example of the true testimony despite the threat 
of execution – proves unquestionably that we are free. The radical nature of every-
day freedom becomes evident in heroic freedom. Thus it is only the reality and 
power of positive freedom that establishes the possibility and the radius of negative 
freedom.12 First appearances are hence deceptive: Negative freedom does not lead 
the way and then, as a kind of friendly encore, enable its positive orientation towards 
ethical values and other values. Rather, it is the other way around: The conscious-
ness of being called to act in accord with the demands of positive freedom leads to 
an awareness of negative freedom. Freedom may hence in no way be equated with 
the realization of existing preferences. It includes also the possibility of critically 
11 That is above all to be noted in regard to the philosophy of John Rawls. He believed that he had 
to extricate himself from Kant because he set out from the mistaken assumption that Kant’s con-
cept of freedom as rational autonomy rested upon manifold presuppositions of his moral and meta-
physical theories, which is why, according to Rawls, another foundation for the idea of freedom 
had to be sought for the concerns of contemporary liberalism – and this would have to be found in 
a rationalistic calculus of interests. More on this in Sect. 2.3.2.
12 See Onora O’Neil, “Autonomy, Coherence and Independence” in Milligan & Miller, Liberalism, 
eds., Citizenship and Autonomy (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), 212–221, 213.
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relating oneself to one’s own preferences, to reject some, to emphasize others, or, 
third, to develop yet others, etc.
With the example of the false testimony Kant shows that the concept of inner 
freedom required for moral philosophy is something familiar to everyone and not 
only the preserve of philosophically educated minds. One does not need compli-
cated dialectical exercises in order to avail oneself of the concept of freedom 
employed in Kant’s legal or moral philosophy. In both cases, Kant merely recon-
structs foundational assumptions that our everyday consciousness inevitably already 
makes when it thinks of itself as free. On but these assumptions he establishes his 
ethics. Therefore, it does not at all depend upon, as is sometimes claimed, (possibly 
illegitimate) metaphysical foundations. Kant’s ethics consequently also continues to 
be relevant for societies that conceive of themselves as post-metaphysical.
Let us pause here for a moment and consider the results of these reflections for 
liberal thinking. Kant shows how values can be liberating. The only faculty that we 
do not hold to be trounced by sensory stimuli is that power of ethical commitment – 
in the latter example: to the duty to be truthful. Here, the ethical value (truthfulness) 
does not lead to a reduction, but rather to an awareness and increase of our freedom. 
At the same time, however, the value of truthfulness can only wield such a power 
since the former is an act of ethical self-commitment. As an imposed value, not 
shared by those concerned, the same commandment, not to lie, would be ineffective. 
According to Kant, just as the moral law lets us realize our freedom theoretically, 
our freedom in turn lets us realize the moral law practically. Therefore, to oppose 
freedom to ethical values (like some libertarians) is just as mistaken as it is to sub-
ordinate freedom to them (like many communitarians).
But how can we philosophically explain the very freedom presupposed by our 
everyday consciousness? It is only in order to answer this question that Kant has 
recourse to metaphysics. Since this groundwork is of subordinate importance for 
practical questions, it will here be discussed only briefly: Kant thinks of freedom of 
choice as merely a faculty of the empirical subject and not the transcendental sub-
ject. Freedom of choice comes about because the transcendental subject precisely 
does not have this capacity, but rather is merely free to follow and express the moral 
law. With this theorem, Kant explains his counter-intuitive claim that the human 
being is not at first simply free – and then, on top of that, takes on some normative 
orientation, but rather that we become free to choose as a result of ethical duty. This 
prima facie unwieldy thought is clarified by Kant’s oft-cited distinction between 
“will and choice.”13
The will, Kant says, is pure practical reason; reason, that is, which self-legislates 
and realizes its own concepts: radical ethical freedom.14 In contrast, choice (Willkür) 
denotes that psychophysical freedom of human beings, seemingly indeterminate, to 
opt for or to do this or that: the freedom to select (Wahlfreiheit). Freedom of choice 
13 See Hud Hudson, “Wille, Willkur, and the Imputability of Immoral Actions,” Kant-Studien 
(1991), 179–196.
14 “We can therefore also explain reason by means of the faculty of judging and (in a practical 
regard) acting according to principles” (AA VII 199).
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however is only possible insofar as ethical freedom is actual, “for then it would 
itself be subject to the natural law of appearances, to the extent that this law deter-
mines causal series in time” (AA III, 373f.). The possibility of deciding for this or 
that expires precisely when a subject is without normative regulation and instead 
simply follows hedonistic or other preferential calculi. As a mechanism purely 
reacting to stimuli, his behavior would then resemble that of a robot; it would be 
both describable and predictable in terms of algorithms. Voluntary choice between 
alternatives would not take place (AA V 97). Rather, the conjunction of inner and 
outer circumstances would determine the subject’s decisions. This resembles the 
‘freedom’ of an hour-glass blessed with consciousness, foreseeing its running out, 
but at the same time itself ‘deciding’ in favor of precisely this and no other course 
of events for each and every grain of sand.15 Kant also derisively compares this form 
of liberty with the “freedom of a turnspit,” which, “when once it is wound up, also 
accomplishes its movements of itself” (AA V 97).
This then is the core of the Kantian metaphysics of freedom: Because of its ethi-
cal faculty, the human being is able to act against the urges of interests and environ-
mental influences.16 Morality makes free. Autonomy is experienced  – but as 
obligation. As the example of the false testimony impressively demonstrates, even 
the threat of execution cannot extinguish our awareness of the possibility of decid-
ing in accordance with the moral law.17 Unlike the outer, political-juridical freedom 
of action, the inner moral freedom of conscience is thus not always perceived to be 
a gift, but often rather as a burden.18 The consciousness of freedom does not resem-
ble a passively-relished choice of the respectively most delightful option taken from 
a simply quantitatively assessed sphere of possibilities, but instead it is accompa-
nied by uncertainty and angst. Since its qualitative aims are not already precisely 
given, they must above all be decided in responsibility before the particular con-
science. The dignity (Würde) and the burden (Bürde) of freedom are one and the 
same. Consequently, freedom is less an objective fact (Tatsache) and more a con-
tinuous subjective project. Fichte will thus speak of an Act (Tathandlung), since 
freedom does not exist in itself, but rather for and through us.
Critics have reproached Kant for thus orientating human freedom  – and thus 
ultimately also the human dignity resting upon it – to too great an extent around the 
very variable capacity for moral rationality. There are two things to say about that:
15 Many contemporary philosophers are satisfied with a freedom of this kind (semi-compatibal-
ism). Derek Parfit can in this respect be taken as representative here for a large part of the Anglo-
American discourse (Parfit, All That Matters [Oxford, 2009], 267). His critique of Kant is that we 
do not at all need to think of any superior form of freedom; to him, it is enough if we experience 
our decisions as our decisions in order to – whilst starting out from deterministic premises – not 
end up in fatalism. In other words: If the illusion of the freedom of the will is unavoidable and 
irrevocable then it is also harmless – for the experiencing and organizing of everyday liberties.
16 See AA V 29. See also Lewis White Beck, Kants Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft: Ein Kommentar 
(München: Fink, 1995), 46.
17 See AA V 31.
18 See H. L. A Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 8ff.
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First, Kant actually often gives the impression that human freedom does not 
belong – but is rather opposed – to our animal nature. Accordingly, in Kantian 
thought, small children, senile and mentally handicapped persons – as a result of 
their reduced rational capacities – cannot enjoy a full compliment of rights, while 
animals would possess none at all; and there are some passages which in fact 
imply this.19 Here comes to light an essential problem with every theory of 
human rights based upon freedom; one which, as far as I am concerned, only 
K. C. F. Krause could adequately resolve (See Sect. 2.3.2).
Second, the particular appeal of Kant’s theory lies precisely within the way in which 
it establishes human dignity in and through autonomy.20 By rejecting all material 
mobilization, it helps to prevent the estimation of human life only in terms of the 
utility it produces. According to Kant, human dignity can neither be given nor 
taken away. One of Kant’s justifiably most cited passages proclaims: “What has 
a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other 
hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity” 
(AA IV, 434). That dignity and price are thus mutually exclusive for Kant pre-
cisely leads to the view that the value of human life may never be offset or dis-
counted, but rather demands an absolute priority above all calculi concerning 
utility; a commandment that should be constantly revisited in business ethics.21
Nevertheless, even someone who might not accept Kant’s transcendental expla-
nation of freedom (i.e. his metaphysical interpretations of the implicit assumption 
of our everyday consciousness) can easily follow Kant’s social philosophy. All of 
the determinations of the Kantian doctrine of freedom that now follow, which refer 
to outer actions (rights, politics, economics, etc.) do not depend upon Kant’s expla-
nation of morally-inner freedom. The previously discussed distinction between 
‘will’ and ‘choice’ merely deals with the moral inner life. In contrast, the legal and 
political philosophy is based upon interpersonally manifest facts; it is, as we shall 
now see, concerned with freedom in the forum of society.
19 Concerning the problem of Kant’s conception of the dignity of the person with respect to dis-
abled people and animals see Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice. She notes for instance that 
“for Kant, human dignity and our moral capacity, dignity’s source, are radically separate from the 
natural world” (ibid. 131). That established an irrevocable separation (a “split”) in the human being 
which hinders the creation of harmonious living conditions (in the human understanding as well as 
in our relation to the animal kingdom): “The split wrongly denies that animality can itself have a 
dignity. Thus it leads us to slight aspects of our own lives that have worth, and to distort our relation 
to other animals” (ibid. 132). See also Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development 
Approach, 85 & 160.
20 See Oliver Sensen, “Kant on Human Dignity,” Kant-Studien (Ergänzungsheft) (2011), 166.
21 For that see the unanimous contributions to Dennis Arnold & Jared Harris, eds., Kantian Business 
Ethics (Northampton, MA, 2012).
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2.1.2  Outer Freedom: The Good and the Law
According to Kant there is a necessary object of pure practical reason, which 
describes an aim that we (without self-contradiction) cannot but strive after (AA V 
119). He calls it the “highest good” and describes it as the ideal of ethics for an 
embodied self: as a life in which those experience happiness (Glückseligkeit) who 
are morally worthy of it (Glückswürdigkeit).22 Kant understands this as the ultimate 
objective every ethically relevant sphere of life must advance in its own way. Hence 
it is through this aim that Kant’s diverse categorical imperatives arrive at a concep-
tual unity. For there is not only, as is often claimed, one categorical imperative in 
different formulations (an impression admittedly fueled by Kant’s Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals), but rather (as a glance at his subsequent writings on 
moral philosophy reveals) there are many differing forms of that imperative. Within 
all of the subdivisions of Kant’s practical philosophy (morals, rights, politics etc.) 
the categorical imperative assumes a form appropriate for each of these disciplines. 
And that respective form corresponds to the synthesis of this particular field of 
action with the universal concept of a rationally autonomous subject and its highest 
good. The synthesis of freedom and lifeworld (Lebenswelt) can thus principally be 
carried out in four ways. It will be self-related either to the actor (inner acting) or to 
others (outer acting) and at the same time can either be directed against or in favor 
of something. Ethical agency can thus refer to inner and outer actions: either 
ethically- negative ones (forbidding, excluding) or ethically-positive ones (com-
manding, electing). As a consequence, four central ethical arenas result: negatively- 
inner action (ethics of conscience) complemented by positively-inner acting (ethics 
of ends), as well as negatively outer-action (rights) complemented by positively- 
outer action (politics). They all follow specific – yet complimentary – categorical 
imperatives.23 What connects them is that idea of practical reason (the ‘highest 
good’).
Kant’s ethics culminates in the vision of a world in which individuals who do 
good (glückswürdig) also become happy in life (glückselig); a vision through which 
he morally and philosophically enobles the human interest in well-being: After all, 
a commandment to neglect the happiness of moral individuals stands in opposition 
to the idea of a harmonization of the worthiness and the attainment of happiness 
22 For this, Kant constantly uses symbolic, and at times, religious language. In the so-called ‘Typic 
of Pure Practical Judgement’ (AA V 67ff.) in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant already textu-
ally anticipates the symbolic concept that would be unfolded later in his Critique of the Power of 
Judgement and makes it fruitful for his theory of moral practice. See Annemarie Pieper, “Kant und 
die Methode der Analogie” in Gerhard Schönrich & Yasushi Kato, eds., Kant in der Diskussion der 
Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996), 108–109. The decisive explanations about how it 
could be achieved that he who does good also participates in the good is something that Kant pro-
vides only in his late work, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790), and in the theories it 
prepared concerning symbolic and figurative thinking which Kant unfolds thereafter in his 
Metaphysics of Morals (1797/98), and in a series of essays published around that time.
23 See Claus Dierksmeier, Das Noumenon Religion: Eine Untersuchung zur Stellung der Religion 
im System der Praktischen Philosophie Kants (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998).
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formulated by the “highest good.” A world in which the good suffer and the evil 
rejoice would not only be unpleasant, it would moreover be judged as unjust. No 
one could consistently want such a world – i.e. from the standpoint of possible uni-
versalization; hence the categorical imperative demands its transformation. So, con-
trary to what one sometimes reads, Kant does not reject the “pursuit of happiness”. 
He merely instructs humanity to pursue this goal via actions that make it ‘worthy’ 
of its happiness. This affirmation of an ethical pursuit of happiness is therefore not, 
as some have thought, Kant’s belated attempt to soften his otherwise overly rigorous 
ethics. Instead from the outset the moral law is directed to abolishing anything hin-
dering a harmony of the worthiness and the attainment of happiness.
In addition to this moral command, law and politics are tasked to resolve any 
outer ossification of ethical asymmetries, i.e. as far as is possible they are to make 
sure that society protects against systematic incentives for unethical action.24 The 
law does this by preventing illegal from going unpunished and appears profitable. 
Still, the law is only a very limited means for the dissolution of unjust states of 
affairs. For pragmatic motives (efficiency, feasibility, etc.) as well as for normative 
reasons (the protection of freedom) only a very small part of the ethical asymme-
tries pervading our lives can be resolved by lawful coercion. Could it therefore be 
the task of politics to promote the good beyond rules of compliance? May the state 
find modes of recognition (of a material as well as ideal kind) so as to encourage the 
ethical engagement of the citizens? Could politics be directed to this goal – and at 
the same time satisfy liberal standards of legal justice?25 Should politics serve as the 
public landscape architect of the common good or should we, for the sake of free-
dom, leave the planting of moral seeds to the backyards of private 
self-sufficiency?26
What is at issue here is the view (of Hayek and others; see Chap. 3) that the free-
dom of open society either stands or falls according to whether politics abstains 
from visions and utopias of the good. This question touches upon a central point in 
the self-image of modern liberalism. Conservative liberal thinkers (like Hayek) as 
well as also more progressively liberal authors (like Rawls), set such great store by 
Kant’s doctrine of law precisely because of its reputation for legitimating coercion 
only within strict liberal boundaries.27 So it is most instructive to observe how Kant 
seeks to find the path from his legal philosophy towards a theory of liberal politics. 
On closer examination, though, it becomes clear that in quite the same way that law 
24 Kant’s moral philosophy and philosophy of religion rather deal extensively with the problem 
concerning how it is possible that a human being acts morally even if he believes that the condi-
tions are and remain such that often precisely the moral deed will deprive him of the happiness he 
is entitled to. See Dierksmeier, Das Noumenon Religion, 58–61.
25 See Katrin Flikschuh, Freedom: Contemporary Liberal Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
26 See Claus Dierksmeier, “Zur systematischen Liberalität in Kants Politik- und Staatsbegriff” in 
Ottmann, ed., Kants Lehre von Staat und Frieden (Baden-Baden:Nomos, 2009), 42–63.
27 See Michael Köhler, “Zur Begrundung des Rechtszwangs im Anschluss an Kant und Fichte” in 
Kahlo & Zaczyk, eds., Fichtes Lehre vom Rechtsverhältnis (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 93–125.
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confirms and complements morals, law in turn is paired and completed by a politics 
orientated by the idea of responsible freedom.
This move is a milestone in the development of liberalism and it takes its cue 
from Kant’s parting with transcendent and naturalistic theories of moral value. 
Instead of deriving the principles of law and politics from external authorities (tran-
scendence) or objective directives (naturalism), Kant appeals to reason.28 Autonomy 
instead of heteronomy, self-legislation instead of external-legislation, is his slo-
gan.29 The idea of a freedom giving itself its own law in a rational manner functions 
as the highest principle. Kant thus wishes to develop legal philosophy in such a way 
that it identifies the principle of law as a rationally necessary upshot of the principle 
of freedom.30 Hence, before (metaphysically) unfolding the idea of law, Kant (tran-
scendentally) construes it. That is to say, he first (transcendentally) demonstrates 
that something like law must be thought so that our consciousness of freedom can 
be completely clear and transparent to itself. Only subsequently does he (meta-
physically) consider the extent to which the historically given laws correspond to 
the thus developed idea of law – or can approximate towards it through philosophi-
cal critique.31
Of that idea of law, Kant says:
There is only one innate right. Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s 
choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a uni-
versal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity (AA 
VI, 237-238).
Unlike what Fichte will later have us believe (see Sect. 2.2), according to Kant, 
one cannot derive the specificity of legal rules from mere practical reason, i.e. 
deduce them by logical inference from said right to freedom. Kant rather sees that 
various concepts of law, according to historical and cultural contexts, can legiti-
mately honor the one idea of law. Instead of promulgating from the lectern a par-
ticular set of laws as the philosophically only true ones, i.e. announcing only one 
possible interpretation of that innate right to freedom, Kant’s thinking is open to 
diverse historical alternatives. While he himself interprets the statutes of one par-
ticular legal tradition (namely, the Prussian General Law of the Land of 1794) in the 
light of that idea of law, he does not exclude, but rather emphasizes the possibility, 
that at other places and at other times, other kinds of juridical institutions can also 
legitimately claim to realize the liberal idea of law.
28 See Hariolf Seel & Gerhard Oberer, Kant: Analysen, Probleme, Kritik (Würzburg: Königshausen 
& Neumann, 1988), 218–224.
29 See Friedrich Kaulbach, Das Prinzip Handlung in der Philosophie Kants (Berlin, 1978), 
263–278.
30 See Howard Williams, ed., Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy (University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 24.
31 See Friedrich Kaulbach, “Das transzendental-juridische Grundverhältnis im Vernunftbegriff 
Kants und der Bezug zwischen Recht und Gesellschaft” in Kaulbach & Krawietz, eds., Recht und 
Gesellschaft: Festschrift für Helmut Schelsky zum 65 Geburtstag (Berlin, 1978), 263ff.
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Kant thus separates the abstract deduction of the idea of law (for Kant: “tran-
scendental deduction”) from its concrete unfolding (“metaphysical deduction”) in 
respect to particular legal orders. He thus separates the structural idea from substan-
tial concepts of law. That distinction between concept and idea is something we will 
deal with below in more detail: First, in regard solely to Kant’s political philosophy. 
It leads him to an approach of central significance for current liberalism; for there, 
in the political field, Kant separates a structural idea of liberal politics from concrete 
liberal conceptions of politics and shows how the idea of liberal politics differenti-
ates itself into various political projects. Second, though, we will see that this very 
distinction between idea and concept plays a key role for the entire philosophy of 
liberalism. So much by way of anticipation.
But now let us return to Kant by asking: Must law exist at all? For what reason 
should there be a normative ethical concept for outward-directed behavior separate 
from moral criteria? Cannot morality simply serve as the principle of state action 
and enforcement? Could we not say that law is simply there to avenge especially 
egregious moral violations? Law – the ultima ratio of morality? To these questions 
the Kantian philosophy answers with a clear No – which resounds until today in the 
constitutions of liberal societies. Since not every good will entails also outer moral-
ity and, conversely, an evil will at times can lead to outer moral actions (AA VI 
313ff.), Kant argues that it is indispensable to have laws distinguished from morals 
qualitatively (according to content) and not only quantitatively (according to grades 
of intensity). Intentions and deeds are twofold: they require independent ethical 
principles (AA VI 249).32
The right to property can serve as an example. Conflicts, e.g. concerning posses-
sion and usufruct of property, do not only occur among malicious people. Certain 
goods only allow for one use at a time. Whenever thus the moral usage of one per-
son is incompatible with the ethical plans of the other, even well-meaning people 
may fall into conflict.33 Such a conflict about property marks, however, on the 
Kantian reading, a conflict between objects of freedom, i.e. a contradiction of reified 
freedom with itself.34 In the name of freedom, this should be resolved. Hence, 
according to Kant, all subjects who “cannot avoid living side by side with one 
another” (AA VI 307) have to get rid of every legal uncertainty and ambiguity about 
the use of their common lifeworld with the help of institutions that posit and protect 
rights. Laws of universal freedom should therefore limit all particular freedoms in 
such a way that they do not oppose and cancel one another out.
The idea of the freedom of all thus immanently regulates the freedoms of indi-
viduals. That is, Kant does not presuppose a concept of a first unlimited outer free-
dom, which afterwards would have to be cut back to make it socially compatible. 
32 See Wolfgang Bartuschat, “Apriorität und Empirie in Kants Rechtsphilosophie,” Philosophische 
Rundschau 34:1/2 (1987), 31–49.
33 See Otfried Höffe, Der Staat braucht selbst ein Volk von Teufeln: Philosophische Versuche zur 
Rechts- und Staatsethik (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1988), 56ff.
34 See Rolf Gröschner et al., Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie: Ein Dogmenphilosophischer Dialog 
(Berlin: Springer, 2000), 223.
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Rather, he sees the right of individual freedom to manifest and reify itself in the 
world from the very beginning under the strict condition that it take place under 
forms accepted by everyone; within forms, that is, which concede equal rights to 
all.35 In contrast to the contractualist theory inspired by Thomas Hobbes (1588–
1679), according to Kant’s philosophy our outer freedom does not become restricted 
(by the state) to universalizable forms, but rather (by its idea) it is already so limited. 
The material limitation of freedom under the rule of law merely expresses its ideal 
limitation according to reason. In his eyes, conditions, which the state imposes in 
order to assure the compatibility of the liberties of all, do not not reduce but realize 
individual freedom. Interventions in our acts that conform to this principle of law, 
do not harm the citizens’ freedom; they manifest it. A state under this rule of law is 
hence always a friend, and never a foe, to freedom. Anarchists may not appeal to 
Kant.
In short, where many thinkers observe the law as an outer limitation of freedom, 
Kant recognizes it as its inner boundary. Hence his definition of right as: “the sum 
of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of 
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” (AA VI 230). Law appears 
accordingly as a limitation of one’s own actions to be decided rationally by everyone 
for themselves. The idea of freedom would consequently be incomplete were it not 
directed by the idea of law. In liberal law (freiheitlichen Recht) humanity finds the 
right freedom (rechten Freiheit).36 Hence the legal imperative: “so act externally 
that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accor-
dance with a universal law” (AA VI 231).
In contrast to most libertarians and various neoliberal theorists of today (see 
Sect. 5.2) Kant declares: Law is not defined as the authority to coerce, but rather 
itself legitimates coercive authorities in the first place.37 Each and every act of coer-
cion must result from the application of the principle of law to a finite subject and, 
importantly, it must be justified to the coerced subject in particular as conforming to 
and necessary for the principle of freedom, i.e. as “a hindering of a hindrance to 
freedom” (AA VI 231). If, for example, someone finds himself in court because of 
an accident resulting from drunk driving, he may not welcome the punishment he 
receives, but he cannot rationally characterize it as unjust. Persons are not negated 
by legal coercion, but rather confirmed in their status as mature subjects of freedom, 
insofar as from the point of view of the coerced subject, the legal coercion can be 
understood as an act of liberty-affirming self-constraint through others.38
35 See Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, 
M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 223ff. See also Gregory Kavka, “Why Even Perfect People 
Would Need Government,” Social Philosophy and Policy 12:1 (1995) 1–18.
36 For example Kant writes that “when I draw up a penal law against myself as a criminal, it is pure 
reason in me (homo noumenon), legislating with regard to rights, which subjects me, as someone 
capable of crime and so as another person (homo phaenomenon), to the penal law, together with all 
others in a civil union” (AA VI 335).
37 See Köhler, “Zur Begrundung des Rechtszwangs im Anschluss an Kant und Fichte,” 105.
38 See Peter Unruh, Die Herrschaft der Vernunft: Zur Staatsphilosophie Immanuel Kants (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1993), 44.
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If a state, though, uses coercion for purposes other than the protection of rights, 
it acts unjustly. In that regard, it is one and the same. No matter how noble the 
motives and how welcome the results might be, they cannot by any means justify 
that transgression. In questions concerning the inner determination of the will, that 
is, in the domains of morality and religion, the state should not interfere, according 
to Kant (see AA VI 219). Therein lies a decisive defense of personal liberty in the 
Kantian concept of legality, which protects the citizen from every usurpation on the 
part of the state, however well-meaning. In this regard, Kant’s model is not only 
superior to utilitarian and other consequentialist doctrines, all of which legitimate 
the right to coerce for the sake of its effects and can therefore never be justified to 
those who doubt that in a given case these effects either occur or are desirable. It is 
superior as well to all theories of negative freedom, which aim to prove the compat-
ibility of law and freedom by characterizing law as the sum of legitimate coercive 
acts and then founder, though, upon the question as to what actually legitimates 
coercion in the first place (See Sect. 5.2).
Translated into the terminology I brought into play, this notion could be expressed 
thus: While quantitatively directed liberalism generally seeks to protect the freedom 
of the individual through less, rather than more, state intervention, Kant subordi-
nates the quantitative perspective to the question concerning the appropriate quality 
of state action, orientated by the need to promote the freedom of all. In short, one 
requires just as much state-intervention as is necessary to fulfil the aforementioned 
need: no more, but also no less. For Kant, the quality of the idea of freedom pro-
vides the measure of the quantity of the citizen’s liberties. Kant therefore stands 
firmly not only against excessive state action, but also – all libertarians should take 
note – against insufficient state action.
2.1.3  Social Rights?
If freedom realizes itself in law and this presupposes a relation to objects, does there 
not also follow from the universal right of all persons to freedom a right to partici-
pate in the world at large and to have access to nature? Must the state of law also be 
a social state in order to enable everyone to be able to make use of the freedoms they 
are legally entitled to? Does the idea of freedom have a social side? Today, much 
seems to speak in favor of that idea.
The legal philosophies of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries construed a fic-
tional state of nature where all could take care of themselves through their own 
effort and wits, bringing food on the table, as it were, by the work of their hands. 
Between that imaginary world and our current lives, there is a stark – also philo-
sophical – difference. Today, the access to freedom is societally mediated; no longer 
can individuals through an original appropriation of nature relate to ownerless 
goods and employ them to master their lives in isolation.39 Instead, the freedom of 
39 See G. W. F. Hegel, TWA 7, 388.
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the individual finds its relation to the objects of the world everywhere bounded by 
ownership rights, so that we require the legal consent of others for nearly every 
appropriation and use of the environment. Wherever this approval is lacking, then 
often – the best of will and brave diligence notwithstanding – individuals cannot 
sustain themselves. From the prohibition of appropriating other’s property  – as 
materially manifested freedom – unlawfully, might we not need to postulate to put 
every person in such a position that they do not need to act contrary to the law in 
order to survive? Must not hence everyone who wants to protect private property 
also ensure that the fundamental rights of human life can be realized without infring-
ing upon the property rights of others? Should not the minimum presuppositions of 
maintaining one’s existence and using one’s freedom be construed and claimed as 
indispensable foundations of any individual’s right to freedom?40 A right to social 
participation as a result of a consistently thought liberalism – what is Kant’s view 
on that?
At first glance it catches one’s eye that in his ‘Doctrine of Right’ Kant converts 
the slogan of the French Revolution, i.e. liberté, egalité, fraternité, into the formula, 
freedom, equality, independence (see AA VI, 314). It may therefore seem as though 
he replaces the earlier apparently social-moral concept of fraternity with a category 
of law, and wants to demand the individual’s participation in the economic and 
political sphere as a civil right.
A closer look, however, reveals that Kant’s texts do not allow for this reading. In 
§46 of his ‘Doctrine of Right’ Kant defines the concept of the “citizens of the state” 
as containing three moments:
Lawful freedom, the attribute of obeying no other law than that to which he has given his 
consent; civil equality, that of not recognizing among the people any superior with the 
moral capacity to bind him as a matter of right in a way that he would not in turn bind the 
other; and third, the attribute of civil independence, or owing his existence and preservation 
to his rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth, not to the choice of another 
among the people. From his independence follows his civil personality, his attribute of not 
needing to be represented by another where rights are concerned. (AA VI 314)
Kant thus makes economic independence a presupposition of political indepen-
dence. Distinguishing between “citizens of a state” and “associates in the state,” he 
declares that human beings who do not reach economic independence also do not 
have a claim to political autonomy. In the paragraph in question, he expressly claims 
that:
not all persons qualify with equal right to vote within this constitution, that is, to be citizens 
and not mere associates in the state. For them their being able to demand that all others treat 
them in accordance with the laws of natural freedom and equality as passive parts of the 
state it does not follow that they also have the right to manage the state itself as active mem-
bers of it, the right to organize it or to cooperate for introducing certain laws. (AA VI 315)
In other places Kant adds that those who do not enjoy independent employment 
also must lack the right to active citizenship. For instance, a barber with his own 
40 Michael Köhler, “Justitia distributive: Zum Begriff und zu den Formen der Gerechtigkeit,” 
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 79 (1993), 457–482.
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shop – this is Kant’s own example – is to be looked upon as economically indepen-
dent, whereas another barber who works based on home-visits is not. Women and 
children are from the outset degraded as merely passive “associates in the state”.
How can we explain these – from our current perspective – abstruse restrictions 
on the right to political participation? Kant drew on a reality surpassed by his philo-
sophical idea for its conceptual determination and thus mistakenly inferred norms 
from facts. Instead of celebrating this dip in his thinking as a libertarian curvature,41 
we should rather recognize it as the embarrassing dent that it is. Something else 
would have been far more in accordance with his system, i.e. if the right of everyone 
to political representation would have given rise to a counterfactual claim to eco-
nomic participation. Poverty does undermine active, intellectual as well as practical 
participation in political decision-making – that is correct! Consequently, however, 
it is not the political participation of the poor, which should be abolished, but their 
poverty.42
Such a reading would also correspond with the Kantian formula of freedom, 
equality, independence. Then, for this interpretation, one need only demand for 
“independence” what Kant’s legal philosophy grants to the principles of freedom 
and equality as a matter of course, namely that they must also be counterfactually 
realized. Kant in no way maintains that all human beings are by nature legally free 
and equal, but declares that all human beings should be free within legal boundaries 
and equal before the law. The same thing ought to be true of independence too. Kant 
even seems to tend in this direction when he recommends that an “associate in the 
state” should at all times have the capacity to “work his way up from a passive con-
dition to an active one” (ibid.). If, however, such a self-emancipation out of eco-
nomic dependency is not possible for contingent reasons, then, one has to object: 
Why not then at least intervene by law? This, at any rate, was how Fichte and 
Krause saw the issue (for Fichte and Krause’s development of this idea see, respec-
tively, Sects. 2.2.2 and 2.3.3).
Moreover, insofar as the citizens themselves obviously have an interest in their 
economic emancipation, this very problem arises once again within the sphere of 
politics in a distinct way. Politics has the mandate to remove unjust living- conditions 
in accordance with the law. Perhaps then the overcoming of poverty and disadvan-
tage could become the objective of politics. As we have already seen, Kant con-
ceived of politics as a positively outer determination of action. Although this frees 
the political arena from an inquisition into inner motivations, it does not make ques-
tions concerning the ethical aims of political agendas in any way superfluous: 
Motivations and objectives are two different things; even the blackest soul can 
sometimes – for whatever reason – set something noble in motion. Not the secret 
intentions of politicians, but rather the recognizable aims of their politics ought to 
41 See Wolfgang Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit: Immanuel Kants Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1993).
42 Thus also Ripstein, Force, 282–285. Inspired by Kant he develops an obligation of the state to the 
needs of the poor through taxation of the rich and extracts from Kantian lines of thought the cre-
ation of a modern welfare state.
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be in the focus of philosophical attention: Is there a separate categorical imperative 
for politics? Can political philosophy achieve an independent a priori synthesis? 
The answer is provided by the liberal proceduralism of the Kantian ethic.
Kant’s ethic typically proceeds formally at first and materially only thereafter. 
Initially, it turns away from the directives of traditional material values (happiness, 
enjoyment, utility, justice, well-being, charity, piety, etc.) towards formal proce-
dures (avoidance of contradiction, universalizability) that are to uncover the morally 
obligatory aims and values. For this insistence on formality, up until today, Kant has 
been unjustly interpreted as culpable of a rigorous formalism allegedly repudiating 
all human striving for happiness and wellbeing. But such interpretations are errone-
ous. For as we have already seen, all the disciplines of Kantian ethics culminate in 
the concept of the “highest good” (AA V 108ff.).43 Politics, too, is directed towards 
this “highest good”, in a yet to be characterized manner. Politics not only curates the 
law, it transforms it as well. Yet how are we able to determine, which political use 
of the legislative agrees with the liberal principle of law, and which contradicts it?44
Since Kant’s idea of law is not constructed by pre-given ethical aims (common 
good, welfare, etc.), the criteria of politics must first be formally determined. Thus, 
still “the form of publicity, the possibility of which is involved in every claim to a 
right” (AA VIII 381) remains. Abstracting from all representations of the good, 
politics can realize the claim to conduct itself under the principle of freedom by 
examining as to their universalizability the way in which the political objectives are 
being established. The public, so to speak, is to run this universalizability-test.45 For, 
according to Kant, it is possible, through a republican “organization of the state,” to 
arrange illicit political forces “in opposition to one another in such a way that one 
checks the destructive effect of the other or cancels it, so that the result for reason 
turns out as if neither of them existed at all and the human being is constrained to 
become a good citizen, even if not a morally good human being” (AA VIII 366).
By making political directives public, as soon as my directives are likely to 
impair the rights of others, there arises an “a priori foreseeable resistance of every-
one to me” (AA VIII 381).46 The notion of publicity thus yields “a criterion to be 
found a priori in reason” with which “we can cognize at once, as if by an experi-
ment of pure reason, the falsity (illegitimacy) of the claim in question (praetensio 
iuris)” (AA VIII 381). Therefore Kant issues the “transcendental formula of public 
right” (AA VIII, 381) that we should only engage in politics whose procedures can 
at all times be made public. Public action is thus structured by the principle of free-
dom (synthesis a priori) and the sphere of permissible politics bounded on princi-
ple, without recourse to material ends of politics.
43 See Claus Dierksmeier, “Kant on Virtue,” Journal of Business Ethics, 113:4 (2013), 597–629 and 
Robert B. Louden, “Kant’s Virtue Ethics,” Philosophy, 61:238 (1986) 473–489.
44 See Ulrich Sassenbach, Der Begriff der Politischen bei Immanuel Kant (Würzburg, 1992) and 
Claudia Langer, Reform nach Prinzipien: Untersuchungen zur politischen Theorie Immanuel 
Kants (Stuttgart, 1986).
45 See Howard Williams, Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy (1992), 34f.
46 See also Reflexion 7687 in AA XIX, 491.
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Yet, up to this point, political reason is “only negative” (AA VIII, 382) in its 
operation. Still, the sphere of permissible directives so demarcated lacks an addi-
tional positive criterion for legislation.47 Not all measures passing the publicity-test 
are equally well-suited for organizing the political will of a society. Political reason 
must choose from the abstract quantity of permissible enterprises those whose con-
crete quality best promotes the citizens’ cohabitation. To provide a genuine categor-
ical imperative of politics, reason must therefore still substantially lead the 
community’s will beyond the formal demand for legal structures. This necessary 
positive criterion is the pursuit of happiness (See AA VIII, 386ff.).
The rehabilitation of happiness (Glückseligkeit) within Kant’s political theory 
has confused many a commentator,48 and, since Kant expressly excluded consider-
ations about welfare from the justification of law and the state, this is quite under-
standable. With the oft-cited words – “welfare possesses no principle” (AA VII, 
87n) – Kant had declared war on all state-paternalism. Kant did indeed dispute the 
central assumption of all utilitarian attempts at making commensurable and measur-
ing individuals’ happiness, pleasure, or utility so that technocratic governments 
could simply enhance everyone’s wellbeing. The individuality and difference of 
human beings, intensified by their every free act, simply does not allow for a univer-
sally valid concept of material happiness. Accordingly, Kant determines “political 
freedom” in the following way: “This consists in each being able to pursue his 
welfare as he conceives it and also that he can never be used by another as a means 
for the end of his own happiness in conformity with the other’s concept of happiness 
but only in conformity withhis own” (AA XXIII, 129). No single project could 
serve the happiness of absolutely everyone; making people feel comfy is not the job 
of the government.49
Still, Kant does champion a formal theory of happiness under the aegis of free-
dom. Projects that are in harmony with citizens’ free choice of goals may be pro-
moted as the object of politics. State action should create the necessary conditions – for 
example through the creation of economic prosperity – for enabling citizens to find 
happiness in the way they see fit.50 So Kant approves of pursuing the welfare of the 
community as a “means to secure their right and to place them in a condition to 
make themselves happy in every way” (AA XIX 560). He also contemplates mea-
sures where “to encourage silkworms, the sovereign offers a reward for planting 
mulberry bushes, or som other action” (AA XXVII 548). Today one would more 
likely think of the construction of structural and informational networks, 
47 See Joseph Knippenberg, “The Politics of Kant’s Philosophy” in Beiner, ed., Kant and Political 
Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy (New Haven, 1993), 155–172.
48 Heinz-Gerhard Schmitz even sees here a – for him welcome – turn from Kant’s entire concept of 
morality and its replacement with a concept of prudence. See Heinz-Gerhard Schmitz, “Moral oder 
Klugheit? Überlegungen zur Gestalt der Autonomie des Politischen in Denken Kants,” Kant-
Studien 81:1 (1990), 413–422.
49 See Wolfgang Kersting, Kant über Recht (Paderborn, 2004).
50 See Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (2000), 285.
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 administrative directives for the coordination of individual and collective pursuits, 
or state support for charity work and participation in NGOs.
The ends change; what remains is the method of protecting voluntariness through 
respect for citizen’s individual interests. In politics it is permissible, often even com-
manded, to motivate citizens materially,51 as long as the advantages and incentives 
are being obtained in accordance with laws of liberty. Forms of recognition – ideal 
as well as financial – for helping political projects along are therefore not only prag-
matically sensible, but  – in the light of the idea of the “highest good”  – also 
demanded: as a just support for those who further the political order and the public 
goods it promotes.
Kant opens up interesting possibilities through this dual determination that, on 
one hand, renounces every substantial concept of happiness, while it, on the other 
hand, marshals the structural conditions that enable the individual and collective 
search for happiness. This move facilitates a political philosophy that allows for a 
procedural instead of a substantial answer to the question which civil concerns 
should direct civic policy. Because individuals’ ends and goals in life are infinitely 
variable, they cannot be directly promoted by state action without some being dis-
criminated against for the benefit of others. Yet, individual welfare can certainly be 
supported indirectly; for instance, by the government enabling and capacitating citi-
zens to pursue their own happiness individually as well as through voluntary coop-
eration. The state can and should adopt the goal of offering appropriate procedures, 
institutions, and infrastructure for this. Then one can reconcile the otherwise coun-
tervailing demands for freedom and wellbeing. Thus, orientated by the lodestar of a 
participatory self-determination on the part of the citizens, Kant steers his political 
concept of freedom between the Scylla of the libertarian refusal of all organized 
political activism and the Charybdis of illiberal paternalism. The aptness of Kant’s 
theory for our times results precisely in his positioning himself both against the 
formalism of a merely “negative freedom” excluding all content, and in favor of a 
procedural, rather than substantial determination of “positive freedom”.
2.1.4  Societal Self-Regulation
According to Kant, politics should refrain from coercion, but may introduce – mon-
etary, material, informational, logistical as well as immaterial, for instance, reputa-
tional – incentives in order to promote its projects. Consequently, politics is not a 
mere amalgamation of the generality of lawful rules and aggregated special inter-
ests. Kant’s concept of politics may not be reduced to state-prudence,52 the “doctrine 
of right put into practice” (AA VIII, 370), the promotion of progress toward justice 
51 The differentiation within the class of praemia auctorantia already worked out within Kant’s 
earlier lectures on morality provides the foundation for this idea. See Hans Vaihinger, Kant-Studien 
(Berlin & New York, 1942), 64ff.
52 Although the contrary view is supported by Schmitz, “Moral oder Klugheit?” See 413ff.
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and/or the protection of peace. It certainly encompasses those dimensions,53 but still 
aims at something higher: an ethically creative interpretation of the lifeworld 
(Lebenswelt). The political agent must ascertain which societal defects citizens con-
ceive as unjust and which ideals provide suitable alternatives.54 Which accomplish-
ments and norms are seen as particularly apt to help or hinder the promotion of the 
common good – and how is that fed back into our societal structures of incentiviza-
tion and recognition?
Yet how do political actors ascertain the people’s sense for socio-ethical prob-
lems to which they must cater? One answer popular in the secondary literature 
focuses upon certain reflections in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment that 
explain how individuals learn to assume the perspective of others in order to bring 
about a convergence of social judgements.55 Kant suggests one should judge as if 
directed by an “idea of a communal sense” i.e. oriented by a counterfactual ideal 
which can only be approximated towards (AA V, 293). He who judges must assume 
a perspective in which, as best one can, the view of all others is taken into account, 
by referring his particular judgment “as it were … to human reason as a whole” 
(ibid.).56 Certainly, man does not possess a God’s-eye view of the world. Nevertheless 
the practice of thinking “in the position of everyone else” (AA V 294) can be culti-
vated and optimized. The shadows our private perspectives cast on the world and the 
obscurity they produce can be lightened up by augmenting our range of vision with 
the perspectives of others.
Political theory here merges into the philosophy of culture. Can an “aesthetic 
education of man,” like the one proposed by Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) in alle-
giance to Kant, support a politics that is both liberal and at the same time orientated 
towards the common good? According to Schiller, by making us sensitive to the 
perspective of our fellow man, culture instigates in man, “a disposition which com-
prises in itself the wholeness of humanity.”57 Cultural forms make us receptive to the 
feelings, points-of-view, and world-interpretations of others.58 Without such 
53 See Thomas Kater, Politik, Recht, Geschichte: Zur Einheit der politischen Philosophie Immanuel 
Kants (Würzburg, 1999).
54 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Offenlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der 
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Franfurt am Main, 1990), 190.
55 See Ernst Vollrath, Grundlegung einer philosophische Theorie des Politischen (Würzburg, 1987) 
and Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Brighton, 1982). In their emphasis 
upon the political meaning of reflective judgement, the works of Hannah Arendt and Ernst Vollrath 
provide an important contribution to Kant-interpretation; but they err in according judgement too 
much independence over and above the sphere of practically normative theory as a whole. This 
aestheticizing of Kantian normativity is rejected within Patrick Riley, “Kant’s Two Conceptions of 
the Will in their Political Context” in Williams, ed., Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago, 1992), 
309.
56 See O’Neil in Williams, ed., Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 77.
57 Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Werke V (München, 2004), 637; translated in Friedrich Schiller, On 
the Aesthetic Education of Man (Dover, 2004), 103.
58 For contemporary reflection upon the contribution of aesthetic education to the project of a 
reflexively global politics see Martha Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the 
Humanities (Princeton, 2010), 7 & 103f.
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 foundations promoting mankind’s mutual respect and sensitivity towards one 
another, failure would threaten the project of a political reason autonomously delib-
erating about its goals. It would fall victim to the cold calculus of uncultivated 
thinking, like a man who – to quote Schiller once more – “self-seeking without 
being himself, unfettered without being free”  – shrinks and sinks into gross 
egoism.59
Yet, no state can flourish that is comprised of individuals who absolutize their 
private ends and, wherever they can, assert themselves at the expense of all others. 
Society must control utility-maximizers who exploit every legal loophole. However, 
the tighter the straitjacket of incentives and rewards, and the more firmly tied the 
knot of surveillance, all the more difficult is it for freedom to breathe. Wherever it 
chokes, the putrid stench of opportunism engulfs us all the more. Without humanist 
culture, political liberalism cannot exist for long. Therefore the liberal state has a 
cultural mission. For this reason alone, culture is not merely a private matter; for 
without it the res publica cannot survive.60
Politics requires the symbolic worlds of culture in order to bring about a unifying 
interpretation of the social life and generate a plausible vision of its optimization.61 
Politics cannot operate in a vacuum of abstract concepts.62 Without the concreteness 
of integrated symbols and convincing scenarios, politics cannot thrive.63 The intel-
lectual lodestar for such a symbolic endeavor marks the command – formulated in 
Kant’s concept of the highest good – to abolish step-by-step society’s ethical asym-
metries; a lodestar by which the respective political actors then are to navigate on 
the very path that, based on their own judgment, best fits the given situation. The 
regulative idea of the “highest good” provides the vision of a societal life where 
“freedom, partly moved and partly restricted by moral laws, would itself be the 
cause of the general happiness, and rational beings, under the guidance of such 
principles, would themselves be the authors of their own enduring welfare and at the 
same time that of others” (AA III, 525).
Although this may very much contradict the customary image of Kant: The pur-
suit of happiness becomes bound up with Kant’s political liberalism and not at all in 
contradiction to its underlying principle of freedom – e.g. by Kant caving in to an 
otherwise overly restive human nature – but rather as its consistent expression.64 By 
including conceptions of the ‘highest good’ in the sphere of politics the synthesis of 
practical reason with its lifeworld is completed. As reason is certainly autonomous, 
but not autarch, Kant coherently and consequently declares it the actual “task of 
59 Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Werke V, 646; translated in Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic 
Education of Man, 113.
60 See Wilhelm Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu 
bestimmen (Stuttgart, 1967).
61 See Dieter Henrich, ed. Über Theorie und Praxis (Frankfurt am Main, 1967), 35.
62 See Heiner Bielefeldt, Symbolic Representation in Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge, 
2003).
63 See Dierksmeier, Das Noumenon Religion, 148f.
64 See Schmitz, “Moral oder Klugheit,” 413ff.
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politics” to make “the public satisfied with its condition” (AA VIII, 386). 
Accordingly, we cannot simply negatively protect the freedom of all, one must 
also – in the sphere demarcated and delimited by the principle of freedom – posi-
tively promote those projects from which citizens expect a better life. Hence results 
“another transcendental and affirmative principle of public right,” which provides 
the systematic conclusion of the political theory of Kant’s philosophy of freedom:
“All maxims which need publicity (in order not to fail in their end) harmonize with right 
and politics combined.”
For if they can attain their end only through publicity, they must conform with the uni-
versal end of the public (happiness), and to be in accord with this (to make the public satis-
fied with its condition) is the proper task of politics. But if this end is to be attainable only 
through publicity, that is, by the removal of all distrust towards the maxims of politics, such 
maxims must also be in accord with the right of the public, since only in this is the union of 
the ends of all possible” (AA VIII, 386)
That which legally becomes the goal of politics in the sphere of publicity of a 
state governed under the rule of law, is consequently also legitimated in the name of 
liberty.65 While philosophy does thus provide a procedural political goal, it leaves 
its substantial contents to the discretion of liberal republican processes. Kant thus 
connects the idea of a liberal order with that of a pluralistic public sphere. He fur-
nishes politics with a normative idea, but does not lay down how specifically poli-
tics should be carried out in the light of this idea. On the contrary, he justifies the 
view that – and how – various societies could, according to their respective needs, 
come up with their own differing concepts of how the idea of liberal politics could 
be concretized and realized.
Kant thus identifies normatively correct politics as the path towards its empiri-
cally successful implementation.66 The political imperative, to only follow direc-
tives which require public agreement for their realization, refers politics to the 
participation of the population. Obviously, this procures the acceptance of the poli-
cies at hand. Instead of fantasizing about shattering private interest by a universal 
ethic imposed ‘from above,’ for Kant, it is all a question of the integration of the 
individual into the social – for the end of everyone’s “moral happiness” (AA VII 
277). Having the citizens’ concrete concerns inform legislation is an outcome of the 
directive to bring politics into alignment with the free participation of citizens in 
order to pursue – within the boundaries of the rule of law – the conceptions of free-
dom they champion.67 Kant therefore does not subordinate the citizens’  understanding 
65 An idea again appears here which is analogous to one that Kant already invoked in the ethically-
inner determination of ends. “What, in the relation of a human being to himself and others, can be 
an end is an end for pure practical reason; for, pure practical reason is a faculty of ends generally, 
and for it to be indifferent to ends, that is, to take no interest in them, would therefore be a contra-
diction, since then it would not determine maxims for actions either (because every maxim of 
action contains an end) and so would not be practical reason” (AA VI, 395).
66 See Volker Gerhardt, Immanuel Kants Entwurf “Zum ewigen Frieden”: Eine Theorie der Politik 
(Darmstadt, 1995).
67 See Christopher Gohl, Prozedurale Politik am Beispiel organisierter Dialog: Wie politische 
Beteiligung professionell gestaltet werden kann – eine Grundlegung (2011)
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of freedom and politics – like Fichte and Marx (see Sect. 2.2.4.) – to the philoso-
pher’s supposedly better knowledge and to the political goals they formulate; he 
rather constitutively incorporates citizens’ conceptions of themselves and the world 
into his political model.
Although Kant, as a citizen of his time, obviously took part in socio-political 
discourse and was savvy enough to ensure that the public attended to his opinions, 
in accordance with his own political philosophy he never claimed to speak with 
philosophical authority on daily politics. On the contrary, having established a uni-
versal idea of political freedom, he left its concretization through specific concepts 
of freedom to the citizens. As one such citizen Kant also allowed himself to express 
his views about current political affairs. Like everyone else, philosophers also have 
the right to add their voice to controversies concerning the optimization of laws – 
and they may be outvoted, like everybody else, too.68
For this reason, Kant’s political liberalism proves attractive beyond the circle of 
people convinced by Kantian philosophy as a whole. Kant did not proclaim for the 
political sphere the metaphysically-moral conception of a freedom obligated 
towards a determinate good, but rather merely proclaimed the outer-legal variant of 
a freedom generally orientated towards the good; consequently, his concept of the 
political can also integrate views privileging concepts of political freedoms other 
than the ones he favored.69 Kant regionalizes and temporalizes politics; it may, or 
rather, it should be different from place to place and from time to time, as he spurns 
the depiction of a philosophical perfect state, a perfectly rational legal and eco-
nomic system or political model. In order to protect everyone’s right to freedom 
and, at the same time, to arrive at adequately specific policy recommendations, two 
things are imperative: first, an informed public taking part in the development of 
political objectives and, second, an emphasis upon citizens’ objections as prima 
facie indicators of possible violations of rights. Kant therefore expected the realiza-
tion of his political theory from political freedom itself. Since philosophy does not 
only theoretically demand a plural public, but also practically promotes the public 
use of reason, it advances the factual recognition of its own liberal ideas.
Through constitutional arrangements regarding the appropriate organization of 
the state the public discourse about political directives must ensure that each law 
deliberated upon has to pass the publicity text. For this purpose, Kant stresses the 
importance of distinguishing between “the form of state” and “the kind of govern-
ment” (AA VIII, 353). Although he looks upon democracy as the adequate contem-
porary expression of political freedom, he does not conceive of democracy as an end 
in itself. He speculates that in bygone times other forms of government may have 
68 See Volker Gerhardt, Partizipation: Das Princip der Politik (München, 2007).
69 Kant thus begins a project of political philosophy which John Rawls similarly made the central 
program of his late philosophy. When Rawls ranks Kant among the proponents of that “compre-
hensive liberalism,” against which he believes he has to demarcate his project of a “political not 
metaphysical” liberalism, then, in my opinion this is either owing to the will to brand only himself 
as the founder of that program and/or an imprecise interpretation of Kant. For more detailed infor-
mation about this see Sect. 3.2.1.
2.1 Reflexive Freedom (Immanuel Kant)
70
been more suitable for actualizing the liberal principle of law; and, furthermore, he 
points out that a democracy (demos/kratein) which turns into as a dictatorship of a 
‘tumultuously’ gathered volition of the crowds is but “mob rule” (AA XXIII, 
160ff.). Specific procedures must rather first transform the sheer will of the people 
into the legitimate will of the state. Liberty-protecting processes have to prevent the 
whims of the masses passing themselves off as acts of law and state – so that minori-
ties can be protected and state action becomes uncoupled from private willfulness.70 
Liberal processes are to ensure that politics does not lose its structural liberty during 
the determination and specification of civic freedoms.
Consequently, Kant does not champion merely procedural justice. Although, 
under the condition of modernity, he considers the democratic form of governance 
to be the most appropriate way of legislating public law (AA VIII, 353), he does not 
conflate the representative institutionalizing of political processes with the republi-
can way of governing in the interest of freedom that, according to him, is the philo-
sophical mission of politics. The right to freedom remains as ever the corrective 
ideal and the criterion for the critical evaluation and legitimation of all forms of 
legislation, including democratic ones.71 The democratic legislator may hence only 
work within the boundaries of a legal framework devoted to liberty and removed 
from popular discretion; that is, for instance, within the sphere of a constitution 
directed – procedurally and substantially – towards protecting the freedom of all 
(see AA XXIII, 160ff.). It is not the will of the majority in itself that should rule, but 
rather it is only the representation of a lawful will (expressing itself in majorities, 
but protecting the rights of minorities) that can legitimately organize citizens’ free-
dom (see AA VI 313f.). Freedom acts thus not only as the basis of democratic legiti-
macy, but also as its boundary. If a democracy annuls its founding liberal 
principle – like, for example, through the Weimar ‘Ermächtigungsgesetz’ of March 
24, 1933 – it nullifies its own normative foundation.
With this turn to the liberal constitutional-state it becomes clear that, for Kant, 
the state’s mission results from the specific measures of legal and political philoso-
phy – and not vice versa. That makes his liberalism philosophically more attractive 
than that of many current Anglo-American thinkers who notably take their cues 
from a certain understanding of society and state (mostly multi-party democracy 
plus market-economy) when philosophizing about the contours of rights and poli-
tics. Kant’s political philosophy thus transcends the cultural boundaries of the occi-
dental context in which it arose and remains especially relevant for dialogue 
concerning human rights and constitutional law within the age of globality.
Moreover, the Kantian philosophy of law is neither primarily nor exclusively 
orientated towards the concept of the nation state. Kant does not legitimate the state 
in terms of ethnic particularity, but rather in terms of humanistic universality. 
Statehood results because everyone’s innate right to an access to a world ruled by 
70 See also Reflexion 7687 (AA XIX 490) which is aimed at the idea of monarchy: “But this type 
of government or state constitution is certainly bad simply because the soundness of the govern-
ment depends upon whether or not the will of an individual is good.”
71 See Langer, Reform nach Prinzipien, 87–95.
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laws of freedom cannot be realized without institutionalization. As Kant had 
showed, even most benevolent human beings cannot prevent themselves from com-
ing into conflict with one another concerning that to which they respectively are 
legally entitled. So as not to be judge in their own affairs, they require institutions 
of arbitration. While this function is today mostly undertaken by nation states, from 
a philosophical perspective, this is insignificant; sub-state and super-state institu-
tions could, with just the same claim to legitimacy, be entrusted with the protection 
of rights. What is indispensable is solely the provision of a monopoly of power 
within the respective sphere of regulation so as to guarantee the execution of the 
law.72 Kant, in short, is no nationalist, but rather a federalist and a cosmopolitan.
Yet, since the historical directive of Kant’s time was the sovereign management 
of law by nation states, he concerned himself with accurately determining their law-
ful relations among one another. In the face of international conflicts, where states 
behave towards one another like individual subjects in a legally unregulated state of 
nature, one has to consider whether states also have a duty to submit to coercive 
lawful rules (AA VI, 354).73 Kant saw this to be the case. The absence of a generally 
binding world-order in the long run enables individuals and collectives to dodge the 
law, which, in his eyes, ultimately means that the lawful framework “of all the oth-
ers is unavoidably undermined and must finally collapse” (AA VI 311). Kant thus 
strove for a lawful world order whose operations would result from universally 
recognized lawful principles and not merely from regional power relations. On one 
hand, this order should be so liberal and subsidiary that the individual states within 
it can protect their cultural idiosyncrasies and exist undisturbed – as long as they do 
not infringe upon the rights of other states or commit human rights violations. On 
the other hand, that global order should be able to address and regulate everything 
that communally concerns all world citizens.
The eventual name for this lawful representation of humanity is of only marginal 
significance. Kant juggles with the expressions “federal state [Bundesstaat]” verus 
“federation of states [Staatesbund],” in pretty much the same ways as today we 
debate concepts like Global Government versus Global Governance.74 More impor-
tant are the criteria orienting such conceptions. These, however, were already clearly 
prescribed by Kant with the formulation of the legal and the political imperative. 
For that reason, Kant deserves to be honored as one of the first liberals both to iden-
tify the problems resulting from the global constellation of modern life and to con-
tribute to their intercultural pacification.
All in all, Kant succeeded in navigating his philosophical liberalism safely 
between the equally unappealing extremes of a formalism of negative freedom and 
a dogmatism of positive freedom. For the quest for a consciously responsible liber-
alism that drives many thinkers today, Kant thus provided a solid intellectual point 
72 See Anna Stilz, Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Objection and the State (Princeton, 2009).
73 See Georg F. Cavallar, Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right (Cardiff, 1999).
74 See Antonio Franceshet, Kant and Liberal Internationalism: Sovereignty, Justice and Global 
Reform (2007) and Mark F. N. Franke, Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, 
and Critique of World Politics (Albany, New York, 2001).
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of departure. Kant championed a reflexive, self-critical conception of a self- 
determining freedom, which allows, also on the global and intercultural level, the 
synthesis of diversity (concrete concepts of freedom) and unity (structural idea of 
freedom). Looking far beyond the affairs of his time, he developed conceptual foun-
dations for a cosmopolitan liberalism that his successors, especially Karl Christian 
Friedrich Krause (see Sect. 2.3.4), made use of when developing plans for a 
European federation of states (Staatesbund) as well as for a worldwide league of 
nations.75
With Kant also begins the impulse to conceive of the relationship between indi-
vidual autonomy and societal responsibility not as an unavoidable conflict, but 
rather as a necessary synthesis. Instead of engaging in a tug-of-war between the two 
respective parties – where a quantitative increase in freedom continually leads to a 
decrease in justice or responsibility and vice versa – Kant inspired people to exam-
ine how a reciprocal inclusion and qualitative reinforcement of either notion could 
take place. Kant thus became the catalyst for the social philosophy of German 
Idealism, which exerted a strong influence on the intellectual forefathers of social-
ism and social democracy. This very transition of the principle of freedom into its 
socio-political concretizations shall now be exemplified by two particularly distinc-
tive representatives, Fichte and Krause. Both set out on the quest for a viable bal-
ance between individual freedom and social responsibility; a balance that is as 
precarious as it is necessary.
2.2  Directive Freedom (Johann Gottlieb Fichte)
In texts about the history of the idea of liberalism, Fichte is often overlooked. For 
many his work seems hardly accessible and its content mostly sublated and sur-
passed by Hegel’s philosophy. Furthermore, the fact that Fichte promulgated social-
ism with a planned economy seems to suggest that his work should be classified as 
illiberal and passed over. But such a reading oversimplifies things. Fichte wished to 
grant freedom even greater importance than did Kant. He regretted that, with the 
exception of the practical philosophy, the idea of freedom does not always occupy 
the premier role in Kant’s thinking. In Kant’s theoretical philosophy it has merely a 
marginal function and in the Critique of the Power of Judgement its function, while 
certainly important, nonetheless remains in the background. In contrast, Fichte 
decided to make freedom the explicit basis of his entire philosophical system. He 
even addresses theoretical and aesthetic questions with reference to freedom. In 
aspiration and approach, philosophical liberalism cannot actually be any more 
radical.
75 Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832) filled the lacuna left over by Kant in his congenial 
engagement with him by producing a systematic theory of the rights of world citizens in which the 




Nevertheless, Fichte’s philosophy does not appear to be consistently liberal: In 
large parts of it, especially within his practical philosophy, directive coercion as 
opposed to freedom is the leitmotif. In the firm belief to be doing freedom a service, 
Fichte considers it right, for instance, to pass over or suspend liberal procedures of 
political decision-making in order to reach a final state of perfect freedom. Illiberal 
measures are sanctified as means towards freedom’s end. Prominent examples are 
his outlines for a planned economy, his instrumentalist treatment of the environ-
ment, and his harsh contractualism – rejecting the rights of the disabled as well as 
gravely curtailing the freedoms of women and children: all proclaimed in the name 
of freedom. This paradox makes Fichte’s philosophy an informative lesson, as it 
exemplifies the central problem concerning how, when, and where freedom may be 
advanced by coercion – by means of the decisive question: Whose idea of freedom 
actually tips the scales; that of the philosophers or that of the citizens?
In the work of all of the proponents of German Idealism, freedom is the philo-
sophical principle par excellence, and Fichte’s work should be seen in this context.76 
In the eyes of the German Idealists, Kant had certainly uncovered the true, uncondi-
tioned character of freedom, but he did not provide a sufficient basis for it. According 
to Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and other thinkers of this epoch, one had to reconceive 
of reality itself as derivative of the principle of freedom, in order to demonstrate 
that, in truth, there is no valid alternative to freedom-based philosophy. Kant was 
therefore to be supplemented or surpassed by a philosophy which would be not 
hesitantly but emphatically, not partially but totally, dedicated and devoted to 
freedom.
In this context, lawful coercion is of particular interest, since it obviously limits 
individual freedom.77 To justify this, one can of course not, like English utilitarians, 
simply refer back to the benefits which legal coercion (in protecting and securing 
the individual) may provide. Reasons for compulsion, which are not essentially 
related to freedom, can be rejected in the name of freedom. Moral or religious con-
siderations are therefore likewise problematic. The validity of subjecting to lawful 
coercion even those who do not share those very reasons cannot thus be derived.78 
Although morality, religion, and a utility-conscious prudence provide numerous 
secondary reasons to behave lawfully, they do not capture what needs to be primar-
ily identified here, a rationale for coercion that belongs to the principle of freedom 
itself.79
76 See Henry S. Richardson, Developments and Main Outlines in Rawls’s Theory of Justice (New 
York: Garland, 1999).
77 See Michael Köhler, “Zur Begründung des Rechtszwangs im Anschluss am Kant und Fichte” in 
Michael Kahlo, Ernst Amdeus-Wolff & Rainer Zaczyk, Fichtes Lehre vom Rechtsverhältnis: Die 
Deduktion der [Paragraphen] 1–4 der Grundlage des Naturrechts und ihre Stellung in der 
Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 93 & 106.
78 See ibid., 119.
79 See Hans-Martin Pawlowski, Stefan Smid & Rainer Specht, “Vorwort” in Die Praktische 
Philosophie Schellings und die gegenwärtige Rechtsphilosophie (Stuttgart: Bad Cannstatt, 1989), 9.
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The attempt merely to define coercion as the double negation of freedom, that is, 
as the nullification of a nullification of freedom, is just as unsatisfying. Kant had 
already considered the idea, taken up later anew by Friedrich August von Hayek and 
others (see Sect. 3.2.1) of a justification for coercion as “a hindering of a hindrance 
of freedom” (AA VI: 231). But Kant also immediately made it clear that the right to 
freedom could precisely not be explained by the authorization to coerce, but that 
rather the authorization to coerce always depends upon the rights it is to protect. The 
question concerning legitimate coercion therefore again leads immediately back to 
the question concerning a lawfully legitimated freedom. Whoever does not want to 
confound facts with norms and who does not want to equate the freedom that ought 
to exist with the freedom that does, has to indicate which freedom is supposed to be 
defended by the means of lawful coercion.
A philosophical clarification about to which freedom everyone has an inviolable 
right, must precede the definition and justification of coercion. Legal positivism 
therefore also fails in the attempt to define ‘right’ only in terms of that which the 
state declares to be right. The idea of law cannot of course be derived from the fac-
tual power of coercion in the cynical sense of the expression that “might makes 
right.” The required self-sufficiency of the justification of lawful coercion however 
clearly means something completely different than a self-legitimation of legal fac-
ticity through value-relative decisionism.
Hence, Fichte concludes, freedom must limit itself. Whoever is coerced by me 
will hardly agree with my coercion if, as a result, only my freedom is excellently 
secured, while theirs is annihilated. I must rather make it clear that also their free-
dom is thereby defended. Consequently, not merely my purely private possession of 
freedom, but rather an interpersonally valid content of freedom, has to serve as a 
criterion. The principle that can acceptably limit anyone’s freedom must therefore 
at the same time affirm everyone’s freedom. Private freedom thus forever refers 
beyond itself to the horizon of societal freedom, without which it is theoretically 
null and practically void. To legitimate coercion one requires more than a contin-
gent convergence of (conditioned) interests and concerns. Only (unconditioned) 
freedom itself can justify coercion.
Fichte now localizes that unconditioned, absolute freedom in the metaphysical 
freedom of the “Absolute,” or, in other words, within the ultimate principle of being 
itself.80 Fichte believes that it is only insofar as freedom essentially holds the entire 
world together that it can constitute a uniting bond between individuals which tran-
scends contextual contingencies. In his time, Fichte’s speculative Idealist metaphys-
ics of a cosmically unfolding freedom in no way stood alone; it was rather typical 
of early nineteenth century philosophy. Fichte’s philosophy did, however, stand out 
from the thinking of his contemporaries because of its methodological rigor. He 
derives highly atypical consequences from the principle of freedom, which make us 
receptive to the systematic problems of the kind of liberalism he supports. At issue 
here is the aforementioned paradox, that Fichte’s philosophy takes up freedom as its 
80 See Georg Römpp, Ethik des Selbstbewusstseins: Der Andere in der idealistischen Grundlegung 
der Philosophie: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel (Berlin, 1999), 274f.
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goal and – as a means for its attainment – advocates a “system of coercion.”81 That – 
and why – this paradox results from a methodological mistake with wide ramifica-
tions, should be more precisely discussed in the following; not least so that, in this 
context, the more perspicacious alternative found in Krause’s procedural liberalism 
(Sect. 2.3) can be better appreciated.
2.2.1  Epistemology and Metaphysics of Law
From time immemorial, most philosophers have treated rights and law as a branch 
of practical philosophy distinct from morals. Kant did this (see Sect. 2.1.2) by dis-
tinguishing within the practical realm legal from moral norms (i.e. the ethics of 
good intentions and dispositions) according to their respective mode of sanctioning. 
In terms of substance, Kant sees law as concerned with outer freedom affecting oth-
ers; in terms of sanctioning, legal norms allow coercion, while morality must be 
content with appeals to inner freedom. Consequently, law and morals both function 
as forms of ethical norms; they both formulate an ought, and not always also an is. 
Precisely this changes with Fichte. He believes one has to treat the theory of 
freedom- giving law in theoretical as opposed to practical philosophy, i.e. as part of 
the structure of what is as opposed to what ought to be. Fichte seeks a theory that 
not only makes an appeal for the establishment and maintenance of a system of 
rights serving freedom, but rather one which guarantees its own implementation. 
Fichte wishes not only to legitimate coercion within the legal system, but also to 
establish a coercion to it.
In a letter to Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823) in 1795, Fichte complained 
about how Kant would explain that an individual positing unethical maxims falls 
into self-contradiction once they are universalized. Yet Kant would not explain why 
individuals have to conceive of themselves in terms of precisely that universal per-
spective instead of, say, contenting themselves with a merely private  – or self- 
contradictory – positing of maxims.82 As a result, Fichte realizes that the actual task 
of the philosopher is to show, in contrast to Kant, that freedom can only be con-
ceived as integrated within a kingdom of rational beings standing under universal 
81 See especially Manfred O. Hinz, Fichte’s “System der Freiheit”: Analyse eines widersprüchli-
chen Begriffs (Stuttgart, 1981).
82 Letter from August 29, 1795 (GA III/2, 384, EPW 407). Fichte’s works are, whenever possible, 
cited from Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
Reinhard Lauth & Hans Gliwitsky, eds. (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1964): GA (with Roman numerals 
for the series, dash, Arabic numerals for the volume, comma and page numbers) for the Fichte 
Gesamtausgabe (e.g. GA I/3, 123). Otherwise, Immanuel Hermann Fichte’s edition is followed 
(e.g.: FW II, 233). The following English translations of Fichte’s works are followed and cited: 
Yolanda Estes & Curtis Bowman, eds. J.  G. Fichte and the Atheism Dispute (1798–1800) 
(Routledge, 2016): AD; Daniel Breazeale, ed. & trans., Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings 
(Ithaca & London, 1988): EPW; and J.  G. Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right (Cambridge, 
2000): FNR.
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laws. The solution to the problem is proclaimed one day later, concisely expressed 
in a letter to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819):
the individual must be deduced from the absolute I … A finite being (supposing that one can 
be deduced) can think of itself only as a physical being who is part of a realm of physical 
beings, of which a part (viz., that part which consists of those beings which are unable to 
initiate anything) is under its causal control, while it interacts reciprocally with the other 
part (viz., that part which consists of those beings to whom it attributes the concept of sub-
ject). (The conditions which make individuality possible are called “rights.”) A finite being 
posits such a realm just as surely as it posits itself as an individual, for these are reciprocal 
concepts. (GA III/2, 391–392, EPW 411)
For the question of freedom, this means: Right would be derived, together with 
coercion, as a necessary expression of freedom, if no one could think of themselves 
as anything other than already connected within a lawful order universally protect-
ing and structuring freedom. To make this point, Fichte wishes to engage in the 
deduction of the concept of right/law from the highest principle of philosophy so 
that “we can rely on this concept to answer all the questions common sense can raise 
concerning right” (GA I/3, 359; FNR 50).83
This claim clearly goes significantly further than the Kantian attempt merely to 
provide “metaphysical foundations” for the doctrine of law. In contrast to Kant, 
Fichte aims not only at a critical application of the idea of freedom to juridical 
themes. Rather, Fichte’s doctrine of law assumes a foundational role in the 
theoretical- metaphysical derivation of the lifeworld. In it occurs the development of 
an, at first, still abstract subject into a concrete person by means of a deduction of 
the external world, of individuality, and of interpersonality.84 Fichte justifies the 
subjective assumption of an external world existing independently of individual 
consciousness not within the sphere of his theory of knowledge, but rather in his 
doctrine of law.85
The comparison with Kant (see Sect. 2.1.4) clarifies what is at stake: Kant had 
always carefully distinguished between critique and doctrine, i.e. between tran-
scendental foundational work and metaphysical instantiation, that is, between the 
legitimation of an idea and of the concepts concretizing it. Fichte finds fault with 
how this does not lead to a unified philosophy. The idea of freedom would thus not 
be the sole principle of philosophy, but rather appears co-determined by worldly 
objects and themes. Fichte therefore nullifies that Kantian distinction (GA I/2, 159). 
With his Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) he wishes to carry out tran-
scendental philosophy and metaphysics – critique and doctrine – at one and the 
83 See Christian Maria Stadler, J.  G. Fichtes Grundlegung des ethischen Idealismus, oder, 
Transcendentale Deduktion zwischen Wissen und Wollen (Cuxhaven, 1996), 129 and Hartmut 
Tietjen, Fichte und Husserl: Letztbegründung, Subjektivität und praktische Vernunft im transzen-
dentalen Idealismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1980), 193–197.
84 See Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, “Die Begrenzung. Von Anstoß zur Aufforderung,” Fichte-Studien 
16 (1999), 167–190 and Edith Düsing, “Das Problem der Individualität in Fichtes früher Ethik und 
Rechtslehre,” Fichte-Studien 3 (1991), 29–50.
85 See Wolfgang Schrader, Empirisches und absolutes Ich: Zur Geschichte des Begriffs Leben in 
der Philosophie J. G. Fichte (Stuttgart: Bad Cannstatt, 1972), 26ff.
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same time.86 The aim is a unified metaphysics of freedom, which brings the deriva-
tion and the proof of validity of the principle of freedom together in one conclu-
sively proven theorem (Letzbegründungstheorem) (GA I/2160f.).87 The idea of 
freedom and the actuality of freedom should melt into one.
The philosopher, Fichte holds, has to reconstruct all our knowledge from the 
ground up (GA I/3, 316n; FNR 7n) – as a necessary concept of the mind whose 
conceptual necessity extends to the specificity of its substantial determination and 
application in life (GA I/3, 319; FNR 8–9). The difference Kant established between 
transcendental and metaphysical deduction is collapsed – with grave consequences: 
As we saw (Sect. 2.1.2), Kant could simply fall back upon historical givens (like the 
Prussian General Law of the Land and the legal institutions outlined within it, like 
private property) as the object of his metaphysical deductions, without – unlike with 
objects of transcendental deduction – having to speculatively derive them. Fichte’s 
method, on the other hand, forces him to deduce also these givens.88 The law is thus 
properly deduced only when it can exactly be identified in its whole concreteness as 
a necessary moment of human self-consciousness.
But since Fichte’s legal philosophy would like to operate, not with representa-
tions of what ought to be, but rather as a doctrine of what is, it does not, as with 
Kant, aim to explain the normative necessity of the idea of law, but rather the factual 
necessity of law: as a strict “condition of self-consciousness [which] constitutes the 
deduction of that concept” (GA I/3, 319; FNR 9).89 Yet, wherever metaphysical and 
transcendental deductions – that is, proofs of content and the proofs of validity – 
coincide, philosophy has to master all phenomena; it cannot leave anything unex-
plained, it must (be able to) trace all things to their ultimate foundation, and in this 
way first establish their respective significance (GA I/2, 146). That also includes the 
derivation of every object of consciousness with the result that “the necessity of all 
the particular objects in nature and their necessary classification” must be derived 
from that foundation (GA I/3, 348; FNR 38).90 All practical – for instance, eco-
nomic – conditions, transforming, protecting, or hindering life under the rule of law 
should be derived in this way.
The effects of this methodological shift upon the theory of freedom are extreme. 
For example: It is one thing to explain the specific form of human freedom in terms 
86 See Christian Maria Stadler, J.  G. Fichtes Grundlegung des ethischen Idealismus, oder, 
Transcendentale Deduktion zwischen Wissen und Wollen, 19.
87 See Wolgang Schrader, “Konstruktion versus Unmittelbarkeit: Zum Verhältnis von Philosophie 
und Leben bei J. G. Fichte,” Fichte-Studien 11 (1997), 367–377.
88 See Ludwig Siep, Praktische Philosophie in Deutschen Idealismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1992) 
65–80, especially 68f.
89 According to J. Brachtendorf, Fichte claims “too much when he pretends that the concept of law 
is a condition of self-consciousness and that he has deduced it from the I,” since it is in no way the 
case “that rational beings must always stand in such a relation.” Existing law is certainly a condi-
tion of possibility for society, yet “that society exists is not a condition of self-consciousness” 
(Johannes Brachtenorf, Fiche’s Lehre von Sein: Eine kritische Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre 
von 1794, 1798/99 und 1812 [Paderborn, 1995], 190f).
90 See Schrader, Empirisches und absolutes Ich, 70 & 77ff.
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of the concept of a choice from manifold options; but it is quite another to “deduce” 
that “the manifold” exists in the world because it belongs to the structure of freedom 
to be able to choose from various options.91 Fichte thus makes the world as a whole 
dependent upon transcendental consciousness: The external world thus exists 
because freedom needs an object to toil with in order to become conscious of itself. 
Fichte maintains that certain materials exist because one requires them for ethical 
action – dense matter for bodily movement and self-articulation, subtle matter (i.e. 
air and light) for the ends of communication (GA I/3, 368; FNR 60–61). In the 
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, for example, space in its entirety is deduced as a 
“sphere of freedom”92 because only within it could the relative position of objects 
be changed and, consequently, only within it could freedom become practical.
Fichte’s contemporaries already reproached him for treating nature as a whole 
merely as a substrate of ethical self-determination.93 Thus he appears guilty of a 
theoretical reductionism, which views the world merely as raw material for free-
dom, as well as of a moral rigorism, which only respects free agency.94 For a long 
time many Fichte scholars have taken pains to counter these objections by citing 
passages which, in contrast, evidence a less derivative valuation of nature.95 But 
such attempts are pointless. The claim that he would turn the world into a mere 
“material of our duty” (GA I/5 353; AD 25) is something that Fichte himself would 
not have understood as a reproach, but rather as a compliment (GA I/5, 349; AD 
22–23). Fichte considered the instrumentalization of the entire world for the ends of 
freedom, not as an awkward blemish upon the face of his philosophy but rather as 
its badge of honor.96
The repeated comparison with the Kantian architectonic elucidates the explo-
siveness of Fichte’s procedure: Kant had started out with a threefold philosophical 
structure (theoretical, practical, and aesthetic) and had established for his philo-
sophical system a merely regulative unifying principle. He did not attempt to resolve 
the three independent basic mental faculties (understanding, reason, imagination) 
into one single principle.97 Rather, Kant purposefully distinguished three classes of 
phenomena: rational, irrational, and a-rational. A-rational phenomena – for instance 
objects and life forms of the natural environment – are in many cases not – or not 
fully – determined by ethical reason. Still, this does not justify deprecating them or 
91 See Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo: Kollegnachschrift von K. Chr. Fr. Krause (1798–
99), Erich Fuchs, ed. (Hamburg, 1982), 61.
92 See ibid., 114.
93 See Marco Ivaldo, “Die systematische Position der Ethik nach der Wissenschaftslehre nova 
method und der Sittenlehre 1798,” Fichte-Studien 16 (1999), 237–254.
94 See Hans Freyer, “Das Material der Pflichten: Eine Studie über Fichte’s spätere Sittenlehre,” 
Kant-Studien 25, 113–155.
95 See Virginia López-Dominguez, “Die Idee des Leibes im Jenaer System,” Fichte-Studien 16 
(1999), 273–293.
96 This original view is followed in: Christian Maria Stadler, Freiheit in Gemeinschaft: Zum tran-
szendentalphilosophischen Rechtsbegriff Johann Gottlieb Fichtes (2000), 25ff. For the genealogy 
of these ideas, see Claus Dierksmeier, “Kant-Forberg-Fichte” (1999).
97 See Klaus Düsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff (Bonn, 1968).
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treating them as opposed to reason. According to Kant, nature does not only exist 
for the ends of humanity. Our end-seeking (reflective) as well as end-giving (teleo-
logical) interpretation cannot determine nature in itself, but can at most determine it 
for us regulatively, and not constitutively, never totally, but forever only partially: 
“Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends, morals considers a possible 
kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature” writes Kant (AA IV 436; italics, C.D.). 
Nature is therefore interpreted as, among other things, a medium of morality, but is 
not forcefully reduced to that role alone. For, in Kant, teleological thinking belongs 
“to no doctrine at all, but only the critique” of reason (AA V 417), a metaphysics 
placing the whole world in the service of freedom remains impossible.98
Fichte strives for the exact opposite. He first reduces our theoretical knowledge 
of the world to a fleeting dance of pictures whose true significance only ethics can 
pin down (GA I/5, 440; AD 114–115). He thus declares practical philosophy the 
“root” of all philosophy, one which penetrates into sovereign sphere of theoretical 
philosophy, thus making the latter subordinate to the former. Nature is, conse-
quently, not to be studied in and for itself, but rather explained as – and thus trans-
figured into – a field of agency conforming to freedom; it is characterized as a world 
whose actual truth is only to be reached by the knowledge of its ethical purpose (GA 
I/5 158 & 169f).99 Contrary to his stated intentions, Fichte thus champions a concep-
tion of the world that it is not less, but rather more, intensively dualistic than the 
Kantian conception. Fichte knows only two classes of phenomena: valuably- rational 
versus worthlessly-irrational phenomena  – tertium non datur. “Whatever is 
grounded in reason is absolutely necessary; and whatever is not necessary is pre-
cisely on that account contrary to reason” (GA I/5 348 AD 22). In this lies the crux 
of his metaphysics of freedom.100
Fichte radicalizes philosophy into a struggle between world-views, between 
nature (deterministic world-view) and freedom (perspective of autonomy). Instead 
of the mediation of both worlds (by a third dimension, that of the reflecting and 
symbolizing power of imagination) favored by Kant, Fichte’s conception forces one 
to side with either one or the other point of view. And Fichte of course favors the 
moral conception of the world. What results is the dominance of a first-order 
(practico- ethical) world-view over a second order (theoretico-scientific) world-view 
98 For more details about this see Wolfgang Bartusschat, Zum systematischen Ort von Kants Kritik 
der Urteilskraft (Frankfurt am Main, 1972).
99 “The practical I and the theoretical I relate to one another like end and means. The theoretical I 
is the means with whose help the I can be practical” (Stadler, J. G. Fichtes Grundlegung des ethis-
chen Idealismus, 356).
100 See Günter Schulte, “Vernunft und Natur  – Transzendentalphilosophie als Symptom” in 
Hammacher & Muses, eds., Erneuerung der Transzendentalphilosophie im Anschluß an Kant und 
Fichte: Festschrift für Reinhard Lauth zum 60. Geburtstag (Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt, 1979), 345–
359. C. M. Stadler attempts to absolve Fichte from this reproach with the peculiar argument that 
Fichte lacked “any sense of a disposition for the teleology of nature” because he, unlike Schelling, 
did not (falsely) claim that nature was “still unconscious spirit,” but rather (correctly) that it existed 
“only as material of duty” and as a “value-free material for the realization” of morality (Stadler, 
Freiheit in Gemeinschaft, 73).
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(GA I/5, 349 AD 22–23). Quite consistently, therefore, Fichte writes that the kind of 
philosophy one has depends upon what kind of person one is and wishes to be (FW 
I 434f.). For an ethically committed consciousness there can only be Fichte’s 
freedom- orientated world-view.
While Kant had declared the gradual harmonization of nature and freedom to be 
an ongoing, open project, Fichte champions a radical and total subordination of 
nature to freedom, and gives it top priority in his philosophy. All phenomena con-
trary to the moral law are labeled as insubstantial appearance or declared to be mere 
illusion (FW II, 298f.). For Fichte there exists no necessity to have a non- instrumental 
theoretical or practical approach to nature; to claim otherwise simply betrays the 
fact that one is beholden to a lower-order world-view. Only technical purposes war-
rant an interest in nature. A philosophical reconciliation of freedom with its natural 
contexts or even a recognition of the environment as intrinsically valuable are both 
absent – for systematic reasons. Since Fichte subordinates nature as a whole (onto-
logically) to the ethical sphere of human ends, i.e. freedom, everything within nature 
counts (ontically) as but a means at the arbitrary disposal of humans (GA I/3, 406–
407; FNR 104–105).101
Corresponding to that principal subordination of the sensible world to the con-
sciousness of freedom (on the part of transcendental philosophy) we find in the 
everyday lifeworld (on the part of moral philosophy) the – no less problematic – 
complete subordination of everything sensible to the rational (GA I/5 440; AD 114–
115) as well as the subordination of the body to the mind.102 Not unfairly, therefore, 
Fichte has been accused of metaphysical reductionism as well as of ethical rigorism. 
Hegel, for instance, characterized Fichte’s concept of freedom – precisely for this 
reason –as purely ‘negative.’103 Hegel holds that the I’s freedom from and against all 
limitations  – so strongly promoted by Fichte  – would, carried to conceptual 
extremes, be an attribute of death.104 Life, on the contrary, presupposes bonds of 
positive reference, which is why Hegel strove to promote a “concrete,” “organic,” 
“affirmative,” and “substantive” freedom through which individuals become auton-
omous within their environment rather than against it.105
Like nature, Fichte also slips his interpretation of society into a freedom- 
theoretical straightjacket. Every I meets in the external world restricting resistance; 
as a result, the subject is in part impeded in its freedom, in part the resistance is such 
that the subject perceives itself to be free or as being called upon to be free because 
101 Concerning this, see Manfred Brocker, Arbeit und Eigentum: Der Paradigmenwechsel in der 
neuzeitlichen Eigentumstheorie (1992), 311f.
102 See Peter Rohs, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (2007), 106.
103 Georg Wilhelm Hegel, TWA 2, 69–82. Translated in Hegel, The Difference Between The 
Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy (Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1978).
104 “I can kill everything and abstract from everything. Thus the obstinacy is invincible and can in 
itself overcome everything. But the highest thing would be to overcome this freedom, this death 
itself” (Hegel, TWA 2, 547).
105 See TWA 7, 298 & 7, 406. Translated in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (London, Oxford & 
New York, 1967), 107 & 160. See also TWA 9, 66; 10, 333; 12, 58–66; 12, 417.
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of it – for instance through appeals to ethical action (GA I/3 343f.; FNR 33f.). Calls 
to a responsible use of freedom indicate a rational sender (GA I/3 344; FNR 34–35). 
Everyone, however, who cognizes the rationality of others must, logically speaking, 
also recognize them. For insofar as he understands autonomous reason to be the 
condition for the validity of his rights to freedom, for the sake of consistency he also 
has to see in the other’s reason a foundation of equal validity.106 As the demand to 
recognize others thus proceeds from one’s own reason it presents no external limita-
tion of freedom (GA I/3 353; FNR 44).
Yet, its logical cogency notwithstanding, there still remains the possibility that 
this recognition will not ensue de facto (GA I/3 356; FNR 46). This, however, Fichte 
cannot tolerate; for otherwise, he fears it would not be “possible to point to an abso-
lute reason why someone should make the formula of right – limit your freedom so 
that the other alongside you can also be free – into a law of his own will and action” 
(GA I/3 387; FNR 82). Why should one limit one’s freedom if one cannot oneself 
be certain that others are doing the same? Consequently, Fichte devises means and 
ways to guarantee absolutely said reciprocal recognition – through state coercion107 
and a complicated mechanism for the protection of rights.108
Herein again, Fichte proceeds contrary to Kant. Instead of leaving reciprocal 
recognition within the medium of the sphere of ought, Fichte is committed to the 
law’s sphere of being and must thus transform the merely hypothetically- conditioned 
character of factual recognition into one categorically-unconditioned recognition 
which is assured by “certainly not the moral law” but rather “the law of thought” 
(GA I/3 356; FNR 47). Not recognizing the other as a subject entitled to rights, 
declares Fichte, presents a contradiction in transcendental consciousness which hin-
ders the generation of free consciousness as such. In his Foundations of Natural 
Right (1796/1797) Fichte declares a direct reciprocal interaction (Wechselwirkung) 
between physical modification and volitional determination to be indispensable. He 
completely identifies (normative) liberty and (factual) physicality with one another 
(GA I/3 363; FNR 56). Physical action thus directly assumes a constitutive function 
for law.109
It is true that Fichte had already modified this position within his Vocation of 
Man of 1800.110 Yet, that change of course did not have a significant influence upon 
106 Rosales, “Die Begrenzung. Von Anstoß zur Aufforderung.”
107 See Michael Köhler, “Zur Begründung des Rechtszwangs im Anschluss am Kant und Fichte,” 
113ff.
108 For an exemplary discussion see Wolfgang Janke, “Anerkennung: Fichtes Grundlegungen des 
Rechtsgrundes,” Kant-Studien 82:1 (1991), 197–218.
109 For the variations upon the theory of recognition which follow on from the Foundations, see 
Düsing, Das Problem der Individualität; also Ivaldo, Die systematische Position der Ethik nach 
der Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo und der Sittenlehre 1798. For a critique of the Foundations 
of Natural Right’s theorem of interpersonality see Eberhard Heller, Die Theorie der Interpersonalität 
im Spätwerk J. G. Fichtes: Dargest. in den “Thatsache des Bewusstseyns” von 1810/1811; eine 
kritische Analyse (1974), 59ff.
110 In later years, Fichte promulgated the view that we reach the apperception of the other only by 
means of a supra-individual ground that we share with all others. The founding of recognition is 
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the unfolding of his doctrine of law, politics, and economics. In most of his writings 
on social philosophy, Fichte outlines those ideas of a factually requisite, mechani-
cally reciprocal recognition in such a way that in the case of failed or refused (fac-
tual) recognition it should be possible  – or even ethically necessary  – that the 
non-recognizer thus becomes (normatively) devoid of rights (GA I/3 355f.; FNR 
45f.).111 In breaking the law, Fichte writes, the other provides the “sure proof” (GA 
I/3 387; FNR 83) that he did not bring his body completely under the control of his 
reason. Because of this infringement, one may now justly withdraw the recognition 
owed to his reason and withhold the concomitant respect for his dignity. Through 
unlawful action the wrongdoer loses his human dignity and, from then on, Fichte 
expressly says, one may consider him “as a merely sensible being” and treat him as 
a mere thing, i.e. as fundamentally devoid of rights (GA I/3 356; FNR 46).112
For the same reason Fichte refuses to acknowledge rights of all those persons 
who lack “a real reciprocal interaction” with us, as, for instance, in regard to “the 
rights of the dead.” Real thus means physical: Rights concerning intellectual rela-
tions, for example concerning “freedom of thought, freedom of conscience” are 
flatly refused (GA I/3 360; FNR 51–52). We owe a relation of law only to such 
rational beings who can exact our recognition through physical influence. Fichte 
thereby touches upon a central problem of liberal philosophy as such: How do we 
deal with those who do not stand in reciprocal relations to us? Do we have obliga-
tions to future generations whose weal and woe we influence through our actions, 
but who, on their part, can yet neither benefit nor harm us? Does our freedom still 
deserve respect after death (the natural boundary of all chances for reciprocation)? 
May we, for instance, foil the testament of the deceased for the benefit of the living? 
And how does it stand with the freedom and dignity of mentally handicapped per-
sons, whose behavior perhaps does not always clearly indicate a desire faultlessly – 
in exact observance of the social contract – to toe the line of the law? Are they thus 
only to be considered as mere things devoid of rights?
Fichte answers these questions in a manner that crassly contradicts our moral 
intuitions.113 That results from that principal feature of his social philosophy to 
able to be reconstructed in a way that does more justice to the phenomenon; the understanding of 
the call-to-recognition – now clearly empirico-factically conceived – requires a disposition towards 
supra-individual reason, whose possibility is derived from precisely that supra-individual ground 
(of being) which the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo already engaged. See Makoto Takada, 
“Zum intersubjektiven Verständnis des Ich in der Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo,” Fichte-
Studien 35 (2010), 345–356. In passing it should be remarked that through engaging with this more 
mature position, Fichte’s follower, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, constructed his own theory of 
interpersonal (and also intercultural) recognition. More on that in the following chapter.
111 For a critique of this see Ludwig Siep, “Naturrecht und Wissenschaftslehre” in Siep, ed., 
Praktische Philosophie in deutschen Idealismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 38.
112 For a critique of this idea see Rainer Zacsyk, Das Strafrecht in der Rechtslehre J. G. Fichtes 
(Berlin, 1981).
113 For a twentieth-century critique see Ernst Bloch, Naturrecht und menschliche Würde (Frankfurt 
am Main, 1991) and Helmut Girndt “Über den Umgang mit der empfindungsfähige Natur nach 
J. G. Fichte” in Transzendentalphilosophie als System: Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen 1794 
und 1806 (1989), 139ff. For K.  C. F.  Krause’s contemporary critique of Fichte see Claus 
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reproduce the entire system of rights in analogy with geometrically construing sur-
faces from lines and lines from points. Fichte gradually construes from reciprocal 
agreements (lines) between purely private subjects (points) the public relations of 
law (as a surface).114 Thus he anticipates many of the later conceptions of game 
theory and social contract theory. As a consequence, we can learn from his example 
a lot about their features: Fichte begins with two subjects who only wish to realize 
their private wills and recognize one another (for example, in their respective prop-
erties) through a reciprocal arrangement (GA I/4 5f.; FNR 165f.). Rational self- 
interest produces the interest in the other. What arises next is a relation of reciprocal 
protection of rights and property of a still very fragile nature: “The smallest viola-
tion of another’s property nullifies the entire contract and entitles the injured party 
to take everything from the transgressor, if he can” (GA I/4 9; FNR 169–170).
Upon the “surface of the earth,” as a “sphere where everyone can exercise his 
efficacy,” everyone’s property can, in principle, always be endangered by everyone 
else. Consequently, no-one’s property is absolutely secured through the mere agree-
ment of two or more persons (GA I/4 9; FNR 170). Yet, according to Fichte, this in 
turn threatens to nullify the decisive condition under which one could at all consent 
to refrain categorically from appropriating the other’s property. Something else 
must be added: The will (passively) to refrain from appropriating the other’s prop-
erty has to be reciprocally augmented by the decision (actively) to protect property: 
A reciprocal “protection contract” has to be established (GA I/4 10; FNR 171). 
Fichte reasons further that, just like the property contract, this “protection contract, 
like every other contract, is conditioned” (GA I/4 10; FNR 171): only under the 
condition of factually provided protection is one bound to protect the other against 
a third party. In order now to make that (theoretically) only hypothetical condition 
(practically) categorical, it must be assured that entry into that contract inevitably 
produces the fulfillment of the citizen’s obligation through the requisite “contribu-
tion in the form of abilities, services … or … money” (GA I/4 16; FNR 178). Thus 
(in a manner similar to the later accounts of Robert Nozick and others) Fichte lets 
the state arise from the spirit of possessive individualism (Besitzindivialismus): The 
state first articulates itself as a protective association from an abstract pact of mutual 
assistance on the part of particular individuals after “the whole has come to exist as 
a result of contracts among individuals” (GA I/4 15: FNR 177). Its unifying end is 
but the individuals’ interest in the protection of their safety and possessions. Where 
these interests, or the possibility of its timely fulfillment, are lacking, then so too the 
rationale for maintaining the community.115
Now, since, in the chosen mechanical picture of a static equilibrium of service 
and counter-service, even the smallest disruption to the balance would nullify the 
whole, the universal security of rights appears as strictly conditioned by the 
Dierksmeier, “Fichtes kritischer Schüler: Zur Fichtekritik K. C. F. Krauses (1781–1832),” Fichte-
Studien 21 (2003), 151–162.
114 See Hans Jürgen Verweyen, Recht und Sittlichkeit in J. G. Fichtes Gesellschaftslehre (Freiburg, 
1975), 124.
115 See ibid., 132.
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 service- contribution of each individual: “Thus the contract is cancelled as soon as 
the citizen does not contribute” (GA I/4 17; FNR 179). Then, the guilty party is 
liable with his entire existence; the state forcibly subjects this person to its law and 
treats him now like lifeless matter. For this reason, just as Fichte postulates, the 
contract actually guarantees its own fulfillment: “If someone exists apart from the 
contact, then he stands outside every rightful relation whatsoever”; whereas if he 
enters into the contract “then it binds him completely” (GA I/4 18; FNR 180). But 
since no government can afford to coerce its citizens incessantly, the order of law 
must be so constituted that violations of the social contract will not occur in the first 
place, and Fichte thus stipulates that “if an arrangement could be found that would 
operate with mechanical necessity to guarantee that any action contrary to right 
would result in the opposite of its intended end, such an arrangement would neces-
sitate the will to will only what is rightful” (GA I/3 427; FNR 127).
As a result, for the execution of the law one would no longer depend upon a good 
will, ethical self-commitment, voluntarily assumed responsibility, etc. Once this 
kind of mechanical state apparatus exists, then a strict judiciary, with automaton- 
judges subsuming deeds under norms (GA I/3 398; FNR 95), will forever protect its 
order. And Fichte seriously believes that the idea of freedom commands the estab-
lishing of such a – totalitarian – state, as, in his reading, the liberal idea of law 
encompasses all the means for its complete realization (GA I/3 426f.; FNR 
126f.).Fichte recognizes that it is just as impossible as it would be unethical to com-
pletely prevent human beings born free from carrying out actions contrary to law by 
means of physical precautions (GA I/3 425f.; FNR 125f.). Yet he sees no problem at 
all in thoroughly necessitating their wills to legality: For “this law of coercion does 
not infringe upon the freedom of the good will or its full dignity” (GA I/3 427; FNR 
127; italics, C.D.). If it were clear to everyone that each volition contrary to the law 
necessarily resulted in “the opposite to what was intended” then, Fiche speculates, 
solely volitions in conformity with law would remain extant (GA I/3 426; FNR 
126). Any volition contradicting law should thus become the reason for its own – 
not improvement, but – negation, and this “proposition in its full synthetic rigor” 
would provide the unifying principle for all laws of coercion and punishment and a 
corresponding machinery of surveillance (GA I/3 426; FNR 126).
These ideas lead to a peculiar result: In order to secure the preservation of the 
mechanical equilibrium of law, every conflict of rights, even every unintentional con-
flict of rights, must be conceived as an intolerable disruption of the overall balance, 
which therefore must not only in retrospect be declared null and void as well as cor-
rected (as is common in most constitutional states), but rather must ideally be pre-
vented from the outset.116 In Fichte’s time the technical possibilities for a complete 
surveillance and regulation of behavior were still lacking. Nowadays, since such tech-
116 “Coercion is the typical foundation of the Fichtean state: it enables the existence of the equilib-
rium of law because without the threat of punishments this equilibrium is unstable. Deterring 
activities contrary to law is the central element of the deduction of communal being in §§14ff of 
the Foundations” (Lucca Fonnescu, “Die Aufhebung des Staates bei Fichte,” Fichte-Studien 11 
(1997), 85–98). For criticism of that see Köhler, Begründung, 111.
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nologies are increasingly at our disposal, the illiberal menace encapsulated in these 
ideas is all the more salient. As far as possible, with the means available then, Fichte 
wanted to place the entire mechanism of the state – particularly socio- economic laws 
and regulations – in the service of the unavoidable fulfillment of the social contract. 
Allegedly for the sake of freedom, Fichte made coercion the principle of politics and 
economics, calling for directive paternalism on the part of the freedom-granting state. 
Starting from an almost libertarian position (with the state as merely an institution for 
protecting possessions) Fichte surprisingly ends up at a theory of law that is not liber-
tarian at all (with a conception of a comprehensive nanny-state).
Fichte’s philosophy of freedom is nevertheless not to be seen as but a eulogy for 
legal coercion. Fichte’s works also contain an abundance of ideas that directly go 
against that mechanical concept and show another, more liberal Fichte. His social- 
philosophical writings frequently contain biological metaphors giving expression to 
the notion of an organic self-organization of society.117 That, too, is typical of his 
time. In numerous philosophies of the early nineteenth century, the epithet organic 
gathers together many initially partly unarticulated and partly still unclear ideas 
with the common aim of escaping the rigid spirit of (Hobbes-inspired) social- 
contract theory.118 Many thinkers felt that Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment 
legitimated new and different ways of thinking through the relation of individual 
freedom and collective order oriented by the lodestar of a harmonization of nature 
and freedom achievable through culture. Fichte was no exception, and he enriched 
his social-philosophy with organic metaphors, too.
Occasionally Fichte declares that the human being is an “organization,” a “con-
summate plant” (GA I/3 379; FNR 74). For, unlike machines, in the organism “the 
whole also exists for the sake of the parts, it has no purpose other than to produce 
these parts in a specific way” since “the product of nature … continually produces 
itself, and maintains itself precisely insofar as it produces itself” (GA I/3 378; FNR 
73). Fichte maintains that the human being represented in the image of the organism 
could only be conceived in terms of “the concept of freedom given to him by his 
own self-consciousness” (GA I/3 379; FNR 74). As beings whose concept is alone 
to be attained and interpreted by themselves, humans can truly realize their potential 
only when guided by their own aims. And all such passages obviously stand in rec-
ognizable tension with everything outlined earlier.
If, as it now seems, the “character of humanity” consists in “formability” towards 
freedom (ibid) then the vocation of the human being can hardly lie in a lawful order 
destructive of that freedom. As a consequence, it could be concluded that the citi-
zens themselves ought to produce the law organizing their modes of socialization: 
in reflexive freedom and inspired by their own ideals. Instead of a philosophically 
deduced order, a socially construed order ought to arise, emerging from free civic 
agreement. And, in the light of that, would one then not also have to reconsider and 
redraft the objective of the law?
117 See Manfred Riedel, “Fichtes zweideutige Umkehr der naturrechtlichen Begriffsbildung,” 
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 31:1 (1977), 5–18.
118 About the mechanical versus organic distinction see Carla Amadio, “Aesthetik und Politik von 
der Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre aus,” Fichte-Studien 11 (1997), 99–112.
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Some passages of Fichte’s works, for instance in The System of Ethics, actually 
seem to warrant this reading: Freedom cannot be conceptualized as intrinsically 
vague, i.e. as non-conceptual. Freedom rather must know of itself and has to be 
committed to a concept of itself. Nevertheless, this concept cannot be gleaned from 
a purpose outside of freedom itself to which liberty would have to surrender: Human 
freedom must itself designate the ends that provide its orientation. But truly autono-
mous freedom can only remain in this process, however, if the goals it thus takes on 
in turn affirm freedom. Freedom is therefore that which posits itself as a universal 
end; freedom aims at freedom – otherwise it is not freedom. This is why individual 
freedom intrinsically refers to universal freedom. Personal freedom must be sought 
in the mode of universality. Otherwise the essence of individual freedom would 
become negated by its application, i.e. its idea would be negated by its realization.
Fichte hence confirms Kant’s categorical imperative that individual subjective 
axioms of action (the maxims) should continually be able to be posited as an objec-
tive law. This, Fichte agrees, is the appropriate formula of the idea of freedom and 
its normative self-commitment. And since that categorical imperative demands that 
human beings be treated as ends in themselves and not instrumentalized, Fichte 
must also orientate the lawful order towards the aims autonomously formulated by 
the citizens and develop the law as the reflexive organization of their freedom. 
Throughout Fichte’s writings we find numerous hints at such a more organic – rather 
than mechanical – conception of law. He thus recognizes for instance – refraining 
from all the negative restrictions which law imposes upon the pursuits of individu-
als – “the positive element in the concept of right” (GA I/3 356; FNR 47) as pre-
cisely lieing within the fact that everyone may be treated and judged only according 
to that lawful concept which he himself “must possess” (ibid).
But beware: Fichte is not referring to an idea of law empirically gleaned from 
historical reality. Rather, Fichte divines that this very concept of law is “contained 
within the essence of reason,” since “no finite rational being is possible if this con-
cept is not present within it … in consequence of the being’s rational nature” (GA 
I/3 358; FNR 49). He treats the factual conceptions of law entertained by real people 
with lofty disregard. He is similarly ambivalent when he describes the conception of 
conditions of the possibility for being “a person” as a “right” of said person, and 
calls all of these rights contained “in the mere concept of the person … original 
rights” (GA I/3 390; FNR 87). In such contexts, he may well write that such rights 
belong to the essence of persons as such, thus unconditionally and not as a result of 
conditioned relations of recognition.119 Yet as soon as such declarations appear, they 
119 It is hence problematic that this revaluation of all individuals (including oneself) is with Fichte 
nevertheless ultimately only to be understood instrumentally on behalf of reason since all human 
beings are or should be means to the end of the universal reason; a position, which entails the 
immediate devaluation of all of those being or making them fit for this project. See Klaus Kodalle, 
“Der Stellenwert der Historiographie im Kontext des Fichteschen Gesichtsdenkens” in Fichte-
Studien 11 (1997), 259–285. This is shown within, among other places, Fichte’s formulation that 
the justification for the existence of human beings is contained in the work they do for the end of 
the species: “for that alone is he there, and if this should not occur, thus he does not at all need to 
be” (GA I/5 230).
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are retracted: “There is no condition in which original rights exists; and no original 
rights of human beings.” Basic rights, i.e. human rights, are “a mere fiction … for 
the sake of science” (GA I/3 403–404; FNR 102).
Doubts are appropriate. If the idea of law really follows as a necessary concep-
tion from the articulation of the free essence of human beings, then Fichte’s claim 
that there is a natural law only within, and not before, the state, can hardly be main-
tained (GA I/3 395ff.; FNR 92). Certainly, the realization of the norms of natural 
law requires the state. But if the idea of law together with a limitation of everyone’s 
freedom to the boundaries of the law belongs to the free essence of human beings, 
can – or indeed must – one not then speak of a minimum supply of pre-positive, 
rational normativity, i.e. natural law?120 Fichte seems now and then to concur when 
he declares that his concept of law is what legitimates positive laws in the first place. 
For instance, he argues: If one has an original right to personal liberties then one 
also has a claim to the adjudication of the rights which make this de facto possible: 
“Original right (Urrecht) returns back into itself and becomes a self-justifying, self- 
constituting right, i.e. an absolute right” (GA I/3 409; FNR 108).
For its legitimation, an absolute right depends only on itself, not on empirically 
given laws. But if a right is valid for us as a person, then it is valid for every person 
(GA I/3 374; FNR 68–69). To demand rights to personal liberty means to claim a 
concept that interlinks the positing (of the rights) of one person with that (of the 
rights) of others. We can only expect freedom for ourselves in the name of reasons 
that at the same time obligate us to stand up for the freedom of all persons, of all 
world citizens. A foundation for intercultural human rights appears therefore to be 
the upshot of Fichte’s concept of reason. If freedom is universally valid, should it 
not also be globally realized? Fichte, however, leaves that promising cosmopolitan 
path to become overgrown by the notional plants of the nationalism for which he 
was as famous at the beginning of the twentieth century as he has become infamous 
now after that century has come to an end.121 These potentials for a generously uni-
versal conception of freedom are, however, squandered. Fichte makes an astonish-
ingly narrow-minded use of these intellectual foundations in order to secure a 
conception of perfect freedom through philosophical directives. Because the actual 
value of freedom consists for him in its rational use alone, Fichte subjugates all civil 
and civic freedoms to the philosophers’ blueprint of freedom; and being without 
hope of enforcing this blueprint on a global scale, he limits his theory to national 
parameters.
120 See Riedel, Fichtes zweideutige Umkehr der naturrechtlichen Begriffsbildung. The same applies 
to Fichte’s central reflections concerning the “right of world citizens”; see Verweyen, Recht und 
Sittlichkeit, 98.
121 For information concerning Fichte’s reception in the philosophy of National Socialism, see 
Konrad Cramer, “Um einen nationalsozialistischen Fichte von Innen bittend: August Faust über 
Fichte im Jahr 1938” in Jürgen Stolzenberg, Oliver-Pierre Rudolph, eds., Wissen, Freiheit, 
Geschichte: Die Philosophie Fichtes im 19 und 20 Jahrhundert (Amsterdam, 2010). See also 
Christian Jansen, “The Formation of German Nationalism, 1740–1850” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Modern German History (2011), 234.
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Without hesitation, Fichte tells those who protest against his nationalist paternal-
ism that they misunderstand themselves. That icy reproach of a false consciousness 
will later become a staple of Marx. Fichte, however, employs it even more rigor-
ously. Marx at least allows the false consciousness (for him, at most times: capitalist 
ideology) to possess a partial historical truth, which, helped along by the philoso-
pher, eventually can be transformed into complete truth (accordingly: communist 
theory). Fichte, instead, radicalizes the separation between true and false conscious-
ness and situates it between the levels of the transcendental and everyday conscious-
ness. The ordinary consciousness, insofar as it is philosophically reconstructed and 
guilty of mistaken assumptions, has no claim to validity at all. One must neither 
theoretically consider it, nor practically respect its proponents.
2.2.2  Social Philosophy
Fichte’s social philosophy starts out from plausible, even congenial, concerns: All 
persons, according to Fichte, require a certain sphere to realize and symbolize their 
respective freedom: property (GA I/3 361; FNR 53). In property, freedom becomes 
materially graspable. The right to property functions, so to speak, as the grammar 
that regulates the communication of civic freedoms among one another. Whoever 
wishes to secure the semantics of freedom in inter-individual relations must know 
the syntax for the relation of individual and community. For example, in order to 
demarcate justly what does and does not belong to whom, the private must first be 
linguistically distinguished from the public. Fichte thus dedicates voluminous stud-
ies to the style of the legal prose of possession and property, interpreting the specific 
proclamations of civil rights, as it were, as public speech-acts of freedom itself. The 
poetic attraction of those considerations lies in how they describe the rights of oth-
ers as manifestations, not negations, of the individual’s freedom.
Fichte argues: Whenever I exclude others from my relationship to objects and 
wish to do so in a lawfully valid manner, I must acknowledge as legitimate the same 
behavior on part of every other rational being. In principle, therefore, my relation to 
any object entails the object-relations of all others (GA I/3 414–417; FNR 113–
116). Hence, the legal order’s refusal to allow my appropriation of certain goods 
that belong to others is not merely the expression of an alien will (to possess) but 
also the manifestation of my own will (to possess) (GA I/3 416; FNR 115–116). 
Therefore, my right to property finds no alien limit in the property rights of others, 
but rather its very own boundary. That connection of everyone with everyone else is 
what constitutes the right to property: The social limits of property thus function, 
not as supplementary restrictions of an antecedently abstractly-universal right, but 
rather define all property radically (i.e. from the Latin radix, its root) as a common 
property prior to its subsequent private division.122 Everyone is entitled to freedom- 
122 For more information about the following, see Johann Braun, Freiheit, Gleichheit, Eigentum: 
Grundfragen des Rechts im Licht der Philosophie J. G. Fichtes (1991).
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enabling property. As a consequence, freedom should not only be protected by the 
rule of law (i.e. doubly negatively: as negation of negations of freedoms already 
established as a legal entitlements), but it has rather to be also (immediately posi-
tively and affirmatively) created (GA I/5 314). No-one may be animated (e.g. by 
destitution) to violate the law (e.g. towards theft) (GA I/3 459; FNR 163).123 The 
state under the rule of law must also be a social state.
Fichte is convincing when he demands us to see in the rights of others, not nega-
tive limitations, but positive bounds, which in the first place individuals into valid 
relations of mutual recognition. Consequently, the individual’s lawful position is 
confirmed – or, where necessary, corrected – by society.124 It seems hardly surpris-
ing, therefore, that Fichte, unlike other philosophers of freedom, does not feel 
inspired towards a passionate hymn in favor of exclusive private possessions. 
Nevertheless, it remains surprising that he lets himself be carried away by an elegy 
on collective property. Although one finds his occasional approval for an intermedi-
ary, social-democratic position, he ultimately clearly joins the socialistic chorus 
about common property, in which the private at most chimes in as a softer counter-
point to the collective leitmotif. In an all too rapid series of chords, Fichte moves 
from his philosophically directive idea of freedom – via the interlude of a quasi- 
organic social utopia  – to a brisk socialist oeuvre; orchestrated and announced, 
though, as an ode to freedom.
This is occasioned by his philosophical method, since it, directed by Fichte’s 
speculative deduction alone, believes itself entitled to pay no attention at all to pop-
ular opinions. Fichte does not aspire to a politics by the people. His aim is the purest 
possible translation of the rational will of human beings into legislation and execu-
tive decisions (GA I/3 438f; FNR 139f). Only rational interests concerning the com-
mon good, and not the arbitrary opinions of the majority, should be politically 
decisive. Imitating Rousseau’s distinction between the ‘volonté de tous’ and the 
‘volonté générale,’ Fichte demands that the (factual) “communal will” (gemein-
schaftlicher Wille) of the people must, in order to maintain political legitimacy, first 
be transformed into a (normatively acceptable) “unified will” (gemeinsamer Wille) 
(GA I/3 436; FNR 137). That requires an integrative representation of the common 
interests orientated towards a universally valid – and hence generally accepted – law 
(GA I/3 436; FNR 137). How can this succeed?
The most appropriate image for illustrating this concept is that of an organic product of 
nature. This image has frequently been used in recent times to describe the unity of the dif-
ferent branches of public power, but – so far as I know – it has not yet been used to explain 
the civil condition of the whole. […] In the organic body, each part continually preserves 
the whole, and by doing so, is itself preserved; the citizen relates to the state in the very 
same way. And in fact, in the one case as well as in the other, this preservation of the whole 
does not require any special arrangement; each part, or each citizen, preserves only itself in 
123 For this “new motif in Fichte’s thinking” which allows us to now grasp the rule of law “as some-
thing dynamic, as a system of interconnected rightful relations,” see Nico Wallner, Fichte als poli-
tischer Denker: Werden und Wesen seiner Gedanken über den Staat (Halle/Saale, 1926), 
107–110.
124 See Verweyen, Recht und Sittlichkeit, 107f.
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the place that has been determined for it by the whole, and in the very act of doing so, it 
preserves the whole in this particular part: and precisely because the whole preserves each 
part in its place, the whole returns into itself and preserves itself. (GA I/4 19; FNR 
180–182)
Politics has accordingly to follow a concept of the common good, which harmo-
niously unites the particular interests and the needs of the political whole. For the 
specification of this abstract aim, Fichte makes use of the parallelism of natural 
product and social union: in numerous appeals to the “ordinary” and “sound judg-
ment,” which felicitously ascertains the “nature of the issue” (GA I/3 454f.; FNR 
157). It is simply a question of “treating everything according to its final purpose”, 
states Fichte. In this way, the required program could easily be “scientifically estab-
lished” (GA I/5 150).
What is the origin of this remarkable optimism about divining with certainty and 
ease the respective necessities? Is such a teleological doctrine of the “final pur-
poses” given by nature at all possible and admissible within the framework of a 
transcendentally directed philosophy?125 Certainly, it strays notably from the straight 
philosophical path pursued by Kant. For unlike Kant, Fichte presupposes not only a 
principal compatibility of nature with human ends, but rather – as for him the ought 
is the ultimate purpose of being  – begins from a metaphysically founded (more 
precisely expressed: feigned) harmony of nature and freedom. Fichte ascribes a 
servitude to freedom even to such forms of life that in and of themselves do not 
display any such liberal tendencies.126 A procedure, whose general premises are just 
as questionable as its specific conclusions. Whoever takes Fichte at his word, has to 
ask at once: Why then does such an exquisitely arranged world still require means 
of coercion, when, as we are told now, some internal teleological necessity drives 
the cosmos toward the realization of the liberal utopia? What does one need compul-
sion for?
While in Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right it still looks as though (legal) 
coercion alone is needed to establish society, things sound quite different a little 
later in the System of Ethics (GA I/5, 253). And in Some Lectures concerning the 
Scholar’s Vocation that followed shortly afterwards, one even reads that “upon the 
a priori prescribed course of the human species there lies a point where all state- 
based relations become superfluous” (FW VI 300). Fichte suddenly emphasizes that 
the state does not first socialize individuals by law, but already finds them embedded 
in ethical forms of community (FW VII 382). Numerous places, where Fichte even 
occasionally flirts with the complete dissolution of the state,127 suggest a theory of 
sociality established neither completely nor essentially by enforced laws, but rather 
by voluntariness.
At times one even seems to be hearing anarchic sounds when Fichte proclaims 
that clever politics could and should lead to a future state of affairs where individu-
125 See the critique of Fichte already put forward by Albert Th. Van Krieken, Ueber die sogenannte 
organische Staatstheorie: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Staatsbegriffs (Leipzig, 1873), 60–65.
126 See Georges Gurvitch, Fichtes System der konkreten Ethik (Tübingen, 1924), 251.
127 This is carefully documented and interpreted in Fonnesu, Die Aufhebung des Staates bei Fichte.
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als will conform to society’s plans from ethical motivation such that gradually the 
lower forms of human behavior brought about through the sheer force of the law 
develop into a higher – more ethically than juridically established – compact for 
societal life. For, as is clearly repeated in later writings, the “life in the state does not 
belong among the absolute purposes of humanity.” The state may then merely func-
tion as precursor of higher forms of fellowship; it serves as a useful means to an 
“art”  – which will ultimately replace it  – of “furnishing the entire relations of 
humanity according to the previously scientifically interpreted reason […] until the 
species stands there as a complete expression of its eternal original image in reason” 
(FW VII 10f.).
Fichte surely never wishes to give up the state’s role in economic planning and 
distribution,128 but, in later years, he wished to do away with precisely that apparatus 
of coercion which he had wanted to prove to be a logically absolutely required pre-
condition for the possibility of a consistent idea of freedom.129 It remains unclear 
how the reason-directed social relations he strives after would have to be put into 
place (FW VII 161). On one hand, Fichte at times recommends the “absolute state” 
as “institution for coercion” (FW VII 143f.), as the most appropriate means for this 
purpose. Then again, on the other hand, he announces that, aside from their duties 
of citizenship, human beings should remain completely free of all political bounds130: 
The state should only create the “outer conditions” with which human beings 
“could, with their own freedom, make themselves the apparent manifestation of 
reason” (FW VII 162) – for instance through indirect promotion of “religion, sci-
ence, and virtue” (FW VII 166–168); a strikingly more restrained interpretation of 
the tasks of the state.131
Does Fichte’s social-philosophy then ultimately follow a liberal or a totalitarian 
model? For Fichte, when it comes to freedom, is the path the goal? Or can the emi-
nence of the ultimate end justify whichever choice of means? Fichte provides vari-
ous and ambiguous answers to these questions. His thinking oscillates between 
(structural) ideas and (material) concepts of freedom and thereby exemplifies cen-
tral questions for philosophical liberalism as a whole: How far is philosophy permit-
ted to venture into the concrete? When and how do philosophically meaningful 
pointers deteriorate into pedantic dirigisme and illiberal dogmatism? The final 
answer to these queries lies in Fichte’s economic philosophy.132 Long before Marx 
attempted to rescue human freedom from alienation and exploitation, Fichte had 
128 See Heinrich Rickert, “Die philosophische Grundlagen von Fichtes Sozialismus,” Logos 
Internationale Zeitschrift der Philosphie der Kultur 9 (1923), 149–180.
129 See Georg Geismann, “Fichtes “Aufhebung” des Rechtssaates,” Fichte-Studien 3 (1991), 
86–117.
130 See Walker, Fichte als politischer Denker, 111.
131 For more information about this conflicting interpretation see the contributions from Günter 
Zöller and Christoph Asmuth in Günter Zöller (ed.), Der Staat als Mittel zum Zweck: Fichte über 
Freiheit, Recht und Gesetz (Baden-Baden, 2011).
132 See David James, Fichte’s Social and Political Philosophy: Property and Virtue (Cambridge: 
New York, 2011), 22f.
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already seen the close connection between a liberally founded doctrine of law and a 
socially engaged philosophy of economics and thus worked upon their dovetailing. 
Fichte quite clearly recognizes and suggests that economic conditions in particular 
manifest human freedom in everyday life. Since for Fichte the universal right to 
freedom involves the particular presuppositions of a free life, economic questions 
(for example the allocation of goods as well as the distribution of costs and burdens 
in society) become the object of his doctrine of freedom.
2.2.3  Economic Philosophy
Fichte unequivocally demands: “everyone ought to be able live from his labor” (GA 
I/4 22; FNR 185). Whoever does his bit for the economic freedom of the whole, 
should receive his or her personal due – the material presuppositions of his or her 
individual freedom – on the part of the community. Every person should receive a 
private sphere of efficacy and property (GA I/3 361; FNR 53–54). Yet the market by 
and of itself will never guarantee that all obtain the goods they require for a free life. 
Fichte sees this as an unacceptable contravention of his idea of freedom that must 
be resolved by means of a national economy directed towards the freedom of all by 
regularly and reliably assigning everyone their fair share.
For this purpose, Fichte devises the model of The Closed Commercial State 
(1800) within which a cyclical exchange of goods and services takes place planned 
and overseen by the state. First of all, the state assigns to the proprietors their respec-
tive possessions and then establishes rules for their mutual exchange of commodi-
ties and services. According to these legally unchallengeable rules, thoroughly 
symmetrical relations of exchange should put an ordered cycle of allocation in 
place. This cycle is devised so that no one ever ends up positioned worse than they 
were upon the state’s initial distribution. Fichte does not see the economy as able to 
process asymmetries productively.133 That is why he signs his readers up for a static 
model of mechanical order.134 For him stability cannot result from a dynamic bal-
ancing of economic inequalities. Consequently, Fichte fears foreigners. They are 
certainly not instituted into their property by the state. Their exchange behavior is 
thus much less malleable. So, they could disrupt the precious balance of the pre- 
established relationship between property and exchange.
Only a world-state could ultimately resolve this problem. Only when there are no 
more foreigners can property be guaranteed in a truly permanent and absolutely 
stable form recognized “by the present constitution of humankind” (GA I/3 418; 
FNR 118). In the absence of a world-state, the national economic system and nation- 
state must be “closed” so that, at least within their boundaries, the desired balance 
133 See Hinz, Fichtes “System der Freiheit.”
134 See Bernard Willms, “Zur Dialekik der Planung: Fichte als Theoretiker einer geplanten 
Gesellschaft” in Böckenförde (ed.) Säkularisation und Utopie (Stuttgart, 1967).
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of goods is not endangered from outside.135 Fichte accordingly severs the national 
society from the world-market in order to conduct undisturbed, within the so 
enclosed space, his politics of redistribution. The specific provisions for the execu-
tion of this plan within The Closed Commercial State are no longer of interest today. 
They do not penetrate into the essence of economics and attempt to bring Fichte’s 
ethical ideals into play, not in the economic exchange process, but rather against it.
More interesting than that early outline for a planned economy (as a means) with 
a liberal agenda (as the end) is, however, the position Fichte presented 12 years later 
when reflecting upon his own subsequent studies of economic literature.136 Fichte 
took the topic of economics up again in lectures held in Berlin in 1812, but this time 
he wishes not only to cover and constrain the region of economics with juridical 
structures from the outside, but rather aims to transform it from within. He believes 
himself to be successful in this endeavor, and thus in a position to profess the very 
principles required for all future economic policy. This is shown by the following 
passage in which Fichte summarizes his mature philosophy of economics as 
follows:
In Summa: Everything rests upon (1) that the state has a concept of human wellbeing and of 
the means to advance this and of the important consequences of this means. (2) That it in 
every moment knows precisely the actual and true condition of its nation and its standpoint 
in every respect. The first, as something a priori, is expected of it without doubt. The second 
arises from the constitution, since it always oversees the state of agriculture and business, 
and the results of that which its own action produces, and from time to time it is necessary 
to put aside precise accounts about it since it must establish the price of the commodities. It 
in no way lacks the power to give direction to the National-Industry since without its will 
no hand in the state stirs towards this end, and it continually has freely at its disposal a sum 
of forces which it can also arbitrarily increase or diminish. One should not fear the army of 
officials and their work and paperwork which would bring this about. (FW X 587)
The economic theory summarized in these words is bewilderingly heterodox. In 
it considerations about the state as a venture-capital-agent are united with socialist 
doctrines, and guild-thinking is united with physiocratic speculations and mercan-
tile subtlety. Economically one can hardly find a common denominator for these 
ideas, but one might philosophically. Fichte ultimately presents his theory as the 
self-unfolding of metaphysical reason in economic matters. We must hence seek the 
conceptual key for deciphering the code of the true essence and value of commodi-
ties underlying all economic activity within precisely this philosophical enterprise.
Fichte desires to find reliable bases of value assessment for questions of social 
participation and redistribution. Real freedom manifests itself often as access to 
goods. Whoever wishes to promote a just allocation and fair distribution must make 
goods administrable and their value commensurable. Fichte hence strives to attri-
bute to all commodities a fixed inner value, remaining stable in the face of every 
fluctuation of their so-called outer value, i.e. of their exchange value on markets. 
135 About this see the far-sighted critique given in Krieken, Ueber die sogenannte organische 
Staatstheorie, 641.
136 See for instance Fichte’s commentary to Theodor Schmalz’s “Handbuch der Staatswissenschaft” 
of 1808 in GA II,/13, 9ff.
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His policy of redistribution requires as much. He seeks this “basic criterion of the 
value of all things” far away from the price of commodities, so as to not fall into that 
“bias towards money which disturbs all healthy insights into this matter” (FW X 
558).
Fichte first posits the subsistence-costs of laborers as a necessary component of 
every commodity’s value (FW X 559), below which nothing could be continuously 
produced. He then adds on the laborer’s claim to “leisure,” more precisely a claim 
to participation in the goods achieved macro-economically above the level of every-
one’s subsistence (FW X 544). Leisure is thereby defined as a span of the “ability to 
live without labor” (FW X 560), whereby it is not a question of free time alone, but 
also a question of a “release from all material purposes,” secured by adequate mate-
rial provision, during this time (FW X 539). In leisure time, one ought to be able to 
dedicate oneself to higher ends, for example, moral self-improvement.
Thus Fichte abruptly changes from a theoretical to an ethical perspective on eco-
nomics. It is true, usually, laborers procure exchange-value, which exceeds simply 
covering the costs required for their continuing ability to work, and thus allows 
them some leisure. Nevertheless, this is not always the case. Therefore the state 
shall intervene. According to Fichte, every citizen who contributes towards society’s 
wealth is entitled to claim adequate remuneration from society’s total assets. If a 
laborer invests time, that is, if he puts in individual effort and leisure in order to 
establish subsistence and leisure for society, one must compensate this justly  – 
according to the proportion of the time employed by him to the time applied within 
the entire society and its total profit produced (FW X 561). The individual can thus 
multiply his applied hours with that economic performance ratio and may thus cal-
culate what he is entitled to from the state (ibid).
All individuals are charged with being as economically successful as possible so 
that the community can secure the material freedom of each and everyone. Fichte, 
for instance, comments in the margins of his copy of Theodor Schmalz’s Handbook 
of Political Science [Handbuch des Staatswissenschaft] of 1808 that prosperity “is 
not merely the means for another end, but rather the end of the whole is to be as 
great, cultivated, and wealthy as it can be. – The individual is not allowed to say: I 
wish to put up with being poor. You should and must be as rich as you can” (GA 
II/13, 9). Fichte’s social-utopia needs economic growth.
But that alone does not yet solve the problem of (re)distributing value: While 
within the mental model of a static economy it is relatively comprehensible how the 
respective proportion of goods can be measured out for all, a dynamic order aiming 
towards growth brings along its very own econometric difficulties. In a constantly 
changing economy, how can one establish stable and lasting relations of property? 
How can one prevent the exchange-system producing ever-greater inequalities in 
private-property? Fichte deals with this problem with his usual tendency towards 
drastic solutions. He absolutely does not recognize any property prior to govern-
mental assignment. Every position of property must, in the last instance, result from 
public distribution. As, however, public allocations have to proceed from equal 
rights for everyone, the government must assign everything to everyone in accor-
dance with the same principles.
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Not only the abstract institution of private property, but also that of concrete 
private possessions, is thus turned by Fichte into a canvas for governmental 
designs.137 Accordingly, Fichte does not leave things to rest with a one-time alloca-
tion. He wishes also to ensure that every citizen “maintains the value of this prop-
erty” through every further exchange of commodities and services that takes place 
even after that hypothetical original allocation (FW X 524). Fichte, that is, strives 
for nothing less than a lasting fixation of all relative assets. Unlike usual relations of 
exchange, where the cleverer individuals have an advantage over duller ones, the 
knowing over the unknowing, the independent over the dependent and – because of 
economies of scale and the conventional terms of trade  – the rich have, in most 
cases, an advantage over the poor, from now on it ought to be so that “trading into 
infinity, no one will as a result become either richer or poorer” (ibid.).
What is heralded here is by no means merely the utopia of freely chosen com-
munitarian socialism. Rather, according to Fichte, it is the “task of the state” to 
secure – and, if necessary, also by force – this “progress of humanity” through a firm 
control of all relations between commodities and prices (GA II/13, 10). The logical 
presupposition of that regulation of prices by the state constitutes a theory of the 
true value of commodities, formulated irrespective of any exchange relations. Its 
purpose is to enable the state to allocate to all precisely that to which they are enti-
tled, and so Fichte strives for a metaphysically secured commensurability of the 
value of all commodities and services. His theory of money, doctrine of trade, and 
his idea of political economy all thoroughly depend upon this absolute dimension of 
value.
But what is that ultimate and highest criterion through which economic goods 
can be ascribed a completely market-independent value? For that role, mere work-
ing time does not seem to qualify since obviously equal working time does not 
always produce equal value – neither the same use value nor the same exchange 
value. In every competitive economy some lines of production certainly fair better 
than others and, even within one and the same profession, some producers attract 
more customers than others. Hence a market could hardly come to exist spontane-
ously in which everyone trades goods with everyone else simply for the amount of 
labor contained within them.138 Since the individual estimation of the utility of 
exchanged goods continually oscillates, the desired egalitarization of trade requires 
that one must politically fix value relations of the commodities’ values.
That designation now may not be a forever fixed singular attribution. Otherwise 
it cannot adequately reflect the continual increase in production that Fichte demands 
from society (FN X 544). With a static principle of value the increase in individual 
137 “The being of the freedom of the individual […] is again completely lost by Fichte, since the 
empirical individual is, concerning the guarantee to property, exposed to the total grip of the 
administering community.” Willms, Zur Dialektik der Planung, 121f.
138 The trade on time in especially created trade-exchanges is something different. That is an excep-
tion, however, which confirms the rule, because in such exchanges one can only deal in units of 
time. The fact that one especially needs to create such artificial environments in order to facilitate 
1:1 exchange in temporal units indicates that the exchange ratios that are protected by them could, 
in their absence, only rarely adjust themselves. Otherwise we would not require such exchanges.
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powers of production, for instance, would lead to an unequal distribution of the 
burdens between individual lines of production, as technology-driven growth in the 
economy hardly ever takes place in all sectors at the same time and in the same way. 
The upshot would be allocations running counter to the equal right of all citizens to 
their “due property” (FW X 530). Fichte thus looks for a dynamic medium that 
automatically reflects the societal progression in productive powers adequately:
It is to assign some kind of product of labor as continual criterion of all value, and to attri-
bute the value to all remaining products of labor. That that product of labor must be a food-
stuff, and certainly the most universal and most used foodstuff, e.g. a quantity of corn (a 
bushel) is obvious; for the possibility of life is precisely the ideal criterion of all value and 
labor. (FW X 563)
The quantification of all future economic production in terms of corn-bushels is 
not a self-evident proposition, however. Fichte’s quantification of economic goods 
in terms of corn (albeit modeled most likely after the British economics of his time) 
proceeds – unlike that of, for instance, Fichte’s contemporary David Ricardo (1772–
1823)  – in a physiocratic manner (FW X 565). Ricardo had established a corn- 
calculation in order to show that, by leaving aside econometrically notoriously 
elusive fluctuations in the value of money, one is able to validate certain assessments 
of marginal and comparative value; especially about the relative relation of soil- 
fertility to its annuity.139 Ricardo, that is to say, makes an exemplary regulative use 
of the calculation in terms of corn, but in no way assumes that corn is the actual 
constitutive criterion of all value. Fichte, on the other hand, seeks in corn an abso-
lute measure of value: Every advance of productive powers ought to show in the 
corn-price, which – inasmuch as it is not calculated in money – always remains 
stable and consequently serves him as a reliable constant. Fichte believes that corn 
continually increases in price proportional to the cheapening of the production of 
other goods conditioned by growth (FW X 566). Therefore, the price of corn appears 
to be the sought-for dynamic third medium that can express the firm value-relation 
of all other goods standing in exchange-relations. With this criterion of value, the 
entire political economy is subsequently newly directed by Fichte:
The price of everything upon its surface is produced by the state, and it seeks out the prod-
ucts of labor which enter into commerce and declares them; and for this price everyone will 
be able to have every access at any time to the desired commodities against the equivalent 
which is to be found in his hands. Now how should the state secure this? There remains no 
other means than that it itself takes over commerce, to become the […] third class, the trad-
139 See David Ricardo, Miscellaneous Pamphlet Collection (Library of Congress) and Commercial 
Pamphlet Collection (Library of Congress), An Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on 
the Profits of Stock: Shewing the Inexpediency of Restrictions on Importation: With Remarks on 
Mr. Malthus’ Two Last Publications: “An inquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent” and “The 
Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Coin” (1815) (taken 
from the printing in Works [London, 1821]). For Ricardo the meaning and purpose of the calcula-
tion in corn is to show how the rate of profit of a branch of the economy is oriented by the weakest 
marginal profit within it: In the case of agriculture: how the rate of yield of the soil poorest in profit 
also determines the measure for the yield of more fertile soils insofar as the surplus of productivity 
of these soils are absorbed by proportionally increasing rental costs (soil-annuity).
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ing class […], that means merchants must be civil servants who buy on the state’s account 
everything without exception that is offered to them at the fixed price, and thus sell on the 
state’s account. (FW X 568f)
In terms of econometrics, Fichte’s theory of the foundational corn-criterion fal-
ters. One reason is that the production of corn is not intertemporally stable; another 
is that even simultaneous corn-production requires different production-expenses in 
different places. There is consequently no fixed relation of applied labor and pro-
duced corn, not even when one neglects the time factor.140 As a result, Fichte’s desire 
to reach social equality through a unitary taxation of all land-ownership is already 
thwarted at the outset. A land-tax of this kind would – because of the differing fertil-
ity of different soils – lead to an unfairly uniform burden and thus achieve the exact 
opposite of Fichte’s egalitarian intentions; a difficulty later ever again faced by vari-
ous “One-Tax” systems.
Another problem with the calculation in terms of corn is that the bringing about 
of exchange relations between corn and other commodities is only imaginable, if at 
all, in a strictly subsistence-orientated minimal economy. In no cases does this cri-
terion allow the construction of meaningful relations of value for the innumerable 
non-material goods in complex service and communication-orientated societies. 
Goods can enter into a corn-calculation at best according to their relevance for the 
objectively general interest in survival (like basic nutrition). The more differentiated 
a society, however, the more it produces goods directed towards subjective individ-
ual preferences. Since the latter then can only be grasped by a generalizing eco-
nomic calculation, economic planning based upon a central calculation must 
fail  – not only accidentally, but also generally – to establish a stable relation of 
equivalence between corn and those differentiated economic goods.
Why these economic details? Because with Fichte’s assumption of an a priori 
determinable value of commodities there topples a central-pillar of a distributive 
politics supposed to secure for citizens equal access to all life-goods relevant for 
freedom. Fichte overestimates the hermeneutic competence of the state and under-
estimates the heuristic potentials of the market. He does not even consider the con-
tribution of fair, justly accessible and ordered markets for the establishment of value 
relations between goods and services. Compared with his ideal of an optimal ethical 
distribution, Fichte deems every market-constituted evaluation of goods and alloca-
tion of commodities to be pitifully deficient. He views market prices only as distor-
tions of just exchange-ratios, but never as procedures achieving the latter 
approximately.
Fichte thus explains changes in price only in terms of the profit-motive of mer-
chants to pass overpriced commodities on to consumers. Accordingly, he values the 
profits of trade as an illegitimate robbery from society’s treasures and concludes that 
the state should rather place trade in its own hands (FW X 569f). Yet that is not all. 
As soon as domestic trade is value-metrically brought into line, the established 
140 See David Ricardo, Miscellaneous Pamphlet Collection (Library of Congress) and Commercial 
Pamphlet Collection (Library of Congress), On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 
(1817) (taken from the printing in Works [London, 1821], 121).
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price-relations must be protected from foreign trade. Fichte’s more detailed consid-
erations about this (FW X 587ff) are variations upon the selfsame theme of The 
Closed Commercial State. They follow the schema: The national economy presents 
an endangered order, which all too easily would be brought into disequilibrium by 
uncontrolled inner and outer commercial movements. The state thus requires unlim-
ited powers of control and coercion.141 In essence, economic freedom cannot exist 
within or through the market, but only outside of it.
It would certainly not be fair to gauge Fichte in terms of knowledge reached only 
after the failure of ‘Real-Existing Socialism’ (real-existierender Sozialismus). But 
one should certainly compare Fichte’s theory with the level of knowledge within the 
economics of his day. After all, that is what he wants to surpass. It is thus quite sig-
nificant when Fichte ignores its insights. When he views commerce as nothing other 
than an exploitation of customers, he overlooks, for instance, the balances and allo-
cations resulting from the merchant’s counter-cyclical sale of commodities which 
commerce produces within society. Since commerce reacts to price-differentials 
and so gradually reduces these, it leads in the long term to a more efficient alloca-
tion of goods  – and thereby to an increase in society’s overall wealth. Profits 
obtained by merchants in this way are garnering otherwise unrealized returns and 
thus do not amount to a theft from society’s assets. In that regard German national 
economics of the early nineteenth century thoroughly agreed with classical English 
economics. The same is true mutatis mutandis of commerce across borders. Trade 
imbalances in the roundabout commerce of an international exchange economy can 
lead to an increase in the prosperity of all parties. That had been previously recog-
nized within classical economics since Hume and Smith, and Ricardo had begun to 
model such effect already, although still with fictional numerical values.142
Fichte, though, considers the appeals of English economics to spontaneous com-
mercial balances as the evasions of a lazy reason refusing to engage with the con-
struction of plans (FW X 554). He believes that before him one just did not yet 
seriously penetrate the concepts of property, trade, and exchange – and thus one had 
simply been unaware of the possibility of governing economic life by pure reason. 
Here, too, Fichte misjudges the state of the discussion back then. English econo-
mists had developed their theory of dynamic orders coping with inequalities pro-
ductively as a reaction precisely to the failed hopes of mercantilists and physiocrats 
141 About this see Fichte’s outline “Concerning Bonds [Pfandbriefe],” which probably came into 
being around 1809/10, especially his remarks there concerning the ‘Durability of Value’ (GA II/13, 
11): “Only the state can secure the durability of this (we again insist upon a closed 
Commercial-State).”
142 For the contemporary status of the discussion about the national economy, see the article 
“Political Economy” in the fourth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, Or, A Dictionary of Arts, 
Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature (Edinburgh, 1810), vol. 17, 106–123, as well as the equally 
very instructive article of the same name in The Cyclopedia or: An Universal Dictionary of Arts, 
Sciences, and Literature (Philadelphia, New York, 1810). For the integration of Fichte’s theory 
within the contemporary context of German philosophical theories of economics see also Tetsushi 
Harada, Politische Ökonomie des Idealismus und der Romantik: Korporatismus von Fichte, Müller 
und Hegel (Berlin, 1989).
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to devise an economy completely planned by the government; attempts in many 
ways resembling Fichte’s. The British-Scottish economists had not simply over-
looked, but rather rejected, the option of outlining rationalist models of closed 
cycles of goods and static commercial balances.
2.2.4  Socialism Versus Social-Democracy
A philosophical evaluation of Fichte’s theory must obviously begin with the idea of 
freedom, around which revolves his outline for a socio-economic order directed by 
the state. In this regard, it is first of all to be recognized that Fichte very early on 
saw – and appropriately evaluated as challenges to freedom – some essential prob-
lems posed by the globalizing market and exchange economy. Fichte justifiably 
rails against conditions forcing human beings – out of economic necessity – to agree 
to contracts they would otherwise never enter. That is particularly pertinent wher-
ever – as a result of historical injustice (colonialism, imperialism) – people end up 
in situations that render it impossible for them to reject the very conditions, defined 
by outer powers, for their own economic participation in the global market. Unjust 
commerce is illiberal.
Translated into the language of sport: Whoever has no other choice but to earn 
his living through boxing at fairs (Preisboxen), certainly recognizes – with every 
entrance in the ring – the fundamental rules of boxing as de facto binding, but not, 
for that mere reason, as fair. Something similar is true today of many developing 
countries. They cannot renounce participating within the global economy, but in no 
way find their legitimate interests appropriately addressed by the regulations of the 
World Trade Organization: Fichte clairvoyantly recognized this problem. Wherever 
there is no global government to govern the global economy, sheer power often 
defines the terms of trade: Trade agreements concluded by asymmetrically posi-
tioned partners, however, often perpetuate precisely the very economic unfreedom 
and indigence that bring the weaker party to the table. In this regard, Fichte’s cri-
tique of an economic freedom naively seeking liberalism through laissez-faire eco-
nomics certainly remains cogent. Free trade is only to be demanded in lockstep with 
the gradual developement of a global economic order that secures fair access to the 
global market for all world citizens.
Yet Fichte’s recommendations for therapy appear to be just as erroneous as his 
diagnosis was sound. Whoever recognizes that decentralized transactions – under 
certain unfavorable presuppositions – create, or worsen, injustice, had better direct 
the wind of change to those unfavorable frameworks than attempt to nullify the free 
exchange of goods and services. His optimistic faith in a planned economy notwith-
standing, Fichte anticipates that citizens might attempt to break out of his fixed 
exchange-schema. Hence he tries to foil such attempts by contriving multiple 
 measures of police-control and supervision. But he thus throws into question why 
citizens would want to escape a system that grants them “property absolutely guar-
anteed by the state” (FW X 561) without any market risk? Why would they not 
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simply want to wait obediently until the hand of the state doles out to them what 
they require for economic autonomy?
Fichte casually asks this question himself when investigating why human beings 
trade in and with variable currencies (FW X 575). No one can know what quantities 
of gold and silver are yet to be found upon earth, or which quantities of goods are to 
be acquired by them (FW X 575). Compare this to the quantity of corn-money con-
trolled by his ‘state of reason’ (Vernunftstaat), which exactly represents one-to-one 
the available quantity of corn and thereby offers a stable foundation of value (FW X 
571f.). For Fichte it thus appears to be completely unreasonable that citizens every-
where accept commerce in non-fixable – i.e. themselves traded – currencies (FW X 
575). The aim of a generally balanced commercial transaction would thus always be 
endangered, and through disadvantageous trades one would constantly be in danger 
of reducing the level of property previously maintained. Fichte can thus understand 
the commerce in unstable currencies extant upon the world-market in no other way 
than as brought about “by the need” of the trade-partners (FW X 576). If they did 
not have to sell under conditions of uncertainty, they certainly would not; hence, if 
they do so, they are certainly coerced; and he concludes: “Here reigns force, cer-
tainly not right” (ibid.). “Who profits thereby … ? Whoever understands well to 
calculate the needs of others. All commercial speculations, what else are they but 
presuppositions of such need” (ibid.).
The unintentional irony within Fichte’s reasoning lies in his attempt to help out 
here with price-dirigism. Certainly, most human beings in no way wish to be 
diverted from the ‘predicament’ of a commercial or financial transaction resting 
upon their estimation of its personal benefit to them. One must rather force the 
‘blessings’ of a planned economy upon them.143 Fichte fails to realize that, not only 
the criminal and crazy, but also everyday citizens tend to prefer their own judgment 
of the situation to benevolent state planning.144 Yet, in the firm possession of objec-
tive assessments of economic value, Fichte feels comfortable to disregard these sub-
jective evaluations.
Which leads us to the question: If Fichte had not erroneously believed himself to 
possess an infallible criterion of value, would his economic theory then perhaps 
have turned out differently? Which form of economy would he have ended up with 
if he had renounced the assumption of a metaphysical omniscience in economic 
evaluations? How would his postulate of providing – for liberty’s sake – an appro-
priate sphere of efficacy for all individuals be realized under conditions of informa-
tional uncertainty? Under this premise, might not the answer be found in forms of 
recursive freedom instead of in forms of directive freedom, therefore in forms 
which – instead of coercing – make the freedom of individuals the means for socio- 
economic reform? With the impossibility of an absolute measure of value one 
143 In Fichte’s state, money remains the only private property openly available, but also only within 
narrow boundaries, for it is significantly limited by political state-interventions as well as by the 
exclusion of all foreign money in its individually liberating effect. See Willms, Zur Dialektik der 
Planung, 123 n.560.
144 See Karl Hahn, Staat, Erziehung und Wissenschaft bei J. G. Fichte (München, 1969), 109.
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should expect a renewed appreciation of subjective estimations of utility and a 
revaluation of market dynamics.
Once one no longer sees market transactions, like Fichte, merely as an economic 
state-of-nature to be corrected by the state (FW X 578), then market-based price 
formations appear in a new light. They now appear as interpersonal discussions 
about how much – in terms of money – citizens appreciate certain goods. That this 
conversation is comprised of verdicts about prices that differ and vary from one 
person to another as well as from one situation to another is, then, not only innocu-
ous, but rather welcome. While such a free and fluctuating formation of prices cer-
tainly eludes all rational planning, it is, however, not necessarily contrary to all 
reason. Subsidiary allocations by the market are rather a-rational; they require a 
philosophical interpretation which does not force everything into that dual schema 
of rational versus irrational favored by Fichte. The exchange value of commodities 
and services established on the market is not inevitably a deceptive illusion (trüger-
ischer Schein). Rather one might come to see it as a necessary appearance (notwen-
dige Erscheinung) of the use value of goods and services which otherwise, i.e. in 
and of itself, remains ineffable: as a value, that is to say, which although not formed 
rationally might still – under determinate further presuppositions – be approved by 
reason.
Such a point of view also corresponds more closely with the liberal foundations 
of economic philosophy worked out by Kant, upon which Fichte believed himself 
to be building. Kant had, after all, defined the price of commodities: “the price (pre-
tium) of a thing is the judgment of the public about its value (valor) in proportion to 
that which serves as the universal means to represent reciprocal exchange of indus-
try (its circulation)” (AA 6:289). For Kant, inter-subjective judgments of value 
determine the price of commodities, and not – as with Fichte – objective costs of 
self-preservation. Consequently, and insofar as the prices the market establishes are 
not subject to the conditions of an illegitimate distortion (an – at that time as today – 
unfortunately all too often counterfactual presupposition), they may provide infor-
mation about what society actually values. Thus the economic freedom of citizens 
could be brought about through market-transactions, not merely against them.
For the functioning of such a price-based discourse on values the procedures of 
the market-economy must, however, be optimized in the interests of the freedom of 
all human beings. Still today, the path up to that destination remains long and toil-
some. Only when access to the market is equitable and negotiations on all sides are 
carried out without coercion or manipulation, can there be a valid supposition of 
justice regarding commercial agreements. Only then may it be assumed that by 
means of formal fairness results of substantial justice are brought about. This aspect, 
therefore, i.e. the appropriate formal and procedural presuppositions of a free inter- 
personal discourse concerning economic value, would consequently be key to 
advance the Fichtean ideal of a universal participation in the goods of the earth. 
Fichte’s socio-philosophical aims would more likely be served by a regulatory and 
fiscal law affirming and transforming market-freedoms, rather than with price- 
controls that abolish commercial freedom once and for all. Economic freedom, 
when universalized, demands social-democracy rather than socialism.
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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) argued in a similar vein. He like-
wise saw in social grievances tangible hindrances to freedom that must be removed. 
He therefore came out in favor of provisions for the poor and a governmental sur-
veillance of the economic order. He proceeded, though, from a general recognition 
of the historically formed views and pursuits of both individuals and institutions. 
Hegel, accordingly, sought freedom in tried and tested forms of sociality and in their 
further advancement, instead of attempting to design the essence of freedom com-
pletely anew from the philosophical drawing board. Not abstract philosophical 
planning is key, but rather the concrete appropriateness of a way of life for autono-
mous action. One has to ascertain where, and to what extent, institutions of concrete 
freedom (families, businesses, associations) are to be protected and strengthened – 
and to what extent the state has the duty to criticize and correct these. Students of 
Hegel, not coincidentally, later expanded these ideas into a philosophical founda-
tion for subsidiary social-state action.145
A short path leads from Hegel to Karl Marx (1818–1883). The bourgeois free-
dom Hegel aimed to protect was, Marx felt, ground down by capitalist conditions so 
that ultimately freedom was still only to be had in the forms of alienation (for capi-
talists) and exploitation (for the proletariat). Marx thus devalued as “negative,” not 
only the Fichtean freedom which turns against its environment, but bourgeois free-
dom as a whole, including all of its traditional ties – as involuntary contributions 
towards the consolidation of an economic system which undermines all ethical 
commitments and is thereby deeply contrary to freedom. As a positive ideal, Marx 
introduced a freedom through which all human beings could realize – also economi-
cally – their true essence, i.e. their humanity. The essence of mankind to be realized 
thereby, according to Marx, does not rest on the back of history (golden age, para-
dise, primeval communities, etc.) or upon the deepest ground of human existence 
(nature of humankind, image of God), but rather in the future: it consists in reaching 
for still outstanding forms of economic and political freedom. In the name of such 
positive freedom, Marx ultimately calls for the violent destruction of certain forms 
of negative freedom: As with Fichte, with Marx, coercion is chosen as a means for 
realizing freedom, but no longer with paternalistic, but now rather with revolution-
ary force.
Some contemporaries attempted more moderate alternatives; such as Ferdinand 
Lasalle (1825–1864), who, for example, wished to transform capitalism from inside 
by supporting institutional balances like an organized workforce, or also Franz 
Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch (1808–1883), who aimed to tame it through coopera-
tives and consumer-cooperation. For them it was a question of strengthening indi-
viduals, who are weakened by isolation, through association, and thus of forming 
forces able to counterbalance the power of capital. These, and other cooperatively 
orientated groupings of the nineteenth century sought a ‘Third Way’ between the 
planning-dictate of totalizing collectives, on the one hand, and the opposed extreme 
145 See Stefan Koslowski, Die Geburt des Sozialstaats aus dem Geist des deutschen Idealismus: 
Person und Gemeinschaft bei Lorenz von Stein (Weinheim, 1989).
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of the unregulated contingent decisions of atomistic individuals on the other; a path 
of mediation between individual freedom and social responsibility.
In my opinion, probably the purest philosophical formulation of that basic idea 
of a liberalism of responsible freedom is, however, found not with those well-known 
social-liberal and social-democratic figures, but rather in the work of philosopher, 
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832), who up until recently has rarely been 
discussed. According to him, the philosophical idea of freedom must be theoreti-
cally connected (verbinden) and practically allied (verbünden) with the citizens’ 
consciousness of freedom in order to prove effective in society. Instead of writing in 
the style of Fichte and Marx against the false consciousness of the nation, Krause 
wishes to philosophize in a manner that begins with the worldview of his public. 
Economic justice is not to be forced through against the liberal market economy. 
Krause rather intends to support social justice by means of economic freedom and 
responsibility. For Krause, the means for freedom is not coercion, but rather free-
dom itself. He leads the idea of freedom through a critical reflection upon its presup-
positions and aims toward a conception of a liberal order, which continuously 
reforms itself – and thus raises philosophical liberalism to a new methodological 
level.
2.3  Participative Freedom (Karl Christian Friedrich Krause)
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832), while hardly known within the 
Anglophone world,146 is remembered by many Spanish and Latin-American phi-
losophers as the authentic progenitor of a sustainable and context-sensitive philoso-
phy of freedom.147 Although Krause’s philosophy was also neglected in Germany 
for a long time, since the 1980s, however, it has been receiving increasing attention 
among scholars. It has a key place in the history of ideas, insofar as Krause pio-
neered ideas which were later of formative importance for German Idealism as a 
whole.148 Moreover, slowly but surely the outdated caricature of Krause as a second- 
146 Apart from references to Krause in the work of Thomas Hill Green and James Lorimer, as far as 
I am aware, in the Anglophone world, one only finds real enthusiasm for Krause within the work 
of Clay MacCauley. MacCauley never fails to praise Krause, and describes him as “one of the best, 
wisest, most prescient and, in true manliness, one of the greatest of human kind” and considers it 
the greatest misfortune that Krause did not become Fichte’s successor in Berlin, instead of “the 
compliant and complacent Hegel” (Clay MacCauley, “Krause’s 1818 League of Peace,” The 
Advocate of Peace 81:2 (1919), 43–44 & 48; see also Clay MacCauley, Krause’s League for 
Human Right and Thereby World Peace [Tokyo, 1917]).
147 See Dierksmeier, “Krausism” in Nuccetelli, Schutte & Bueno (eds.), A Companion to Latin 
American Philosophy (2010).
148 See the studies by Enrique M. Ureña, K. C. F. Krause: Philosoph, Freimauerer, Weltbürger: Eine 
Biographie (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1991) and Enrique M.  Ureña, 
Philosophie und Gesellschaftliche Praxis: Wirkungen der Philosophie K.  C. F.  Krauses in 
Deutschland, 1833–1881 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2001) as well as Claus 
Dierksmeier, Der absolute Grund des Rechts: Karl Christian Friedrich Krause in 
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rate philosopher yields to the portrait of a first-class thinker whose work was not 
only of relevance yesteryear, but also provides great inspiration for today.
Krause is particularly innovative as a result of his methodologically consistent 
implementation of the Kantian project of a philosophy focused upon freedom: dia-
logically, phenomenologically, and discursively. Krause thus arrives at a liberalism 
open to difference, which is highly suggestive for the current discussion. Directed 
to humanity in its entirety, his philosophy considers – at the outset of the nineteenth 
century – issues such as the legal representation of unborn children, minors, the 
disabled, distantly living peoples, and future generations. While promoting global 
governance structures for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts, he 
stresses the importance of sustainable conservation and pleads for the complete 
elimination of any kind of religious, sexual, and racial discrimination. And all of 
this was at a time when, as is well known, the prevailing tone favored the sounds of 
nationalistic and sexist chauvinism.
Such – in 1800 extremely unusual – postulates are not merely prophecies of a 
consciousness mystically communing with the future. They can rather consistently 
be derived from the fundamental convictions of Krause’s methodology. As we have 
seen, Kant had already drawn attention to the self-reflexivity of the idea of freedom 
(see Sect. 2.1.1). Kant had specified the idea of freedom by referring to itself as 
regards its content. Krause goes one step further and appropriates that reflexive way 
of thinking in regard to the method of philosophy as well. Krause wishes to involve 
all persons in the generation of the rules under which they live; wherever possible in 
a direct and participatory manner, and wherever this is (still) impossible, at least in 
an indirect and representative way. From this approach, Krause develops a global 
ethics of freedom, the potential of which has up to now in no way been exhausted.
The proximity of Krause’s doctrine to arguments currently championed by the 
proponents of ‘capability theory’ is particularly striking. Krause likewise bemoans 
how social contract theories fail in the face of asymmetrical living conditions: 
Whenever certain stakeholders (children, women, the disabled, or even animals) are 
so placed that the consideration of their interests is not in the self-interest of a ratio-
nal utility-maximizer, the contractualist construction threatens to collapse. Krause 
thus suggests a revision of its fundamental assumptions (legitimating societal soli-
darity by the means of a contract for the sake of a reciprocally beneficial utility- 
exchange), and thereby he anticipates the critique of contractualism championed 
today by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen.
These points of contact cannot be investigated in detail here. Yet, in especially 
striking cases I will highlight these parallels by referring in the footnotes to corre-
sponding claims within Martha Nussbaum’s work. In addition to Krause’s pro-
nounced systematic proximity to the “capabilities approach,” there may also have 
been historical lines of connection, on one hand, by means of Thomas Hill Green 




and Ernest Baker149 and, on the other, by means of Friedrich Fröbel and John 
Dewey.150
In what follows, I first situate Krause’s thinking within the philosophical context 
of 1800. I then discuss how his relational concept of personality and qualitative 
149 Amartya Sen studied in Cambridge (UK) in an environment influenced by Ernest Baker; Baker 
was a student of Thomas Hill Green. The latter – a leading authority in German Idealism – was not 
only essentially closely connected to Krause’s ideas (for instance, in regard to his capability-orien-
tated concept of freedom, his panentheistic metaphysics, and his conception of cosmopolitanism), 
but rather, incidentally, also explicitly referred to Krause (for instance to his definition of rights, as 
entitlements enabling freedom and the presuppositions of reasonable self-determination); see Peter 
P. Nicolson & Richard Lewis Nettleship, Works of Thomas Hill Green (Bristol: Thoemmes) II, 341.
150 In questions of pedagogy, Martha Nussbaum aligns herself with John Dewey (e.g. in Martha 
Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities [Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010], 18 & 60), who, for his part, (in John Dewey, Democracy and Education: 
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education [New York: Macmillan, 1929], 207) explicitly and 
emphatically refers to the work of Friedrich Fröbel. Fröbel, however, was in direct contact with 
Krause. For the relationship between Fröbel and Krause see P. Hohlfed, “Über Krause und Fröbel” 
in Die Neue Zeit 3 (1874), 161–182; L.  Kurze, Die pädagogischen Gedanken Karl Christian 
Friedrich Krauses in ihrem Zusammenhang mit seiner Philosophie dargestellt (Langensalza, 
1911), 138–145, K. Giel, “Unvorgreifliche Gedanken über die Beziehung zwischen Krause und 
Fröbel,” in: Kodalle & Hofgeismar (eds.) Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832): Studien 
zu seiner Philosophie und zum Krausismo (Hamburg, 1985), 112–123, and especially E. M. Ureña, 
Philosophie und gesellschaftliche Praxis: Wirkungen der Philosophie K.C.F.  Krauses in 
Deutschland (1833–1881) (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2001), 215ff.: Krause 
and Fröbel became acquainted because Krause responded to one of Fröbel’s essays in the maga-
zine Isis with good-natured criticism – good-natured in respect of its pedagogical content, and 
critically because Fröbel presented his educational ideals as ‘German,’ whereas Krause advocated 
‘human’ Ideals. Subsequently, a correspondence took place which intensified when Fröbel began 
to read Krause’s works. Fröbel then attempted to acquaint himself personally with Krause. A meet-
ing occurred between both teachers and some of their students that was both personally and profes-
sionally positive: The schools began to cooperate closely. Krause’s son-in-law, Leonhardi, who 
sought to increasingly involve himself in the field of Fröbel’s projects (especially in the Fröbel-
school in Keilhau), became an essential link (see ibid. 298ff.). A close collaboration arose (from 
1872 onwards) in, e.g., the General Education Association (Allgemeinen Erziehungsverein). 
Another connection could be the principle of cyclical education promoted on the part of the 
Krausist Institución Libre de Enseñanza. Cyclical education, as understood by the Krausists, 
rejects the separation of content by age groups and the compartmentalization of the disciplines. 
Instead, its standard model of education seeks progress through penetrating topics in accordance 
with the students’ respective advances, deepening their grasp of them with each cyclical reoccur-
rence of the subject, and through clustering topics so that they meet the vital needs of the students 
and their societal contexts, see L. Esteban Mateo, El Krausismo, la Institución Libre de Enseñanza 
y Valencia (Valencia, 1990), 56ff. A cursory glance reveals that those pedagogical considerations 
are very similar to the program of a life-affirming cultivation enabling democratic self-determina-
tion that was followed by John Dewey (and supported by Martha Nussbausm). Francisco Querol 
Fernández also stresses (in La filosofia del derecho de K. Ch. F. Krause: con un apéndice sobre su 
Proyecto europeista [Madrid, 2000], 395) the demand for a life-long cultivation closely associated 
with Krausism. For information about the dissemination of these and other widely exported edu-
cational principles from Krause’s philosophy by the Institución Libre de Enseñanza, see Francisco 
Garrido Dominguez, Francisco Giner de los Ríos: Creador de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza 
(Granada: Editorial Comares, 2001), 59–64. In what follows we shall provide more information 
about the political aspects of Krausist pedagogy.
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understanding of freedom motivated his adoption of a methodology fundamentally 
different from those of his philosophical contemporaries and associates. I go on to 
discuss the central positions of Krause’s socio-political and economic philosophy 
and finally return to considerations concerning its relevance for current problems of 
globalization. Throughout this reconstruction examples will illustrate how his phi-
losophy of freedom was influential in Spain and Latin-America.
2.3.1  Reception, Context, and Method
In many Spanish speaking countries, Krause’s philosophy found its practical expres-
sion in the political movement of Krausism or krausismo, a liberalism aiming at 
social harmony.151 Over half a century, from the middle of the 1860s until its sup-
pression by Franco in the middle of the 1930s, krausismo shaped the constitutional 
life and political culture of Spain.152 The same is true of Argentina and Uruguay, 
where, since the 1870s, whole generations of presidents were committed to the 
Krausist thinking – until, in the second half of the twentieth century, dictators took 
over power and suppressed any kind of liberalism. Immediately after the end of 
those dictatorships, the first democratically elected presidents of those countries and 
the parties supporting them again avowed Krause’s intellectual heritage. This 
applies both to the Argentinian President, Raúl Alfonsin, and Argentinia’s liberal 
party, Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), which was very popular during his time in 
office, as well as to the Battle family in Uruguay, which since produced several 
heads of state.153
Up until the 1990s it was believed that the programmatic publications of 
Krausism were original creations of Iberian culture. Enrique Menendes Ureña’s 
textual analyses have shown, however, that the writings that Julian Sanz del Río (the 
father of Spanish Krausism) distributed to his people were – contrary to what he 
made them believe – nothing but cleverly arranged translations of Krause’s original 
151 For more information about the Krausist concept of “harmonious liberalism” see Juan José Gil-
Cremades, “Die politische Dimension des Krausismo in Spanien” in Klaus Kodalle (ed.), Karl 
Christain Freidrich Krause (1781–1832): Studien zu seiner Philosophie und zum Krausismo 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1985), 221–223.
152 Nicolás Salmerón, president of the first Spanish republic is known to most people as “exponent 
de la penetración krausista en la vida pública,” see, for example, JuanTerradillos Basoco, “El 
Institucionalismo y el Nuevo Enfoque de la Doctrina Penal” in López Álvarez (ed.), La Institución 
Libre de Enseñanza: su influencia en la cultura española (Cádiz: Ronda, 1996), 80. Carlos Otto 
Stoetzer indicates (in Karl Christian Friedrich Krause and his Influence in the Hispanic World 
[1998] 98) that not only Salmerón, but also the third president of the Spanish republic, Castelar, 
were Krausists, which had an effect on the Spanish constitution of 1869 (see Stoetzer, 104). For the 
Krausist influence upon the genesis of the first Spanish republic see C.  A. M.  Hennessy, The 
Federal Republic in Spain: Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican Movement, 1868–1874 
(Oxford, 1962) & John Brande Trend, The Origins of Modern Spain (Cambridge, 1934), 30–49.
153 See Enrique Ureña, “Krause hoy” in Jorge O. Casella (ed.), Las ideas filosóficas que influyeron 
en la formación del Uruguay contemporáneo (Montevideo, 1988), 19–27.
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texts.154 A few years ago, Ureña also presented extensive and meticulously 
researched studies which set the record straight in regard to Krause’s impact on his 
homeland (where he was widely regarded as a “vergessener Privatdozent”). Ureña 
could show that there was, in a manner of speaking, something like a German 
Krausism at the end of the nineteenth century. The view that, within Germany, 
Krause’s work never found any resonance, should thus be corrected.155
Krause deserves particular attention in the context of the philosophy of freedom 
of the early nineteenth century. At that time numerous thinkers strove to apply 
Kant’s theory of freedom to social questions. In the competition to be Kant’s official 
successor, Fichte first took the lead, by surpassing many of his competitors by virtue 
of the systematic rigor of his approach. Krause, although he was deemed to be 
Fichte’s best student,156 nevertheless chose to endorse this view. At the tender age of 
22, he published a legal philosophy, which, in its structure and content, as well as its 
title, competed with Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right. In his “Foundations of 
Natural Right” of 1803, Krause explicitly accused Fichte’s philosophy of grave 
structural and theoretical deficiencies.157 This critique allows us to reconstruct how 
Krause broke away from Fichte’s directive liberalism to bring his own participative 
liberalism into being.
Fichte’s deductions, Krause complains, attempt “by illusory teleological proofs” 
(NR 236) to feign a concreteness which can only be attained by a philosophy 
which – unlike Fichte’s – does not merely pretend to engage with people’s lives and 
ideas.158 Krause wanted to rehabilitate the everyday world-view – and its typical 
154 See Ureña, K. C. F. Krause: Philosoph, Freimaurer, Weltbürger.
155 See all of Ureña, Philosophie und gesellschaftliche Praxis.
156 See Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, El Sistema de la filosofia de Krause: Génesis y desarrollo del 
panenteísmo (Madrid: UPCo, 1998), 41–56.
157 For the textual history and intellectual background of this work, see Wolfgang Forster, Karl 
Christian Friedrich Krauses frühe Rechtsphilosophie und ihr geistesgeschichtlicher Hintergrund 
(Ebelsbach, 2000).
158 Krause’s writings are referenced by means of the following abbreviations: (AR): Abriss des 
Systemes der Philosophie des Rechtes oder des Naturrechts (Göttingen, 1828); (ERB): Der 
Erdrechtsbund an sich selbst und in seinem Verhältnisse zum Ganzen und zu allen Einzeltheilen 
des Menschheitlebens, Georg Mollat, ed. (Weimar, 1893); (EU): Entwurf eine europäischen 
Staatenbundes als Basis des allgemeinen Friedens und als rechtliches Mittel gegen jeden Angriff 
wider die innere und äußere Freiheit Europas (1814) H. Reichel, ed. (Leipzig, 1920) (original edi-
tion 1814); (G): Grundlage des Naturrechts, oder philosophischer Grundriss des Ideales des 
Rechts. Erste Abteilung (Jena, 1803); (G II) Grundlage des Naturrechts oder philosophischer 
Grundriss des Ideales des Rechts. Zweite Abtheilung, G.  Mollat, ed. (Weimar, 1890); (GW): 
Vorlesungen über Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft, zugleich in ihrer Beziehung zu dem Leben. 
Nebst einer kurzen Darstellung und Würdigung der bisherigen Systeme der Philosophie, vornehm-
lich der neuesten von Kant, Fichte, Schelling und Hegel, und der Lehre Jacobi’s. Für Gebildete aus 
allen Ständen (Göttingen, 1828); (K): Erklärende Bemerkungen und Erläuterungen [Kommentar] 
zu J. G. Fichte’s Grundlage des Naturrechts, Georg Mollat, ed. (Leipzig, 1893); (LL): Lebenlehre 
oder Philosophie der Geschichte zur Begründung der Lebenkunstwissenschaft (Leipzig, 1904); 
(Nph): Anleitung zur Naturphilosophie. I. Deduction der Natur, II. Anleitung zur Construction der 
Natur (Jena & Leipzig, 1804); (NR): Vorlesungen über Naturrecht oder Philosophie des Rechts 
und des Staates, R. Mucke, ed. (Leipzig, 1892); (SL): System der Sittenlehre. I. Versuch einer wis-
2.3 Participative Freedom (Karl Christian Friedrich Krause)
108
assumption of an independent external world (K 5). Unlike Fichte, Krause does not 
identify a world to which one – among other things – relates oneself morally with a 
world that actually exists only insofar as we can relate to it thusly; a world that, 
abstracted from the purposes of human freedom, possesses neither meaning nor 
intrinsic value. To follow Fichte’s views invites thus an irrevocable dualism between 
the reasonable (freedom) and the unreasonable (necessity).
According to Krause, what is missing here is a medium indifferent to reason; a 
medium of neither reasonable nor unreasonable, but rather of reasonably determin-
able sensibility. As a consequence, Fichte’s conception cannot productively synthe-
size the ‘I’ with nature. Free life inevitably comes into opposition with nature, and 
one ends up with “precisely that erroneous view of nature as inhibition and obstruc-
tion, but not real life” (K 5). In such a theory, free activity in nature must degenerate 
into the demand for radical actualization of freedom against everything that is not 
yet reasonable – and thus also against nature. According to Krause, this is the origin 
of Fichte’s philosophical transformation of nature into nothing but a dead “material 
of duty” (GA 1/5, 353; AD 25) as well as of Fichte’s advocacy of the devaluation of 
animals and plants as in themselves worthless things, which is strongly criticized by 
Krause (GW 455).
Krause’s objections to Fichte’ theory of intersubjectivity have a similar focus.159 
As we have seen (Sect. 2.2.1), Fichte at times advocated that, so as to not forfeit its 
claim to recognition, freedom qua reasonable freedom has to be demonstrated 
through thoroughly ethical conduct. According to Krause, however, the recognition 
of human dignity is something that is neither won nor lost (K 11). Hence the forever 
conditioned reciprocity of factual recognition cannot justify the basic right of all 
human beings to be recognized as moral and reasonable. Rather, the unconditioned 
right to be respected as a reasonable being justifies an absolute legal obligation 
(Rechtspflicht) towards general recognition. In direct opposition to Fichte, Krause 
thus demands: “Treat as a reasonable being also one who treats you as an unreason-
able being, who does not respect your reasonableness.” Even “if no one respected 
me, this would not mean that I am no longer duty bound towards respect in general, 
not even legally” (K 13f italics in the original).
Fichte’s doctrine that the foundation of law is the symmetry and reciprocity of 
legal acts (Rechtsleistungen) is rejected in favor of a rehabilitation of “original 
senschaftliche Begründung der Sittenlehre. Zweite, vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage, 
II. Abhandlungen und Einzelgedanken zur Sittenlehre, P. Hohlfeld & A. Wünsche, eds. (Weimar, 
1888); (Sysl/II): Vorlesungen zum System der Philosophie, Siegfried Plegerl, ed. (Breitenfurt, 
1981) (original edition, Göttingen, 1828); (U): Das Urbild der Menschheit (Göttingen, 1851) 
(original edition, 1811); (VR): Das System der Rechtsphilosophie – Vorlesungen für Gebildete aus 
allen Ständen, K. A. D. Röder, ed. (1874). Das Urbild der Menscheit is available in English trans-
lation as: K. C. F. Krause, The Ideal of Humanity and Universal Federation, W. Hastie (Edinburgh, 
1900).
159 These objections do not affect Fichte’s later theory of intersubjectivity. Since Krause had inti-
mate knowledge of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo (today’s text is based upon his lecture 
notes) – and employed a similar approach within his own theory of intersubjectivity – it should 
also not be assumed that they were Krause’s target.
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rights” (Urrechte) of personality (K 29). Consequently, the freedoms owed to every 
human being do not result from reciprocal exchange or contract. One is not only 
(hypothetically) obligated to enable the freedom of all persons if and insofar as one 
can expect symmetrical acts in return (Gegenleistungen).160 There is rather a (cate-
gorical) duty to enable everyone’s freedom, and this duty also extends to thoroughly 
asymmetrical relations (such as, for example, the rights of future generations or of 
people with disabilities). The social contract does not result from the quantitatively- 
maximizing calculation of otherwise disconnected individuals haggling for rights 
and advantages. Rather a qualitatively-optimizing logic of human fellowship grants 
to all persons the right to a self-determined life, and this also entails, according to 
Krause, the entitlement to commit themselves autonomously to social contracts.161
Fichte’s doctrine, according to which only strict reciprocity can justify claims to 
rights is, incidentally, rejected by Krause, even in cases where exchange and con-
tract theories (Tausch- und Vertragstheorien) are by their very nature particularly 
strong, namely, in the sphere of civil-law contracts. In no instance, according to 
Krause, does right arise from contract alone. It is rather the case that everyone’s 
right to personality produces a right to enter contracts with others: And this is why 
it is not the arbitrary will of the parties which is the basis of rights, but, in the first 
place, human rights that provide the necessary basis for private legal autonomy:
The validity of law can therefore not originally be based upon some kind of contract since 
every contract presupposes an arbitrary determination of the will. Choice (Willkür), how-
ever, is any determination of inner freedom which derives its determining grounds merely 
from the willing person as individual person. Law rather first gives to the free will the 
sphere of its choice and justifies it to move arbitrarily within its limits. For any contract to 
have legal force one has to presuppose the existence of rights in and through the state in 
order to enter into such a contract. In short, in the already established state it is possible to 
enter into rightfully binding contracts […]. It is therefore a deep and dangerous misunder-
standing to ground all rights, even the state, and all legally binding powers, upon contracts, 
upon so-called fundamental contracts, which have no legal force beyond said choice”. 
(ERB 39f.)
Even contracts within the realm of civil law and the obligations accompanying 
them do not always come to an end, as Fichte believed, as soon as just one party 
does not comply with the contract in some way (K 37). That is, reciprocity creates 
concrete rights only insofar as it itself is already abstractly justified and legally 
authorized for it  – an insight, by the way, which accords with today’s juridical 
 practices and productively contradicts the reconstructions of law and society prof-
160 To see what the “capability approach” has to offer for the same topic see Martha Nussbaum, 
Frontiers of Justice, 393f., e.g. the following quote: “We do not have to win the respect of others 
by being productive. […] Productivity is necessary, and even good; but it is not the main end of 
social life” (ibid., 160). The search for reciprocal advantage would simply be a “wrong account of 
the primary basis for social cooperation” (ibid., 129).
161 Compare with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “we acknowledge, as well, that the kind of socia-
bility that is fully human includes symmetrical relations, … but also relations of more or less 
extreme asymmetry; we insist that the nonsymmetrical relations can still contain reciprocity and 
truly human functioning” (Frontiers of Justice, 160).
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fered by game theory and utility theory that dominated the end of the twentieth 
century (about which there is more in Chap. 3).162
In the same context of a rejection of the mechanistically-reciprocal justification 
of rights, Krause also attacks Fichte’s theory of excessive self-defense. If people 
harm us but slightly, one may not maltreat them ad libitum, since their actions can-
not extinguish the constitutive legal relationship between us and them (K38). On the 
whole, Krause rejects what he sees as Fichte’s “unlawfully determined” criminal 
law, which recognizes a barbarous penal power that, upon illicit conduct, would rob 
human beings of their right to dignity and henceforth treat them like beasts (VR 
116).163 Succinctly and powerfully, Krause notes:
The thesis is false, for its condition [i.e. that the other acts illicitly] is in no way the founda-
tion of legal status (Rechtswürdigkeit), but this is rather the reasonable nature [i.e. of the 
other]. It is impossible that the latter be stripped off by a single illicit action […]. Therefore, 
Fichte’s positing of rigid consequences [Fichtes Konsequenzenmacherei] is unjust. (K 46)
For Krause, freedom is an upshot of humanity’s “reasonable nature”. On this 
foundation rests the unconditioned dignity of human life, which is – even for the 
respective persons themselves – inviolable.164 Consequently, universal “rights for 
world citizen” (Weltbürgerrechte) are to be proclaimed, which guarantee certain 
freedoms to all human beings, not based on their specific citizenship, but in virtue 
of their general personhood. Concerning those cosmopolitan rights, Krause writes:
They belong to me not insofar as I am a citizen of this particular region and state, but insofar 
as I am a citizen of the world. I can thus call them, together with the rights to my body, as 
the proximate condition of their attainment, my rights as a world-citizen [Weltbürger], and 
call my possession of them my cosmopolitan property [weltbürgerliches Eigentum]; they 
rank higher than any positive form of coercion and are indelibly etched into the legal con-
stitution of the world [Gesetzbuch der Welt]. (G 28)
Since the idea of freedom is not only the highest content of his philosophy, but 
serves also as its ultimate methodological principle, Krause has no desire to present 
his philosophy of freedom as ready-made before the public. He rather aims for the 
active contribution of the public. If a philosophy of freedom is to be liberating, free-
dom’s ends and means must harmonize. Philosophy’s path has to foreshadow its 
goal. Krause does not want to persuade his readers rhetorically, but rather aims to 
convince them truly. This is why he constantly refers back to pre-philosophical atti-
tudes and everyday sensibilities and integrates them into his train of thought. He 
searches for a theory that does not dismiss as unscientific humanity’s everyday con-
162 See also Martha Nussbaum’s intensive critique of “contractualism” as such: “our dominant 
theories of social contract give us the wrong message. For centuries they have been giving us a 
defective story about why people get together to form a society” (Frontiers of Justice, 222f.); see 
also Creating Capabilities, 87.
163 See Michael Köhler, “Zur Begründung des Rechtszwangs im Anschluss an Kant und Fichte,” 
118.
164 Compare with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “the approach espouses a principle of each person 
as an end. […] The approach, however, considers each person worthy of equal respect and regard, 
even if people don’t always take that view about themselves” (Creating Capabilities, 35).
2 Metaphysics of Freedom
111
cerns and world-views. The goal must rather be to understand, reconstruct, and 
address these more clearly and coherently than they themselves can; where that 
succeeds, people will heed philosophy gladly and voluntarily. For that reason, 
Krause’s focuses upon dialogical argumentation, comprehensible thought- 
experiments, and a theory formation – open to falsification – open to empirically 
testing its explanatory power. In short, he focuses upon methods which only later 
became widely adopted in academic philosophy.165
From 1803 onwards, there are therefore two strands to his philosophy. He devel-
ops his theory by means of a continually self-critical engagement between analytic 
and synthetic observations, which meadiates between scholarly ideas and everyday 
worldviews. The indispensable conceptual constructions serving all theory- 
formation should combine intellectual speculation and experience in a process of 
thinking in which “the deduction and the intuition of the object, as though holding 
hands, proceed together side-by-side into the depths” (SysIP 336).166 Two things are 
thereby avoided: The lack of contact with reality of those solely deductive methods 
which retreat into merely formal and conceptual worlds on the one hand, and the 
unimaginative blindness of purely inductive approaches and the analytical opaque-
ness of merely intuitive approaches on the other (SysIP 334f). In marked contrast to 
the speculative philosophies of the time, Krause makes clear that it is in no way as 
though “the constructing philosopher wishes to masquerade as the Creator; […] or 
[that] the philosophizing spirit [Geist] ventures to scientifically deduce, demon-
strate, and construct, as such, the infinitely determined temporal individuality of 
things” (SysIP 337). A philosophical construction should rather only be the link 
uniting the given intuitions, inductions, and deductions, which are required for this 
reciprocal critique and integration into a universal theory. Such construction, conse-
quently, does not rest upon a mystical power of intuition or representation inacces-
sible to ordinary people.
Krause’s philosophy thus contains presuppositions which enable it itself to be 
critically surpassed. The conceptual constructions of his philosophy result from 
free, creative mental activity (Geistestätigkeit): without blueprints and guarantees 
of success. Krause expressly underlines the capacity for error and revision of all 
philosophical speculation. Only thus can one avoid a philosophy like that of his 
teacher Fichte, which in extracting results from erroneous premises immunizes 
itself against any critique, only to fail all the more dramatically the more consis-
tently it proceeds (SysIP 335f).
For this reason, too, Krause turns to his readers. In the light of their experience 
and insights, he examines, time and again, his constructions. While the German 
Idealists sometimes took to the lofty heights of a “transcendental” or “absolute 
consciousness” and, from this perspective, rebuffed the protestations of the “mun-
dane” and “blind” consciousness of ordinary people as per se intellectually 
 unsatisfactory, Krause takes them seriously. Although, Krause does not automati-
165 For more detailed information about this see Dierksmeier, Der absolute Grund des Rechts, 
Chapter IV.
166 See ibid., 322ff.
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cally regard every critique as justified, he nevertheless takes up each objection and 
always tries to do justice to the concerns it conveys. No reasonable critique, he 
believes, can be completely off the mark; this is why their respectively applicable 
aspects must be recognized and acknowledged first. Only subsequently may one 
then proceed to a theory that integrates and surpasses these objections.167
Krause’s theoretical philosophy takes a didactic path designed as a discourse that 
gradually leads his readers from their respective knowledge and level of insight to 
the requisite synthetically speculative topics of metaphysics. In his practical phi-
losophy, that analytical approach develops out of the prevalent moral convictions of 
his contemporary citizens. Krause accepts their reservations as an indication that his 
philosophical constructions are yet imperfectly explained or still in need of revision 
(Nph 84). In this way, in Krause, the public is transferred from a passive object of 
philosophy into an actively participating subject. And just as with the establishment 
of truth in theoretical philosophy, Krause also involves the public within practical 
philosophy: By integrating their actual conceptions of freedom into the procedures 
of ethical argumentation.
2.3.2  The Freedom of Nature and of Humanity
In the philosophy of the nineteenth century, nature is often reduced to a mere object 
of human activity. Krause however looks for human freedom not so much in indepen-
dence from, but rather in interdependency with, its environment. Human beings ulti-
mately develop themselves and their freedom, not only in abstraction from their 
biological and social contexts, but rather mostly in and through them.168 Human 
beings live in and out of relations to their shared environment and posterity (Um-, 
Mit- und Nachwelt). From this relational understanding of the person there results a 
sustainability-orientated concept of freedom. Clearly, human beings must maintain 
the natural preconditions of their life if – in using their freedom – they do not want to 
negate its preconditions (VR 58). Since human freedom always depends on a context, 
every enlightened thinker will demand the “protection, maintenance and support of 
nature” (NR 135). Furthermore, Krause reasons that nature ought to be grasped 
according to its own laws and “in its inner freedom and absoluteness” (Nph 82).
Krause incorporates into his philosophy ontologically, as well as ethically, the 
degrees of freedom realized within all living beings, i.e. their self-organizing 
167 For more information about the development of Krause’s philosophical system in reaction to 
Fichte’s metaphysics see also Stefan Groß, Die Philosophie Karl Christian Friedrich Krauses im 
Kontext des Deutschen Idealismus: Vom Bild des Absoluten Krauses Lehre vom Göttlichen und 
Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1804 (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2010).
168 Compare with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “we insist that need and capacity, rationality and 
animality, are thoroughly interwoven, and that the dignity of the human being is the dignity of a 
needy enmattered being” (Frontiers of Justice, 278).
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capacities,169 and thereby departs from the trend of his time towards an anthropo-
centric devaluation of nature (ERB 36).170 Yet he does not lapse into the other 
extreme of biocentric thinking, but rather argues anthroporelationally: It is neces-
sary to convey to the human consciousness, according to its categories, all natural 
boundaries it ought to recognize.171 Precisely this mediated conveyance is impera-
tive, because nature does not immediately reveal its internal structures of intrinsic 
values at first glance.
In order to situate ourselves within nature as adequately as possible, we should 
strive to understand nature according to its own laws and strivings. Nevertheless, 
man, being situated within nature, cannot attain a God’s-eye view. Nature must 
therefore be reflected upon in a twofold way: From the human perspective, and also 
with a critical glance upon this perspective. We are to recognize each living being as 
something not designed for mankind but living according to its own freedom (ERB 
45), while also keeping in mind that, as far as we know, the human being is the only 
creature on earth aiming to evaluate accurately this intrinsic value of nature (ERB 
36).172 That nature’s intrinsic value (i.e. independent of our consciousness) cannot 
be assessed by anything other than our consciousness hinders the immediate deriva-
tion of normative commandments from facts. Biological facts can at times con-
strain, but never obligate us.173 For this reason, biocentric theories – be their motives 
as noble as those within the deep ecology movement or as ignoble as those of social 
Darwinism (survival of the fittest)  – cannot claim immediate moral validity. 
Diagnoses are insufficient; we require valuations.174 Krause thereby questions that 
position which later on, since the time of George Edward Moore (1873–1958), has 
been called the naturalistic fallacy.175
Conversely, we must also not commit the obverse normative fallacy of teleologi-
cally ascribing moral purposes to nature (VR 104). Krause likewise strongly opposes 
the tendency, found within Antiquity and throughout the Middle Ages up until 
 eighteenth century scholasticism, which metaphysically inscribed the respectively 
favored good as a supposedly inherent striving within the essence of human life. In 
169 Compare this with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “what is relevant to the harm of diminishing 
freedom is a capacity for freedom or autonomy. It would make no sense to complain that a worm 
is being deprived of autonomy, or a rabbit of the right to vote” (Frontiers of Justice, 360).
170 Ernst Bloch even speaks of an “abolition of nature in German Idealist Natural Law” in 
“Naturrecht und menschliche Würde,” 91 (see also ibid. 86).
171 For Martha Nussbaum’s position on this see Creating Capabilities, 161.
172 See the similarly anthroporelational ethic of Martha Nussbaum in Frontiers of Justice, 355.
173 A similar argument can be found in Otfried Höffe, “Naturrecht ohne naturalistischen Fehlschluss” 
in Höffe (ed.), Den Staat braucht auch ein Volk von Teufeln: Philosophische Versuche zur Rechts- 
und Staatsethik (Stuttgart, 1988), 35.
174 Compare with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “the Capability Approach is not a theory of what 
human nature is, and it does not read norms off from innate human nature. Instead it is evaluative 
and ethical from the start” (Creating Capabilities, 28).
175 See §12  in George Edward Wisser Burkhard Moore, Principia Ethica (New York: Barnes & 
Noble, 2005) and, for more detail, see William K Frankena, “The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind 48 
(1939), 464–477.
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searching for ethical norms, one cannot avoid the self-critical spirit of humanity and 
its freedom.176
The values and aims of freedom are not arbitrary, however. Whoever emphasizes 
freedom within ethics does not necessarily reduce morality to the contingent collu-
sion between contractual parties negotiating their liberties, just as if human decision 
alone confers value upon the world. From the indispensability of human freedom 
for moral values it neither follows that freedom alone presents a good to be 
respected, nor, conversely, that our freedom is diminished only in respect to the 
values it facilitates. If, that is to say, freedom fulfills itself in the effort to relate 
properly to its world and contexts, then the construction of the inherent value of the 
natural environment may be neither arbitrary, partisan, nor unfree. A daunting task 
for philosophical construction.
Krause takes up this challenge by presenting and discussing different levels of 
freedom and consciousness of freedom in nature as a criterion for the relevance of 
non-human interests. Specifically, he distinguishes “three essentially different lev-
els of finite reasonable personality” and the grades of freedom belonging to each 
(VR 245). The lowest form of freedom describes individuals whose self-direction is 
merely physical. The next level incorporates persons, whose behavior is orientated 
mentally but is only (pragmatically) rational (verständig) and not also (morally) 
reasonable (vernünftig), i.e. whose acts are only conditionally motivated and not 
based upon unconditional reasons. The third level of freedom describes those who, 
in addition, become self-conscious in a reflexively philosophical manner and from 
this standpoint critically evaluate their preferences. “As to these three levels of rea-
sonableness, we find all three of them presented in certain ways by the human 
beings upon this earth” (VR 245).
In this way, Krause anticipated Ernst Häckel’s (1834–1919) globally influential 
thesis of the recapitulation of the development of species (phylogeny) in the devel-
opment of the individual (ontogeny): Every human being initially repeats in his 
personal development “certain periods” of vegetative and animalistic life (LL 18), 
within which he nevertheless would only remain as a result of a lack of education or 
disability. For most of their lives, most human beings act according to the second 
level of consciousness of freedom, i.e. in the mode of self-assertive finality. To a 
human being in the full sense there potentially belongs, however, also that highest 
level of consciousness – self-critical freedom – as well as, actually, a more or less 
conscious striving towards it.
The essential difference between animal and human being lies in the human I’s 
ability to recognize itself as integrated by self-transcending rules and norms to 
which it is knowingly and willingly bound. Animals are not capable of that, since 
“they determine themselves only according to sensory finite impulses and not 
according to eternally infinite concepts […]” (VR 172). Within “the sphere of our 
experience” we thus rightfully see the human being as the only form of life (LL 115) 
to whom belongs freedom in the all-embracing sense and, consequently, also a par-
176 For the present state of the discussion see Hilary Putnam, Ethics without Ontology (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard, 2004), 75.
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ticular responsibility as well as a certain ethical primacy (ASys 183).177 Krause 
hence neither endorses a biocentric view, seeing animals and human beings on one 
and the same level, nor an anthropocentric devaluation of all non-human life as 
mere stuff for arbitrary human use.
The special position of the human being in contrast to plants and animals is not 
grounded upon actual mental accomplishments. In contrast, Krause thinks, that 
often on the phenomenal level there is not such a huge difference between intelli-
gent animals and human beings who (want to or must) live reduced to the realm of 
sensuality. What counts for the differentiation in species is rather the potential form 
of reflexive self-determination: An ethical freedom, to which only human beings 
(can) develop towards within the course of their lives. Humans and animals are not 
only gradually differentiated from one another, they differ also categorically. They 
are divided by precisely that difference which runs between purely technical ratio-
cination (which is environmentally conditioned and only free within limits) and 
moral reasoning (which is unconditionally free) (NR 136). And this constitutes a 
difference “in their entire essence” (LL 338). Unlike animals, mentally and/or phys-
ically limited human beings are reflectively-autonomous beings; their disability cer-
tainly inhibits the articulation of their human nature, but this does not signify a 
privation of it (LL 172).178
Hence, for Krause, disability in no way entails a loss of human dignity (VR 247). 
In this way, too, Krause represents a turning point within modern thinking. While 
numerous philosophers of the early nineteenth century demoted people with dis-
abilities to a mere article of Sozialhygiene, for Krause, the disabled are never merely 
passive objects of law, but rather always active subjects with inextricable dignity.179 
To enjoy humane freedom is the right of all human beings “however deformed and 
deficient, however stunted, however mentally or physically ill, however immersed 
in misery” they may be (LL 180). For the sake of their human dignity, society is 
177 Compare with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “The species norm is evaluative, as I have insisted; 
it does not simply read off norms from the way nature actually is. But once we have judged that a 
capability is essential for a life with human dignity, we have a very strong moral reason for promot-
ing its flourishing and removing obstacles to it. The same attitude to natural powers that guides the 
approach in the case of human beings guides it in the case of other animals” (Frontiers of Justice, 
347).
178 “A child with severe mental impairments is actually very different from a chimpanzee, though 
in certain respects some of her capacities may be comparable. Her life is lived as a member of the 
human community and not some other community; it is there that she will either flourish or not 
flourish. The possibilities of flourishing in that community are defined around species norms. […] 
the fact, that their disabilities create impediments to species-typical ways of flourishing creates a 
moral imperative for society: such impediments should be treated and cured, where possible, even 
if the treatment is expensive” (Frontiers of Justice, 363f.).
179 Compare this with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “a focus on dignity is quite different, for 
example, from a focus on satisfaction. Think about debates concerning education for people with 
severe cognitive disabilities. It certainly seems possible that satisfaction, for many such people, 
could be produced without education. […] A focus on dignity will dictate policies that protect and 
support agency, rather than choices that infantilize people and treat them as passive recipients of 
benefit” (Creating Capabilities, 30).
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obligated to respect and care for disabled persons (G II, 189).180 The disabled have 
an entitlement to expect that others, i.e. the state, will help them make the best pos-
sible use of their freedom (G II 189).181
This entitlement to social support is not conditioned by returns. It belongs to the 
dignity of all human beings that their rights be unconditionally granted to them.
Insofar as the individual citizen is affected by one or more unavoidable limitations in body 
and soul, he can be incapable of naturally fulfilling some legitimate requirements or become 
incapable of this within the course of his life. To these belong those who are born without 
genius, those born blind, those born deaf and dumb, those who are naturally weak etc., as 
well as those who are weakened by sickness or mechanical damage to body or spirit or both. 
Now because, as is proven, the possession of the rights that are supposed to be awarded to 
him are in no way originally legally founded upon what he does in return, they are rather 
established by the constantly available demands of reason, so can the same unfortunate 
[person] […] in no respect be or become legally incapacitated as a result of his misfortune. 
(G II 149)
By way of legal representation, society advocates that rights should also be 
enjoyed by individuals who do not (or are unable to) demand them.182 For this pur-
pose, Krause promulgates a universal legal guardianship of humanity for all indi-
viduals. Instead of disenfranchising certain individuals or groups, this concept 
conversely serves as protection against creeping disenfranchisement (such as, of the 
child by the parents, the wife by the husband, the disabled by the healthy, of the 
uneducated by the educated, etc.). In contrast to many thinkers before him, Krause 
does not draw on factual dependency in order to legitimate legal dependency, but 
conversely forges – from the legal equality of all persons – an argument for the 
quickest possible improvement of degrading forms of life.
This legal guardianship, however, should – as much and as soon as possible – 
render itself superfluous (VR 459). Representation is to be exercised in this eman-
cipatory sense alone. Inasmuch as, for instance, a child can adequately handle its 
own freedom, it should no longer be kept in tutelage (bevormundet); the same is 
true, mutatis mutandis, of people with disabilities who always only partially, and 
never totally, fall under the management, care, and legal representation of others 
(VR 458f). Liberation towards autonomy is both the legitimation and limitation of 
all representation (NR 155).
Autonomy is also the guiding theme of Krause’s treatment of the difference 
between the sexes, which, Krause declares, is anyway much exaggerated. But inso-
180 Francisco Garrido shows that these Krausist ideas entered Spanish legal theory by means of 
F. Giner de los Rios’ philosophy of law – the fundamental equality of the right to dignity of all 
human beings was explicitly extended to the “loco” and the “feto.” See F. Garrido, Francisco Giner 
de los Ríos. Creador de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza (Granada, 2001) 88.
181 Compare with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “we should bear in mind that any child born into 
a species has the dignity relevant to that species whether or not it seems to have the “basic capabili-
ties” relevant to that species. For that reason, it should also have all the capabilities relevant to the 
species, either individually or through guardianship” (Frontiers of Justice, 347).
182 See also James Lorimer (ed.), The Institutes of Law: A Treatise on the Principles of Jurisprudence 
as Determined by Nature (Edinburgh, 1872), 308.
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far as it actually exists, it in no way annuls “the universal human equality, rather it 
is only a further determination of it” (VR 471). Sexual differences can specify the 
universal human rights of women and men in respect of their implementation, but 
not reduce or violate them. Completely against the spirit of his time and society, 
Krause thus defends the rights of women in fiery words:
In contradiction to all spiritual, physical, and human empirical knowledge and history they 
wanted to claim that, spiritually and physically, the woman occupies a lower level of devel-
opment, that women are only incomplete men […]. Similarly averse to the nature and voca-
tion of the human being is the claim that the whole vocation of woman is exhausted by her 
role as a mother and that the female half of mankind are not destined to participate in public 
life. The sexual function and its ethical and legal consequences (looking after the children 
and the household) annul neither for the man nor for the woman the demand for and the 
possibility of universally humane education and a satisfying career (in all aspects of the 
human vocation). And that which especially concerns the procreation, care, and upbringing 
of children is something that both sexes essentially and necessarily equally possess and, as 
the similarity of the bond with the children already shows, they possess the same intimate 
role and thus, as reasonable beings, an equally justified obligation, although the mother 
possesses the special duty towards the first nutrition and closest physical care in the womb 
and after birth. The whole life of the woman in itself must therefore, also in view of rights, 
be so determined that she can fulfill this duty which is only hers to fulfill […]. (NR 272f)
Concerning the entire societal life and the participation in intellectual and mate-
rial goods, Krause demands equal rights for both sexes.183 At the same time he 
advocates specific rules for the protection of mothers.184 Krause thus creates legal 
inequalities in order to enforce the fundamental equality of rights to autonomy in 
view of diverging conditions of its realization.185
The extent of Krause’s originality at that time is also shown by his advocacy of 
an autonomous sexuality which may not be reduced to the reproductive function 
(ERB 138), in direct opposition to his contemporaries, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and 
Georg Wilhelm Hegel, who were completely impervious to ideas of sexual 
 independence or any kind of legal emancipation of woman (see § 16 of Fichte’s 
Foundations of Natural Right and § 166 of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right). Krause’s 
183 For information about the influence of the women’s rights advocate, Angelina Carnicer, and the 
Krausist “feminismo” see L. Esteban Mateo, El Krausismo, la Institución Libre de Enseñanza y 
Valencia (Valencia, 1990), 103ff. See ibid., 126ff for information about the Krausist Institución 
para la enseñanza de la mujer in Valencia, which prepared the adjustment of the educational dif-
ferences between men and women in order to bring about concrete equal opportunities. See E. M. 
Ureña, “Algunas consequencias del panenteismo krausista: ecología y mujer” in El Basilisco, 
Segunda Epoca, 3:4 (1990), 51–58.
184 See Christine Susanne Rabe, Gleichwertigkeit von Mann und Frau: Die Krause-Schule und die 
bürgerliche Frauenbewegung im 19. Jahrhundert (Böhlau Verlag: Köln Weimar, 2006).
185 See also F.  Querol Fernández: La filosofía del derecho de K.  Ch. F.  Krause, a.a.O.,S. 317. 
Similar contemporary arguments can be found in Susan Moller Okin & Jane J.  Mansbridge, 
Feminism (Aldershot & Brookfield, 1994). Martha Nussbaum also argues that treating everyone 
schematically equally “proves an ally of the status quo. In order to put women and men in a similar 
position with respect to educational opportunity in a society that strongly devalues female educa-
tion, we will have to spend more on female education than on male education” (Creating 
Capabilities, 57).
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remarks about the protection of the rights of underage children,186 whose freedom 
and dignity, if in doubt, must be defended against even their parents (G II 189), also 
far surpasses the horizon of his contemporaries. The family is subjected to the laws 
of society and is also controlled by it – especially with regard to the education of 
children. For a comparison one need only glance at the starkly illiberal views of 
Fichte (§§44f. of his Foundations of Natural Right) and Hegel (§175 of his 
Philosophy of Right). While the philosophy of his time callously declared children 
the property of their parents and wives the property of their husbands and – com-
pletely or partially – deprived them of their own rights to freedom, Krause cam-
paigned for their autonomy.
Krause’s theory of human sociality correlates the societal norms with grades of 
freedom. The various levels of maturity, which human freedom moves through, 
involve various forms of responsibility (LL 127ff.).187 Individual life begins with 
“sensory freedom,” which takes its cues from context, follows habits, and customs 
(VR 441). On a next level of “rational freedom [verständiger Freiheit]” individuals 
set about making themselves more independent of their contexts  – specifically 
through rational abstraction, and, for instance, emphasize their subjective character-
istics in contradistinction to society (ibid.). That intellectual freedom leads to the 
productive liberation of individual capacities and energies, but  – exclusively 
exerted – also to one-sidedness and isolation. It is rectified by a “reasonable free-
dom [vernünftige Freiheit]” (ibid). This highest level of freedom enables forms of 
coexistence surpassing connections concerning mere needs and interests by uniting 
human beings in the name of ethical aims (ibid.).
In the right to freedom lies the philosophical foundation of human rights. These 
are treated by Krause as subcategories of a more universal theory of personal rights, 
and thus not limited to, though exemplified by, homo sapiens. Life’s essential grades 
of freedom are the main criterion. Plants, for instance, represent a form of uncon-
scious life, which, internally as well as externally, certainly exhibits functional self- 
organization in space and time, but not conscious self-reflection. Yet the idea of 
freedom requires conscious life, and thus only comes into existence when an entity 
knows about itself and its environment. Plants are therefore not subjects of a 
freedom- oriented ethics, but only its objects.188 Hence biocentric theories propound-
ing the ethical equality of human life with plant life cannot find support in Krause.
Yet, at the same time, Krause does not argue anthropocentrically, as his animal 
ethics show. All animals represent forms of conscious life. Some animals, moreover, 
possess more highly developed forms of self-conscious life and personality.189 
186 See Querol Fernández, La filosofía del derecho de K. Ch. F. Krause, 178–183.
187 Krause’s remarks in this connection anticipate the discoveries of Piaget and Kohlberg in their 
empirical investigations into the development of the moral consciousness of adolescents (see 
Lawrence Kohlberg, Child Psychology and Childhood Education: A Cognitive-Developmental 
View (New York: Longman, 1987).
188 See Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 158f.
189 In the same way Capability Theories define “animals as agents, not receptacles of pleasure or 
pain” (Creating Capabilities, 160).
2 Metaphysics of Freedom
119
Krause declares that such animals hold a rank of particular relevance for an ontol-
ogy of freedom, “because we assume that they know themselves in certain ways, 
sense themselves, and strive to maintain and perfect their selfhood according to 
sensory ends” (VR 172). A glance at our own pets, teaches us for example:
that these beings show all those idiosyncrasies which express the lowest level of the spiri-
tual personality; they feel themselves, feel pleasure and pain, they have representations and 
fantasy, as is well known they determine themselves according to social concepts, since 
within various individuals of the same species they nevertheless recognize the same spe-
cies, e.g. just as every man distinguishes himself as man, so every animal accordingly dis-
cerns its own species. They are therefore intellectual beings [geistige Wesen] […]. (VR 246)
While the majority of the thinkers of his era thought anthropocentrically, viewing 
animals merely as instinctively driven automata and thus as mere things conve-
niently at hand for human purposes, Krause expressly recognizes animals as free 
beings.190 Because of their capacity for self-determination, Krause categorizes them 
as persons191 – and makes a plea for their protection; a position, which, in the histo-
riography of animal ethics, still waits for its proper recognition.192
190 In this way, also, Krause’s position foreshadows Martha Nussbaum’s, which likewise recognizes 
not only human beings, but rather “a wider range of types of beings who can be free” (Frontiers of 
Justice, 88).
191 “Right exists without regard to the person. No person has a privilege (no one anticipates the right 
of another), but every person has his or her right. This is just as true … of the simplest (qui capere 
valet, capiat!) animals” (NR 114).
192 In Krause’s time there were certainly isolated ethical reflections on animals (for an overview 
see: Aaron Garrett, et al., Animal Rights and Soul in the 18th Century [Bristol & Sterling, 2000]): 
The following authors, for instance, argue in favor of animal rights, or more precisely, the rightful 
duties of man to animals: Humphry Primatt, in A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of 
Cruelty to Brute Animals (London, 1776) argues with the golden rule, starting out from the ani-
mal’s capacity for suffering: Wilhelm Dietlar (in: Gerechtigkeit gegen Tiere [Mainz: Schiller, 
1787]) on the basis of an ontology of happiness for all life forms; Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (in 
“Über die Rechte der Menschen in Ansehung der unvernünftigen Tiere” in Neues hannovrisches 
Magazin 2 [1792], 945–960) based on a theory of perfection; and Lauritz Smith, Über die Natur 
und Bestimmung der Tiere wie auch von den Pflichten der Menschen gegen die Tiere (Copenhagen, 
1790), with creationist theology. They also surpassed the characteristic style typical of their era, 
which merely limits, to some extent, human action towards animals out of an aversion towards 
cruelty. Nevertheless, it is only Krause who manages to integrate questions of animal ethics sys-
tematically into the modern philosophy of freedom (which was already noted at the end of the 
nineteenth-century by Ignaz Bregenzer in Thier-Ethik: Darstellung der sittlichen und rechtlichen 
Beziehungen zwischen Mensch und Thier [Bamberg 1894], 208). Krause’s approach is phenome-
nologically more convincing than those theories interested merely in animals’ capacity for suffer-
ing. His position portrays animals not only as passively capable of suffering, but also as actively 
capable of freedom, and in this way it also very much resembles the Capability Theories of today; 
compare the following observation of Martha Nussbaum that, “mere sentience is too simple a 
focus: it neglects the variety of animal capacities and activities, and thus certain areas of damage 
to flourishing that do not register as pain.” For this reason, “uncritical nature-worship” is out of 
place and, and rather a “valuational exercise” is demanded (Frontiers of Justice, 94). Whoever 
today reaches back to Jeremy Bentham (cue: “capacity for suffering”) and Arthur Schopenhauer 
(“animals are not things”) for progenitors of current reflections on animal rights (see, for instance, 
Tom Regan, Animal Rights and Human Objections [Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey, 1989]) should 
therefore definitely enlist Krause in the trajectory of precursors.
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Yet, as we have seen, Krause does not view animals as on the same level with 
human life. Fully developed human beings are capable of reflexively orientating 
their basic faculties, i.e. they are capable of feeling their feelings, willing their will-
ing, thinking their thinking, but also, feeling their thinking, willing their feeling, and 
reasoning their willing. By means of these reflexive faculties human beings are able 
autonomously to criticize and direct themselves (LL 115ff.). Unlike human beings, 
animals are, as far as we know, incapable of such self-reflective freedom and the 
genuinely ethical finality this enables (NR 149f.); therefore, they are deprived of 
such rights that specifically shape this third level of freedom.
As soon as one considers the animal as a self-inward being possessing self-consciousness 
and self-feeling, one demands that man should also be just towards animals. But no one will 
talk about an animal justice which animals themselves practice. That is because one does 
not consider the animal capable of grasping the idea of justice in order to make justice its 
end. Thus one says: Man should be the guardian of all animals and man considers the entire 
animal kingdom as in need of legal reprensentation [unmündig] and rightly so. (VR 205)
It is thus not because animals cannot themselves demand their rights – also chil-
dren, minors, and the mentally ill are often unable to do so (NR 149f) – but because 
they ontologically exist upon a lower level of freedom that they have a different 
axiological ranking. Animals and humans possess different rights. Yet their rights 
are not any weaker. They belong directly to animals with the same binding force as 
human rights belong to human beings. Just as much as human rights, animal rights 
are unconditional. Just as little as human beings, do animals have to work for their 
specific rights; no reciprocity of rightful commissions and omissions is called for.193 
Just as with human beings whose autonomy is limited (such as children, disabled 
and senile persons) a legal guardianship is thus to be applied to animals, so that “the 
temporally-free conditions of the completion of their purely animalistic life are 
guaranteed” (VR 246). Animals possess the right to a self-determined life insofar as 
they (unlike predators at times) do not violate the higher level, i.e. human rights (NR 
136f).194
That which humans as the representatives of the highest degree of freedom and 
autonomy on earth may enforce upon others of the same standing, e.g. the elimina-
tion of unlawful violence, may also be enforced upon every being belonging to a 
lower level of freedom. If we are allowed to limit our shared environs – by enforce-
able laws – for the protection of everyone’s freedom, then we are also allowed to 
limit that of animals insofar as their rightful interests are respected. If humans may 
industrially utilize their own organic waste products (hair, nails, etc.), then they may 
193 Today Martha Nussbaum makes similar arguments, see FJ 354–365.
194 The right of animals to constitute themselves was also recognized in 1892 by Henry S. Salt in 
Animals’ Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress (1892) [New edition: London, 1980]. 
Like Krause, Salt also recognizes in the moral law the legitimate limit of animal behavior (to be 
enforced by humanity); so that a guardianship of humans over animals has to be realized (ibid., 
46). However, Salt’s position is based upon an implicit “anima” metaphysics which moves every 
natural kind (also flowers and crystals) into a position equal to the one of humanity in a quasi-
contractualist position; see Andreas Flury, Der moralische Status der Tiere: Henry Salt, Peter 
Singer und Tom Regan (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1999), 96ff.
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do the same with animal resources.195 Krause also thinks that it may be possible to 
use animal labor “for reasonable purposes” and thereby curtail the animals’ natural 
freedom of movement (NR 137). Such a use does not automatically impinge upon 
the respective animal’s right to freedom if it serves acceptable ends and does not 
distress the animal (VR 246), as we are wont to make similar use of human labor.196
More far-reaching rights are, however, problematic. May humans, who do not 
kill one another for the purpose of nourishment, eat animals? Only insofar, states 
Krause, as “without such killing humanity on earth could not exist, unless some 
other kind of nourishment were found” (LL 300n.). This theory does not provide a 
justification for the industrial exploitation of animals for gourmet purposes. For 
Krause believes that the justifying condition, i.e. that otherwise human life could 
not be guaranteed, only rarely occurs. Most people, after all, would have access to 
vegetarian food of adequate quantity and quality. And to destroy animal life without 
need cannot, according to Krause’s theory, be justified at all, since one thus negates 
the natural freedom of animals without good reason.
Although Krause claims that animals “have a right to bodily well-being, to 
absence of pain, and to the requisite nutrition” (VR 246) he does not advocate that 
it is incumbent on humanity to assure a comfortable existence for all living beings 
of this earth. As a general rule, animals are quite capable themselves to take care of 
their own welfare, to obtain their own food, and avoid pain, etc. – They thus realize 
their natural rights as a result of their own capabilities and freedom. But human 
interference with the animal biospheres requires due diligence (LL 117).197 If one 
takes animals out of their original habitat, or limits it, and so impairs their capacity 
for self-care, then a duty to species-appropriate behavior and nutrition follows hot 
on the heels (NR 136n.).198 This conclusion, Krause optimistically believes, would 
concur with a pervasive “feeling favoring justice for animals,” which “cannot be 
eradicated” from the human mind (NR 137).
195 Martha Nussbaum brings up similar ideas in connection with education and cultivation: “A good 
education is sensitive to the individuality of the child, and is not rigid and above all not cruel or 
humiliating, but it does have goals and standards, and exacting through respectful discipline is 
often appropriate in leading children toward those goals. Why should we think differently about 
non-human animals?” (Frontiers of Justice, 377)
196 Also see here Martha Nussbaum: “The analogue to work rights is the right of laboring animals 
to dignified and respectful labor conditions” (Frontiers of Justice, 400).
197 Compare with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “large numbers of animals live under human’s 
direct control: domestic animals, farm animals, and those members of wild species that are in zoos 
or other forms of captivity. Humans have direct responsibility for the nutrition and health care of 
these animals […]. Animals in the “wild” appear to go their way unaffected by human beings. But 
of course that can hardly be so in many cases in today’s world. Human beings pervasively affect 
the habitats of animals, [and] our pervasive involvement with the conditions of animal flourishing 
gives us such responsibilities now” (Frontiers of Justice, 373f.)
198 Compare with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “As for the idea that we should leave animals 
alone when they live in “the wild,” this naively romantic naturalism ought to be rejected for today’s 
world. There is no habitat that is not pervasively affected by human action” (Creating Capabilities, 
162).
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In dealing with animal persons as well as human persons, the aim is the same: To 
guarantee an optimum of freedom through lawful representation and protection. For 
both humans and animals, this implies a facilitation of the requisite space and 
opportunities for free individuation. With regard to human social relations, Krause, 
therefore, highly appreciates how the differentiation of modern society allows indi-
viduals to realize personal talents and preferences so as to play a part in society in 
their own unique way. But whoever supports the functional differentiation of soci-
ety must also promote the sectorial specialization of ethics. A diversified society can 
no longer be directed by an ethic wholly alike for everyone and remaining the same 
for all times; it rather has to open itself up to regionally, professionally, culturally, 
and personally diverging representations of the good. The ethic of freedom is then 
to be so structured that it becomes receptive and adjusted to the peculiar logics of 
different societal subsystems.
A liberal society therefore cannot derive laws from a far-reaching metaphysics of 
the good, but rather justifies legal norms in and for themselves so that these enable 
human beings  – all human beings  – to strive for the good in their own way. 
Accordingly, Krause distinguishes, for example, an ethical concept of freedom from 
a legal concept of freedom. Krause declares that “the essential form of human life 
itself is ethical freedom, that is one’s innermost [selbsteigne] choice of the individ-
ual good […]” (NR 254). Legal freedom, in contrast, means freedom in which 
“everyone would have to possess a determinate outer sphere for the confirmation of 
his ethically free efficacy, in which sphere he can externally realize that which he 
internally cognizes with ethical freedom as good and thus decides to realize” (VR 
452f.) Legal freedom protects the potential of reasonable freedom; ethical freedom 
realizes it. The freedom to be legally protected should enable, but not enforce, the 
ethical orientation of individuals.
The law is to grant opportunities, but not to lead mankind in shackles towards the 
good life (G II 166f.). The good should enter into the world through voluntary 
choices, not through coercion (VR 304). The law has consequently “to externally 
restrict the ethical freedom as little as possible” (NR 256), so that that ethical free-
dom can develop itself as much as possible. The first and foremost content of free-
dom’s law is thus a “legal authorization [Erlaubnisgesetz]” of the ethical use of 
freedom, negatively as well as positively: “He who possesses jurisdiction may or 
may not avail himself of this right of his” (NR 256). The law does not only defend 
the reality and actuality of ethical freedom but also its possibility and conditions 
(LL 191); and, with that, also lots of immoral uses of freedom. Freedom cannot be 
had without this ambit. “This sphere of power (of outer freedom) must namely be 
greater than the sphere of its already constituted, reasonably-appropriate will, oth-
erwise the free self-development cannot take place” (VR 304). Krause knows that 
morals only thrive by being tried and tested in and by freedom. “Every man and 
every society of men thus has the right to a determinate external sphere of freedom” 
(VR 453).
Consequently, Krause draws sharp boundaries of legal protection around the per-
sonal liberties of citizens. Whoever is morally troubled by the other’s unethical use 
of freedom, he proclaims, should rather help to reduce the given motivations towards 
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immorality and replace them with incentives towards the good, instead of limiting 
the freedom of choice of his or her fellow citizens (VR 317). For since freedom not 
only presents one good among many (i.e. a first-level good) but also – being fre-
quently the only path towards these other goods – a good superior to them (i.e. a 
second-level good or meta-good), it may not be limited for the sake of these other 
goods alone, but rather its possible limitation must at the same time continually be 
carried out in accordance with its proper idea – i.e. in the sense of a reasonably, self- 
limiting freedom (VR 455).
Krause thus does not advocate a (“negative”) concept of freedom without any 
relation at all to the good. He unambiguously claims rather that “freedom is not 
aimless choice [Willkür], not egotistic self-interest, not arbitrary lawlessness” (ERB 
9). Yet Krause also does not champion a (“positive”) concept of freedom, which 
makes a single, quite determinate morality the foundation of ‘freedom’s rights’ 
(Freiheitsrechte). Krause can maintain this distance from either side since his idea 
of freedom is not committed to one materially-concrete concept of the good but 
directed to a structurally-abstract idea of the good. There thus arises neither a formal 
(“negative”) under-determination nor a substantial (“positive”) over-determination 
of the idea of freedom.
Certain (ethical) ends should direct but not dominate the freedom of the subject. 
In Krause’s eyes, ends to which human freedom is autonomously committed do not 
corrupt but realize the idea of law. Thus, for him, law is something more and some-
thing different from a mere legitimation and limitation of coercion, namely a system 
of the outer conditions for responsible freedom (G 19f.). Therein consists the pro-
nounced proximity of Krause’s position to today’s capability theories. The idea of 
law has not only a negative-protective side, but also positive-productive aspects: It 
aims not only to protect against the ‘injury’ (laesio) of factually given liberties, but 
also at contributions to the creation of capabilities and opportunities by forms of 
cooperation and life which promote the individual as well as the collective pursuit 
of goals.199
The shelters of private freedom that the law is to provide thus do not result from 
indifference towards the concrete differences of the ethical aims of individuals, but 
rather from respect for them. Thus, for Krause, the negative – restrictive – moment 
of freedom does not define, but rather articulates the idea of right. It is secondary to 
its primarily positive focus on affording chances for an autonomous existence. If 
individuals reasonably limit (in the sense of negative freedom) their freedom with 
and for one another, they can pursue their goals with less conflict and harmonize 
better (in the sense of positive freedom) with the interests of the general public. The 
bounds of the liberal law thus do not signify a quantitative minus, but rather a quali-
tative plus in freedom. Krause, that is, understands negative and positive dimensions 
of freedom as mutually reinforcing aspects of one and the same freedom. Freedom, 
since it develops successively from initial dependence, through levels of private 
199 See also Martha Nussbaum’s characterization of her own theory: Capabilities “are not just abili-
ties residing inside a person, but also the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of 
personal abilities and the political, social, and economic environment” (Creating Capabilities, 20).
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independence, to forms of targeted interdependence, needs on all levels of its devel-
opment (in always different degrees), both the negative liberation, without which it 
withers, and the positive orientation, without which it wilts.
The freedom for the good (‘freedom-to’) nevertheless possesses logical priority. 
No society should ever prevent its subjects from leading an ethical life, and to this 
belongs the voluntary dedication to the ethical. For the same reason society must not 
pervert the citizens’ own ethical striving and compel them to good actions (G II 
166f.). People must be allowed to pursue their own respective conception of the 
good and must therefore be safeguarded against well-meaning heteronomy. Hence 
individuals require negative freedom (‘freedom-from’). Both freedoms, the positive 
freedom to commit and the negative freedom to refuse, thus present only two sides 
of one and the same qualitative freedom for moral autonomy. Not in isolation but 
only in unison do they articulate the essence of freedom.
Among the preconditions of personal freedom, which are to be legally protected, 
Krause includes, besides basic individual properties and capabilities, also an indi-
vidual’s capacity to enter into relationships with and towards other (natural as well 
as collective, i.e. juridical) persons. From this concept of relational personhood 
follows (as a first-level right) a set of basic personality rights. To these are related 
(as a second-level right) a ‘right to right’ and (as a third-level right) a claim on soci-
ety for its promotion. The personality rights are therefore self-reflexively related to 
their realization. Krause calls this a “right to legal empowerment” 
(Rechtsbefähigungsrecht), which should guarantee that everyone “is capable of 
exercising his specific rights” (VR 260f.).200 Thereby Krause already anticipates 
much of the discussion about human rights at the end of the twentieth century: His 
concept of basic rights encompasses human rights of the first, second, and third 
generation, i.e. civic rights, rights to political participation, and to social as well as 
cultural inclusion.201
Since freedom degenerates without objectives, Krause also dedicates himself to 
the general conditions for the realization of personal ends – on the part of institu-
tional infrastructure, as well as individual capabilities (VR 452f.). Much of what is 
today widely discussed in the spheres of capability theory was already anticipated 
by him202: For Krause, the radius of any basic ‘freedom right’ (Freiheitsrecht) 
always also encompasses the right to cultivate oneself accordingly so as to be able 
to exert this respective freedom autonomously. The free cultivation and exertion of 
one’s own body, for instance, requires certain presuppositions such as an intact liv-
200 Today’s Capability Theories see things quite similarly: “In other words, to secure a right to citi-
zens in these areas is to put them in a position of capacity to function in that area.” And for that it 
is not sufficient that one grants certain rights to citizens only on paper; one must enable them to 
seize these rights: “They really have been given right only if there are effective measures to make 
truly capable of political exercise.” Thus, for instance, Martha Nussbaum formulates it and she 
further explains that “to do this involves affirmative material and institutional support” (Frontiers 
of Justice, 287).
201 See Bard-Anders Andreassen & Stephen P.  Marks (eds.), Development as a Human Right: 
Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions (Antwep & Portland: Intersentia, 2010).
202 See all of Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities lists in Creating Capabilities, 34f.
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ing environment (VR 483). One must dwell in hygienic and unchallenging condi-
tions (VR 498) or have access to care and treatment in the event of illness. Hence 
“the health of citizens” is, for Krause, a “public concern,” because without it the 
corresponding individual freedom easily turns out to be a chimera (G II 169).
Similarly, rights to intellectual freedom protect people’s intellectual cultivation 
and exertion. For what is the point of the freedom of thought “if one cannot concen-
trate and is unable to educate one’s mind and learn scientific truth”? (LL 195) A 
right to free agency is also needed – e.g. a right to the intellectual activity of science 
and the physical activities of the arts (G II 125): “To deprive someone” of the real-
ization of these rights “means to deny his human dignity” (G II 117). Without a 
minimal level of education, after all, intellectual freedom hardly ever arises, which 
is why Krause derives a secondary right to education from the primary right to intel-
lectual freedom. Krause has in mind a pedagogy (U 230f) which gradually empow-
ers the human being for mature self-control (U 231–235). In a third step, he considers 
whether, in order to secure the impartiality of educational contents, “public educa-
tional institutions” are required (G II 169), financed by the state (G II 136). On the 
other hand, private initiatives in education are also to be allowed, in order to guar-
antee a plurality of epistemic approaches, so as to help individuals form their own, 
mature judgment. Consequently, for the purpose of a real freedom of expression 
there also needs to be an uncensored media and free access to information (ibid.).
The example of the educational policy of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza 
(ILE), which exists until today, clearly illustrates Krause’s basic concerns. The ILE 
was established in Madrid in 1876 by the Krausist Francisco Giner de los Rios in 
order to avoid the influence of church and state upon academic teaching and to 
develop Spanish citizens’ political maturity.203 As Spain’s first private institute of 
higher education this cultural and educational institution shaped Spain’s educa-
tional elite over many decades (e.g. the famous “generación de 98”).204 Up until its 
closure during the Franco era, the ILE significantly influenced Spain’s intellectual 
life – and also that of Latin America – by offering intellectual alternatives to the 
worldviews propagated by church and state. This initiative set precedents, for exam-
ple, in Valencia in 1903. Based upon the free lectures of dedicated teachers, the 
Krausists founded there a Universidad Popular. Since the population was often 
insufficiently educated for taking up university courses, the Krausists created alter-
native offerings. They provided additional educational formats that made academic 
topics with relevance for daily life more broadly accessible. They especially 
attempted, by means of political education, to enable citizens to make use of their 
203 See J. F. Alemparte, “Aufnahme der deutschen Kultur in Spanien: Der Krausismo als Höhepunkt 
und sein Weiterwirken durch die Institución Libre de Enseñanza” in Kodalle (ed.), Karl Christian 
Friedrich Krause (1781–1832): Studien zu seiner Philosophie und zum Krausismo (Hamburg, 
1985), 141 und J. J. Gil-Cremades, “Die politische Dimension des Krausismo in Spanien,” in ibid., 
235. For more information about the pedagogical conception followed by the Krausists see note 
285 in this chapter.
204 See Juan López-Morillas, El Krausismo Español: Perfil de una aventura intelectual (Madrid: 
Ediciones Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1980).
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freedom and motivate them towards the active participation in the fledgling Spanish 
democracy of that time.205
The transition from the realm of intellectual education to the field of intellectual 
(often: political) activities, as shown in these practical examples, is indicative for 
Krause’s theory. From the right to education there follow rights, which protect the 
freedom of conscience and the freedom of thought (VR 481), which safeguard the 
“acceptance or tolerance” of a critical public (VR 483) and which guarantee that all 
citizens can participate in the spiritual and cultural life of their society (VR 483). In 
this way, Krause gradually develops a catalog of human rights from the principle of 
freedom, which includes the rights of social life (VR 488; 491), a protection of the 
intimacy and exclusivity of private life (VR 484), forms of free economic activity, 
and of private autonomy (VR 491).
This is not the place for a more detailed presentation of the corresponding corol-
laries. But the decisive idea of these considerations should once again be pointed 
out: Krause qualifies the idea of freedom by a theory of relational personhood which 
stresses the interdependence of individuals with their social and natural environ-
ments more than it stresses independence. Accordingly, Krause also relates the fun-
damental right to a free cultivation of personality to the specific social and 
environmental preconditions of individual autonomy. Because of the central role of 
social spaces of interaction for the development of personal freedom, his theory of 
freedom thus ultimately leads to a sketch of a public order in the service of freedom. 
That order is to be structured by emancipatory forms of interaction so that the free-
dom of everyone is promoted by the freedom of all; this idea is the aim of Krause’s 
legal and economic philosophy.
2.3.3  Private and Public Interest
In countless theories of freedom there is a conflict between private and public inter-
est. The representatives of negative freedom usually fight on the side of private 
interest and employ the idea of freedom in the service of protecting that interest 
from public interference. They are, so to speak, concerned about the maximization 
of private goods. Conversely the representatives of positive theories of freedom are 
advocates of the common good and recognize in public freedom a liberty of higher 
value to which private freedom should subordinate itself. What about Krause’s the-
ory? What follows from Krause’s conception of relational personhood and his con-
cept of freedom focusing on interdependence for the ordering of the civic sphere 
and the rights belonging to it (property, possession, transfer, etc.)?
Concerning the animal environment, Krause had pleaded, as we have seen, for an 
ethics that recommends consideration in proportion to different levels of freedom. 
But what kind of ethics should we apply when the object of free activity is no longer 
a self-conscious animal (with his own liberties and rights), but rather an uncon-
205 See L. Esteban Mateo, El Krausismo, 134ff.
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scious plant, or even a nonliving thing without inherent freedom? Are boundaries 
then also still to be drawn or can human freedom now enjoy unhindered choice and 
exploit the world as it pleases? What liberties may human freedom take with unfree 
entities?
Nothing, according to Krause, can be absolutely worthless (ASys 182), because 
of the never to be excluded possibility of it serving somehow, someone, at some 
time, as a means towards freedom (NR 139). Sustainability protects future freedom. 
As a consequence, anyone disturbing or destroying the environment must justify 
their actions; it must plausibly be the case that they thus create more freedom than 
they annihilate.206 Unlike most liberal thinkers, Krause does not first abstractly 
allow the use of nature, only to then, subsequently, limit it as required. Rather, 
Krause prohibits from the outset every useless and purposeless destruction of nature 
as well as every excessive exploitation of nature: “Things are to be consumed, that 
is destroyed through their use, (a) only under the condition that they can promote 
higher living-being (a higher amount of the good or a higher good); and (b) only if 
the damage which they inflict on living beings could otherwise not be prevented” 
(NR 144n.).207 Against traditional philosophies of freedom, Krause thus shifts the 
burden of proof from the defendants of nature upon those who wish to instrumental-
ize it.
From these qualitative directives results the quantitative radius of the legitimate 
use of objects. Use without consumption or wear and tear can be granted without 
limit (NR 176). In regard to objects with multiple uses, an examination is due, 
which, e.g., with the use of wood, may reveal that one should give priority to “tim-
ber instead of firewood” (NR 176). It becomes more complicated if we move from 
natural products to manufactured objects. There is of course an important difference 
between “material goods dignified in themselves,” i.e. such in which inheres the 
freedom they represent (artworks, etc.), and mere “utility goods” (NR 143). One 
may not only “use” pure “utility goods,” but also “use them up” (NR 144), insofar 
as the rights of others and of society are not opposed to this (VR 292). Yet matters 
differ in respect of said “material goods dignified in themselves”; i.e. objects incor-
porating the ‘freedom rights’ of their creators that need to be respected, which is 
especially the case with intellectual property (as we shall see below).
Thus, although mere things can in principle be appropriated and used freely, this 
obviously surrenders neither their appropriation nor use to arbitrary and unlimited 
choice. Both are rather first to be regulated on the path of public, i.e. political, self- 
206 For more information about whether plants have rights, see the detailed discussion by Francisco 
Querol Fernández, La filosofía del derecho de K. Ch. F. Krause: Con un apéndice sobre su proyecto 
Europeísta (Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 2000), 227–234. See Martha Nussbaum’s 
position (Frontiers of Justice, 94) as well as, in regard to the differentiation between plants and 
animals, Creating Capabilities, 158f.
207 One can here catch sight of an answer to the later arising question about how man should ade-
quately handle the “Promethean gap” lying between humanity’s technical and prospective capa-
bilities; already found in Günther Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen: Über die Seele im 
Zeitalter der Zweiten industriellen Revolution, (München: Beck, 1956), 267ff.
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determination. The notion of the originally communal human possession of the 
earth functions as a fundamental corrective to all appropriation and use of things.
Prior to public distribution, no individual possesses a legitimate right to some kind of useful 
thing except his own body, and only the public allocation according to just division is the 
form in order to obtain the rightful possession of something useful. Whoever wishes to take 
possession of something must first be entitled by everyone for this appropriation, just as is 
the case with whoever intends to work on something; […] No individual can be placed by 
another individual in the rightful possession of some kind of useful thing or be driven out 
of such possession. (G II 191)
With these words, Krause rejects the acquisition of goods in the ‘Wild West’ 
manner as propounded by, for example, John Locke (1632–1704), according to 
which working on No-Mans-Land thus makes it one’s own. The earth is neither 
infinite nor ever a no-man’s-land; it belongs in principle to all of humanity. One 
must thus continually ensure that in all acts of appropriation the rights of others – 
not to be excluded from global participation and to have a proper realm for their 
respective freedom – remain preserved. That, however, cannot at all be guaranteed 
by the individual, but only by a community representing everyone. All possessions 
up to date attained throughout history can thus only lay claim to provisional, and not 
eternal, validity. They are subject to the right to revision possessed by a future 
legally constituted humanity (ERB 108).
If one wants to grant everyone access to freedom, one must not necessarily call 
for an equality of goods (Gütergleichheit) (NR 142) like Fichte, but certainly for a 
uniformity (Gleichförmigkeit) of the right to acquisition (VR 253). The right to 
property has to balance the individual claim to the privatization of things with the 
public concern for open access to objects that are means to freedom (VR 511f.). For 
that is, following Krause, precisely the deeper, philosophical sense of private prop-
erty, where “the outer becomes an inner, equivalent to the inner – being lawfully 
made dependent on the freedom of the entitled person” (NR 171). Just as all have a 
right to freedom, everyone also has a right to differentiate him-or herself from oth-
ers (through merit and industry), i.e. to make his or her existence unequal from 
theirs.208 Nevertheless, not every inequality is now to be celebrated as an expression 
of freedom or praised for expressing the individual will to differentiation. Wherever 
an inequality exists because equal opportunities are lacking, there is a lack of free-
dom, and this must always be annulled. Thus commands freedom.
Krause gives the social dimension of property neither a prior nor posterior place 
in relation to its private dimension; he rather recognizes the former as being imma-
nent within the latter, as an internal counterbalance of all private possession,  without 
which it loses its principal legitimacy. In Krause’s view, private property is not 
hindered but rather promoted by the demand of social responsibility. This demand 
does not burden the proprietors with excessive duties, but instead releases them 
208 The idea of communal ownership is for Krause in no way to be understood socialistically or as 
stressing collectivism, see Wolfgang Vester, Sozialphilosophie und Sozialpolitik der deutschen 
Rechtsphilosophie des XIX Jahrhunderts (Krause, Ahrens, Röder) (Cottbus: Grosse, 1935) 36. 
More on this below.
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from having to explain on a case-by-case basis their right to the exclusion of others 
which is bound up with the idea of private property. The concrete, socially adequate 
regulation of private proprietors supports the abstract institution of private property. 
The freedom of the owner is therefore not negated by social constraints in the name 
of everyone’s freedom, but it is rather affirmed; laws and taxes that enable that free-
dom of everyone accordingly realize – and do not ruin – the freedom to property 
ownership.
Krause keeps his distance from both the extremes of individualism and collectiv-
ism. He neither narrows down freedom to private property, as was common in nine-
teenth century liberalism, nor does he strive for freedom by abolishing any and all 
property structures. He achieves this twofold distance by means of an innovative 
concept of property: Property, Krause notes, can always only bear upon functional 
characteristics. One can, to be precise, (legally) have ownership over something, but 
never (ontologically) be in possession of something. Thus “it cannot actually be said 
that this thing is property, one should rather say that this condition adhering to the 
thing is property” (NR 173). Not only does Krause thus distinguish possession and 
property as do the Roman and German traditions of jurisprudence, but also, what is 
more, an extremely consequential practical difference is thus also inscribed in the 
concept of property itself.
The point of this distinction between ontological and legal property is, according 
to Krause, to avoid the possible misunderstanding of “unconditional possession,” 
including the heresy that the proprietor could do with a possession “whatever he 
likes and whatever he pleases” (VR 287).209 The everyday understanding of legal 
property as the holding of rights without regard for others, confuses the often 
granted, but also sometimes refused, exclusive legal relationship of a proprietor 
towards non-proprietors with the metaphysical relation of a subject towards things. 
An object can certainly belong to proprietors in certain legal respects, but it can 
never absolutely, ontologically be theirs. In short, rights to property are always valid 
functionally, never totally. And their function is freedom.
Although there is an unconditional right to possess some property in general for 
one’s own free use, Krause recognizes only a conditioned right to specific properties 
and uses (NR 173). Properties and their employment are subjected to the discretion 
of their owners only within certain boundaries. Human beings should certainly also 
obtain some personal possessions to the “exclusion of all other persons” in order to 
win, for instance, a radius of free, undisturbed productivity. Nevertheless, the exclu-
sion of others may never become a defining feature of the right to property. The 
209 With his critique of the conventional theories of property (see their presentation in Julius Weiske 
& Franz Bopp, Rechtslexikon für Juristen aller teutschen Staaten enthaltend die gesammte 
Rechtswissenschaft [Leipzig: Wigand, 1839] 146f.), Krause is very much aware of the fact “that in 
the majority of states, as they are currently, in respect of the majority of assets an unconditional 
right to property is lawful. Here, however, we are not after teaching the legal status quo, but rather 
after seeing what reason considers as eternally right. It happens that, with the increasing education 
of peoples, this raw determination (Bestimmniss) of the absolute right to property becomes increas-
ingly less feasible, that one limitation after the other must be added, and that one is thus gradually 
lead back to the reasonable principle of property, just as it was developed here” (VR 287f)
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validity of this or that exclusion rather stands and falls with its function of embody-
ing freedom. Thus, also for Krause, the handling of everyday objects is mostly up to 
the liberty of the owners; but not because they may possess in and for themselves a 
(quantitatively) unlimited right to do to their things whatever pleases them, but 
because (qualitatively) to all individuals a determinate “sphere of freedom 
[Freiheitskreis]” must be granted, in which they freely define themselves (VR 452f.).
In terms of positive law, this means: The exclusion of others can only become 
effective as a secondary juridical consequence of a prior relation of the owner to a 
specific property, a relation that needs primarily to be approved by society (NR 
173).210 The right to exclude others (in Latin privare = to exclude, to deprive) does 
not constitute private property, rather, conversely, the right to property has as a con-
sequence at times – but not always – certain rights to exclusions. This theoretical 
differentiation has tangible practical consequences. As we saw, things ought to be 
used according to their basic determination in the light of the reasonable freedom 
of all. From this there follows not only a specific proscription (Verbot) against 
senseless destruction, but also an unspecific prescription (Gebot) to use things sen-
sibly and optimize their utility. Only a fundamentally socially obligated concept of 
property, which reciprocally qualifies the rights to freedom of the individual mem-
ber and the social whole, can harmonize the “opposing demands of communal prop-
erty on the one hand and the strict (absolute) private property” on the other hand 
(NR 173).211
Therefore, Krause believes that the material individualism of classical British 
liberalism sins against its own principle: freedom. When liberals, like Locke, 
attempted a justification of property in general, they typically enlisted the doctrine 
of the concrete types of acquisition in the service of a theory on the abstract right to 
ownership, and thus they confused the genesis and the validity of property: histori-
cal formation with systematic legitimacy.212 Whether unilateral actions (occupation, 
specification, and work) or multilateral actions (contract and law) lead to the acqui-
sition of particular property, is, from a philosophical perspective, irrelevant to the 
question concerning whether anything like private, i.e. exclusive, property may 
exist at all (AF 174). This never follows from those actions themselves, but rather 
depends on a preceding justification of the institution of property. That universal 
right to property, however, can only be legitimated by the fundamental right to per-
sonal freedom (VR 512) and not, like particular properties, by specific forms of 
acquisition. Anything else would found the institution of property upon an insecure 
basis. Neither occupation and specification nor contract and law can legitimate 
210 See Francisco Querol Fernández, La filosofía del derecho de K. Ch. F. Krause, 378.
211 For more information about the concept of “organic property” in Krause see: Julius Kautz, 
Theorie und Geschichte der National-Oekonomik (Wien, 1858). Kautz classifies Krause himself 
(62ff., 79) and his followers, Ahrens (83), as well as Leonhardi and Tiberghien as the earliest cam-
paigners for a socially directed market economy (ibid. 170  f.). A similar judgment appears in 
Eugen von Philippovich, Die Entwicklung der wirtschaftlichen Ideen im 19. Jahrhundert 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1910) and similarly Vester, Sozialphilosophie und Sozialpolitik, 46ff.
212 See Rolf Gröschne et al. Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, 131ff.
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property empirically in any and all cases, but, as merely hypothetical principles of 
validity, these legal forms do not suffice to derive the initial right to property.
Krause’s follower, Ahrens, supplemented these considerations, with the remark 
that – contra the social-contract theory – the disadvantaged people in impoverished 
countries could not rationally accept conditions which prevent them from assuring 
their own subsistence, and that – against the theory of work and occupation – today 
property can no longer be attained only through industriousness, since hardly any-
where do ‘ownerless things’ present themselves to the potential appropriator for 
their occupation and work. Nowadays when non-propertied individuals seek 
untapped opportunities for their industry, they are typically dependent on being 
granted access to goods, which they then work upon or refine. Some such basic 
access to the world and its goods, however, is owed to everyone as a consequence of 
each person’s entitlement to freedom, according to Krause.213 When, given appro-
priate procedural rules, the private property of some is employed to help others 
realize their basic personal right to acquire property, e.g. if the state taxes one’s 
posessions to help others to some property, then we should not complain that this is 
an intervention into the freedom of private property, but rather welcome it as its 
appropriate regulation, according to its very own immanent principle. From the per-
spective of the principle of freedom, social securities and private property condition 
rather than combat one another.
The potency of conceptualizing property as, in principle, socially obligated 
comes especially to the fore with the problem of intellectual property. The question 
concerning the ownership in “intellectual things” or “objectified intellectual works” 
(VR 252) was already eagerly discussed in Krause’s time with the example of the 
reprinting of books (AR 175n.). Krause’s follower, Heinrich Ahrens, quite in the 
sense of his teacher’s doctrine, offers the following solution to the dilemma about 
how society’s interest in literature as a public good and the financial interests of the 
author can be reconciled. Since a book per se presents a common good, the author 
can possess no absolutely private, i.e. exclusive, right to it. In the rare event of an 
author without any countervailing interests, a text thus passes over immediately into 
the possession and use of the general public. But if, as in ordinary cases, such inter-
ests are to be recognized, these must be evaluated in light of the notion of freedom- 
functional property. Unless and until society offers no other form of subsistence for 
the author other than book-sales, the financial interests of this ‘intellectual worker’ 
(Geistesarbeiter) are to be adequately respected. Without the prospect of profiting 
from sales the author might have, instead of the writing of the book, tried to procure 
his livelihood differently. As a consequence, for the duration of the author’s life (and 
possibly also longer based on inheritance law) there must not be any reproduction 
without remuneration. Yet since the author never has an absolute right to the text, 
but rather a claim to income generated by it, compensatory interventions are always 
possible, for example, in the case of texts with particular societal relevance (research 
literature, etc.) (AR 175).
213 See Heinrich Ahrens, Die Rechtsphilosophie, oder, das Naturrecht; auf philosophisch-anthro-
pologischer Grundlage (Wien: C. Gerold, 1852), 462.
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Without going into further details, we can see clearly from the above example 
that Krause supports a relative and not absolute concept of property, which treats 
the right to possession, not from the singular perspective of the proprietor, but from 
the perspective of universal freedom. While other thinkers treat the social commit-
ments of property rights as merely exceptions to a right conceived as without inher-
ent limits, Krause can elegantly derive these legal qualifications from his principle 
of freedom-functional property (VR 287f). Thus the conflict between private and 
public interest (often driven to extremes by theories of negative freedom) loses 
much of its drama. Krause shows that what is at hand here is not a question of an 
ultimately irresolvable quantitative polarity between private and public concerns, 
but rather a question of their reconciliation by means of a qualitative criterion. To 
wit, in order to be protected, the exercise and employment of possessions must be 
socially acceptable. Property must never turn into an end in itself but has always to 
remain a means only – a legal attribution on behalf of freedom.
Generally, the state operates under the assumption that private possessions are 
put to appropriate use. This is, however, otherwise (preventatively) in the case of 
goods of extreme societal relevance. Krause is thinking of forestry and agriculture, 
whose undertakings should remain under public supervision because of their vital 
importance for the sustainability of life. Krause’s disciple, Heinrich Ahrens, further 
ponders  – based on the same principle of freedom-functional, socially-obligated 
property – how (reactively), in the cases of obvious adverse misuse detrimental to 
the common good, expropriations can be justified and compensated.214 What is 
more, Krause grants a right to permanent usufruct to non-proprietors, wherever this 
can increase the number of compatible utilizations of given goods for the benefit of 
the freedom of all. Certain claims on the property of another, like, for example, 
usufruct, occupancy, right of way, and easements, should open access to otherwise 
underused goods, their private possession notwithstanding. Last but not least: Forms 
of communal and societal property should be promoted (VR 291). The basic idea is 
always the same: Freedom not only legitimates private property, but also limits it.
What is true of the relationship between persons and things also characterizes the 
relationship between person and person, inspired, as it is, by an idea of freedom 
fulfilling itself in and through its societal embedding (LL 173). In Krause’s thought, 
associations between persons do not have to be artificially added to individual exis-
tence, they are rather a natural form of how human freedom manifests itself. 
Families, associations, and society should not be secondarily derived (as today’s 
game-theorists and contractualists care to do) from the interests of individuals pri-
marily presumed to exist in isolation. Social contract theories thus falsely treat as 
emergent what is actually essential. In human beings, sociality is not contingent, 
however, but constitutive. For there is, Krause writes, “no … possible sociality, 
unless they, as human beings as such, are already sociable” (U 79).215
214 Ahrens, Die Rechtsphilosophie, 467ff.
215 Martha Nussbaum also champions a relational concept of the person which is constitutively 
characterized by sociality; just like Krause she differentiates it from the apolitical models of con-
tractualism and determines the “idea of the human being as ‘by nature’ political” (Frontiers of 
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Unlike animals, humans can voluntarily enter and annul contracts. Human beings 
do not need one another merely for utility-enhancing exchanges and the reciprocal 
overcoming of deficiencies. They also come together for more noble ends.216 Beyond 
the mutual compensation of deficits, they strive to perfect themselves as well as to 
improve and ennoble their ecosystem into an ever-more freedom-enhancing envi-
ronment (LL 149).217 Sociality arises not only through the inevitable coexistence of 
“characterless rational persons,” but much rather – and contrary to the social con-
tract theories of the time and the game theories of today – through freely chosen 
cooperation and collaboration of “persons full of character” (ERB 41). The theory 
of freedom should thus not reconstruct interpersonal relationships merely as institu-
tions satisfying lower and urgent needs. It must also grasp them as interconnections 
for voluntary value creation. All aspects of societal life that display a desire for free 
sociality beyond assuring material survival are of particular dignity: The penchant 
for cultural self-advancement, symbolic communication, and spiritual contempla-
tion, as well as the wish for joint ethical engagement in service to the freedom and 
dignity of others.218
Krause’s social philosophy ascribes great importance to associations of persons. 
In their goals and through the forms of life they promote, certain institutions – like 
for example those dedicated to the cultivation of art, science, and religion (LL 
198) – express the very idea of freedom. They provide society with patterns of non- 
oppressive community and responsible self-commitment. Even when some organi-
zations, due to their mission, constrain and co-determine the use of their members’ 
freedoms, this, too, can be grasped as a (qualitative) actualization of freedom and 
not as a (quantitative) constriction of it (U 318ff.) as long as, in their procedures and 
aims, these institutions are based upon personal freedom, offer inner and outer 
openness, and are democratically constituted, etc. – Krause’s idea of freedom thus 
functions both recursively and procedurally at once. That which legitimates the 
interpersonal institutionalization of freedom limits it as well. Community-building 
is never an end in itself but should help individuals to realize and reinforce their 
freedom. Illiberal collectives are not Krause’s cup of tea.
Beginning with the family, moving on to further and wider social relations (com-
munity and city), and concluding with sub-state and state, national and suprana-
Justice, 86) and explains that the concept of the person includes “the ideas of a fundamental socia-
bility and of people’s ends including shared ends” (ibid. 86) with the consequence that “the good 
of others is an important part of one’s own scheme of goals and ends” (ibid. 91).
216 In just the same way, Martha Nussbaum argues against the “very idea of classical liberalism, 
namely that the goal and raison d’être of social cooperation is mutual advantage” (Creating 
Capabilities, 150).
217 Once again the comparison with Martha Nussbaum: She strives for “the gradual formation of an 
interdependent world in which all species will enjoy cooperation and mutually supportive rela-
tions. Nature is not that way and never has been. So it calls, in a very general way, for the gradual 
supplanting of the natural by the just” (Frontiers of Justice, 399f).
218 Thus, Martha Nussbaum also states that that the end of “social cooperation is not to gain an 
advantage; it is to foster the dignity and well-being of each and every citizen” (Frontiers of Justice, 
202).
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tional structures, even the entire world, Krause develops – with great attention to the 
sociological details – the theme of how individual freedom is complemented and 
completed by collective freedom. Said “inner sociability” ultimately leads, accord-
ing to Krause, to the idea of but “one mankind,” which – conforming to this very 
idea – comprises all persons, human beings far and near, and future generations just 
as much as present generations (U 72). The more that human beings are orientated 
by this idea in their thoughts and deeds, the more harmonious will they coexist and 
cooperate with others, Krause holds (U 72). In principle, human freedom has a cos-
mopolitan and intergenerational direction.
The government has to ensure the harmonious co-existence of the diverse social 
associations. To fulfill this task, the state has to relate to all sub-state associations 
“but only on the part of the law and for the sake of the law” (NR 226). It should not 
orchestrate communitarian life, but rather promote the subsidiarity and autonomy of 
associations (VR 84f).219 In this field, too, Krause’s theory of freedom redirects 
customary lines of argumentation. Communitarian freedom has, like every other 
freedom as well, a pre-positive claim to legal recognition. While in the legal theories 
at that time, the state deigns to acknowledge social associations if these can adduce 
good reasons for it to do so, Krause demands the opposite. The state has to recog-
nize as legitimate any and all associations aiming for the collective exercise of free-
dom, as long as no good reasons stand against this – like lack of liberality or failure 
to comply with the law (G II 134).
Already at the beginning of the nineteenth century Krause thus wrote a theory of 
civic engagement and intermediary organizations,220 which anticipates conceptually 
the later juridical doctrine of legal persons.221 In his time, taking subsidiarity as the 
bedrock for (legal) theories about sociality was a novelty (AR 171). Krause, after 
all, explained that processes of organized community building are always already 
219 E. Diaz praises (in Elias Diaz, “Krausismo e institución libre de enseñanza: pensamiento social 
y politico,” jornadas homenaje a Giner de los Rios, 234) the Krausist “concepción organicista de 
la sociedad,” because in it individual freedom as well as the social whole find their appropriate 
place. According to him, the Krausist insistence on “subsidiariedad” is not merely an expression of 
the desire for efficiency. Rather it expresses in a positive way the fellowship (Miteinander) of 
individually-personal and socially-personal freedom in an open “pluralism.” Krause’s societal doc-
trine thus prevents “la absorción y consecuente disolución del individuo en el todo social o en las 
plurales asociaciones” (ibid.).
220 Concerning the importance of the intermediary organizations in Krause see G. Mollat, Lesebuch 
zur Geschichte der deutschen Staatswissenschaft von Kant bis Bluntschi (Osterwick: Harz, 1891) 
97–104. Johannes-Michael Scholz’s essay “Legitimationspraktiken krausistischer 
Dezentralisierungspolitik” in Ius Commune 12 (1984), 117–163 shows – orientated by Krause’s 
leitmotif of “Lebenskreise” in vivid detail the influence of the Krausist body of thought concerning 
subsidiarity theory on the Spanish legal policy of the previous century. Equally instructive is 
Querol Fernández, La filosofia del derecho de K. Chr. F. Krause, 415ff.
221 Krause’s students were the first to employ the term “legal person [juristischen Person]” which 
is still common today. Krause speaks, on the other hand still within the Roman-law tradition of 
“societal persons [gesellschaftlichen Personen],” or with his own neologism of “associative-self-
beings [Vereinselbwesen]” (VR 241). Concerning Krause’s treatment of the tension between natu-
ral persons and legal, general persons, see the writings of the Spanish Krausist: Francisco Giner de 
los Rios, La persona social: Estudios y Fragmentos (Madrid: V. Suárez, 1899).
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different from ephemeral legal relations (e.g. purchasing), purely functional part-
nerships for certain ends (e.g. trading companies), or rather conventional legal enti-
ties (e.g. the family). When social organizations are consciously and deliberately 
brought about, they also deserve a legal status sui generis. They are to be considered 
as manifestations of consciously collectivized freedom – and must not only be con-
sidered instrumentally, for instance, in respect of the goods and functions they real-
ize. This theoretical insight must lead to their practical recognition. Where citizens’ 
associations are understood in just this sense as forms of the development and orga-
nization of freedom, there immediately follows the anti-etatistic insight that wide 
fields within public order could and should emerge bottom-up, i.e. from private and 
voluntary cooperation, instead of having to be decreed in a top-down fashion.222
It did not remain unnoticed at the time that this approach allows rethinking the 
relationship between society and state entirely – based upon the notion of collective 
freedom.223 From the contemporary perspective, two things particularly stand out: 
First, how Krause distances himself from atomistic liberalisms by stressing that 
voluntary integration into collectives is an important expression of individual free-
dom. And second, how in regarding freedom as the raison d’être of those commit-
ments, he also differentiates himself from positions labeled “Romantic” then and 
“communitarian” today.224 This is already shown by his terminology: Krause antici-
pated the differentiation, later popularized in German sociology, between “commu-
nity” and “society” (U 62).225 He, however, values societies as desirable, since they 
222 See José Luis Malo Guillén, El Pensamiento Económico del Krausismo Español (1999).
223 Heinrich Ahrens developed Krause’s thinking – with the help of the distinction between “corpo-
ration” and “association” – into a theory of civil societies and trading companies; see Peter Landau, 
“Gesellschaftliches Recht und das Prinzip freier Körperschaftsbildung in der Rechtsphilosophie 
von Heinrich Ahrens” in Dilcher & Distelkamp (eds.), Recht, Gericht, Genossenschaft und Policey 
Studien zu Grundbegriffen der germanistischen Rechtshistorie (Berlin, 1986). Also noteworthy is 
Krause’s influence upon Lorenz von Stein and Robert von Mohl. Robert von Mohl himself posi-
tively acknowledged Krause’s influence upon his thinking, see Robert von Mohl, Die Geschichte 
und Literatur der Staatswissenschaft in Monographien dargestellt (Graz: Akad. Dr.- & Verl.-Anst, 
1855), 245. Klaus Fischer sees “Lorenz von Stein as the intellectual successor of K. C. F. Krause” 
in Klaus H.  Fischer, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft: Gesellschaftsanalyse und 
Gesichtsphilosophie der Lorenz von Stein unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seines gesellschafts-
wissenschaflichen Entwurfs (Frankfurt am Main: Haag & Herchen, 1990), 109.
224 The influence of Krausist sociology upon the social philosophy of Spencer is regarded as certain 
in Spanish Krause research: “Spencer será deudor, ciertamente, de Krause, al retomar la idea de 
que la sociedad es un organismo y que la evolución es por esencia orgánica” (León Esteban Mateo, 
El Krausismo, la Institución Libre de Enseñanza y Valencia (Valencia, 1990) 35). In the same way 
there is a likely influence of Krausist doctrine upon Spanish sociology – above all in the work of 
Perez Pujol (1830–1894) – (see M. Núñez Encabo & Manuel Sales y Ferré, Los origenes de la 
sociologia en España [Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1976]).
225 One can trace a conceptual line of thought to Ferdinand Tönnies. The philosophical teacher of 
Tönnies – Rudolf Eucken – admired Krause’s philosophy and dedicated intensive studies espe-
cially to his social philosophy, as one can learn from the research currently being conducted at the 
Eucken archive in Jena (I am grateful to Uwe Dathe for informing me about this). For many sub-
stantial agreements exist. It can be concluded that Tönnies’ organic principle of sociology (see 
§2  in Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Der reinen Soziologie [Berlin: Kurt 
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are liberal, namely, consciously and deliberately established forms of association. 
Community arises from coexistence, sometimes without free will. “Community but 
not society can be forced on us by fate.” The latter, that is to say, presupposes delib-
erate association and thereby the conscious will towards self-integration in a higher 
unity.
Despite due respect to natural communities like the family, Krause clearly does 
not share the later prevalent pejorative outlook of Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936) 
and, afterwards above all, Werner Sombart (1863–1941), that societies are merely 
ethically thinned-out communities (U 62). “For society is a union of individual 
activity for communal achievement.” Therefore, it is the “freely recognized and 
individually reciprocally enlivened community” that foremost deserves the title 
“society” (ERB 49). Krause thus does not champion a statist or popularist philoso-
phy, but a civic, social philosophy; one that is founded neither on blood and soil nor 
on cold utility, but rather upon freedom and reason.
In this context, it must once again be emphasized just how explicitly Krause 
objects to the view that society and state could be grounded by reciprocity – by 
interest-oriented exchanges and thought-experiments aiming at utility. Remember: 
Even legal relationships based on reciprocal obligations do not, in his view, obtain 
their respective legal form and status from that reciprocity (NR 165). Mutual 
claims – constitutive as they are for commercial life – draw their legal force not only 
from the interests communicated within them.226 The private will of the subjects 
only establishes binding contracts if it lawfully determines itself (necessary condi-
tion) and can adduce legitimate reasons (sufficient condition).227
Krause therefore never simply reconstructs contracts from their negatory- 
restrictive aspects. Contracts are not merely instruments to avoid or compensate 
damages or losses in exchange relations, for instance by contractual penalties, 
indemnification rules, etc., but rather fulfill integratively-positive functions. For the 
protection of these functions rather, and conditioned just as well as bounded by 
them, the negatory-compensatory aspects of contract law come into view. Contracts 
enable “individuals […] to divide work” (VR 451). Contracts are thereby of a sig-
nificant meaning, far beyond the utility they grant the parties concerned. They create 
stability, security, and trust within social transactions, they enable long-term 
 economic planning, and thus constitute a central moment of civic self-sufficiency 
and collective freedom. Beyond emotional and family commitments, they allow for 
a reliable and constant allocation of goods and services through lawful, sanctioned 
agreements (U 218).
Curtius, 1912]) is clearly Krausist. And also Tönnies’ reflections about the concepts “power of 
choice/choice of power [Willkür/Kürwille]” are also already anticipated by Krause (VR 317). 
Nevertheless – and this is decisive – Krause’s valuation of community and society is thoroughly 
opposed to that of Tönnies.
226 Again, Martha Nussbaum is of a similar view: “We acknowledge, as well, that the kind of socia-
bility that is fully human including symmetrical relations … , but also relations of more or less 
extreme asymmetry and truly human functioning” (Frontiers of Justice, 160).
227 See Querol Fernández, La filosofia del derecho de K. Ch. F. Krause, 93.
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Private autonomy enjoys constitutional protection with Krause for the same rea-
sons. Every single private contract, however, remains forever bound by and to the 
legal basis of all contracts, and can never replace this basis.
The contract is merely concerned with the allocation and individualization of right and of 
the legal claim, and not with the justification (nor the foundation) of law itself, that is why 
after the fulfillment of the contract the claim can still remain. Contract [sic!] is therefore 
only legitimately valid so far as the societally associated will could be seen as included 
(given) within the legal bases it relies on. (NR 198)
As the idea of law functions as the ultimate principle of legal legitimation, soci-
ety is entitled to protect individuals who, from need or ignorance, might otherwise 
enter into contracts inimical to their autonomy. In contract law, the state regulates 
the individuals’ sphere of action, not at all to eliminate their autonomy, but rather to 
safeguard it (NR 164). Thus Krause reconstructs, as inherent to the principle of 
freedom, those limitations of contractual autonomy that constitute the traditional 
canon of general contractual duties (“good faith” [Treu und Glauben]), of mutual 
contractual obligations (offer, acceptance), debtor’s duties (notification, offer, spec-
ification, transfer), and the creditor’s duties (demand, acceptance), including possi-
ble omissions (G II 170; NR 164ff.; VR 280ff).
Here too the strengths of Krause’s conception directly catch one’s eye, namely in 
view of the philosophical interpretation of the presuppositions of validity for estab-
lishing contracts: Capacity (no lack of understanding or maturity), absence of men-
tal or physical coercion, presence of a ‘permitted’ subject matter of the contract (VR 
342ff.). The agreement of the parties may be brought about neither by fraud or 
deception, nor can it include an error about the substance or essential characteristics 
of the object; and they must be explained reciprocally, correspondingly, and on 
time, etc. How are all of these restrictions justified? A clever maximizer of his or her 
own interests (which game theories or contractualist theories normally postulate) 
would accept these qualifications only as a necessary evil if and when they increase 
the average rate of returns: limitations of freedom in exchange for increased utility. 
Clearly, such reconstructions of contractual law fail to capture what Krause aims at, 
i.e. showcasing those qualifications as but conditions for enabling everyone’s free-
dom. Krause advocates that these rules of fairness do not reduce the freedom of 
concluding contracts but rather secure this freedom in the first place.
For a contract to be valid, it need not only represent the interests of directly 
involved parties. It also has to conform to everyone’s ‘freedom rights’ (VR 343). 
What holds true of contracts between individuals is all the more required of the 
social contract. The state can by no means simply be thought of (as libertarians 
would like) as a private contract extended to all citizens for the sake of the  reciprocal 
protection of their interests.228 The various goals uniting people with each other are 
228 Similarly, Martha Nussbaum says “the capabilities approach denies that principles of justice 
have to secure mutual advantage […]. Justice is about justice […]. It is always very nice if one can 
show that that justice is compatible with mutual advantage, but the argument of principles of jus-
tice should not rest on this hope” (Frontiers of Justice, 89).
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by no means sufficient – in a generalized form – to ground a state of law.229 For 
every private contract is only ever valid provisionally and hypothetically, i.e. based 
upon the consenting volition and the persistent interest of the participants, and 
therefore can in no way provide peremptory and categorical validity (NR 133). On 
such shaky grounds, Krause feels, no stable state of law can be erected.
No. A communal entity is neither an agreement of private individuals nor a side- 
effect of a reciprocally conditioned waiving and exchanging of rights. The commu-
nity of rights exists unconditionally – for the right to freedom and through it. Social 
contract theories built solely upon the logic of bartering cannot, after all, include 
within the shelter of law human beings who can neither profit nor damage us (for 
instance members of future generations or the distantly located poor), since the 
nature of a utility-oriented exchange is to watch out for symmetry of commission 
and omission. Krause, however, does not have this problem. From the outset, his 
theory of society insists upon the unconditional protection of human rights, also and 
especially in cases of strictly asymmetric relations.230 A social contract (Staatsvertrag) 
laid down in the form of a constitution can therefore only be viewed as a historical 
manifestation of human rights, but not as their systematic ground of validity (AR 
182).231 Likewise, the reverse applies: The universal human right to law justifies the 
right to formulate a national social contract or a constitution.
2.3.4  Procedural Policy in Global Responsibility
All human beings should, according to Krause, have the “same opportunity for the 
development of their spiritual and physical capacities” (NR 277f.); to create fair 
opportunities is the task of policy. The state helps those who cannot adequately sup-
port themselves by their own means (G II 149). The access to basic needs like nour-
ishment, housing, and clothing must not only depend upon the market economy (G 
II 149), since “the legal ground of useful possession does not lie in work, but rather 
in the need and, above all, in the reasonable nature itself” (G II 188). Everyone 
should be capacitated for a life in freedom and dignity.
Recall that Fichte still believed that whoever did not work and did not find any-
one to provide him nourishment gratuitously, should “die of hunger, and rightfully 
so” (FW III/1, 119). Krause begs to differ. He rejects a reciprocally conditioned 
relationship between work and sustenance. The individuals are unconditionally 
229 “The non-economic spheres of society cannot however develop their Logos from the logic of 
economic relations of exchange […] The economy […] cannot be the source code of society” (Udo 
di Fabio, Die Kultur der Freiheit (München: Beck, 2005), 122.
230 Martha Nussbaum also sees things this way (Frontiers of Justice, 22). Like Krause, contrary to 
the basic logic of game theory and contractualist theories, she thinks that “A large asymmetry of 
power … might make questions of justice more urgent than, as in contractarianism, taking them off 
the agenda” (ibid. 87).
231 See Vester, Sozialphilosophie und Sozialpolitik, 15.
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obligated to work for their and the collective livelihood according to their abilities. 
Conversely, society owes to all the presuppositions for an existence in freedom – 
also unconditionally. Both these commitments do not condition one another; they 
exist in and for themselves.
The physical and spiritual needs have to be provided for him [the worker], not because he 
works but because he is in need of them as a human being. If, although he is able to, he 
should not be working enough or properly, then he should thus be punished, but no right can 
be based upon taking away from him something other which he otherwise justly requires. 
(G II 198)
Since Krause does not conceive the legal order as a barter society, but rather a 
community for enabling all-round freedom (VR 531), he wants a dignified free 
human life for all, independently of social and biological contingencies (G II 152). 
Today, we may find analogous positions less within John Rawls’ plea for a 
quantitatively- equal provision of “basic goods,” and rather within Martha Nussbaum 
and Amartya Sen’s qualitatively-differentiated “capability” approach (see Sect. 
4.2.3).232 Similarly, i.e. with solidarity, one would have to deal also with natural 
catastrophes (and other disasters). “Natural damages on the common field of life” 
must not “be borne only by the person contingently affected, since, in contrast, this 
is a legal concern of the entire society” (VR 440).
On the whole, Krause wants to balance out through providential social policy the 
postulates of personal freedom, legal equality, and the citizens’ economic indepen-
dence. The historical experiments of krausismo illustrate this endeavour: Due to the 
“unidad intrínsica entre politica, filosofia y economia”233 in Krause’s thinking, at the 
end of the nineteenth century leading Spanish Krausistas felt compelled to develop 
a social-liberal concept of economic policy that was said to balance out the diverg-
ing demands for social justice and individual freedom. The “libro más conocido de 
la corriente krausista,” the “Estudios económicos y sociales” (Madrid 1876) of 
Gumersindo de Azcárate234 as well as the “Tratado de Hacienda pública y examen 
de la española” of J. M. Piernas Hurtado (which in the late nineteenth century was 
for several decades the standard textbook for economics at Spanish universities) 
were firmly dedicated to these intentions.235
232 Peter Landau thus believes that a basic-income, differentiated according to divergent needs, as 
well as a basic supply of education and health care, would thus have been supported by Krause. See 
his “Karl Christian Friedrich Krauses Rechtsphilosophie” in Kodalle (ed.), Karl Christian 
Friedrich Krause (1781–1832): Studie zu seiner Philosophie und zum Krausismo (Hamburg, 
1985), 92.
233 See José Luis Malo Guillén, “La Institución Libre de Enseñanza y la ciencia económica,” 
Sistema – Revista de Ciencias Sociales 157 (2000), 93–114, 99.
234 For the realpolitik of Azcárate see ibid., 105ff.
235 This Krausist economic theory first appearing in Madrid in 1884/85, went through several edi-
tions, and was widely used in academic economic instruction until the 1930s. According to its 
intellectual structure and train of thought, this treatise may be regarded as a true representation of 
the Krausist thinking of the time. See José Lusi Malo Guillén, krausismo económico español 
(2005).
2.3 Participative Freedom (Karl Christian Friedrich Krause)
140
In foreign policy, the Krausists mostly fought for a policy of free trade, but 
regarding domestic policy they clearly distanced themselves from the economic 
thought of classical liberalism. Those economic and political differences result from 
philosophical divergences. A closer look at the latter leads us to some illuminating 
conceptual ideas – also for current debates. From the second half of the nineteenth 
century, economics both in its classical as well as its neoclassical (i.e. wedded with 
marginalism) form increasingly sought to feature mathematical methods.236 One 
wished to read the (optimal) economic activity by means of deductions from general 
economic laws – largely omitting social factors.237 Within that paradigm pursuing 
an equilibrium of market forces, every external intervention into the market is per 
definitionem viewed negatively as a disturbance of otherwise balancing forces. One 
was, consequently, against state intervention in economic life. Instead, such econo-
mists sought refuge alone with the “invisible hand” of the market – in a sometimes 
extremely selective reading of a crudely misunderstood Adam Smith.238 They, in 
short, defended an economic philosophy of negative freedom.
The social-liberals in Germany proceeded conversely. They backed the empirical 
investigation of historical conditions instead of abstractly-universal laws. Induction 
was their method of choice. The representatives of diverse “historical schools” 
wanted statistically to calculate which respective measures lead to desirable distri-
butions of property, in order to derive recommendations for future economic policy 
and social welfare.239 They opposed the market’s lottery with an unbridled trust in 
the planning capacity of society, which, when steered by correct insights, through 
the state’s visible hand, would easily accomplish what the market’s invisible hand 
grappled with so unsatisfactorily: a just distribution of welfare. They championed 
an economic philosophy of positive freedom.
The Krausist liberals criticized both approaches for being one-sided and – fol-
lowing Krause’s philosophical methodology – sought the connection of induction 
236 See Claus Dierksmeier, “The Freedom-Responsibility Nexus in Management Philosophy and 
Business Ethics,” Journal of Business Ethics, 101:2, 262–283.
237 Here one should remember especially the works of William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882) and 
Carl Menger (1840–1921), in which it was announced that they wished to practice economics in 
the sense and in the form of mathematical mechanics. See Carl Menger, Untersuchungen über die 
Methode der Sozialwissenschaften und der politischen Ökonomie insbesondere (Leipzig, 1883) 
and William Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (London & New York: Macmillan, 
1871) and his The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method (London: 
Macmillan, 1874). For the contemporary debate see Samuel Bostaph, “The Methodological Debate 
between Carl Menger and the German Historicist,” Atlantic Economic Journal 6:3 (1978), 3–16.
238 For the argument against equating Smith’s theory with laisser-faire economics, see Matthias 
Hühn & Claus Dierksmeier, “Will the Real A. Smith Please Stand Up!,” Journal of Business Ethics 
(2014), 1–14.
239 See Gustav von Schmoller, Über Einige Grundfragen der Sozialpolitik und der Volkswirtschaften 
(Leipzig. Duncker & Humblot, 1904) and Werner Sombart, Die drei Nationalokonomien: 
Geschichte und System; der Lehre von der Wirtschaft (München: Duncker & Humblot, 1929). For 
the overall state of the discussion in his time, see Peter Koslowski, Methodology of the Social 
Sciences, Ethics and Economics in the Newer Historical School: From Max Weber and Rickert to 
Sombart and Rothacker (Berlin & New York: Springer, 1997).
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and deduction in conceptual construction.240 That means, in the first instance, that 
neither reality should be dismissed as negligible for the benefit of pure theory, nor 
that the proper momentum of the economic sphere may be neglected in pursuit of 
noble ideals. Theory and practice should relate to one another through a common 
goal. Mediating concepts ought to be expressly construed, in order to integrate both 
spheres productively, instead of playing them off against one another.241
On the basis of frequent factual divergences between morals and the economy 
and, at the same time, because of their conviction regarding the (principal, freedom 
and responsibility based) commensurability of economic and ethical laws, the 
Krausists assigned to economists the task of scientifically investigating how market 
failures and social evils can be theoretically explained and practically corrected. 
They, so to speak, author the economic philosophy of a substantive idea of freedom, 
encompassing as well as socially reshaping both negative and positive aspects.
For the Krausists, the adequacy of society’s influence upon economic life results 
not from a quantitative plea for either more state action (as on the part of the social-
istic liberalism and the representatives of positive freedom) or less (as on the part of 
the Manchester liberalism and the supporters of negative freedom), but rather from 
the qualitative prescription to enable the freedom of all.242 From this then follows 
the stipulation to intervene by means of economic policy in free economic activity 
as much as is necessary and, at the same time, as little as is possible. The state’s 
balancing activity must be subsidiary and thus secondary to the primary endeavors 
of individual self-reliance and charitable care for others.243 The state is the last guar-
antor of opportunities to a life in freedom, not their first producer. A free state 
requires a free economy; and where the latter fails, the former repairs it, but does not 
replace it.244
In an ideal market (i.e. in a market not distorted by asymmetries from informa-
tion, power, opportunities, transaction costs etc.) individual economic activity 
directs itself to where the greatest profits are expected. Thus production takes place 
wherever the greatest possible value can be attained by the least possible means; a 
240 For Krause’s concept of construction see Claus Dierksmeier, Der absolute Grund des Rechts, 
Chapter 3.
241 See José Manual Piernas y Hurtado, Tratado de Hacienda Pública y Examen de la Española 
(Madrid: Tip. De M. Ginés Hernández, 1891), 25ff.
242 E. Diaz situates Krausist social-politics upon the golden mean between “abstencionismo” and 
“estatalismo” in his Krausismo e Institución Libre de Enseñanza: Pensamiento social y politico, 
230f.
243 In the first instance people should help one another upon a voluntary basis. Wherever this help 
is not enough to guarantee that each and all can live freely and self-determine themselves, the state 
should, according to Hurtado, compensate the “deficiencias de la caridad privada” by “beneficien-
cia publica” (Hurtado, Tratado de Hacienda Pública y Examen de la Española, 116).
244 Hurtado thus writes that the state should not run and take into its own hands “la industria por via 
de especulación,” but may exercise an influence only upon the economic processes necessary for 
freedom, law and security, “cuando la actividad privada no se sienta capaz o no se halle dispuesta 
a llevarlas a cabo por si misma” (Hurtado, Tratado de Hacienda Pública y Examen de la Española, 
117f).
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process that optimizes the societal allocation of resources. As a consequence, pri-
vate economic activity promotes the common good without having to directly intend 
this effect. Given these presuppositions (which, however, in such a pure form only 
exist on economists’ blackboards), the government’s direct and material interven-
tion into the entrepreneurial calculations may damage the efficiency-enhancing 
allocations of the market. Then, “laissez faire” would make more sense, but not in 
order to bring about such ideal market conditions.
For real markets other considerations apply. From a Krausist point of view, one 
must insist upon a formal configuration of the market and certain guidelines for 
entrepreneurial action. A protection of public goods by regulations as well as 
performance- friendly taxation should continually broaden the opportunities for eco-
nomic self-reliance and thus improve the presuppositions for fair transactions. 
Where this succeeds, a wage policy orientated by the market price, including a cor-
respondingly unequal distribution of wealth can be accepted – not only in the name 
of economic efficiency, but also as an expression of the different extent of people’s 
ambitions. This, however, only holds true if and where all have the chance to better 
themselves through their own accomplishments. Where this is not the case, the com-
munity must help out.
In elaborating the factual presuppositions required for a fairer market, the 
Spanish Krausists follow a three-level model of the individual (micro-level), inter-
mediary associations (meso-level) and the state (macro-level). Piernas Hurtado, for 
instance, thus prescribes as a qualitative end that all economic life should provide 
everyone with appropriate conditions for life and freedom, by which the quantita-
tive pursuit of profit is positioned at the level of a  – legitimate and necessary  – 
means, but can no longer appear as an end in itself. Means and ends – technical and 
normative rationality – cannot be played off against one another within this model, 
but rather are constructively related to one another: Parameters and systems of rec-
ognition have to be found by which a state may attain welfare, companies can attain 
cooperative revenue, and individuals are able to make profit, each in a manner that 
helps rather than hurts the social, ecological, and moral contexts of the economy.245 
The Krausist economic doctrine thereby already anticipated in the late nineteenth 
century attempts again undertaken in the late twentieth century to coordinate free-
dom, equality, and independence structurally with the internal logic of the economic 
sphere, so that the individuals’ opportunities and the freedom of all are enhanced at 
one and the same time. The Spanish Krausists were thus well ahead of the 
Methodenstreit (“methodology controversy”) and Werturteilstreit (“value-judgment 
controversy”) in economics around the turn of the twentieth century – and  formulated 
a philosophical standpoint which still contains much potential for our current debate 
(for the current state of economics see Sects. 4.1.3, 4.2.1, and 5.2).246
245 See Stoetzer, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, 311ff.
246 For the contemporary debate at the time see Jürgen Backhaus & Reginald Hansen, 
“Methodenstreit der Nationalökonomie,” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31:2, 307–
336. For Amartya Sen’s role in current economics see Steven Pressman and Gale Summerfield, 
“The Economic Contributions of Amartya Sen” in S.  Pressman (ed.), Leading Contemporary 
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Economic policy is promoted or impeded by the constitutional order. In the inter-
ests of everyone’s freedom, Krause votes for a federal-subsidiary state constitution 
in which sovereignty is not handed to a single higher-level authority, but is rather 
collectively exerted by the legislative, executive, and judicative powers (VR 528).247 
With freedom as his method, Krause strives for a political order that does not treat 
citizens as merely passive objects, but as active subjects, and so includes them in the 
state’s decision-making. Freedom should be granted to the population in a proce-
dural manner; the population is meant to participate in legislation.248
The Spanish Krausists put this mandate directly into practice, as may be illus-
trated by the 1883 referendum about the ‘cuestión social’ by Gumersindo de 
Azcárate (1840–1917).249 At that time, Spanish society threatened to fall apart 
because of the antagonism between labor and capital. To address blatant social 
inequality, monarchist forces recommended to Spanish society that it take a step 
into the past towards the violent restoration of the pre-modern social order. 
Conversely, socialist groups backed violent revolution leading to an egalitarian 
future. Against these two dirigistic alternatives, the Krausists put their entire trust in 
a participatory solution: Peaceful reform of the current state of affairs through the 
involvement of the population. Trusting the capacity for the enlightened self- 
organization of society, Azcárate initiated a countrywide ‘Encuesta’ about the social 
question, which documented sociopolitical demands. That brought about the resolu-
tion to the controversy and enabled the Krausists to defuse tensions by actualizing 
several sociopolitical demands, which previously were not implementable: A “proof 
of concept” for the Krausists’s favored model of deliberative political governance 
and the harmonistic model of society underlying it.
The integration of the people’s will into legislation may, though, never take place 
at the cost of the principle of law, according to Krause: “The fact that one or mil-
lions are deciding for an action in complete agreement makes it neither just nor 
Economists: Economics at the Cutting Edge (London & New York: Taylor and Francis, Routledge), 
66–98.
247 In respect of the regional structure of the state, Krause distinguishes between villages and prov-
inces, i.e. tribal and national communities, and applies them to a separate, federal, and subsidiary 
ordered structure of administrative systems (VR 349). His follower Heinrich Ahrens develops 
Krause’s thinking and wants to establish a federalism of the golden mean – between the extreme 
positions of the state being only the sum of the communities or the communities being the mere 
agents of the state – with the help of Krause’s “life-philosophy” (Lebenlehre) according to which 
every higher form of life is characterized by a moderate transformation of its nevertheless autono-
mous members (Heinrich Ahrens, Die organische Staatslehre auf philosophisch-anthropologischer 
Grundlage [Wien, 1850], 221ff.). For the socio-political appropriation of these ideas in Krausismo 
see Johannes Michael Scholz, “Krausistische Staatskritik in der spanischen ‘Restauración’” in 
Bergfeld (ed.), Aspekte europäischer Rechtsgeschichte: Festgabe für Helmut Coing zum 70. 
Geburtstag (Frankfurt, 1982), 335 and Scholz, Legitimationspraktiken krausistischer 
Dezentralisierungspolitik, 117–163.
248 For the status of all democratic “cooperation of legal persons” in the legislation see also Landau, 
Karl Christian Friedrich Krauses Rechtsphilosophie, 90f.
249 See Johannes Michael Scholz, “La función sociopolitica del krausismo” in Ebert (ed.), 
Reinvindicación de Krause (Madrid, 1982), 87–99.
2.3 Participative Freedom (Karl Christian Friedrich Krause)
144
unjust” (NR 228) Democracy must never degenerate into the tyranny of the majority 
(AR 192). Only the systematic mediation of the empirical will of the people with the 
normative idea of law can legitimately determine the state’s activity.250 Freedom 
may never be surrendered to the sheer will of the state apparatus or the majority of 
the population. Citizens owe obedience only to a lawful regime.
A state can certainly not demand the blind obedience of its citizens, but can demand free 
obedience, that is, an obedience grounded upon their own recognition of the reasonableness 
of the laws; otherwise the state would make machines out of its citizens, would itself hinder 
reason and profane its own vocation. (G II 173)
The common good is for Krause not simply the smallest common denominator 
of all factual interests. The universal will is not the same as the will of the majority, 
but must be ascertained from instances of a legislation orientated around the prin-
ciple of law (VR 523). The legitimate will of the people thus does not just exist 
before and beyond the constitutional procedures, but rather first emerges from them 
(VR 522).251 One cannot divide democratic substance from its constitutional form or 
play them off against one another. Procedures and principles require and condition 
each other.
Only insofar as they govern themselves in conformity with law “are the people 
themselves the sole administrator of law, sovereign, and autocrat” (LL 207); only 
then is there “a community, res publica, in the complete, genuine sense of the term” 
(LL 207). Under this strict and often unfulfilled precondition alone one could say 
“that what the community establishes as right is right in itself as well” (LL 211). 
Where this legal representation of the people’s will succeeds, Krause prioritizes the 
idea of the parliamentary democracy over the then prevailing form of government, 
namely, constitutional monarchy (VR 541n.) Also and especially democracy 
remains subordinated to law and this, in turn, is subordinated to freedom, which is 
why Krause demands a transparent policy of “absolute publicity” [Publicität] (ERB 
109). Legislative “decrees must have this disclosure, that is, they must be publicly 
decided, publicly announced, and accessible to everyone at all hours” (G II 167). 
Similar to Kant, Krause concludes that “the basis of the absolute disclosure of state 
authorities is positive, whereas mistrust and fear of suppression are not” (ERB 109). 
Publicity promotes participation. It lets individual and collective freedom find 
within each other a regulative body which enables them together to construct and 
thereby reciprocally optimize the democratic will.
250 For a complete contrast, see the concept of right in the contemporaneous Rechtslexikon (Weiske 
und Bopp): “The national spirit [Volksgeist] collectively living and operating in every individual 
creates positive right” and “the foundation is the collective consciousness of the people; one rec-
ognizes this because it reveals itself in outer actions by emerging in practice, convention and cus-
tom; in the uniformity of a continuous, thus lasting conduct one recognizes the people’s belief, 
which is a common root opposed to mere coincidence” (ibid., 152f.).
251 This distinction between immediate people’s sovereignty and lawfully, i.e. institutionally medi-
ated national sovereignty is further developed by, above all, Krause’s follower, Heinrich Ahrens. 




This turn towards a transparent, dialogue-orientated, and self-critical political 
model, too, was further developed by the Spanish Krausists.252 They did not want 
static and etatistic policy making, but rather one that was societal and dynamic, i.e. 
a policy constantly further developed by a discourse in the light of its own liberal 
leitmotif. Instead of, like many Continental European liberals, primarily defending 
acquired liberties, they continuously aimed at the conquest of new freedoms.253
Freedom enhancing policy requires state institutions. That is why Krause was 
skeptical about the theories concerning the imminent death of the state that were 
emerging at the time. Injustice (and thus criminal state activity) could certainly 
diminish with a progressive improvement of living conditions (NR 230). But even 
if crime could one day be reduced to zero, “policing and punishment would be abol-
ished, but law would not be” (VR 360). Anything else would mean mixing up 
(negating) administrative and criminal law with the whole of law and thus misun-
derstanding the (positively-affirmative) character of the constitutional state (NR 
239); for “the state is not originally established to avoid and to destroy injustice, but 
rather it is the institution of society which is supposed to realize the idea of law” (LL 
192f).
This vote in favor of the constitutional state is in no way the same as a sanctifica-
tion of the national state.254 The “people’s state [Volksstaat] which one customarily 
incorrectly only called the state” (AR 179), certainly takes a prominent position in 
the circles of institutions protecting rights but may never be made absolute (LL 
203). For, contrary to the tendencies typical of the age, Krause ascribes no excessive 
significance to the people’s ethnicity. For one thing he explains in detail how legal 
structures evolve underneath and outside of the sphere of the nation state.255 For 
another thing, his thought is strictly cosmopolitan and rejects every form of patrio-
252 In an oft-cited study by López-Morillas it says that the Krausist “es liberal porque el liberalismo 
politico es un postulado necesario de la doctrina de Krause, ya que, al mantener que no hay más 
autoridad que la razón, el krausismo subraya que el libre ejercicio de ésta es imposible bajo un 
régimen político fundado en el cesarismo o la arbitrariedad. Decir liberalismo es […] decir proyec-
ción política del racionalismo armónico y luchar en pro de aquél es coayudar a la implantación de 
éste. […] El krausista no abrazaba el liberalismo por simple preferencia o capricho, sino que 
necesariamente tenía que ser liberal si quería mantenerse fiel al espíritu de la doctrina que profe-
saba” (Juan López-Morillas, El krausismo español. Perfil de una aventura intelectual [Madrid, 
1980] 176).
253 See Julián Sanz del Rio, “El derecho y el Estado según Krause” in Boletin de la Institutción 
Libre de Enseñanza 6 (1882), 269.
254 It seems particularly important that Krause reached the idea of the dissolution of the national 
state as the theoretical model of social unification over a hundred years before it arose within sub-
sequent social sciences. Teresa Rodriguez de Lecea in “Der spanische Krausismo als praktische 
Philosophie” in Kodalle (ed.), Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832): Studien zu seiner 
Philosophie und zum Krausismo (Hamburg, 1985), 202. For a modern critique of “methodological 
nationalism” see Ulrich Beck & Edgar Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa: Gessellschaft und 
Politik in der zweiten Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004).
255 See Vester, Sozialphilosophie und Sozialpolitik, 11ff.; According to E. Diaz the fact that the 
Krausist doctrine does not contribute to the “exaltación hegelinana del Estado” and favors strictly 
separating state and society considerably contributed to its favorable reception in Spain, Diaz, 
Krausismo e Institución Libre de Enseñanza: Pensamiento social y politico, 64n.
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tism devaluing foreign countries.256 National law, for Krause, clearly does not legiti-
mate itself by itself (as in legal positivism), but does so by its functional contribution 
to the freedom of all, i.e. concretely, in order to “provide” everyone with “his human 
rights” (VR 350) through the institutionalization of political autonomy. Krause 
explicitly says that national laws are supposed to be always constituted with regard 
to the possible “attunement of the whole of living humanity” (ibid). In his footsteps, 
Latin-American Krausists enshrined the cosmopolitan and intergenerational obli-
gation of all national politics into constitutional law.257
A people is, for Krause, simply the cultural correlate of a legal community (LL 
206). Only as representatives of humanity are nations authorized to enact and sanc-
tion legal norms. Therefore, the idea of a nationalistic liberalism is a non-starter 
(NR 230, VR 352). Krause rejects Fichte and Hegel’s assumption that the Universal 
Spirit (Weltgeist) is biased towards certain nations and would realize itself supremely 
within the German people. Krause counters that “all currently living human beings 
taken together [must] be considered as representatives of reason itself” (G II 156f). 
With him there is therefore no Universal Spirit predetermining history (by making 
a grubby backroom deal with this or that nation). Krause is interested in humankind 
as a whole and its shared cosmopolitan reason.258
History is the open-ended process of human freedom (LL 160). To the individual 
and collective freedom there corresponds the openness of human history.259 The 
freedom underlying human commerce and social life, although not randomly cha-
otic, is nevertheless unpredictable on both the individual as well as the general level 
(VR 200). Insofar as humanity wishes to survive, it must necessarily progress in its 
ethical development (LL 129), but precisely this survival is not guaranteed “for it 
could even be mankind’s own misfortune to be extinguished in its prime” (LL 175). 
Whether that will happen can only be shown by experience (LL 213n.). Human 
beings, not chained to specific forms of being and behaving, can fail in their collec-
tive projects just as much as in their individual projects (LL 160). There is thus no 
speculatively predetermined world history for Krause.
256 Thus, for instance, in November 1815 he explains to his father: “In order to respect and to love 
the German people, I do not need to hate another people in an unjust way” (Briefe 435).
257 The Argentinian constitution of 1853 can in certain essential respects be identified as Krausist 
(see Julián Barraquerro, Espirit y Práctica de la ley Constitucional Argentina [la Tribuna, 1878]); 
in that, for instance, it is directed towards all mankind and not only the Argentinian people, that the 
basic rights are derived from personal right, that sovereignty is conferred only upon the whole of 
society and that it intends to provide a thoroughly subsidiary and decentralized redistribution of 
power. See Otto Carlos Stoetzer, “Raices intelectuales de la Constitución Argentina de 1853,” 
Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas (1985) 22, 295–
339. As well as Claus Dierksmeier, “Harmonischer Liberalismus am Rio de la Plata,” Liberal, 
Vierteljahreshefte für Politik und Kultur (2008) 50, 46–49.
258 See León Esteban Mateo, “El Krausismo en España: Teoria y Circunstancia (1),” Historia de la 
Educación 4 (1985), 97–118.
259 See Alfred Theodor Schneider, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause als Geschichtsphilosoph 
(Leipzig: Druck von Bär & Hermann, 1907), 37.
2 Metaphysics of Freedom
147
Historical agency is influenced by one’s respective understanding of history (LL 
22f.). Whether human beings master their tasks depends upon their respective use of 
freedom – and this is in no small part a consequence of their understanding of free-
dom (NR 262). The intellectual and the practical realization of the idea of freedom 
thus influence one another (VR 200). A fatalistic view of the world can paralyze 
efforts towards social emancipation, a liberal theory, on the other hand, can have 
emancipatory effects (G II 119). The contemplation of cultural history is thus par-
tially determined by the history of freedom both on the universal (species) level and 
on the particular (individual) level (LL 401ff.). We are accordingly able to, on the 
one hand, speak of a historical progress towards and within the consciousness of 
freedom, without nevertheless suggesting, on the other hand, that one can be certain 
about the future course of history, e.g. about the expansion of liberal systems (LL 
160).260
To think historically, then, means to rely on interpretations and embrace ambigu-
ity. Krause too undertakes such historical interpretations. For instance, he conceives 
of the Europe of his day as being in a gradual transition from a period of intensive 
national and cultural differentiation to a more integrative phase of regional coopera-
tion (LL 376–396). He hopes one could soon progress from the still prevailing 
quasi-mechanical “system of mere political balancing” to a more organic interna-
tional legal order (EU 9).261 Most European states do already recognize fundamen-
tal human rights, freedom of religion widely prevails, and technology helps to 
disseminate ideas to overcome national borders (LL 425). Moreover, one would 
find everywhere the seeds of a historically founded common European conscious-
ness (LL 422).262 The epochal step towards a supranational legal order could thus 
first of all be demanded and expected from Europe.263 Krause even draws up a 
sample constitution for such a union of European peoples, in the hope that a suc-
cessful European Union might serve as a model for the world and find emulation in 
various regions.264
260 Tiberghien’s history of philosophy explicates Krause’s ideas by interpreting history as the nor-
mative history of freedom and judges it from the point of view of a strict prohibition of retrogres-
sion and from a soft precept towards development; see S. Monreal, Krausismo en el Uruguay: 
Alguno’s fundamentos del Estado tutor (Montevideo: Universidad Católica del Uruguay Dámaso 
A. Larrañaga, 1993), 68.
261 See Clay MacCauley, “Krause’s Proposition for a European League of States,” The Advocate of 
Peace (1894–1920), 79 (11), 337–39.
262 Krause’s pro-European thinking distinguishes him from his philosophical contemporaries. See 
Rolf Helmut Foerster, Europa: Geschichte einer politischen Idee (München: Nymphenburger 
Verlagshandlung, 1967), 240–243.
263 See Lorimer, The Institutes of Law, 310.
264 It was not by accident that Krause published his Entwurf eines europäischen Staatenbundes in 
1814. It contained ideas which Krause wanted to explain within his text on Erdrechtsbund, but 
which remained fragmentary (see von Mollat, ed. Der Erdrechtsbund an sich selbst und in seinen 
Verhältnissen zu allen Einzelheiten des Menschheitlebens [Leipzig, 1893]).
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The world’s citizens can only attain perpetual peace through a law-abiding 
league of nations – for which Krause draws up constitutional considerations, too.265 
For as long as there exists no legal institution spanning the planet, in cases of con-
flict every country can insist upon its right to self-defense. But where every state 
acts as a judge in its own affairs arms races and spiraling violence are the conse-
quence (VR 500). It is therefore to be hoped that the world’s citizens will see this 
sooner or later and then one day “legally determine the relations of peoples as the 
whole of mankind and establish a higher organism of law, to which the peoples will 
relate themselves in the same way that every individual human being relates to his 
own people” (U 60). The required delegation of state sovereignty rights to higher 
regional, as well as global, unities is legitimate since, from the outset, Krause sees 
the nation state as just one – but in no way the only – form for institutionalizing the 
rights of freedom (LL 203f.).266
But since and so long as this condition of global law is still a long way off, the 
rights of individuals and peoples must be promoted in other ways.267 Provisional 
legal systems are to be established. A few states, acting from joint principles, may 
suffice for a start (U 142). And Europe ought to take the lead (EU 11). For example, 
a European Union could abolish all military conflicts within the European continent 
(SL 318) and ensure that, at least within its sphere, the “law of peoples [becomes] 
increasingly independent of fortune or misfortune, the size of the population, and 
any arbitrary decision-making” (EU 13). Krause thinks that it would be optimal if the 
earth were gradually to be transformed by such regional associations of peoples 
working together towards the task of establishing a fair world order (LL 201, U 149).
These cosmopolitan ideas are the result of the methodological principle of 
Krause’s participative liberalism. Since the idea of ‘right’ imposes a duty of every-
one to contribute to the acquisition and preservation of the rights of everyone else, 
one is to strive to put the world eventually in precisely such a state wherein “every 
citizen of the planet, wherever he may be heading, is granted his germane personal 
rights” (VR 467). In just the same way as one avails oneself of human rights, one 
must also help others to realize theirs, regardless of how far away (spatially or tem-
porally) they live.268 The legal world order to which Krause aspires for the future 
would bring with it transformations of existing rights (VR 449f.) and modifications 
of the earlier (local, national, and regional) legal systems (LL 204). Should a “state 
of mankind [Menschheitsstaat] on this earth” (VR 348) ever arise then one has to 
reckon with a certain redistribution of legal positions, which in the light of that new 
265 For the cosmopolitan and pacifist character of Krause’s philosophy see Veit Valentin, Geschichte 
des Völkerbundgedankens in Deutschland: Ein geistesgeschichtlicher Versuch (Berlin, 1920), 48f.; 
Hermann Hetzel, Die Humaniserung des Krieges in ihrer culturgeschichtlicher Entwicklung 
(Frankfurt an der Oder, 1889), 58 & 157; MacCauley, Krause’s League for Human Right, 458.
266 See Karl Viktor Fricker, “Das Problem des Völkerrechts,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft 28 (1872), 91–144.
267 For more about Krause’s “splendid cosmopolitanism” see also Carl Fortlage, Genetische 
Geschichte der Philosophie seit Kant (Leipzig, 1852), 228.
268 Compare with Martha Nussbaum’s claim that “humanity is under a collective obligation to find 




alliance appear in need of reform (U 147).269 But since the earth is anyhow “the 
original external property of the entire whole of mankind” (VR 463) and certainly 
fundamentally belongs to “all and everyone who are at the same time counted as 
rational ends,”270 this is philosophically unproblematic, howsoever controversial the 
concrete legal implementation could prove (VR 466).
Krause hereby provides an interesting, indeed provocative contribution to glo-
balization ethics. He seeks to mediate between theoreticians who claim that no pos-
session of rights is ever of permanent validity until the highest possible system of 
law is established and those who claim that every historically acquired right must be 
binding for all times. “In between these, decisively emerges the unpartisan truth that 
subordinate rights of subordinate legal persons have the authority to prevail” wher-
ever they need not be “demoted by the novel higher ground of law into an inferior 
position, and [adjusted] accordingly to the now arising and emerging higher organ-
ism of rights” (VR 328). This transformation must not always entail the loss of 
acquired legal positions in favor of a modified return. For there will always exist 
particular areas of life in which individual “independence must be maintained” (NR 
264n.). The accession of a state to a community of peoples will not change many of 
its local structures. But in respect to certain geographical sources of livelihood 
(Lebenschancen) a compensation in favor of disadvantaged peoples is to be 
expected. For the actual occupation of nature and its treasures has taken place as a 
result of power-relations. Thus it often ran counter to the “authority to take posses-
sion of the earth” (NR 262) which equally belongs to all human beings – on account 
of their common ownership of the earth. Therefore the first possession of land can-
not also be the last (NR 262).271
Since every newly created legal entity is not only encouraged to quantitatively 
further the total extent of its freedoms through expansion or internal complexity, but 
rather also qualitatively to enhance them and thus to free itself from ethical contin-
gency and asymmetry (NR 264), some of its internal legal positions are continually 
to be modified (ERB 108). Such a fairness-oriented transformation of global owner-
ship presupposes the “insight” and “good, rightful will” (NR 264) of the global citi-
zens, which is obviously not always a given. Instead often, wherever tensions are 
encountered, there prevails violence, destruction, and war, between individuals as 
well as peoples (NR 265). Krause nevertheless believes that the hope for a growing 
legal penetration of the areas of social conflict is justified. Culture and the sense of 
269 In the same way, Martha Nussbaum claims that “one might then doubt that domestic arrange-
ments can be insulated from scrutiny, if they are such as to make it impossible for people in other 
nations to live decent lives” (Frontiers of Justice, 229).
270 See Martha Nussbaum: “The capabilities approach is fully universal: the capabilities in question 
are held to be important for each and every citizen, in each and every nation, and each person is to 
be treated as an end” (Frontiers of Justice, 78).
271 Martha Nussbaum similarly says that “even the concept of redistribution […] needs to be called 
into question, since it rests on the prior determination that people own the unequal amounts they 
have.” She thus argues against positions which claim “that the part of a person’s holdings that is 
needed to support other members of a society (or world, […]), are actually owned by the people 
who need them, not by the people who are holding on to them” (Frontiers of Justice, 373).
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justice, on the one hand, and people’s prudent self-interest on the other, are signifi-
cant driving forces for the global advance of law (NR 268). Long-term economic 
calculations of utility hand in hand with an appeal to “the conscience of mankind” 
(U 305) can definitely result in humanity increasingly directing itself towards the 
integrative regulation and protection of rights by means of global institutions. And 
once an order maintaining the interests and rights of all of earth’s citizens arises, it 
would also – because of the economic advantages attained through membership – 
be very likely to endure.272
Krause in no way wishes to level the diversity of civilizations and peoples in that 
envisioned global federation of law, but rather especially aims to protect diversity 
through the progress of cosmopolitan law.273 While, in a legally unregulated world, 
economic and military power raze traditional cultures ad libitum, their chances for 
a critically-affirmative preservation are far better in well-ordered relationships of 
cosmopolitan law. Precisely because, for Krause, the earth belongs to all people and 
peoples for the realization of individual freedom, the lifestyles of cultures may also 
manifest themselves in dissimilar ways of life. The basic right of all humans to a 
self-determined life may well lead to a multiplicity of divergent local and regional 
legal systems. These can continue to exist as, in essence, internal specifications of a 
globally networked system of rights and freedoms (VR 539f.).
That implies that neither is justified the one claim which in recent times was fanatically 
claimed and striven for: that all men could have absolutely only identical equal rights. Nor 
is justified the other claim, which was just as fanatically taken up and enforced: that every 
man could have only his own quite individual right, and consequently one is unable to think 
about a universal (human) right possessed by all men. Both of these erroneous claims rather 
rest upon two basic truths, which were however at the same time misunderstood and com-
prehended in a one-sidedly exaggerated fashion. The universal, ever equal right of man is 
the eternal, unchangeable, and forever remaining foundation, but, on this foundation, rights 
must then be further determined. (LL 197)
Krause’s cosmopolitan vision is astonishing. Two hundred years ago, he already 
showed the sociological as well as normative boundaries of the nation-state and 
took up the theme of globalization. While at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
most German philosophers inferred from the de facto marginalized role of colonial-
ized peoples an inferior status for them in terms of rights and freedom, Krause 
boldly marches in the opposite direction. He campaigns for “the One indivisible 
human nature” (VR 469) which all individuals share in, and demands that it be 
respected vis-à-vis all persons regardless of where and how they live.
Krause strongly rejects all racial differentiations within the right to freedom. He 
disapproves of the reference to a supposed cultural gap between European and non- 
European peoples, common at the time for the justification of colonialism. Back 
272 See Vester, Sozialphilosophie und Sozialpolitik, 11 as well as Siegfried Wollgast, “Karl Christian 
Friedrich Krause (1781–1832): Bemerkungen zu seinem Menschheitbund und Friedensplan” in 
Erhard Lange (ed.), Philosophie und Frieden: Beitrage zum Friedensgedanken in der deutschen 
Klassik (Weimar, 1985), 260–276.




then, Krause was already using arguments very similar to those used today by, for 
instance, Thomas Pogge.274 Those differences of cultivation and civilization, Krause 
holds, largely do not at all exist in the form and intensity claimed. But where they 
do exist, they have in many cases first been brought about by practices of colonial-
ism in violation of international law. Therefore cultural and socio-economic differ-
ences may never be employed for the justification of relations of subordination, as 
legal grounds for (further) discrimination or even as proof of racial inferiority. 
Those asymmetries rather obligate us to support with solidarity those affected by 
them as well as to provide remediation for colonialized peoples (VR 464).275
Certainly, Krause did not believe that ideas alone could change the world, but he 
also never gave in to the opposing view that the world could manage without them. 
Human beings are, not in the least, what they become; and the latter results in part 
from what they strive for. Only a theory which also knows of the ideas and ideals of 
humanity is thus of practical value. And it was precisely the establishment of such a 
realistic idealism to which Karl Christian Friedrich Krause devoted his entire life.
Particularly interesting in Krause is the status of philosophical arguments and, 
especially, the status of metaphysics. Citizens instead of professors should ulti-
mately decide whether and which metaphysical body of thought should influence 
humanity’s public self-image. Therefore, instead of providing the world with a sin-
gle overarching metaphysics, Krause advocates a world where the consensus regard-
ing values and norms requisite for cosmopolitan coordination arises from the many 
minor metaphysics of the citizens. His philosophy of freedom is thus, so to speak, 
self-reflexive: Krause had initially (descriptively) characterized the idea of freedom 
as an unavoidable foundation of human self-determination. Its analysis showed that 
individually freedom can be consistently employed only if one attributes it to all 
human beings. That universal (ascriptive) dimension of the idea of freedom then 
(prescriptively) corresponds to a normative consequence; namely, the responsible 
exercise of one’s own freedom in the interests of all human beings. Krause’s idea of 
a globally responsible freedom results from a cosmopolitan ethics whose specifica-
tions derive from the influence of precisely those for whom it wishes to be valid. 
Therefore, Krause’s philosophy of freedom is a participative liberalism par 
excellence.
Nevertheless, some readers will no doubt ask why – if all of this is true and if this 
Krause really philosophized with such balance and foresight  – they have never 
heard of him before. Why do we not find  – as with other far less interesting 
 philosophers – statues of him, streets named after him, and busts portraying him? 
Why does his name not appear in most histories of philosophy? Indeed, within the 
German and English-speaking academic world, he is hardly known. And anyone 
274 See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms (Cambridge & Malden, MA: Polity, 2002).
275 Once again Martha Nussbaum’s position is compatible: “Many of the problems of poorer 
nations were caused by colonial exploitation, which prevented them from industrializing and 
robbed them of natural resources, among other things. Redistribution in the present seems an 
appropriate form of remediation for the past” (Creating Capabilities, 115).
2.3 Participative Freedom (Karl Christian Friedrich Krause)
152
who searches for him on the internet or within appropriate lexica often finds his 
work less favorably presented as here. Krause is condemned for abstruse language, 
fantastical ideas, and metaphysical preferences, and thus the impression may arise 
that he is justifiably forgotten.
Elsewhere I have endeavored to rebut these objections in detail.276 Hence I shall 
confine myself to but a few cursory observations here. That Krause was an enthusi-
astic utopian with obsolete metaphysics, would, in the light of the argumentation 
reconstructed here, appear doubtful. It is true however that Krause worked out his 
own technical terminology, which does indeed make the appropriation of some of 
his works more difficult. Although this was not always the case – some of his writ-
ings and also some of his posthumously published lectures are very clearly and, 
indeed, most elegantly written –, Krause’s at times excessive recourse to his own 
terminology has certainly hindered the reception of his thought.
The external occasion for this move was the religiously and politically tense situ-
ation at the University of Jena. First, his teacher Fichte was forced to leave the uni-
versity because of the so-called atheism controversy and, subsequently, also his 
colleague, Schelling, left in the wake of the so-called pantheism controversy.277 
Krause, who had developed his own philosophy through critical engagement with 
theirs, did not wish to get into ‘the cross-hairs’ of questions about the philosophy of 
religion. Also, Krause wished to escape the ambiguities of quotidian concepts 
through a regularly constructed derivation of the required technical terms so as to 
bequeath to philosophy a logically unambiguous terminology. Other thinkers with 
similar aspirations, like, for instance, Leibniz (with his ‘mathesis universalis’) 
attained more recognition for such efforts than did Krause.
It seems to me that the actual reason for Krause’s poor reception in his homeland 
was much rather his unfortunate academic career. In his time, only a few philoso-
phers outside the university system were able to raise their work into public con-
sciousness. Krause, though, never managed to get hold of a regular professorship. 
This had to do, for one thing, with envious chicaneries from political and academic 
opponents278 and, for another, certainly also with Krause himself. He neglected to 
promote either himself or his work. Tactical maneuvering was far removed from his 
nature. Trusting that his philosophy spoke for itself, he (all too?) peacefully acqui-
esced to inferior employment contracts and chose to apply his energies to the devel-
opment and perfection of his system at the expense of its marketing. He had 
absolutely no desire to be a ‘public intellectual.’ Therefore, the true responsibility 
for the lack of prominence of his philosophy lies more within his personality than in 
his works, whose rediscovery is very much to be hoped for. Facing enormous cos-
mopolitan challenges and searching for a healthy mean between an irresponsible 
276 See Dierksmeier, Der absolute Grund des Rechts.
277 For more information about this see Klaus Kodalle & Michael Ohst Martin, Fichtes Entlassung: 
Die Atheismusstreit vor 200 Jahren (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1999).
278 For a more detailed discussion see Enrique M.  Vierhaus Rudolf Ureña, K.  C. F.  Krause: 




libertinism on the one hand, and the equally unappealing alternatives of socialist or 
religious command economies as well as virtue- or eco-dictatorships (Tugend- oder 
Ökodiktaturen) on the other, the global community today can discover in Karl 
Christian Friedrich Krause an instructive precursor of the project of a liberal world 
ethos (Weltethos).
2.4  Results and Implications
In this section, as in later sections under the same heading (Sects. 3.3 and 4.3), we 
pause in order to see what systematic results our trawl through history has yielded, 
and what consequences can be derived from them for contemporary work on a the-
ory of freedom.
Immanuel Kant showed: Only through the freedom to act morally can we make 
our own (also immoral) decisions. Without this ethical freedom enabling us to opt 
against our inclinations, we would be mere automatons weighing up quanta of plea-
sure, impelled by advantage-maximizing algorithms programing our very existence. 
Our freedom would be neither unconditioned nor spontaneous; it could not make us 
the authors of our actions.
Our real employment of that radical freedom is obviously also conditioned by 
the circumstances of life, by education and cultivation, by access to resources, both 
material and informational, and political as well as cultural. Not only a lack of rights 
diminishes freedom. Not only the legal, but also the social and cultural buttresses of 
freedom should therefore be strengthened by liberal politics. But since Kant also 
maintains, in harmony with classical liberalism, that coercing state interventions 
should be limited to the narrow sphere of the administration of rights, other non- 
coercive forms of politics must be found. To further the radius of an empowering 
and capacitating politics enabling an autonomous life for everyone, it must be open 
to the interests and opinions of the population.
Yet Kant does not only legitimate – he also limits – the democratic self- regulation 
of the open society according to the principle of a freedom self-consciously shaping 
itself. He thereby prepares a bridge towards conceptions of the ‘common good’ 
considered off limits by many other liberal theories. Freedom, he declares, can only 
be consistently conceived as directed toward a notion of a “highest good,” albeit one 
open to different interpretations. Freedom’s highest good does not lie ready-made 
waiting to be found. It only arises as a result of a communal searching and striving: 
as the result of free political deliberation. Against the false alternative – fostered by 
many of liberalism’s friends and enemies – of either a theory of freedom averse to 
values or one consumed by ethical commitments, he opens a third way. Kant shows 
that freedom always already has a resolve towards values, without dissolving itself 
in them.
Culture is required for values to be realized in a liberal manner; so that the state 
is not lead into attempting to violently counter moral anomie, ethical pathologies, 
and social atomization; and so that ethical impulses (ethischer Drang) instead of 
2.4 Results and Implications
154
governmental impositions (staatlicher Zwang) create the required commitments 
and institutions which enable individuals and institutions to tolerate freedom. A 
liberal society needs the state to promote culture (Kulturstaat); not to establish a 
dominant culture, but certainly to place into the citizens’ hands the necessary means 
of communication for peacefully and liberally developing a shared political will. 
The more the representation of minds and the collaboration of spirits succeed, the 
easier becomes the coordination of body and things. Culture improves governance. 
Wherever it facilitates identification with others and empathy for their situation, 
people find it easier to act from consideration and self-restraint, for instance by 
improving the livelihood of strangers. Especially in the era of globality and ever- 
more pluralistic societies, a cosmopolitan culture that promotes sympathy for the 
fate of foreign human beings is of increasing significance.
Fichte reassesses the Kantain attempt at making freedom the foundation of all 
modern, self-reflexive, and self-critical philosophy. He points out: One cannot phi-
losophize about freedom without considering its, above all, social presuppositions. 
But how are these to be integrated into philosophical liberalism? Fichte wishes to 
achieve this through a theory of reasonable freedom. Only a thoroughly rational 
concept of freedom could identify what precisely state and society have to provide 
for individuals’ autonomous lives. Since only (his) philosophy can legitimately 
indicate the freedoms truly worthy of promotion, only the philosophically directed 
state – but not the freely constituted citizens’ will – is granted the right to define and 
concretize the right to freedom.
Fichte thus commits an instructive error: Whoever, like Fichte, views the world 
as either material conforming to reason or as mere resistance contrary to reason, 
will treat it in just the same way. The same is true of our fellow human beings. 
Alterity is valuable to Fichte only when in service of his philosophical model; in all 
other cases it is seen as a hindrance to be abolished. In the realm of such thoughts 
there is no room for shades of grey. Everything within nature and society is clearly 
separated into black and white according to how serviceable it is to freedom. With 
Fichte, the normative force of freedom thus has theoretically and practically exces-
sive effects. This leads to an exaggerated concept – as well as to an over-bearing 
reality – of legal coercion. Fichte’s insistence that freedom is essentially ethically 
orientated is just as convincing as his wish to protect only ethically realized free-
dom appears bizarre. His correct view that coercion may only be legitimated through 
the logic of freedom, however, in no way justifies Fichte’s erroneous belief that 
coercion also presents the correct means for every advance towards freedom.
For Fichte, coercion is advanced from a means to enable a state of law to a means 
to realize reason’s ideal state. And therein lies the decisive problem. A notable 
example is Fichte’s social-contract doctrine. In order to motivate the individual 
towards law-abiding behavior by means of a machinery of incentives and punish-
ments, Fichte contrives a mechanism of legal and economic relations resting upon 
strict reciprocity. Wherever that symmetrical reciprocity is absent, no legal 
 relationship – and, as a result, also, no protection of freedom – is achieved. This 
model cannot process asymmetries. It supports a closed social space that continu-
ally safeguards a static equilibrium through strict (legal and economic) surveillance. 
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Human beings are entirely prevented from politically or economically exercising 
their freedom in ways Fichte views as unreasonable.
The result is, in many respects, a dictatorship of reason in the name of freedom. 
Since Fichte believes himself able to derive most precisely what and how much 
every human being needs to live freely, he embarks upon, for instance, planning an 
optimal economic system. Therein the state features as that which is reasonable and 
the market as that which is contrary to reason. Since the market only disturbs the 
well-planned distribution of goods it is eliminated. Fichte overestimates the possi-
bility of the state to establish freedom-conducive relations between goods and ser-
vices. At the same time, he underestimates the contribution market-structures can 
provide to this endeavor. It would have been more appropriate to conceive of the 
market as an a-reasonable process; one that – dependent on its political and cultural 
framing and direction – can be more or less reasonably shaped.
In Fichte’s philosophy of freedom, liberal and totalitarian motives are thus fight-
ing for predominance. At the same time, cosmopolitan and national motives battle 
one another. On the one hand, Fichte behaves universally and ascribes to every 
person an original right (Urrecht) to freedom. Still, he does not advance towards a 
globally-oriented liberalism. Because Fichte supposes that the reasonable order he 
strives for can only be secured in small, controllable spaces, he restricts his political 
perspective to the German people. And since global markets can disturb national 
equilibriums, the unstable world had better remain outside. Instead of devising pro-
cedures with which the challenges of globalization could be surmounted in a liberal 
manner, Fichte advocates national unilateralism. It is no wonder, therefore, that later 
populist thinkers chose him as their philosophical hero.
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause undertook to even out the socialistic-totalitarian 
and ethnic-nationalistic imbalances in Fichte’s thinking. His critique of Fichte goes 
to the root of the matter, being directed against the false dichotomy between nature 
and reason. In truth, according to Krause, the relations between natural necessity 
and moral freedom are far more complex. Krause presents them in a multi-level 
order of forms of freedom interlaced with one another instead of in a model of 
opposed polarities. This order then provides a differentiated foundation for the con-
ferral of rights and obligations. Krause can thus espouse ecological sustainability 
and the protection of animals for example – not as limitations, but as consequences 
of the liberal principle.
Krause seeks the foundations of ethics beyond the logic of reciprocity. Against 
the Fichtean social-contract theory (and contemporary game-theory) he establishes 
a foundation for the principle of freedom that encompasses not merely symmetrical 
exchanges but also asymmetrical situations in life. This allows him to guarantee 
human dignity unconditionally: Unborn lives, the severely disabled, members of 
future generations, and the senile must be protected by the legal and societal order 
even though their contribution to it might not be economically equivalent to what 
they receive. For Krause wishes to formulate the rights of all persons so that people 
become effective about what affects them; wherever possible through participation, 
and otherwise through representation. With Krause, humanity as a whole is pro-
moted to the overall corrective of all legal claims. Consideration for other human 
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beings’ rights to freedom appear, from this perspective, not as subsequent curtail-
ments of an originally infinite freedom, but rather as the outer expression of the 
inner structure of freedom. For Krause, freedom goes in hand with responsibility for 
the freedom of others.
Especially in regard to the right to property it becomes clear how this different 
groundwork leads to an innovative liberalism. Property and possession are to be 
cherished for promoting freedom, according to Krause. Certain – absolute – forms 
of property, however, often prove less conducive to the freedom of all than other – 
relative – forms. The liberal support for private property must correspondingly pre-
vent property from being never communally and always exclusively possessed. In 
contrast: The enabling of an autonomous life for all functions as regulator of the 
order of possession; and therefore the human claim to just participation is global-
ized by Krause. Our commitment to help others attain freedom does not end at the 
front door, customs-barriers, or national boundaries.
Krause’s cosmopolitanism outshines the work of his predecessors. He holds a 
subsidiary federal order to be the best protection of freedom inside the nation as 
well as outside of it, in the international and intercultural space. Just as on the 
domestic front Krause pleads for the civil-societal development of institutional 
orders, he makes similar pleas in foreign (and global) affairs. He opposes a global-
ization ‘from above’ with his model of a cosmopolitanism ‘from within.’ Krause 
wants freedom’s commitments to be established by the global citizens themselves. 
As a result his preferred procedure is a subsidiary political self-determination aris-
ing from civil-society organizations and movements, and not the plebiscite; one 
finds contemporary equivalents of these ideas in, for instance, the concept of 
Network Governance and Stakeholder Democracy. By differentiating the idea of 
freedom in the medium of freedom in various concepts of freedom, Krause’s phi-
losophy returns to its methodological principle, already sketched by Kant. It frees 
human beings for the formation and implementation of their own representations of 
freedom.
We here witness a historically as well as systematically fascinating trajectory of 
thought in three steps: Kant had turned the idea of freedom back upon itself, by 
showing that the basis for the legitimation of individual freedom is the freedom of 
all. Correctly understood, the freedom of others and its promotion must hence be 
recast as an objective for individual freedom. Fichte further develops this conse-
quence, albeit in a manner often running contrary to its liberal core concern. From 
the task established by Kant and the overblown Fichtean solutions, Krause extracts 
the appropriate consequence: To elevate the realization of the idea of freedom not 
merely as the aim of individual liberties, but rather to make liberty also the means 
for its pursuit.
Correspondingly, these three thinkers present the relationship between meta-
physics and freedom very differently. In Kant, metaphysics serves to enable the 
self-questioning of everyday conceptions of freedom. Fichte employs it in order to 
give a definitive answer to those questions. And Krause in turn uses metaphysical 
thinking as a horizon of orientation before which human beings can individually as 
well as institutionally answer the conundrums being produced by the radical nature 
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of their freedom. In short, with Kant, metaphysics leads us to the big questions how 
freedom should relate itself to its lifeworld. Fichte’s metaphysics provides but one 
big answer, whereas Krause uses his metaphysics in order to combine Kant’s big 
question with the global citizens’ many small answers.
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Despite all of their particular differences, the metaphysics of freedom of Kant, 
Fichte, and Krause have a common guiding thread: They characterize freedom 
according to its inner essence before setting to work on the outer delimitation of 
individual freedoms. They differentiate between essential and inessential, meaning-
ful and meaningless options, and first designate which freedoms are in question 
before indicating how many of these respective freedoms are to be granted respec-
tively. That consensus about the priority of the qualitative nature of freedom and its 
merely subordinate quantitative contours is due to the fact that Kant, Fichte, and 
Krause philosophize about freedom essentially from the consciousness of freedom. 
This fundamentally qualitatively and normatively evaluative consciousness serves 
them as a decisive test for the cogency of their theories of freedom. Since the era of 
German Idealism, however, the willingness to employ metaphysical arguments for 
the philosophical investigation of the consciousness of freedom has noticeably 
decreased.
In the face of a world where, in the shadows and security of theological dogmas, 
freedom of thought and civil liberties were curtailed for centuries, the wish for more 
theoretical and practical license grew. To some a frontal assault upon the ancient 
walls of metaphysics seemed necessary. With David Hume (1711–1776), an alterna-
tive philosophical program gradually began to gain acceptance. From now on, truth 
was in no way seen to be gleaned from mere conceptual speculation or cognitive 
intuition, but should rather be gained either analytically by means of the logical 
examination of “relations of ideas” or synthetically by means of interpersonally 
accessible “matters of fact.”1 In the first case a priori knowledge is possible, in the 
second case only knowledge a posteriori; the former can be unconditional, while 
the latter only lays claim to conditional validity. With some modifications, the 
majority of positivist and analytic philosophers of the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies retained this two-source theory. They refused to search for a third font of 
knowledge, i.e. for cognitions necessary for consciousness and independent of 
1 David Hume, Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding (London: Cooper, 1801).
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experience, which nonetheless structure the latter – like, for example, Kant’s a pri-
ori synthetic judgments or the dialectics of Fichte, Schelling, Krause, or Hegel.2
What does this methodological presupposition mean for the theory of freedom? 
Whoever accepts as true only that for which either logic or experience provides 
compelling grounds must establish the essence of freedom through either logical 
analysis or empirically locate it: Voilà, the theoretical program of large parts of the 
Anglo-American philosophy of freedom in the twentieth century.
Let us first turn to the empiricist attempt. Its positivist investment restricts free-
dom to phenomena that can be observed through the five senses; primarily to free-
dom of movement. The forefather of such attempts is Thomas Hobbes with his 
physicalist concept of freedom (which we already encountered in Sect. 1.3.2). The 
advantage hoped for by such an undertaking is a value-free, purely descriptive con-
cept of freedom that first defines the permissible linguistic field upon which later 
questions of a normative nature can be cultivated – for example, who owes to whom, 
and how, the (re-)production of which freedoms.3
One nowadays no longer follows Hobbes, who includes in his definition of the 
boundaries of freedom also physical constraints and natural hindrances. Rather, 
most side with Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) who only accepts boundaries other 
human beings could be held causally responsible for. The particular aim of this 
demarcation is to delimit clearly from one another “freedom as normative condition 
and freedom as physical fact”; the physical freedom resting upon “modal categories 
of possibility and impossibility” is to be separated from normative questions orien-
tated towards “deontic categories of permissibility and impermissibility.”4
At first glance, that appears convincing: What one can and what one may often 
differs. But not always. The mere fact that we can clearly distinguish conceptually 
between ability and authorization does not mean that also in reality there could be 
“no necessary connection between instances of normative freedom and instances of 
non-normative freedom.”5 If, for instance, libertarians advocate that the same free-
doms that are open to the rich are also open to the poor, they nevertheless base their 
claim upon precisely this assumption: The poor may (normatively) ultimately aspire 
to the same thing as the rich, but merely often can not (physically) attain it. Their 
(prescriptive) freedom nevertheless is said to remain untouched by this (descriptive) 
incapacity and to resemble the freedom of affluent people. Poverty thus does not 
seem to be a problem for the philosophy of freedom. This is countered with the 
well-known objection on the part of social-liberal thinkers that the “freedom to 
sleep under bridges,”6 for instance, nevertheless appears very different to the poor 
2 See Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London, 1936)
3 Felix Oppenheimer, for instance, is a representative of this position. He writes: “An agreed 
descriptive language is a prerequisite for a fruitful discussion of normative issues” (Felix 
Oppenheimer, “‘Constraints on Freedom’ as a Descriptive Concept,” Ethics 95:2 (1985), 309).
4 Kramer, The Quality of Freedom, 59.
5 Ibid., 61.




than it does to the rich. Since the rich can also sleep somewhere else, it is all the 
same to them whether they may sleep under bridges. Rendering the separation from 
facts and norms absolute could consequently lead to a suspect theory and a cynical 
practice. Yet, against this objection libertarians maintain: Even if one is poor, there 
would nevertheless be a marked difference between a society in which the poor, like 
the rich, could avail themselves of this very freedom and one in which the police 
cordon off all bridges.7
Who is right? Let us scrutinize this: Can one really describe what people ‘can’ 
do in purely physicalist terms before dealing normatively with what they ‘may’ and 
‘must’ do? Is this truly the smallest common denominator, agreeable to all, from 
which any controversy in the philosophy of freedom can be untangled and solved? 
Can we measure, enumerate, and calculate freedoms? Is this the key that opens the 
door to comparing and distributing freedoms interpersonally?8 Doubts seem 
appropriate.
Even physical ability arises in the context of authorization. Someone, for exam-
ple, suffering from a tetanus infection in the leg will experience a quantitative 
reduction of his abilities: His initial set of physical freedoms to walk and/or to limp 
is numerically reduced to the ‘freedom’ to limp.9 Yet that does not have to be the 
case. Most societies prevent such cases with tetanus injections – or treat them with 
penicillin. Access to tetanus and penicillin, functional for one’s physical freedom 
(to walk), is socially provided: through a legal authorization, i.e. by the consent to 
appropriate the requisite medicines (hitherto in the possession of others). Whoever 
does not receive such consent (by lacking means of payment for instance) must 
limp. Ability and authorization are, consequently, in this case in no way absolutely 
separable from one another. Their relationship – and thereby our real freedom – var-
ies from society to society and, also within certain societies, from one point in time 
to the next.10 In a communist society, access to medicine should be for either every-
one or no one. In a consistently libertarian-capitalist society, however, it may be 
available only through sufficient private financial means. Whoever would want to 
obtain the required medicine otherwise would be stopped by the long arm of the 
law: a physical coercion par excellence. The physical freedom (to be able to walk 
again) encounters its limit in physical coercion (of the police’s protection of posses-
sions), yet only because those affected lack normatively legitimated options (legally 
to acquire medicine). Decreased authorization reduces physical ability; a lack of 
normative freedom reduces factual freedom.
What follows? The quantity of our descriptively describable freedoms ultimately 
depends upon the quality of the freedoms normatively ascribed to us, like, for 
example, the societally granted or refused freedom for basic medical care regardless 
of wealth. Therefore, the physicalist-quantitative concept of freedom is devoid of 
7 See Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Cambridge, MA, 1994).
8 See Christopher Megone, “One Concept of Liberty,” Political Studies 35:4 (1987), 621ff.
9 I have borrowed this example from Philippe van Parijs, see Parijs, Real Freedom for All, 14.
10 See Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 165, 182.
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meaning without normatively-qualitative background assumptions (who possesses 
what and who owes what to whom). The oasis of semantic clarity luring us towards 
the positivist concept of freedom evaporates upon closer inspection into a Fata 
Morgana.
If freedom really only consisted in moving our body as we like, how could one 
then explain the emphasis and moral pathos with which political and philosophical 
discussions about freedom are conducted? Why do human beings desperately cling 
to certain freedoms, while nonchalantly renouncing others?11 That shows: If we 
completely separate the question concerning what actually makes a freedom valu-
able from the idea of freedom, then we subjectivize something that actually objec-
tively belongs to the matter at stake. Wherever normative aspects belong to the 
freedom in question, a limitation to only descriptive judgments and a shift of the 
normative into the private leads us astray; it sacrifices truth to method.12
Whoever shuts themselves off from this insight – of freedom being normatively 
conditioned and socially constructed – must accommodate themselves to strange 
stances: In order to remain true to the program of mere description even something 
like coercion would have to be grasped purely materialistically: as physical neces-
sitation. For lack of physical causality, mere omissions would not count. Coercion 
would require that an agent be physically prevented from acting. But that leads to 
bizarre consequences, because, on the view of those positivist-empirical stipula-
tions, even a death threat does not coerce anyone to anything. In regard to the slo-
gan: ‘Your money or your life!’ we could, after all, decide for the option of forsaking 
the latter. One may not voluntarily want to make such a decision, but many believe 
that such a decision nonetheless remains a free one.13 Nevertheless, whoever still 
blithely speaks of freedom even in regard to an acute death threat, may hardly pres-
ent themselves as an analytic philosopher obligated to the customary use of lan-
guage. Since, in everyday language, a pistol to the head stands, quite to the contrary, 
for a bitter loss of freedom.
What do we learn from this? A certain value (to allocate one’s money free from 
intimidation) enters into the description of the facticity of the freedom to be dis-
cussed. The meaning of the expression ‘Your money or your life!’ is not quantita-
tively measured by the recipient against a factual benchmark (‘How many options 
does that expression create or leave open?’). Rather this command is qualitatively 
interpreted in front of a normative horizon of interpretation (‘How does this change 
the existence I cherish?’). Instead of celebrating that, quantitatively viewed, an 
additional option – to be shot dead – is now on offer for selection, the affected party 
may well lament losing an alternative of qualitatively higher value – to remain unin-
11 “If we view […] agency as nothing but the pursuit of preference, or freedom as nothing by the 
absence of constraint, how are we to explain how some acts can be more central than others to the 
self, agency, freedom, identity or integrity […]?” (Onora O’Neil, Constructions of Reason: 
Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy [Cambridge, 1989], 205).
12 See William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Oxford, 1993), 139–143.




jured in possession of one’s purse. One correctly understands this expression only 
as a necessitating threat to which one better comply by relinquishing the wallet: as 
coercion.14
The suggestion, therefore, that one could – first – decide upon the factual level 
whether a threatening situation implies a physically-causal coercion so that it 
could – then – be meticulously separated from all value-judgments (whether or not 
such coercion be legitimate),15 contradicts our experience, goes against our moral 
intuition, and is contradicted by the natural use of language. We also describe as 
unfree such people who, albeit not because of physical influence, but rather due to 
a credible threat, lose the chance to act autonomously.16 (The same is true – about 
which there is more to be said later – of the absence of physical causality in cases of 
failure to render assistance or of an unalleviated lack of the means of livelihood: 
here, too, freedom is curtailed.)
Coercion can thus be present in the absence of direct physical influence and 
whether this is the case has to be ascertained by value judgments. The positivist 
separation of fact and value does not succeed, therefore, neither with the idea of 
freedom itself, nor in the attempt to define freedom supposedly quite value-free – as 
the negation of coercion. The quantitative program to explain freedom through the 
formula ‘less (value-free) coercion = more (valuable) freedom’ fails. We require an 
evaluative concept of freedom as well as coercion. In the last decades, analytic phi-
losophy has therefore gradually distanced itself from the attempt to define freedom 
by purely concentrating upon visible, physical components. In an appeal to every-
day pre-reflexive understandings of freedom, and their linguistic reflections, ‘invis-
ible’ dimensions are now ever more often taken into account, for instance moral 
aspects of the idea of freedom. This, too, indicates that the immanent normativity of 
the idea of freedom presents the true basis for the controversies about freedom.17
That today’s philosophy admits and examines the richer forms of meaning which 
our everyday language ascribes to the idea of freedom is surely a positive develop-
ment. But is that enough? The analytic approach must, nonetheless, ultimately 
renounce every interpretation of the idea of freedom transcending the factual cus-
toms and boundaries of the linguistic community. This hampers the appropriate 
perception of counterfactual aspects, for instance when the idea of freedom con-
fronts us as a normative demand to change our dominant ways of talking and acting. 
Consequently, one should ask more fundamental questions: Does it make sense to 
merely (extensionally) pin freedom upon its semantic or other expressions? Or 
should we not also (intensionally) investigate the idea of freedom according to its 
possible meaning beyond all previous manifestations? After all, were we to forget 
that the image of freedom, arising from an externally-objectivizing observation 
14 See Swanton, Freedom, 109–113.
15 See Felix E. Oppenheim, Political Concepts: A Reconstruction (Chicago, 1981), 53, 160.
16 See Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981–1991 (Cambridge, 1993).
17 In my opinion William Connolly is correct to declare that the idea of freedom is thus “contested 
partly because of the way it bridges a positivist dichotomy between descriptive and normative 
concepts” (“Liberty as an ‘essentially contested concept,’” in Cramer (ed.) Freedom, 200).
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alone, severed from its inner sense and purpose, was at best a replica of its worldly 
manifestation and never its original image, then we could unintentionally end up 
taking a distorted picture of freedom for its accurate portrait. Freedom then would 
shrink to (nothing other than) the mass of existing options, and all normative ques-
tions suddenly would be settled by the basic and base expression “the more, the 
better.”
For this, too, David Hume provided the blueprint. Like Hobbes, he defined free-
dom as unhindered movement according to discretion. The space for the articulation 
of such movement itself has to be limited, since no individual freedom can be infi-
nite, if space for the freedom of others is to remain. According to this model, there 
is an unavoidable competition between the individual’s desire for freedom and 
interpersonal requirements for coordination. This is the Achilles’ heel of many 
Anglo-American theories of freedom: their geometrical image, representing free-
dom via mutually exclusive shapes on bounded surfaces. This schema reduces free-
dom to a quasi-spatial conflict of distribution between incompatible circles of 
freedom. Accordingly, the relationship between law and freedom appears to Hume 
to be a tragic conflict: “In all governments, there is a perpetual intestine struggle, 
open or secret, between authority and liberty, and neither of them can ever abso-
lutely prevail in the contest. A great sacrifice of liberty must necessarily be made in 
every government.”18 Peaceful order costs much freedom, and thus establishes the 
false choice between quantitatively enlarging either the individuals’ spheres of free-
dom and action or that of the state. Tertium non datur.
The opposed idea that individual and collective freedom could reciprocally aid 
and include one another, cherished and celebrated within the Continental-European 
tradition, cannot be expressed within this matrix. This is due to the classical percep-
tual angles of quantitative logic – geometry and arithmetic. It is geometrically true 
that two bodies cannot occupy the same space. Therefore, wherever freedom is rep-
resented through a parallelogram of physical forces, the societal gestalt of personal 
freedoms can only be interpreted as loss or limitation of their original impetus. The 
same result arises arithmetically. Society is conceived – in terms of game theory and 
social contract theory – as a thought-experiment in which individuals aim to maxi-
mize their own freedom and minimize the interventions of others. The crux of the 
purely quantitative approach to the subject of freedom is, as the following sections 
will illustrate in more detail, to perceive the societal balance and synchronization of 
conceptions of value merely as an antagonistic zero-sum-game. According to this 
logic, gains in freedom on the one side, must produce losses in freedom on the other.
According to the quantitative logic, individuals only accept the state, for exam-
ple, insofar as they foresee that under the rule of law they are able to catch hold of 
more advantages for themselves than in anarchic settings. In order for this cost- 
benefit- calculation to work, in their hypothetical exchange of rights and duties, indi-
viduals must get out something of at least equal value to what they put in. And 
here – in this demand for symmetry – lies the snag: What about people who are 




clearly not in a position to help or hurt others, and thus appear as unattractive 
 partners for such an exchange? How are they to be integrated into society?19 This 
problem arises, for instance, in regard to the needs, interests, and rights of disabled 
people.
Let us think of a teenager who, because of being physically disabled, cannot 
travel to school by his or her own means. According to theories of quantitative free-
dom, one would only have to guarantee that no one hindered him or her through 
physical coercion on the way to school. Then their freedom would not be damaged 
and there would be no duty on the part of the state to intervene to help them. 
Everyone else can go on maximizing their private options; they do not have a social, 
political, or legal responsibility to help the teenager. The case would be delegated to 
individual morality and left to charity stemming from private compassion – which 
of course also often fails to materialize, and makes the recipient dependent upon the 
benevolence of the provider. The case looks quite different from the perspective of 
qualitative freedom. It evaluates a freedom that cannot be exercised as a deficiency; 
as a consequence, society has to empower the teenager to make use of his or her 
freedom of education through appropriate measures. Therefore, even if no one has 
actively produced the teenager’s quantitative ‘minus’ in freedom, a society orien-
tated by qualitative freedom would recognize the qualitative ‘malus’ of impairment 
and remedy it.
Proponents of quantitative theories have at times attempted to ward off such 
outcomes, by stating, for instance, that citizens could certainly have an interest in 
enabling the education of disabled people. One would only have to consider the 
required expenditure as an investment in their later economic productivity. The nec-
essary expenditure would then prove financially worthwhile, as a contribution to a 
later increase of the gross-domestic-product (as the material proxy for aggregated 
individual options). Thus the symmetry of services and returns demanded by the 
proponents of the contractarian utility exchange could somehow be established. – 
But is this argument convincing? In the case of some disabled people, such a calcu-
lation might succeed; but it hardly works out for all, above all hardly for the most 
severely mentally handicapped persons.20 Moreover, in each and every case, the 
right of impaired individuals, recognized as unconditional from the perspective of 
qualitative freedom, would thus be devalued as merely conditionally conceded 
opportunities for freedom – i.e. under the condition of their prospective economic 
profitableness. Society’s support would then no longer be the expression of the 
inalienable (unveräußerlichen) dignity of humankind, but rather would become 
speculation about its alienable (veräußerbaren) economic value. In cases of a bla-
tant asymmetry of service and return, it would be consistent if society’s assistance 
would not come forth; in all other cases it would be the result of base motives.
19 See Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, 87.
20 “Such cases strip contractarianism bare, so to speak, and reveal a face often concealed by the 




The difficulties at which quantitatively orientated theories of freedom arrive 
when confronted with the problem of such – and other – asymmetries (for instance 
in regard to global and intergenerational justice) are now examined more closely, by 
scrutinizing the work of Friedrich August von Hayek and John Rawls. Both thinkers 
were – and are – popular: Rawls, as a progenitor for social-liberal and progressive 
liberals, and Hayek as patron of conservative and economic-liberal groups. In politi-
cal direction, they differ. They are nevertheless united in the undertaking to speak of 
freedom free of metaphysics. Both philosophize from the premise of a rationally 
pursued self-interest. Both advertise that the most liberal of all worlds would follow 
from their respectively favored institutions for the maximization of private options. 
They each thus pay homage to the quantitative paradigm of freedom – and their 
doctrines throw light upon its plausibility. In respect of strongly asymmetrical social 
relations, for instance, both Hayek and Rawls furtively amend their quantitative 
models in order to produce the desired socio-political and redistributive results. 
They thereby shift – unintentionally, but patently – freedom’s quantitative paradigm 
into a qualitative one.
3.1  Liberal Allocation (Friedrich August von Hayek)
Friedrich August von Hayek (1899–1992) was originally trained as an economist, 
but his interests ultimately included all of social philosophy. Accordingly, Hayek 
attempted to integrate his economic theory within a larger philosophical architec-
ture presented as a comprehensive analysis of the modern consciousness of free-
dom. In The Constitution of Liberty he makes explicit this connection between 
questions of economic order and the philosophy of freedom. He aspired to produce 
ultimate and conclusive proof that freedom was the true basis and boundary of all 
state action.
Throughout his life, confronted by the violent excesses of systems of state regu-
lation (from the right as well as from the left), Hayek sought principles which could 
both justify and effectively limit the exercise of coercion, and found these within the 
individual’s consciousness of freedom. In this endeavor, Hayek played the part, not 
only of the academic, but also of the polemicist. Many remember him less as an 
author of subtle theoretical treatises, but rather as a strongman sporting confronta-
tive theses and combative postures. Thus one knows him, for instance, as the grand-
master of a noteworthy paradox: of liberal thought-police. Just as fiercely as he 
campaigned for freedom, he fought against all who differed in their understanding 
of freedom. Ideas that he loathed, such as those of positive freedom and social jus-
tice, Hayek brusquely declared as anathema for liberals.
Where, previously, there prevailed still fluid crossovers between ordo-liberal, 
social-liberal, and neo-liberal positions, Hayek introduces a radical either-or; either 
freedom or the social: “Liberty does not mean all good things or the absence of all 
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evils. It is true that to be free may mean freedom to starve (…).”21 That was a clear 
pronouncement. Together with his mentor, Ludwig von Mises, and his follower, 
Milton Friedman, Hayek saw to it that from that time on the triumvirate of classical 
liberalism (in the shape of Hume, Smith, Kant, Humboldt, etc.), new liberalism 
(Green, Hobhouse, Hobson, etc.) and neo-liberalism (Eucken, Müller-Armack, 
Rüstow, etc.) no longer presented a harmonious trinity. Since Hayek’s adepts cham-
pioned – with the furor of the orthodox – his doctrinal views as dogmatic insights, 
behind which no future liberals may hark back, liberal theology has been embroiled 
in disputes about heresy. However, his adherents nonchalantly overlook that many 
of Hayek’s political positions covertly contradict his proclaimed philosophical 
principles and can in truth only be legitimated by assumptions transcending his 
theoretical program. This very problem – the transition from quantitative to qualita-
tive models of thought – is at the heart of what follows.
3.1.1  Genesis of the Neo-Liberal Concept of Freedom
In one fell swoop, Friedrich August von Hayek became both famous and infamous 
through the publication of his controversial pamphlet “The Road to Serfdom” in 
1944. Therein he declared that Great Britain was on the way to transforming itself 
into a second Weimar Republic. The German state could only have been conquered 
by Hitler because it had already been undermined by social-democratic thinkers. 
They had anaesthetized the spirit of individual freedom and responsibility in the 
suffocating embrace of total nurture, having thus prepared citizens’ minds for 
National Socialist collectivism and the drowning of individual liberty in the intoxi-
cating waters of totalitarianism. Insofar as England was now attempting social- 
democratic experiments of its own, it but repeated the error of underestimating the 
corrupting force of the Left’s ideals. Whoever flirts with social-democracy ends up 
in an involuntary marriage to socialism; hence, proclaimed Hayek, such experi-
ments must be nipped in the bud!
Hayek felt that Europe had been truly liberal only before the First World War; 
in an era, it should be recalled, when power was chiefly held by monarchies. At 
that time, individuals could still call a sizeable sphere of freedom their own, while 
the collective hand only put in an appearance on the margins. But since then, 
everywhere a drastic increase in state-quotas has been observable, and people 
became increasingly spoonfed by the nanny state. Freedom’s case is everywhere 
failing, because democracy allows the masses to raze the liberal ramparts that pro-
tect the community from falling into the temptations of collectivism. – Even today, 
neoliberals and libertarians still relish citing this pamphlet. It supplies them with 
powerful quotations accusing their opponents – whether from the camps of the left, 
the right, or that of social liberalism – of deliberately or carelessly encouraging 
21 Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, 19.
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totalitarianism. For his image of being a libertarian populist, Hayek must therefore 
take some of the blame.
In his later years, however, Hayek attempted to tread more lightly and add more 
nuance. And these attempts deserve our attention. As Hayek further developed his 
theory over the decades he provided the public with a vivid lesson on both the 
strengths and weaknesses of a quantitatively directed liberalism. Hayek’s theory is 
a textbook example of what a formal theory of freedom geared to private options 
can provide  – and where it fails, which is why at long last it dialectically turns 
towards qualitative categories.
In the theater of his mind, there are qualitative liberal motives, which, albeit in 
the background, forever vie for control over the play’s storyline with the more vis-
ible, purely quantitatively-oriented protagonists, and which drive the latter to some 
thoroughly surprising theatrical twists and turns, which make his dramatic texts an 
instructive characterpiece on liberty. Let us hence first look a little more closely at 
the dramatis personae populating Hayek’s philosophical stage. Hayek names those 
Old Whigs, responsible for plotting England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688, as the 
intellectual progenitors of his position.22 Aligning himself with this tradition, he 
propagates a British concept of liberalism as the paragon for his own philosophiz-
ing. That model, presented more as a conceptual archetype than a historical 
reconstruction,23 stands for an empirically-inductive position. In questions of soci-
etal organization, the contingencies of historical developments are stressed and pro-
cedures of cultural trial and error are glorified as the greatest political wisdom. 
Enter into Hayek’s drama of ideas, opposed to the heroic Whig, the villain of the 
piece: a French concept of liberalism tracking Jacobin doctrines of freedom. The 
gaudy garb of this quite sketchily scripted antagonist makes him out as a tragic fool 
beholden to rational deductionism and all-too-optimistic planning. Hayek then 
sharpens that conceptual comparison into a political opposition and comes down on 
the side of the British model. He opts for a politics orientated towards experience 
and experimenting, which ever so wisely forsakes the outlining of perfect societal 
systems through rational scenario techniques.24
Hayek epistemologically underlines this position with the cybernetic argument 
that one can completely comprehend only systems of lower orders of complexity 
and never systems of the same or much higher complexity.25 Individuals should not 
therefore dictate to others what their highest good is supposed to be because they 
are unable to know this with certainty. All political teleologies aiming at materially 
concrete ideas of the good necessarily fail, according to Hayek, because of free-
dom’s unique unpredictability and dynamic. Subordinating societal life to a gen-
eral plan means to undercut the developmental potentials inherent within the 
22 Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, 407ff.
23 See William P. Baumgarth, “Hayek and Political Order: The Rule of Law,” Journal of Libertarian 
Studies 2 (1978), 11–28.
24 See Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, 54f.




self- determined cooperation of individuals who can always congregate into new, 
spontaneous orders. And it would be illiberal to boot.
With these arguments, Hayek casts about 2000 years worth of philosophical doc-
trines about the essence, value, and vocation of human life into the trash can of 
history. Instead of planned orders, Hayek promotes the market as the paradigm of 
societal relations. For one thing, the market helps pursue and counterbalance con-
flicting interests peacefully. For another thing, markets promote social productivity 
by employing and trading on the differences of personal interests. Decentralized 
market-activities use resources more efficiently than social-technocrats and societal- 
planners ever might.26 This superiority of unplanned market activity over planned 
economies causes Hayek to advise against rational constructions in the political 
arena as well. But – to raise an obvious objection – are not precisely our complex 
political institutions proof of the capacity of the politically planning intellect to 
mold and improve the world we live in?
Hayek sees this differently. One ought to understand the effects of political rea-
son historically; as the product of social evolution. Historically developed social 
structures are often less the result of purposeful planning, but rather have gradually 
arisen; at times contingently or even contrary to expectations, yet finally they proved 
themselves reliable. Our political institutions function sometimes rather in spite of, 
instead of because of, the ideas people once had about their tasks and purposes. 
Nothing is more mistaken, therefore, than to absolutize a single, social or political 
model (via a supposed highest social goal, for instance, or through a fictional or real 
social contract) and thereby block the way towards further social evolution – as has, 
according to Hayek, the French constructivist type of liberalism.
Hayek’s statements about the German philosophy of freedom complete the pic-
ture.27 Against German Idealism he notes that one may not postulate an identity of 
freedom and the moral law so as not to curtail the freedom to act morally wrong.28 
Such remarks, however, say clearly more about Hayek’s strategic motives than 
about the tradition devalued here: Each and every substantive definition of freedom 
de facto would lead to an erosion of freedom through ethical pressure to conform, 
which, Hayek believes, only a concept of strictly negative freedom could 
prevent.29
26 Werner Keck, Zwischen evolutionärer und gesellschaftsvertraglicher Fundierung des Staates: 
Eine vergleichende Analyse der Staatsauffassungen von Rawls, Buchanan, Hayek un Nozick 
(Berlin, 1998), 212.
27 See Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, 16, 20.
28 See ibid., 79.
29 See ibid., 31.
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3.1.2  Validity of the Neo-Liberal Concept of Freedom
Anyone who defines freedom negatively has no other alternative but to opt – ceteris 
paribus – for those competing alternative actions and arrangements which promise 
more options. Quantitatively directed liberalism therefore often stands in tension 
with religion because every form of spirituality reduces liberality through the com-
mitments it commends. Hayek thus claims that, for instance, a “Jesuit who lives up 
to the ideals of the founder of his order” has to be counted as unfree, since his spiri-
tual dedication bars him from numerous options.30 Is that true?
Now, if a Jesuit renounced certain freedoms, he would have at his disposal, not 
necessarily fewer options, but rather, in the first instance, others: such as those aris-
ing only from intensive dedication and concentration upon spiritual goals, which 
perhaps are less frequent in a thoroughly secular life. Could the gains and losses in 
options possibly offset one another even quantitatively? Some managers who, fol-
lowing a burnout, flee into the next best monastery for a spiritual retreat may per-
haps entertain such ideas at times. Yet even if that Jesuit has a lesser number of 
choices at his command, his freedom could thrive nonetheless, namely if the remain-
ing quantity contains options that to him are especially desirable. But this insight is 
not gained arithmetically; it can only be captured by a qualitatively oriented way of 
thinking.
Precisely that difficulty – of distinguishing between options of higher and lower 
value – continuously troubles Hayek. Despite his own rhetoric that only a social 
order demanding the quantitative maximizing of the individual realm of choice may 
count as liberal, one finds in Hayek no plea for a total laissez-faire. Hayek does not 
support a position that knows no kind of commitments to the social environment or 
only accepts such restrictions as can result from utility-exchange models in minimal 
states, i.e. as strategies of reciprocal maximization.31 Rather he defends – in contrast 
to what many of both his supporters and opponents believe – a freedom that is not 
only limited by moral laws but also oriented at ethical values.
Concerning ethical values Hayek’s insistence that he would support only a 
“merely negative” concept of freedom is hence misleading.32 Hayek wishes to pro-
tect not freedom as libertinism, but freedom precisely as the source of ethical val-
ues, when he postulates it as society’s “overriding principle.”33 This principle should 
prevent us from employing means contrary to freedom in order to realize ethical 
values. A coercion towards the good – for instance towards engagement in civil- 
society  – could rob that good of its ethical quality. Individual freedom must be 
spared morally motivated coercion, not because Hayek would renounce all ethical 
30 See Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, 14.
31 This is according to the interpretation in H. B. Falkena, “On Hayek’s Philosophy of Limited 
Government and the Economic Order,” South African Journal of Economics 53:4 (1985), 
235–243.
32 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 19.
33 See ibid., 68.
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orientation, but rather because he wishes to liberate people to engage freely in genu-
ine commitments. Ethical aims ennoble the freedom they arise from. Among other 
things, freedom should thus not be sacrificed to moral values since a virtue coerced 
is a virtue lost.
Hayek defends the legal limitation of freedom by disassociating himself from 
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)34 who (see Sect. 1.3.2) had supported the view that 
“every law is an evil for every law is an infraction on liberty.”35 In contrast, Hayek 
stands in solidarity with the idea of law as a form of freedom prominent in the 
Kantian tradition. Like Kant, Hayek demands boundaries for individual freedom of 
action which constitute the presuppositions of the freedom of all.36 While the prox-
imity of his thinking to Kant’s, which the later Hayek likes to stress,37 certainly does 
not always exist,38 in this respect it is patent: He battles only against arbitrary coer-
cion, but never one in conformity with laws of freedom. Arbitrary coercion reduces 
individuals to mere instruments, yet they desire and shall be ends in themselves, 
forming and directing themselves free of coercion.
Freedom from arbitrary coercion requires the state to have a monopoly on coer-
cive practices which it then employs only in the service of freedom. State action 
should therefore be directed by the principle that coercion may befall no one “unless 
he has placed himself in a position where he knows he will be coerced.”39 So far as 
the exercise of coercion is depersonalized, subject to abstractly general and publi-
cized laws, all individuals can adjust their behavior to avoid coercion. Legal norms 
are then hypothetically and instrumentally present for individuals, just like laws of 
nature. Just as one knows that lighting a fire in the living room can lead to burning 
down the house, one likewise knows that the deliberate burning down of a house can 
put one in prison.40 This spells the end of arbitrary coercion, as now only coercion 
deliberately or negligently provoked by individuals is administered. The rules of 
law indicate the juridical admissibility of certain means, yet entrust the determina-
tion of ends to free moral choice alone. The basic pattern of the state’s coercive rules 
are conditional codes (like the if/then regulations of penal law), according to which 
all can make an informed decision about whether they wish to put themselves in a 
situation invoking state coercion.41
34 See ibid., 60.
35 Jeremy Bentham, Étienne Dumont & Richard Hildreth, Theory of Legislation (London, 1887), 
48.
36 For the theoretical connection with Kant (concerning freedom) and the remaining differences 
between both thinkers see Michael Kläver, Die Verfassung des Marktes: Friedrich August von 
Hayeks Lehre von Staat und Markt im Spiegel grundgesetzlicher Staats- und Verfassungsrechtslehre 
(Stuttgart, 2000), 18–31.
37 Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal 
Principles of Justice and Political Economy (London, 1976), 166 n.24.
38 For more about Hayek’s reckless and, at times, clumsy Kantian musings see Hans Jörg Hennecke, 
Friedrich August von Hayek: Die Tradition der Freiheit (Düsseldorf, 2000), 287–294.
39 Hayek, Constitution, 21.
40 See ibid., 153.
41 See ibid., 142ff.
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Obviously, the state cannot establish such conditional rules capriciously. Citizens 
must never be degraded into mere means for the realization of political ends they do 
not share; not even from paternalistic concern for the sake of their assumed welfare, 
let alone for the benefit of contingent aims. Hayek only sanctions rules of coercion 
that help individuals pursue their own ends in a manner that excludes collisions with 
the freedom of others. Just like with Kant, with Hayek, the real coercion of the legal 
order is, therefore, legitimated and – in accordane with the former principle – lim-
ited by functioning as ideal support for those coerced by it, i.e. by protecting their 
freedom from themselves.
Yet precisely that tinge of transcendental philosophy within his ideas suggests 
that we should challenge Hayek’s claim that he merely follows a negatively formal, 
externally quantitative concept of freedom.42 Hayek certainly maintains that his 
concept of law pays homage to purely procedural criteria.43 However, many of the 
convictions supported by him cannot be justified with procedural criteria alone, but 
instead require for their support more far-reaching substantial premises, like, for 
instance, the Kantian idea of autonomy.44 Lawgivers could certainly formally act 
without reproach and, say, unanimously place on the satute book universal laws to 
which they themselves would be subject, which, however, Hayek would nonetheless 
materially reject.45 He would surely not brook, for example, a society which legis-
lated to safeguard the orthodoxy of its members (including those in government) 
with the aid of floggings and stonings. Against all who aim to realize their freedom 
in such a way, Hayek draws a clear red line.
Hayek thus dodges the consequences of his own formalisms and brings instead 
an essentially qualitative concept of freedom into play.46 That typically occurs with 
recourse to the previous conceptions of the British legal tradition. Hayek expressly 
does not surrender the rule of law (for instance established legal principles like 
nulla poena sine lege47) to social evolution.48 He proclaims this to be common-law 
42 Christoph Zeitler in any case doubts Hayek’s self-assessment that he is only committed to a 
negative concept of freedom in Spontane Ordnung, Freiheit und Recht: Zur politischen Philosophie 
von Friedrich August von Hayek (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), 147ff.
43 See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 43.
44 See Nikolas Roos, “Hayek’s Kantian Heritage and National Law” in Birner & van Zijp (eds.), 
Hayek, Co-ordination and Evolution: His Legacy in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the 
History of Ideas (London & New York, 1994), 294.
45 See Lionel Lord Robbins, “Hayek on Liberty,” Economica 28:109 (1961), 66–81.
46 See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 58ff. This contradicts Aimar Thierry, who establishes the 
thesis that Hayek’s normativity is purely hypothetically-universal in its nature – since it rests upon 
the subordinate survival interests of everyone, from which everyone’s interest in a productive socio-
economic order is derived – because it merely deals with a normativity “without prescriptions.” See 
his “Coordination, Survival and Normativity: A Hayekian Perspective Revisited” in Birner et al. 
(eds.), F. A. Hayek as a Political Economist: Economic Analysis and Values (2002), 225f., 230.
47 In English: No penalty without a law. Further such common principles are, for instance, in dubio 
pro reo (in doubt, for the accused) and actori incumbat probatio (the onus of proof is incumbent 
on the plaintiff).
48 See Hardy Bouillon, Ordnung, Evolution und Erkenntnis: Hayeks Sozialphilosophie und ihre 
erkenntnistheoretische Grundlage (Tübingen, 1991), 59ff.
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traditionalism. It is not, though, because this particular tradition of the rule of law 
itself is in no way up for discussion.49 The rule of law is the liberal rock in the social 
surf upon which all waves of illiberal plans for change should break. While all other 
institutions are seen as fluid, Hayek ascribes to the rule of law a rock-solid a priori 
validity – which however he does not really admit, neither to himself, nor to his 
readers.50
Holding fast to legal principles that must never be relinquished clearly collides 
with the program of social evolution otherwise so thoroughly supported by Hayek. 
Some interpreters have therefore advised Hayek also to relativize the rule of law 
instead of treating it as though it were, so to speak, a natural right.51 Others, on the 
other hand, come out against Hayek’s evolutionary subjectivism for undercutting 
the logic of argumentation he otherwise employs. This second interpretation seems 
more plausible: By highlighting the conditions that make universal freedom possi-
ble, Hayek put himself in a good position to clarify that not every adherence to basic 
rights and rules of interpersonal recognition is but a contingent postulate by 
construction- loving theorists.52
For example, Hayek writes: Not only physical violence hinders a self-determined 
life. Fraud and deception present interventions in personal freedom quite compara-
ble to coercion. Through them the individual is robbed of the access to reality 
required for living an autonomous life.53 Deception and fraud thereby deny de facto 
the claims to freedom of the deceived and turn them into mere means subordinate to 
the ends of the deceiving. This sort of thing cannot be the upshot of universalization 
and mutual agreement. Accordingly, any law dedicated to the protection of freedom 
must protect liberty not only from violence, but also from fraud and deception. With 
similar arguments – transcendentally seeking the presuppositions of universal free-
dom – Hayek gradually reconstructs a canon of formal legal principles (like, for 
example, pacta sunt servanda) and material legal tenets (for the protection of prop-
erty, for instance).
Hayek is thus not merely retelling the story of one particular legal tradition, 
which cultural evolution contingently treated with especial kindness. These reflec-
tions are rather presented as self-evident elements of the idea of freedom. Here 
deduction reigns supreme – not induction. Speculation orients the compass of his-
torical experience – and not vice versa. Since Hayek loathes the tradition of legal 
positivism and accordingly demarcates his theory of evolutionary development of 
49 See John Gray, Hayek on Liberty (Oxford & New York, 1986), 31ff.
50 See also the differentiation from communitarianism with Barbara M. Rowland, Ordered Liberty 
and the Constitutional Framework: The Political Thought of Friedrich A. Hayek (Westport, 1987), 
119ff.
51 See Theodore A. Burczak, “The Contradictions between Hayek’s Subjectivism and His Liberal 
Legal Theory” in Birner et al. (eds) in F. A. Hayek as a Political Economist: Economic Analysis 
and Values (London, 2002), 201.
52 See Ross, Hayek’s Kantian Heritage, 289.
53 See Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, 143f.
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law sharply from it, he cannot but endorse the idea of justice as a meta-legal ideal.54 
That is why the rule of law has such a key-function within his theory.55 Without this 
counterfactual orientation, Hayek’s descriptive use of social-evolutionism would 
quickly turn into the normative. That however would, in political theory, lead to a 
type of fatalism akin to the legal positivism Hayek rejects. Hayek’s version of the 
rule of law thus has roughly the status of a regulative ideal in Kant’s philosophy.56 
For instead of renouncing his own ideal of justice in favor of social evolution, Hayek 
rather wishes to evaluate the latter against the former.57
Speaking metaphorically: For many sea miles, Hayek’s ship of ideas follows a 
fairway that traverses the ocean of liberty along the societal enabling conditions of 
freedom. Only as he, upon this journey, comes in sight of the continent of social 
justice, does he abruptly change course. Suddenly he makes for the high seas of 
distributive arbitrariness, where he commits his theory and its practical results, afar 
from all normative lighthouses, to the high waves of the market. Hayek keeps insist-
ing that the concept of freedom he employs is merely negative,58 and this certainly 
seems true of that ultimate nautical maneuver; yet, in respect of the overall course 
of his journey, one must view this statement as the yarn of an old seadog. By means 
of qualitative coordinates, Hayek first carefully navigates the ship of freedom 
around the shallows of relativism and past the sandbanks of positivism. Only when 
these are passed by, does he loosen his grip on the rudder and entrust his vessel to 
the currents of social evolution and the eddies of economic deregulation.
3.1.3  Legal and Political Philosophy
Hayek expressly recognizes that, to every social evolution there also belong con-
scious and planned systematic reforms which in turn are based upon orientations 
that do not simply reflect the historical status quo, but rather wish to change it. He 
merely demands that only such steps towards justice should be taken that ensure the 
equal right of all and do not block a further evolution beyond the current state of 
knowledge. The commitment of all positive right to the directive of the rule of law 
that allows freedom to be curtailed for the sake of freedom alone leads therefore to 
one normative demand: to structure the state in such a way that it could only pro-
mote ends whose realization conform with freedom. That postulate, however, in no 
54 See Hayek, Constitution, 205ff., and Law, Legislation and Liberty, 44–60.
55 Zeitler, on the other hand, interprets the rule of law as a merely procedural criterion, ibid., 213.
56 For Kant’s concept of a regulative idea see Dietmar Köveker, Grenzverhältnisse: Kant und das 
“Regulative Prinzip” in Wissenschaft und Philosophie (1996).
57 Yet as Jacob Viner writes: “I do not see how this doctrine can be distinguished from “Social 
Darwinism” (“Review. Hayek on Freedom and Coercion,” Southern Economic Journal 27:3 
[1961], 233).
58 See Hayek, Constitution, 12.
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way resembles the “rigid position” of the libertarian who limits the state to only 
coercive administration.59 Rather, Hayek does accept that the state act as a “service 
agent” assisting in society’s “achievement of desirable aims,” i.e. the qualitative 
transformation of the collective sphere of liberty. This social-democratic and cul-
tural aspect of his theory must not be obfuscated. Hayek does insist, however, that, 
from accepting something as a goal promoting the common good, it does not auto-
matically follow that all means leading to this goal are permissible: Often one must 
content oneself only with second-best, yet, freedom-conforming solutions, in cases 
in which the situation could only otherwise be improved by coercion and diri-
gisme.60 While a “dogmatic democrat” would subordinate anything and everything 
to the judgment and goals of the majority,61 Hayek places politics from the outset 
within firm legal boundaries. Certain realms of reality are taboo.
To wit, the protection of minorities: The majority may only decide upon such 
principles “which the minorities also accept.”62 Yet how does one justify devaluing 
the votes of the majority, so that differences enter into a legal framework, which 
should, in principle, nevertheless serve all legal subjects in one and the same way? 
Hayek declares: Equality before the law should not mean measuring everything 
with the same yardstick, but rather treating that, which is unequal, unequally.63 
Agreed. Yet, how does one find out in a particular case what is essentially equal and 
what essentially unequal? Hayek certainly wishes to elevate certain phenomenal 
differences to the rank of conceptual distinctions and thereby classify certain differ-
ences between people – but not others – as legally relevant or, respectively, irrele-
vant; and yet other differences he wishes to treat counterfactually. With a quantitative 
logic, viewing all options as basically of the same kind, this cannot be had. Must 
one therefore qualitatively ground the principle of freedom?
In The Constitution of Liberty Hayek is still looking for a pragmatic solution to 
the problem: “So long as, for instance, the distinction is favored by the majority 
both inside and outside the group, there is a strong presumption that it serves the 
ends of both. When, however, only those inside the group favor the distinction, it is 
clearly privilege; while if only those outside favor it, it is discrimination.”64 Even 
disregarding the fact that this answer contains no kind of theoretical criteria to pre-
fer normatively just this discursive process over alternative procedures for the selec-
tion of politically operative values, there remains the practical difficulty of 
introducing a consensus about the “generality and equality” of a settlement on the 
59 See ibid., 258.
60 See ibid., 261.
61 See ibid., 106.
62 See ibid., 107.
63 See ibid., 153.
64 See ibid., 154.
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part of all affected.65 What is to be done, if the most that is achievable are highly 
controversial majority judgments?
Not before the three volumes of Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973–1979), 
which appeared after the Constitution of Liberty, did Hayek present an answer to 
this question. Here he elaborates how to conceptualize an appropriate political self- 
regulation that adequately deals with differences of public opinion.66 Through their 
personal – not least financial – interests those in government may be influenced, 
which can noticeably impair the logic of their decision-making. The calamity of 
modern democracies, results not predominantly from the lack of intelligence and 
willingness of the politicians, but rather in the fact that they are systematically 
exposed to lobbying and corruption: “So long as the present form of democracy 
persists, decent government cannot exist, even if the politicians are angels … 
because … we … place them in a position in which they can obtain power … only 
if they commit themselves to secure special benefits for various groups.”67 The bet-
ter certain societal interests are organized, the greater is the peril to the political 
representation of unorganized interests.68 Therefore the modern state should, for its 
own good, constrain its own ability to cater to groups whose interests do not align 
with the common good.
The remedy shall be provided by a two-chamber-system, which makes interfer-
ence in politics unattractive to lobbyists. Accordingly, the functional difference 
between the legislative and the executive should be tightened: “the legislative one is 
to represent the opinion of the people about which sorts of government actions are 
just and which are not, and the other governmental assembly were to be guided by 
the will of the people on the particular measures to be taken within the frame of 
rules laid down by the first.”69 Bribery is thus impeded. One would have to corrupt 
both houses coordinately; and, consequently, it becomes far less probable that the 
legislative issue precisely those laws which suit the executive, but also that both 
houses unproductively inhibit one another like in the continual dispute between the 
American congress and the US president.
The further specification of the rule of law in concrete laws would then be 
incumbent upon a legislative assembly independent of popular influence since, 
according to Hayek, the application of the laws issued by it are in turn entrusted to 
an executive assembly orientated towards the will of the people. And a constitu-
65 See ibid., 210.
66 Calvin Hoy believes that Hayek gives up the theory of consensus in Law, Legislation and Liberty 
because it is no longer explicitly mentioned there (see A Philosophy of Individual Freedom: The 
Political Thought of F. A. Hayek [Westport, Connecticut, 1984], 86); in my opinion it rather looks 
like Hayek feels that the two-level concept of democracy he worked-out in the meantime can 
deliver what his previous idea of a consensus legitimating unequal social distribution demanded; 
an interpretation supported also by the characteristic style of the treatment of public opinion as an 
additional criterion for political legitimacy in the first volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty.
67 See Friedrich A. von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal 
Principles of Justice and Political Economy (London, 1979), 135.
68 See ibid., 99f.
69 See ibid., 104.
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tional court should settle their respective quarrels.70 This model was criticized for 
being artificial and impractical.71 However, Hayek did not at all intend “to propose 
a constitutional scheme for present application.”72 What is more, he even advised 
established democracies against replacing their historically proven constitutions 
with that model – and only talked about it as a normative lodestar for future consti-
tutional developments.
The technical details of this model per se are less interesting than what they 
reveal about Hayek’s understanding of democratic freedoms: Hayek looks for a 
new, institutional solution to the traditional idea that democracy should act within 
the boundaries of the will of the majority. Rather than taking the – for modern con-
stitutions  – routine step of curtailing the decisions of parliament through, for 
instance, certain inflexible rules about human rights, Hayek aspires to a more mal-
leable system. He wishes to secure government in conformity with the rule of law 
in a manner that at the same time affords the legal system an openness to change.73 
The dualism of the chambers shall lead to a political self-limitation assuring that 
everyone can freely agree to the resultant political decisions due to the complete 
transparency about how they come to pass.74
So, after Hayek had first dispatched every rational constructivism through the 
front door of his system, the idea of a universal acceptability now enters again 
through the backdoor.75 This result does not mesh well with a concept of freedom of 
ostensibly only negative and quantitative characteristics. For Hayek thus makes the 
presence of specific qualitative presuppositions – like the feasibility conditions of a 
free reconstruction of the respective political decisions on the part of rational sub-
jects – into the criterion of the lawfulness of precisely those decisions. This is, after 
all, why he orientates politics towards decision-making procedures removed from 
populist and lobbyist pressure. Nevertheless, this only makes sense if one under-
stands the rule of law, not as a mere formality, but rather as a normatively and quali-
tatively determined manifestation of the principle of autonomy. Otherwise, each 
and every traditionally tested procedure would suffice for the production of law.
These ways of guaranteeing the desired impartiality of the parliamentarian 
decision- makers (e.g., by stipulating that the members of the legislature can be nei-
ther voted-out nor re-elected) clearly limit the immediate execution of the political 
70 See ibid., 103–127.
71 For an example of this see Roald Hamowy’s critique in “The Hayekian Model of Government in 
an Open Society,” Journal of Libertarian Economics 6 (1982), 137–144.
72 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 107.
73 See ibid., 109.
74 In this connection, I agree with Keck’s criticism that Hayek merely insufficiently worked out that 
part of his theory – without which it can win no normative independence; see Keck, Zwischen 
evoltionärer und gesellschaftsvertraglicher Fundierung des Staates, 239f.
75 For more information about the tension between Hayek’s historical evolutionism and the con-
structivist approach of his own constitutional model see Viktor Vanberg & James Buchanan, 
Liberaler Evolutionismus oder vertragstheoretischer Konstitutionalismus? Zum Problem institu-
tioneller Reformen bei F. A. von Hayek and J. M. Buchanan (Tübingen, 1981), 35ff.
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will of the population.76 Hayek thus aims to accomplish through a rearrangement of 
the internal organization of the state what elsewhere – also binding the will of the 
majority – constitutional texts aim to achieve through catalogues of basic rights and 
declarations of the state’s prime objectives, i.e. a liberal self-limitation of the demo-
cratic decision-making. Given this reorganization, he holds an enumeration of basic 
rights within the constitution as dispensable.77 This, however, might not convince 
everyone. It could just as well be argued that a catalogue of decisively formulated 
constitutional rights would be rather desirable, especially for the public, self- 
legitimation of the constitutional court and thereby for its assertiveness in respect of 
deciding formal disputes over authority between the two bodies as well as in respect 
of a material condemnation of certain laws. Be that as it may, the main point is that, 
time and again, when it comes to mapping out the political results of his philosophy 
of freedom, certain qualitative considerations in the background of his conception 
consistently prove to be more impactful than the procedures rhetorically placed into 
the foreground by Hayek. A system of quantitative freedom only leads to a liberal 
society insofar as its political processes are conceptualized with regard to qualita-
tive ideals of freedom. In short, Hayek’s political theory disguises the very qualita-
tive presuppositions which it needs to succeed.
3.1.4  Economic and Social Philosophy
Although quantitatively-liberal positions typically seek proximity to laissez faire 
thinking, Hayek quite expressly rejects the hands off-approach of the early nine-
teenth century as a misguided maxim.78 The aim of liberal economic politics is for 
Hayek – unlike the views of many of his followers – in no way “that government 
should never concern itself with any economic matter.”79 It is not defined by 
“absence of all government action,” but rather concerned with the fact that the “free-
dom of economic activity” should only be limited according to liberty-protecting 
laws.80 The economic order is to be pre-structured by the legal order in such a way 
that certain means of state action (like, e.g., arbitrary coercion) are principally 
deemed inadmissible. Thereby the state refuses to realize such ends (for instance a 
strictly equal distribution of assets) which are only reachable by such means.81
76 See Hoy, A Philosophy of Individual Freedom, 110.
77 The decisive passage runs: “The enumeration of certain rights in this Constitution shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”; see Hayek, Law, Legislation and 
Liberty, 111; see also 185f.
78 See G. R. Steele, The Economics of Friedrich Hayek (New York, 1993), 47.
79 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 231.
80 See ibid.
81 See ibid., 221f.
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Hayek’s economic policy focuses upon structural measures. No economic order 
can flourish without “certain activities on the part of the state.”82 That applies both 
to the formal preconditions of market activity – monetary system, weights, units of 
measure etc. – and to the material preconditions of the same: for instance measures 
designed for risk-prevention (building regulations, workplace design), infrastruc-
ture, for the creation of public goods, and for national defense.83 In that respect, 
dimensions of the common good can clearly be found in Hayek.84 And in this 
instance, again, he does not appear concentrated on quantitatively minimizing all 
state-action in the economy, but rather on its qualitative optimizing through a con-
centration upon certain indispensable tasks.
Hayek’s economics wishes to empower citizens. Individuals’ knowledge and 
ability, decentrally allocated throughout society, presents the actual human and 
social capital of a national economy, which is used for better or for worse – depend-
ing upon the respective economic system. To Hayek, market prices appear as an 
especially fast and fluid medium of communication necessary for shared collabora-
tion. In them, citizens communicate with one another in an impersonal, honest, and 
efficient way about the value of certain goods and services. Production follows the 
individuals’ willingness to pay presented in the fluctuation of prices. For the sake of 
their own economic advantage, by allocating resources where these promise the 
highest possible yields, citizens will engage in many socially useful activities. Thus 
the market indicates and coordinates supply and demand in a decentralized and 
reciprocal manner. Information about shortages and surpluses must therefore not 
take the circuitous route via a governmental center. Goods are therefore more effi-
ciently distributed and, due to their thereby increased relative and individual utility, 
the aggregated absolute benefit to society increases.
While in the language of economic valuation prices constitute the vocabulary, 
the state has to provide the grammar for this language game. Through structural 
measures (rules, taxes) it must ensure that individual competition releases as few 
negative externalities (public evils) as possible and as many positive externalities 
(public goods) as possible.85 But the state may also, in certain situations, add its own 
voice, in order, for instance, to create public goods the market does not produce. For 
such operations Hayek recommends a multi-level assessment: Are the economic 
and political measures to be taken legally permissible? If they are, one must then 
examine “whether the benefits are worth the cost.”86 Wherever this, too, is affirmed, 
the examination passes from formal, quantitative gauges to qualitative criteria. For 
instance, the state may never place in the world such monopolies that could exclude 
the possibility that, in the future, the goods currently procured by state-ventures are 
produced by private hands.
82 See ibid., 220.
83 See ibid., 220–223.
84 See Steve Fleetwood, Hayek’s Political Economy: The Socioeconomics of Order (London & 
New York, 1995).
85 See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 44f.
86 See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 222.
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A mix of quantitative and qualitative ideas of freedom is also found in Hayek’s 
discussion of tax legislation. The crux of every tax lies in the fact that, from the 
quantitatively liberal perspective, it presents a means of state coercion: If the indi-
vidual would prefer not to pay it and views it as a minus for personal freedom, it is 
nevertheless forcibly collected. One must therefore clearly justify this coercive 
intervention into individuals’ means for freedom. Since the state is generally enti-
tled to raise money through taxes for community tasks, Hayek believes, one merely 
needs a majority vote in order to legitimate the subsequent distribution of this 
money. As long as the elementary private rights of individuals are not infringed 
upon, the corresponding expenses would already be legitimated through the univer-
sal acceptance of the democratic system: a surprisingly social-democratic pivot 
within his thinking.
Interestingly, here a qualitatively liberal approach might lead to stronger protec-
tions for individuals. Since, in tax legislation as anywhere, only freedom can legiti-
mate coercion, a qualitative perspective suggests the viewpoint that unavoidable 
taxes may only be applied to unavoidable tasks securing citizens’ capacity for free-
dom. Consequently, one would have to concentrate, for example, all direct taxes 
upon the essential tasks of the state (judicature, national defense, securing the sub-
sistence and basic education of the citizens).87 Other tasks of the state would have to 
be financed by indirect taxes maintaining the citizen’s freedom, i.e. by means of of 
the possibility of alternative consumer choices. If one were to follow these ideas a 
few steps further, then one ought to demand moreover that payment and expenditure 
strictly match each other. One should therefore not collect moneys from an ecologi-
cally legitimated gas-tax, and then spend its revenue on “old-age provisions.” 
Hayek, however, completely overlooks this qualitatively-liberal constraint.88
All the more radical are Hayek’s postures in regard to questions of redistribution. 
For a progression of taxes according to income, he complains, no just criterion can 
be provided for lack of universal agreement about such differentiations. No tax must 
alter the relative wealth of economic actors,89 for ethical reasons as well as also for 
reasons of efficiency, i.e. first in favor of an equal right for all and second because 
otherwise one would create incentives towards unproductive economic activity.90 As 
individuals or occupational groups are automatically urged towards the most effi-
cient use of resources by the market and its price-incentives, since in a competitive 
marketplace the most productive activities are remunerated with more money and 
therefore increased, every disproportional tax cannot but skew this matrix of pay-
87 Morris Wilhelm for instance questions where the criterial boundary for a quite generally compul-
sorily ordered state-culture could lie if the state took the step of financing some selected cultural 
interests (building of theatres, etc.) in The Political Thought of Friedrich A Hayek, 171f.
88 See Keck, Zwischen evolutionärer und gesellschaftsvertraglicher Fundierung des Staates, 216.
89 See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 316.
90 See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 95f.
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ment and thereby produce misguided encouragements and discouragements.91 The 
advantage of the beneficiaries would thus be purchased by the disadvantage of all.92
Something similar had already been proposed by Hayek’s mentor Ludwig von 
Mises (1881–1973).93 In the 1930s, Mises had undertaken the reconstruction of eco-
nomic doctrines, like that of marginal utility and marginal profit, in philosophical 
terms and as components of a universal praxeology.94 This was intended to provide 
an analysis of the behavior of rational actors detached from all human ends, and 
thus provide insights relevant for all practical sciences. That praxeology should do 
without value judgments, since, according to Mises, “the aims and ends lie beyond 
the rational sphere. They are deprived of verification and evaluation by reason and 
by thought.”95 Praxeology prepares such evaluations, however, by calling attention 
to problems of implementation and operational costs of certain projects. It thus 
sharpens the view of the effects intentionally or unintentionally implicated in pursu-
ing a certain end.
With that, Mises laid intellectual foundations for the game theory later estab-
lished by Oskar Morgenstern (1902–1977). It too shuns normativity. Decision- 
makers are not told (geraten) what to do but merely informed (beraten) what 
consequences their alternative options entail, which must impact their decision – if 
this is supposed to be perfectly rational. That meshes well methodologically with 
quantitative liberalism, which, allegedly featuring greater scientific rigor, renounces 
all qualitative objectives. Not incidentally, therefore, we find such a strong perme-
ation of the hypotheses of game theory within quantitative liberalisms – for instance 
by way of agent-based modeling based on the homo oeconomicus.
Hayek did not go along with all the steps of this deliberately reductionist pro-
gram; one occasionally finds value-judgments within his work, but never attempts 
at the mathematization of economics. Nevertheless, in central political questions he 
does apply the praxeological method. For instance, in regard to subsidies and price 
and wage guarantees by the state, Hayek shows that these entail determined and 
probably unwanted secondary effects. This, Hayek believes, is especially the case 
with the deviation from proportional tax rates in favor of progressive ones. For pro-
gressive taxes were only able to be politically supported by principles which “most 
people would not approve if they were stated abstractly. That a majority should be 
free to impose a discriminatory tax burden on a minority; that, in consequence, 
equal service should be remunerated differently; and that for a whole class, merely 
because its incomes are not in line with those of the rest, the normal incentives 
91 See Hayek, Constitution, 317.
92 See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 67ff.
93 For information about Hayek’s conception of market-freedom see Kläver, Die Verfassung des 
Marktes, 165ff.
94 See Ludwig von Mises, Nationalökonomie: Theorie des Handelns und Wirtschaften (München, 
1980), 89ff.
95 Von Mises, Nationalökonomie, 44f.
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should be practically made ineffective – all these are principles which cannot be 
defended on grounds of justice.”96
Hayek wishes to limit all redistributive taxes to the quantitively smallest possible 
degree. First, he rejects the aim of an artificially balanced societal distribution of 
wealth. It would allocate the available resources contrary to the laws of productivity 
and thus damage all in the attempt to benefit some.97 Second, he shields himself 
against the, as he believes, illiberal means with which alone such an asset policy 
could be realized.98 Hayek dramatizes such measures as the beginning of a social- 
democratic descent, which ends in a socialistic valley of tears: Initially, an 
assessment- authority would disregard the individual judgments – i.e. payments – of 
citizens concerning what they value economically: a first assault on citizens’ 
 choices.99 Then, a redistribution-authority would interfere with the citizens’ prop-
erty rights according to socio-political discretion: a second infraction upon their 
freedom. Finally, because the market-system would eventually be so impaired that 
it could ever less meet people’s needs, a work-and-production-authority would have 
to mitigate the self-produced market failures. By decree that institution would then 
have to coerce people towards producing the requisite output. The initially merely 
incidental break with the principle of freedom thus develops into a system of all- 
consuming coercion: a dictatorial planned economy.100
How much truth is there in this horror scenario? Hayek’s argument that, whoever 
wants a liberal political order, should principally also stand up for a liberal eco-
nomic order seems plausible.101 Therefore, under the aegis of freedom, individual 
legal positions, like, for example, private dispositions over property, are to be recog-
nized as a rule. A liberal government will consequently prefer to exert influence on 
future asset distribution – by abstractly general laws, while renouncing, wherever 
possible, specific interventions into current assets. In contrast to what Hayek will 
have us believe, however, his view that each progressive taxation would inevitably 
lead to the ultimate demise of the occident, neither follows conceptually nor corre-
sponds with historical experience. Rhetoric rules over realism here.102
Did not Hayek propose that essential inequalities may  – or rather must  – be 
treated unequally? Where extreme quantitative distinctions between rich and poor 
lead to a qualitative difference of living-conditions, an inequality calling for unequal 
treatment might thus be given. That is to say, a qualitatively liberal appropriation 
96 See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 332.
97 See Gerhard Wegner, Wohlfahrtsaspekte evolutorischen Marktgeschehens: Neoklassisches 
Fortschrittsverständnis und Innovationspolitik aus ordnungstheoretischer Sicht (Tübingen, 1991), 
103ff.
98 See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 87.
99 See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 72, 75.
100 See ibid., 82.
101 See Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, 192.
102 See Reinhard Zintl, Individualistische Theorien und die Ordnung der Gesellschaft: 




can accept a progressive tax and the limitation of individual possessive freedom it 
entails: as a quantitative expression of a reciprocal self-limitation of the state’s citi-
zens through universal rules, which grants all citizens the chance for a life in free-
dom. In contrast, proponents of quantitative freedom obscure how this minus of 
pecuniary choice on the part of the taxed benefits the freedom of society at large. 
Quantitative schemas distort the qualitative issue at hand.
Hayek tenaciously maintains that what, in his view, must not be, cannot take 
place: a harmony of freedom and social justice. For Hayek, the idea of social justice 
is simply absurd. Justice is only suitable as a concept of individual behavior, and not 
as a measure of societal relations.103 With that position, however, he stands in oppo-
sition to natural language as well as his own theory. What about procedural and 
structural justice then? Hayek certainly recognizes those forms of justice beyond 
individual justice, which, for example, are inherent in the procedures and rules of 
the state of law. He is therefore guilty of double standards: Should what he deems 
perfectly legitimate in regard to the formal procedures of law, now be illegitimate in 
respect to material aspects of justice? How could that stance be justified?
Looking for intellectual support, Hayek likes to quote Immanuel Kant. With 
Kant’s critique of the material indeterminacy of the concept of “welfare” Hayek 
wants to beef up his own critique of the concept of social justice. Nevertheless, 
Hayek’s lesson about the impossibility of social justice was already completed 
before his encounter with the Kantian philosophy of law.104 Hayek did not heed 
Kant, but rather fitted the Kantian philosophy into his own doctrines.105 And thus 
Hayek undermines the socio-critical impulse of the Kantian position. For Hayek, 
the categorical imperative merely acts as a negative universalizability-test, which 
functions solely against the background of a traditional and undisputed legal cul-
ture, trying to ascertain whether certain plans of action harmoniously conform with 
this accepted context of law and property.106 Hayek thus turns the essential critical 
point of Kantian theory on its head, though.107 Kant had set out from a pre-positive 
share of everyone in the communal possession of the earth: Therefore all property 
includes societal obligation from the outset,108 an extremely unfavorable starting- 
point for the possessive individualism cherished by Hayek.
103 See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 96f.
104 The work which most significantly influenced Hayek was – according to his own statements – 
Mary Gregor’s Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative 
in the Metaphysik der Sitten (Oxford & New York, 1963), which only appeared three years after 
the publication of his Constitution of Liberty.
105 This is also reflected within the literature on Hayek. Bernhard Erning’s otherwise very informa-
tive and balanced portrayal of the positions of Kant and Hayek, for instance, overlooks the dimen-
sion of distributive justice in Kant, see: Hayek’s Moralphilosophie: Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit in 
der Grossen Gesellschaft (1993), 107–132.
106 See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 42.
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Kant certainly declares himself against arbitrary distributions, but for participa-
tive justice, while Hayek lacks the conceptual possibilities for said differentiation. 
Hayek’s kneejerk rejection of the concept of social justice therefore forces him to 
reclassify all assistance given to the indigent as means to protect social peace and 
societal harmony.109 With deliberately drastic formulations, Hayek creates an unre-
solved conflict between the rather balanced social policies of this theory and the 
one-sided rhetoric it is couched in. He thus writes, for instance, that social justice is 
as unthinkable as, for example, a “moral stone,” or also that supporting social justice 
is comparable to believing in “witches and ghosts.”110 On one hand, he firmly 
declares that according to his theory the state has no mandate at all to look after 
individual assets. On the other hand, however, he relativizes this stance in practice, 
by standing up for contributions securing the subsistence of those who lack prop-
erty, for access to education for all, for help towards self-help, and even for a partial 
share of the innocently unemployed in the increase of overall prosperity.111 
Theoretical inconsistence forces him into practical inconherence.112
A further example underscores this point. From the strict inactivity of the state 
his theory demands in regard to all things economic, he expressly exempts action 
against monopolies. If someone has a monopoly on goods vital for life (his example: 
through possession of an oasis in the desert113), then he must respect the legitimate 
needs of his customers or he could be coerced by the law to respect them. Thus, 
however, Hayek again contradicts his claim that the state should act only to protect 
negative freedom. Whoever watches idly as others die of thirst is guilty of all sorts 
of things, but not in violation of the concept of negative or quantitative freedom; he 
neither damages the physical sphere of freedom of the thirsty, nor does he actively 
reduce their available options. Hayek’s plea for state intervention can therefore only 
consistently be maintained through qualitative criteria – like, for example, a norma-
tive, counterfactual entitlement to nutrition.114
We now see the enormous price Hayek has paid for persisting in determining the 
idea of freedom only negatively and quantitatively. Since he characterized freedom 
as but a collection of non-coercive options, his right hand may not know what the 
left one does. While, with the right hand, he rejects any form of progressively liberal 
engagement, with the left hand, he secretly escorts it back into his palace of ideas 
again. That makes him appear hardly consistent from a neoliberal perspective and 
hardly trustworthy from a social-liberal perspective. For instance, Hayek’s criticism 
of class envy and of the lobbyist organization of particular egoism,115 in no way 
takes the side of the propertied. This stance is even maintained when it would entail 
109 See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 202.
110 See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 66.
111 See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 257.
112 See also the (equally Kantian) criticism of Kläver in Die Verfassung des Marktes, 246ff., 299f.
113 See Hayek, Constitution, 135.
114 See David Miller, “Constraints on Freedom,” Ethics 94:1 (1983), 66–86 and John Gray, “Hayek 
on Liberty, Rights and Justice,” Ethics 92:1 (1981), 73–84.
115 See Hayek 1976, 98.
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a loss of privileges and assets. In this manner, Hayek rejects, for example, any social 
isolationism against impoverished immigrants in the interests of the propertied 
classes.116 For Hayek, the principle of freedom does not end when it begins to cost 
something. On the contrary, since, for him the freedom of individuals constitutes the 
legitimating principle of politics, Hayek holds that it is wrong to always grant pri-
macy to national interests instead of the concerns of other peoples. Hence Hayek’s 
support for a liberal, global governance order, which – obligated to the rule of law – 
should serve the freedom of all the citizens of the world.
As a result, it can be said: Contrary to popular belief, Hayek does not always 
insist upon a minimal state, but rather provides some positive tasks which the state, 
serving society as a whole, should undertake. For the arrangement of these state- 
tasks, his theory provides important criteria and unique ideas about constitutional 
theory. Nevertheless, Hayek cannot gather up these results on the path proposed by 
him en route to a purely negative conception of freedom. His theory of the lawful 
state and the economic system concomitant to its legal order are infused with numer-
ous positive postulates. In all, Hayek clearly gives his theory of freedom a direction 
which implicitly points beyond its explicit quantitative foundations – in the direc-
tion of qualitative freedom.
3.2  Liberal Distribution (John Rawls)
At the end of the twentieth century, hardly any philosopher was quoted as much as 
John Rawls (1921–2002). Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, hardly 
any other philosophical conception is criticized as much as his. In the 1970s, his 
work seemed to provide a welcome answer to the question concerning how the 
modern nation-state could harmonize the tension between the ideals of freedom and 
social justice. Today, in the era of globality, this answer appears less satisfactory. 
The burden of global and intertemporal problems revealed many fissures within 
Rawls’ conception, which, while manifest already in its architectural plans, had 
initially been overlooked.
John Rawls intended to establish a new home for liberalism that would perfectly 
situate it within the theoretical landscape of the present. For that purpose, he wished 
to build on the content of Kant’s theory of freedom, while leaving behind its method. 
Liberalism without the metaphysics of freedom: This attempt to appropriate Kant 
selectively motivates and connects the various levels of Rawls’ work and, within it, 
the gradual development of his own theory of freedom. Rawls, for instance, does not 
wish to derive the social order he favors from substantial directives, but rather 
wishes to let it arise by means of formal procedures alone – from theoretical thought- 
experiments and practical political representation. The liberal order should be justi-
fied by reflections undertaken and accepted on the part of citizens themselves; a 
project, which, in his time, was also advanced by other thinkers, like Charles 
116 See Wilhelm, The Political Thought of Friedrich A. Hayek, 168.
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Larmore, and which today continues to be pursued by otherwise harsh opponents of 
the Rawlsian approach, like Martha Nussbaum.
The crux is Rawls’ attempt to get exactly the kind of a fair social order he wants 
through a social contract resulting supposedly from nothing but a purely descriptive 
concept of interests, processed by the instrumental logic of rational exchanges, and 
governed by structural directives alone. However, the preference-theoretical con-
cept of freedom as the quantity of all privately available options, which John Rawls 
overtly declares to be the foundation of his philosophical work, does not harmonize 
with his covert understanding of freedom. Rather, that quantitative theory of free-
dom endangers the very conception of freedom that is close to Rawls’s heart.
3.2.1  Approach and Method
Rawls never leaves any doubt about what kind of social order he favors and wishes 
to promote with his philosophy: a liberal order in which human rights are inviolable 
and where no citizen can prescribe to another which ideas of the good he or she 
should employ to direct his or her life. The human being should be able to live freely 
and only be limited in this freedom insofar as this is required for the protection of 
the freedom of others, or serves to enable the freedom of fellow human beings. The 
leitmotifs of the Rawlsian Theory of Justice117 are built upon this classically liberal 
basic chord. In order to fulfill customary expectations about contemporary compo-
sitions, Rawls nevertheless rearranges the harmonic sequence of his – in melody 
and rhythm – strongly Kantian liberal work. But since Rawls (incorrectly) assumes 
that Kant lets his harmonics of freedom resound from a metaphysically monophonic 
cadence of moral–legal-political ideas of freedom, he commits himself to another 
program. His aim is to unfold the desired liberal melody from the dissonant notes of 
musicians only obligated to their own self-interest. Therefore, Rawls mixes Kantian 
chords with contractualist sounds. Rawls, in short, suggests that Kant is attached to 
a metaphysical composition no longer suitable for post-metaphysical times.118
As a passage from his Theory of Justice makes clear,119 Rawls bases this interpre-
tation of the Kantian opus (attractive melodies, unattractive basso continuo), which 
is quite common in the English-language literature, upon Henry Sidgwick’s The 
Kantian Conception of Free Will.120 This text provides a decisive key to Rawls’ Kant 
reception, as well as to his understanding of freedom as a whole. Sidgwick, discuss-
117 First edition 1971. Quotations are from the following edition: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge, MA, 1999).
118 About this see Onora O’Neill, “Autonomy, Coherence, and Independence” in Milligan & Miller 
(eds.), Liberalism, Citizenship and Autonomy, 214.
119 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 224.
120 See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis, 1981), 511ff. Rawls found this study 




ing Kant’s theory, distinguishes three concepts of freedom: first, freedom as chaoti-
cally unregulated determination of the will; second, freedom as freedom of choice; 
and, third, freedom as conformity with the moral law. The first is then immediately 
ruled out again. For Sidgwick, a chaotic determination of the will can neither be 
thought along with Kant nor in and out of itself: Wherever mere chance rules, there 
is no responsibility. The question therefore arises concerning which of the two 
remaining concepts of freedom Kant favors. Both frequently surface in the Kantian 
oeuvre, and yet are, according to Sidgwick, incompatible with one another.
According to Sidgwick, the conformity theory entangles us in the spider’s webs 
of shadowy metaphysics. One thus remains without any information concerning 
how evil comes into the world since – on one hand – the purely free, i.e. the autono-
mous, enforcement of the moral-law is never evil, and – on the other hand – the 
purely natural will, lacking freedom, cannot actually be called evil. There, 
 consequently, remains only the concept of freedom of choice. Yet, if one stakes 
everything upon that, one loses the rigorous potentials of the Kantian moral doc-
trine – which continually and unconditionally demands that the moral law be fol-
lowed. Eventually, the somewhat awkward question arises: Why be moral at all? 
For, according to Sidgwick, without recourse to the conformity thesis, with Kantian 
means no kind of rational preference between the maxims of the saint and the 
scoundrel can be justified. Either could be universalized; and one could therefore 
consistently (i.e. universalizably) choose both as systems of preference directing 
action.
Having highlighted this difficulty, Sidgwick believes the Kantian position to be 
finished. But not Rawls: He certainly follows Sidgwick in turning away from the 
metaphysics of freedom. He also agrees with him that Kant’s theory could not pos-
sibly explain why a free subject should actually decide upon a moral course of life. 
But Rawls believes that it is possible to remedy this supposed “defect” of the 
Kantian theory.121 It is precisely a question of indicating good reasons for why one 
should freely choose ethical options. If one could show that to do so is based upon 
the well-understood self-interest of every agent, then a plausible motive for decent 
behavior would exist. One could then hold on to the results of the Kantian doctrine 
of freedom without the burden of metaphysical thinking. To this end, Rawls recom-
mends his own conception of the original position (about which there is more 
below):
The original position may be viewed then, as a procedural interpretation of Kant’s concep-
tion of autonomy and the categorical imperative within the framework of an empirical the-
ory. […] No longer are these notions purely transcendent and lacking explicable connections 
with human conduct, for the procedural conception of the original position allows us to 
make these ties.122
This position provides the source-code for Rawls’ Theory of Justice: the derivation 
of substantial positions from procedural postulates. In analogy with classical 
121 See ibid.
122 Ibid., 226.
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German philosophy, Rawls distinguishes between rationality in the narrow sense, as 
a prudent adaption of means to given ends, and reasonableness in the broader sense, 
as a wise consideration of the meaning and purpose of our intentions. Yet, unlike the 
philosophers of German Idealism, Rawls attempts to prove that the reasonableness 
(Vernünftigkeit) of ethical action is the expression of appropriate proceduralized 
rationality (Verständigkeit). He wishes to defend the content of a good number of 
Kant’s positions, yet replace the form of the arguments defending them with calcu-
lations from rational-choice theories.123 Nothing but recourse to formal, procedural 
criteria (like consistency, reciprocity, etc.) would be required for the necessary limi-
tation of individual freedom (i.e. so as to discriminate between legally licit and 
illicit options). Rawls wishes, as it were, to protect political liberalism from meta-
physics and morality.
Via the intermediate step of a hypothetical situation in which rational decision- 
makers – shielded by a ‘veil of ignorance’ from knowing specifics about their life – 
discuss the foundations of their social order, this idea of a purely formal representation 
of the citizens’ political will leads Rawls to a dual conception of freedom character-
ized by the following distinction: “liberty is represented by the complete system of 
the liberties of equal citizenship, while the worth of liberty to persons and groups 
depends upon their capacity to advance their ends within the framework the system 
defines.”124 This differentiation between liberty and the worth of liberty reflects the 
difference between liberal and utilitarian argumentation in favor of freedom. On the 
one hand, freedom (deontologically) presents a value in itself: “Freedom as equal 
liberty is the same for all.”125 On the other hand, Rawls (consequentialistically) rec-
ognizes that a liberal regime is more beneficial for some than for others. For instance, 
the rich typically profit from a liberal order more than the poor; in short, “the worth 
of liberty is not the same for everyone.”126
Since Rawls suspects all material criteria for evaluating freedom of metaphysics, 
there remains for individuals only a formal logic for the comparative evaluation of 
their options: In the absence of qualitative measures they must orientate themselves 
quantitatively. They will therefore (have to) decide upon rules that promise to them 
“more” rather than “less” utility. Consequently both – freedom in itself and its util-
ity for us – should be maximized. Rawls expressly aspires to “the most extensive 
scheme of liberties” for all, as well as also a distribution-technique which is able “to 
maximize the worth of liberty” for those most poorly positioned.127 Extending the 
radius of freedom and maximizing the options contained therein – these quantitative 
leitmotifs are characteristic of the Rawlsian endeavor.
Such an approach, though, comprises difficulties. Two can already be addressed. 
First, there arises the problem that now both targeted values – freedom as well as its 
utility – are made measurable and commensurable; a quite problematic directive. 







How does one count or gauge freedom? Is there a yardstick with which even aspects 
of freedom not extant in the physical world could be accurately measured?128 
Second, a difficulty arises in guaranteeing that the quantitative calculations and pro-
cedures recommended by Rawls eventually produce what is qualitatively acceptable 
to him – namely a liberalism directed also towards social fairness. Rawls attempts 
to guarantee this outcome through certain procedural rules. To rescue some posi-
tions especially dear to him (for instance, distributive justice), Rawls must however 
again free himself strenuously from precisely that quantitative straitjacket he had 
earlier put on.
Referring back to Kant assists us in outlining Rawls’ project more precisely. As 
we have seen (Sect. 2.1.1), Kant requires for his philosophy of law only a concept 
of freedom that makes possible the ascription of outer actions to subjective actors. 
Only for moral philosophy does Kant aspire to a concept of freedom which also 
thematizes the inner life (AA VI 223f). It should therefore be asked: From what 
exactly does Rawls actually detach himself when he distances himself from the 
Kantian metaphysics of freedom? Rawls follows Sidgwick in the assumption “that 
the noumenal self can choose any consistent set of principles,”129 as long as one does 
not attribute to this self some fixed “desires” like the “desire to express their nature 
as rational and equal members of the intelligible realm.”130 Now, Rawls believes he 
has to remedy that (erroneously) assumed lack of direction in Kant’s concept of 
personality: by an ad hoc introduction of certain natural needs for morality, due to, 
namely, a “desire to act justly” and a “desire to express most fully what we are or 
can be, namely free and equal beings.”131 A philosophical Münchhausen trick: To 
free himself from basic metaphysics, Rawls thus flees into baseless speculation.
Yet, Kant’s theory of the noumenal self is neither an indispensable nor character-
istic feature of his liberalism.132 Kant’s theory of the subject is part of his critical 
philosophy, not his applied ethics.133 Kant’s liberalism must therefore be neither 
freed nor protected from metaphysics. Rawls would not have gone so far astray had 
he remained closer to Kant and followed his distinction between a phenomenally 
parsimonious (as well as non-metaphysical) concept of the legal person on the one 
hand and a comprehensive concept of moral personality on the other (see AA VI 
214). As we have already seen (Sect. 2.1.1): Metaphysics in no way provides the 
foundation for Kant’s political philosophy, which refers purely to the sphere of 
outer-factual, legally enforceable actions between persons (AA VI 230). Whoever 
admits outer freedom of action does not at all need to further engage with Kant’s 
128 See Onora O’Neill, “The Most Extensive Liberty” in Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society 80 
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transcendental philosophy for questions of political, legal, and economic ethics.134 
Kant’s political liberalism therefore  – contra Rawls’ interpretation  – in no way 
depends upon his metaphysics and moral theory.135 It rests upon an argument sui 
generis in favor of external freedom,136 which is why the construction of a system of 
rights could occur, as Kant writes, even in “a nation of devils,” i.e. a society of not 
at all morally or metaphysically motivated subjects (AA VIII 366). And hardly any-
one would, after all, ascribe to devils a natural ‘desire’ to be well-behaved.
But Rawls proceeds differently: To prevent the inclination “to act as a free rider” 
from being lived out in the well-ordered society he aspires to, Rawls declares that it 
must be held in check by an “effective sense of justice,” which presents, as it were, 
the natural correlate of those natural “desires” under conditions of institutionalized 
justice.137 With this hefty anthropological thesis Rawls also undermines his own 
supposedly metaphysics-free approach. Rawls introduces those assumptions, after 
all, not via an empirically validated theory, but rather posits them ad hoc.
Rawls apparently wishes to pay off a debt that Kant never actually incurred; and 
Rawls does this by indebting himself to rational choice theory. He accepts the lia-
bility of thoroughly redeeming his arguments in the currency of enlightened self- 
interest. With that charge, however, his project becomes excessively burdened. For 
the repayment of a credit supposedly drawn down by Kant, Rawls turns to a philo-
sophical policy of austerity: both, in terms of content, “by posing more limited 
questions” and, in terms of method, “by substituting prudential for moral 
judgment.”138 Rawls thus renounces the entire purchasing power of ethical curren-
cies: Theories of the good life are rejected for being illegitimate means of payment. 
Normative bills should no longer be paid off with genuinely moral reasoning but 
rather be redeemed by “a judgment of rational prudence.”139 Even the solvency of 
the “principles of justice,” which Rawls so desires, no longer lie within their reason-
ableness, as they still did with Kant. Criteria for justice receive their “justification” 
now only through the contingent fact “that they would be chosen.”140 Philosophical 
values with formally unconditional validity are thus depreciated to a currency whose 
purchasing power results solely from its factual acceptance in circulation.
Rawls perceives this as a gain. The burden of norm-conforming behavior would 
consequently be drastically reduced since everyone could now recognize social 
“obligations” as “self-imposed,” which would provide a good “basis for the public 
acceptance of the corresponding principles of justice.”141 However this kind of una-
134 See Marcus Willaschek, “Right and Coercion: Can Kant’s Conception of Right be Derived from 
his Moral Theory,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17:1 (2009), 49–70.
135 See Thomas Pogge, “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre Comprehensive?,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 
36:1 (1998), 149.
136 See Gregor, Laws of Freedom, 67.
137 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 499.






nimity is only possible on the assumption that the way people understand them-
selves is free from complication and controversy. One should, Rawls holds, start out 
from starkly reduced features of human existence; from individual self-interest and 
the capacity for logical thinking in particular. In the light of these premises, Rawls 
believes that, in a “hypothetical situation,” a social order would be able to be negoti-
ated in which enlightened self-interest would drive everyone to the recognition of 
precisely such rules that enable fair cohabitation for all.142 In short, Kant’s categori-
cal imperative that justice is unconditionally to be done is transformed into the 
conditional commandment of a hypothetical imperative that justice is to be aspired 
to since (and insofar as) it serves rationally pursued self-interest.143
It is difficult to see how this is an improvement upon Kant.144 According to Kant, 
the person’s ethical commitment does not arise as a result of insight into certain 
amoral grounds for morality or through the wish to respond to certain amoral needs 
for morality. Rather it plainly results from the reasonable insight and the concomi-
tant emotional recognition (‘respect’) of the salience of moral commandments.145 
Kant’s approach is therefore more consistent and far-reaching than that of Rawls 
since, from the beginning – and not only by way of secondary derivations – it always 
included cases where ethical action would be contrary to self-interest. The Kantian 
construction thus appears to me to be simpler and more parsimonious than the 
Rawlsian variant.146
3.2.2  Transcendental or Transactional Freedom?
An idiosyncrasy of Rawls’ philosophy of freedom is the enormous tension between 
the plea for a transactionally generated order of freedom on the one hand and, on the 
other, the extensive limits imposed on the very constructions rendered by the quan-
titative computations of self-interest:
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his 
class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natu-
ral assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the 
parties do not know their conception of the good or their special psychological propensities. 
The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. … Since all are similarly 
142 Ibid., 11.
143 See John Martin Gillroy, “Making Public Choices: Kant’s Justice from Autonomy as an 
Alternative to Rawls’ Justice as Fairness,” Kant-Studien 91:1 (2009), 44–72.
144 Concerning the following, see Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations 
of Justice and Fairness (2011), 280ff.
145 See Dieter Schönecker, “Das gefühlte Faktum der Vernunft: Skizze einer Interpretation und 
Verteidigung,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (2013) 1, 91–107.
146 “For Kant … the theory simply defends the principles that ordinary agents accept. But for … 
Rawls, theory claims to construct the principles for society as a whole” (Krasnoff, How Kantian is 
Constructivism?, 409).
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situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the princi-
ples of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.147
Behind that oft-referenced ‘veil of ignorance’ subjects are robbed of all opportuni-
ties to generate tactical advantages for themselves, for instance by choosing rules 
which are in their own interest, while socially damaging. According to these limita-
tions they can then actually increase their own utility only by nolens volens enhanc-
ing the utility of all. No one wants to cut their own finger; and if, behind the ‘veil of 
ignorance,’ one does not know into whose finger one is about to cut, one likely 
wields the blade gently.
As is well known, Rawls explains that a deviation from an initial “benchmark” 
of original equality of assets will be universally accepted in the “original position” 
when this indirectly also favors those who do not directly profit from the admission 
of differences in incomes. There thus arises Rawls’ (in)famous “principle of differ-
ence” in favor of the economically weakest: If after a hypothetical redistribution 
society as a whole has absolutely more, this should also satisfy those who unlike 
others possess relatively less than previously. Reformulated in terms of economic 
policy: Insofar as even the smallest piece of a capitalist cake turns out to be bigger 
than each piece of an all-in-all smaller socialist cake sliced into rather equal parts, a 
capitalist confectionary would nevertheless certainly be preferred to a socialist one, 
wouldn’t it? Therefore, one must move away from the idea of a completely deregu-
lated libertarian pastry-product-market and, through a regulation of the baking- 
business, see to it that a sufficient part of the total production is supplied to the 
hungriest; that is more-or-less the basic idea.
The indirect character of this concept of solidarity immediately catches our eye. 
Why does this social redistribution not occur from a direct commitment in favor of 
the economically disadvantaged? Instead of reflecting upon the quantitative aggre-
gate (for all taxed individuals), it might be more appropriate to inspect directly the 
qualitative results (for the needy).148 Why not – in order to remain in the picture – 
lay down lower boundaries of minimal-satisfaction, which every pastry-product has 
to reach which wants to be just? Surely, by means of the “principle of difference,” 
distributions of assets can incontestably be worked out which appear to societies to 
be both pragmatically and normatively acceptable; which is the main reason for the 
enduring popularity of the Rawlsian model. Nevertheless, in extreme cases situa-
tions may arise where its foundational concerns lead ad absurdum and reveal their 
theoretical weaknesses.
Imagine, for example, an extremely rich society in which everyone would be a 
millionaire, some however – with no limits put up against increasing inequality – 
have made the leap to billionaires. Even in a society of this kind there would still be 
continuous redistribution according to Rawls. The principle of difference certainly 
cannot issue a qualitatively motivated call like “It is enough!”; from every quantita-
147 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 11.
148 See for example Martha Nussbaum’s counter-project: “My theory speaks only of a social mini-




tively enlarging delta it will rather derive an appeal for the relative improvement of 
the “least benefitted.” Conversely, in a society where large sections languish below 
subsistence-level, one would only be allowed to redistribute in strict quantitative 
proportion to the respective growth of the difference in societal assets overall, but 
not beyond this proportion. There could arise drastic emergencies – through famines 
produced by natural catastrophes for instance – in which the state would have to 
remain passive because it would not believe itself legitimated to redistribute more 
radically (accessing, for instance, the substance, and not just the growth of assets). 
For, without a qualitative criterion for basic needs, how could one even begin to 
justify (stronger) egalitarian redistributions within Rawls’ model?
Rawls’ attempt to procure universal qualitative justice from quantitatively- 
reciprocal utility exchanges not only fails in extreme situations, however. The actual 
problem lies deeper: in the idea that (only) the self-interest of individuals constitutes 
the basis of universal agreement with the social contract. Rational agents will grasp 
that their enlightened self-interest comprises entering into social relations only if 
and insofar as society is arranged as “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”149 
The readiness of individuals for “social cooperation” is purchased at the price that 
this proves to be to the benefit of all.150 Where everyone has access to more resources 
and consequently also more numerous options in a rule-based society than in imag-
ined isolation or in unregulated living conditions, the establishment of a state of law 
is but an upshot of the quantitative logic of self-interest.
This rationally pursued interest, however, stands and falls with the precise knowl-
edge of the specific situation one respectively finds oneself in. People from privi-
leged backgrounds benefit from different political rules than persons with a 
background of migration. For example: Without knowledge of one’s own abounding 
private assets, one will perhaps assume to profit from certain regulations (like, for 
instance, a strong progressive taxation of assets and income), which would also and 
especially better position the most poorly situated. Yet as soon as one already knows 
that one will inherit millions, this deliberation becomes meaningless – in the naked 
ratio of quantitative maximization. This shows that, behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ and 
without information about their personal position in life, individuals can therefore 
only very moderately serve their actual interests, which is precisely also Rawls’ 
declared intention.151 But why would human beings at all then venture upon the 
thought-experiment of the original position? Why should they make decisions 
under the constraints of a hypothetical situation in which the successful maximizing 
of their own benefit is de facto impossible? That appears highly implausible, since, 
according to Rawls’ model, the only characteristic all decision-makers possess is 
precisely the rational pursuit of their self-interest. And right here resides a consider-
able problem for the Rawlsian theory.
149 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 4. In contrast, Martha Nussbaum argues that this fixation with recipro-
cal advantage simply presents a “wrong account of the primary basis for social cooperation” 
(Frontiers of Justice, 129). In the following I will present arguments agreeing with this judgment.
150 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 126.
151 Ibid., 148.
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Whereas Rawls is concerned to show that the principles of justice he establishes 
(the principle of freedom and the principle of difference) present a rational choice 
for all participants within the original position, he can hardly explain how it should 
occur to someone from outside this perspective to impose its restraining knowledge- 
limitations upon themselves. A quantitatively orientated self-interest would in no 
way command that. Applied to economics: A homo oeconomicus who robbed him-
self of the presuppositions for being an efficient homo oeconomicus is not really an 
effective homo oeconomicus – or, more precisely, is not one at all. Only a conscious-
ness always already qualitatively directed to duty may urge us to accept the Rawlsian 
intellectual restrictions in order to generate distributive results that serve the cause 
of justice rather than maximization. Whoever is not already ethically motivated will 
hardly involve themselves with that little game with the ‘veil of ignorance.’ Whoever 
is, however, might instead prefer to look directly in the face of justice as opposed to 
observing only its silhouette reflecting the image of self-interested rationality 
refracted by those complicated procedures.
These objections lead back to the Kantian formulation of the problem of expli-
cating the normative form of the consciousness of freedom in and for itself (see 
Sect. 2.1). And it is thoroughly questionable whether for this purpose one must at all 
make use of the model of a social contract advantageous for all participatory par-
ties.152 Rawls advocates this because he assumes that only through inadmissible 
metaphysics might one otherwise be able to identify the good and the just. Therefore, 
due to the peril of endless metaphysical dispute, the direct path to justice must not 
be taken. Society should head for that sublime goal only indirectly. And the social 
contract model provides the sought-after detour.
Yet can substantial justice be reached via forms of procedural fairness alone? 
Rawls believes “there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise 
correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly 
followed.”153 Nothing more than rationally pursued self-interest need be presup-
posed. However, Rawls must then restrict this interest by many procedural tricks so 
as to achieve a quasi-identity between decision-makers and those affected by the 
decisions.154 Ultimately, no one deliberately harms themselves, therefore prudent 
decision-makers will – in the correct procedural framework – always act in every-
one’s interest. Only thus does the model function.
At first glance, it seems that not all that much is demanded of the decision- 
makers; only a general capacity “to take part in and to act in accordance with the 
public understanding of the initial situation.”155 For instance, whoever can grasp the 
rules of a typical strategy game is already deemed appropriate for Rawls’ thought- 
experiment; towering intelligence appears unnecessary. It is enough if the capacity 
for thinking exists “within the normal range.”156 Consequently, Rawls wants his 
152 See Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford & New York, 1995).
153 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 86.
154 See Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 16f.




self-given guideline, “to assume as little as possible,”157 to be sufficient. Most peo-
ple actually possess precisely this instrumental rationality which is here in question. 
“Only scattered individuals are without this capacity, or its realization to the mini-
mum degree.”158
Does that, however, suffice? Rawls suggests that a society structured according 
to the framework of the principles he supports establishes more utility for all partici-
pants than an unjustly structured social order and is consequently to be desired out 
of purely rational self-interest. But perhaps that applies only for some, or in the 
best-case scenario for most, but never for all. Only when one hypostatizes the fiction 
of the “original position” into reality – thus assuming that people actually do not 
know who they are and what is most of all useful for them in their specific position – 
do the principle of difference and rational choice theory provide equal results.159 In 
real life, however, it is not always – and not for everyone – advantageous to join 
together with others within a society that redistributes private assets.
How is it, for example, with those “scattered individuals,” of which we were talk-
ing a moment ago, who lack even the lowest degree of strategic rationality? Severely 
mentally handicapped people, for instance, may not fit in with such a calculation, in 
at least two respects160: First, they cannot engage in the required cognitive processes 
of abstraction which Rawls outlined for working-out their long-term advantage. 
Second, other people among the prudent advantage-seekers may not at all wish to 
include people with such limited capacities within the social contract because they 
view their contribution to social net utility as too small. Highly explosive questions 
immediately surface: How then should the rights and interests of these persons be 
satisfied? Are they to be declared wards of the law and second-class citizens? That 
shows: Strongly asymmetrical living-conditions can implode a social model orien-
tated around the idea of reciprocal symmetry.
Yet doubts concerning the model of the ‘veil of ignorance’ and the original posi-
tion do not of course only arise from the perspective of a self-interest potentially 
thwarted by the Rawlsian procedural requirements. What should we think of a con-
ception of freedom concretized by means of the fiction of people without qualities? 
If we follow Rawls to the point where we have a naked maximizer of preferences 
before our eyes, then we have already stripped the subject in question of two deci-
sive dimensions. First, we find not a word here about reasonableness taking prece-
dence over instrumental rationality. Yet where no ethical reason directs the technical 
ratio, decisions are made as automatically as in software-based expert systems. Is 
that already freedom? Second, behind the “veil,” these subjects lack every sensible, 
bodily, or spiritual dimension, which could give their decisions a genuinely indi-
vidual or private aspect. These decision-makers are therefore, strictly speaking, not 
themselves at all, but rather merely masks of the universal. Is that still freedom?
157 Ibid., 129.
158 Ibid., 506.
159 See Fred D’Agostino, Free Public Reason: Making it up as we go (New York, 1996), 40–44.
160 About the following, see Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 135–145.
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These considerations are especially pertinent in regard to moral or religious life 
goals. As long as I, as a result of the ‘veil of ignorance,’ do not know whether I 
entertain religious sentiments, and if so which, it may be prudent to promote a form 
of society where I do not end up suffering the tyranny of fundamentalists. But, if 
one ponders the matter at hand from a firm, religious perspective, what then? Many 
religious people, from their own theological standpoint, certainly demand open 
societies with institutionalized religious pluralism. Yet intellectual honesty compels 
us to admit that the opposite will also be maintained. Some believers already feel 
that the hypothetical entrance into that situation of theological amnesia postulated 
by the ‘veil of ignorance’ is absurd or blasphemous, and so they reject the demands 
for secular political institutions and comprehensive civil tolerance resulting from it 
as heretical. Only those already motivated to overcome their own (here: religious) 
interests in favor of a concept of universally-acceptable (here: tolerant) living condi-
tions – concretely: only those who already have a liberal understanding of religion 
as instructing tolerance (about which there is more in Sect. 5.1) – will gladly accept 
the preconditions for reflection Rawls establishes. Nevertheless, for its part, this 
qualitative motivation will hardly be derived from a quantitatively maximizing 
rationality.161
Rawls had sensed this problem. It appears highly questionable whether people 
wish to continually and necessarily serve his idea of procedural justice more than 
their own, not infrequently, countervailing ideas of the good or of God. This 
explains, in my opinion, why Rawls had recourse to that already mentioned “desire 
for justice” which was introduced ad hoc and assumed of everyone. Rawls assures 
us that “the desire to express our nature as a free and equal rational being can be 
fulfilled only by acting on the principles of right and justice as having first priority.” 
But how exactly does he know this if not from a metaphysical theory or moral intu-
ition? Is this prioritizing of justice convincing – and what price do we have to pay 
for it?
For the argumentative support of that “desire for justice” Rawls enlists some 
theses far from every metaphysical restraint. Without hesitation he declares: “the 
self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it.”162 That means: The philosophical 
consciousness of axioms of justice belongs to the inner kernel of the person. 
Religious ends, however, are a matter for the outer shell; a definitely controversial 
view. The priority of the self over its attributes and aims maintained here, certainly 
looks back towards a venerable tradition, and it may also appear prima facie plau-
sible to many. But that is not the point. In Rawls’ anti-metaphysical theoretical 
framework, this position can be neither deduced nor defended.163 Therefore, whether 
Rawls’ take on the issue is correct is unimportant, since he cannot justify those 
emphatic declarations with his own methodological directives.
161 See Bernard P. Dauenhauer, “Response to Rawls” in Cohen & Marsh (ed.), Ricoeur as Another: 
The Ethics of Subjectivity (New York, 2002), 208ff.
162 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 491.




Rawls’ critics reliably located and admonished these metaphysical remainders in 
the Theory of Justice. Communitarians and theologians dislike Rawls’ preference of 
rights over the good; utilitarians and game-theorists point towards the indecisive-
ness of a calculation that does not use knowledge of one’s situation; pragmatists and 
relativists want to reject Rawls’ massive claim to normativity; and positivists as well 
as neoliberals are against the sociopolitical aims of his theory of justice: But they all 
agree that Rawls’ arguments in favor of freedom and justice are far less free from 
metaphysics and presuppositions than he professed. Furthermore, his critics concur 
that Rawls only apparently follows an abstractly-maximizing concept of materially 
neutral freedom, but in truth pays homage to a (very) concretely determined doc-
trine of freedom. Rawls could have responded to these criticisms in two ways: either 
by defending the qualitative presuppositions he had already enlisted or by retreating 
to the quantitative realm.164 Which alternative did he opt for?
3.2.3  Relativist Versus Dogmatic Liberalism
Rawls answers his critics in Political Liberalism165 and The Laws of Peoples,166 as 
well as in Justice and Fairness: A Restatement.167 He thereby makes use of both of 
the previously mentioned strategies – the tactical flight forward as well as the stra-
tegic retreat – which makes it difficult to interpret his late work properly. It is, how-
ever, generally agreed that in later years, Rawls distanced himself from the 
quantitatively maximizing directives of his original theory (“the most extensive 
scheme”; “to maximize the worth of liberty”; “mutual advantage”),168 but without 
completely relinquishing the contractualist model.169 He turns his back on the origi-
nally intended quantitative measuring of a single type of freedom and its always 
commensurable value and frankly admits “that the idea of the extent of basic liberty 
is useful only in the least important cases.”170 Instead of that he now also recom-
mends a theory qualitatively orientated towards the sufficiency and optimization of 
freedom.
In Political Liberalism, the emphasis now lies rather on “society as a fair system 
of cooperation over time.”171 Occasionally, Rawls even seems to set aside the struc-
164 See William A. Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” Ethics 105:3 (1995), 516–534.
165 First edition, 1993. Quotations are from the second edition: John Rawls, Political Liberalism 
(New York, 1996).
166 First edition, 1999. Quotations are from the fourth edition: John Rawls, The Law of People: With 
‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (Cambridge, MA, 2002).
167 John Rawls, Justice and Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA, 2001).
168 Ibid., 112–114.
169 Martha Nussbaum pronounces: “However, at the end of the day Rawls was unwilling to drop the 
social contract structure in favour of a more Kantian theory” (Creating Capabilities, 85).
170 Rawls, Justice and Fairness: A Restatement, 112–114.
171 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 14.
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ture of symmetrical exchange-relations; for instance, when he declares that “the 
idea of reciprocity is not the idea of mutual advantage.”172 Instead of that, two 
“moral powers” of humanity henceforth become the normative directives of his 
liberalism: the capacities, on the one hand, to settle on principles of social justice 
and, on the other hand, to develop an idea of the good for one’s own life. With their 
help, in his later work, Rawls qualitatively weighs up the options of freedom as 
more or less “significant”:
a liberty is more or less significant depending on whether it is more or less essentially 
involved in, or is a more or less necessary institutional means to protect, the full and 
informed exercise of the moral powers in one (or both) of the two fundamental cases. The 
more significant liberties mark out the central range of application of a particular basic 
liberty; and in cases of conflict we look for a way to accommodate the more significant 
liberties within the central range of each.173
The example of freedom of speech explains the meaning and purpose of this distinc-
tion. In respect to the proclamation of political opinion, freedom of speech is uncon-
ditionally to be protected, Rawls believes, but perhaps not for the ends of private 
defamation. The justification of the difference lies in their respective contribution 
(present in the first case, lacking in the second) to the actualization of the two moral 
powers.174
All of that is of course transparently qualitative thinking, which – once more – 
enlists full-bodied anthropological pronouncements about the nature of human 
beings and their “moral powers.” Nevertheless, Rawls now also freely admits that 
he thereby sets out from materially loaded assumptions, like, for instance, from a 
normative concept of free and equal persons who are already orientated towards 
justice and the good; furthermore, from a two-level concept of reasonableness, 
which ethically transforms the purely technical end-means-rationality; as well as 
also from a concept of political community as an order aiming, from the outset, for 
fair cooperation.
Nevertheless, the status of conceptual construction in Rawls’ theory thereby 
changes. It is no longer a question of justifying the liberal society in general but of 
specifying its particular features:
We start with the fundamental idea of a well-ordered society as a fair system of cooperation 
between reasonable and rational citizens regarded as free and equal. We then lay out a pro-
cedure that exhibits reasonable conditions to impose on the parties, who as rational repre-
sentatives are to select public principles of justice for the basic structure of such a 
society.175
Oddly, Rawls refuses materially to defend these substantial foundational presup-
positions (for example, the assumption that “reasonable and rational citizens [be] 
172 Ibid. In the light of that, Martha Nussbaum rightly criticises Rawls for nonchalantly skating 
around the thereby produced contradiction with his earlier work: “He is simply silent about the 
apparent contradiction” (Frontiers of Justice, 59).
173 Rawls, Justice and Fairness: A Restatement, 112–114.
174 Ibid., 114.
175 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 103.
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regarded as free and equal”). He rather returns to the unorthodox argument that such 
a defense would run contrary to the liberal interests of his theory.176 He has thus 
been derided for being ready to defend the basic liberal order with arms, but not 
with words.177
Rawls justified renouncing argumentation by claiming that, under conditions of 
pluralistic publicity, disagreements about ultimate truths, even on the part of well- 
meaning as well as intellectually competent judges, cannot be avoided. If one does 
not wish to dictate some kind of position, then one must just accept the fact of plural 
worldviews. No political ideology relying upon but a single one of the extant world-
views, philosophies, or other ‘comprehensive doctrines’ can enjoy universal 
 acceptance. For pragmatic reasons, therefore, only an ‘overlapping consensus’ of as 
many of such doctrines as possible should be aspired to.178
According to Rawls, this consensus shall not be comprised of all extant views, 
but only of those that are already characterized by reasonableness. For Rawls, this 
reasonableness means not to impose one’s own principles of moral reasoning (reli-
gion, morality, tradition, etc.) onto one’s discussion partners. One must address 
one’s interlocutors solely with such arguments that they, too, can share – merely as 
fellow-citizens. Instead of subsuming others into one’s own moral or metaphysical 
paradigm, one is to address them as fellow citizens of the state. Only justifications 
corresponding to this condition of reciprocity should be considered by public rea-
son, i.e. concretely: in the legislative and judicative institutions of the state.179
But how do all citizens agree upon premises as tolerant as, for instance, that 
every fellow citizen is to be recognized as free and equal, and therefore as a fellow 
decision-maker? Rawls’ answer is surprising: One must, in short, have the fortune 
already to live in a liberally constituted society. If this is the case then everything 
required for that step (a generally accepted concept of the basic rights of free, equal 
personality, as well as the idea of society as a fair cooperative order emerging from 
reciprocal agreement) is already anchored in the political culture and constitutional 
reality.
Surely: Wherever one can hark back to an already culturally embedded ‘overlap-
ping consensus’ of tolerant convictions, such as in open societies, one can normally 
rely on that broad support for liberal principles that is required to get the implicitly 
already affirmed values of Rawls’ ideas of consensus explicitly realized in politics 
also. Therefore, the task of political philosophy would no longer consist in deriving 
a liberal canon of values, but rather in applying it, for example by further differen-
176 See Patrick Neal, “Does He Mean What He Says? (Mis)Understanding Rawls’ Practical Turn,” 
Polity 27:1, 77ff. especially 87.
177 “Political liberals will, one assumes, defend liberalism with arms, but they will not do so with 
words” (J. Judd Owen, Religion and the Demise of Liberal Rationalism: The Foundational Crisis 
of the Separation of Church and State (Chicago, 2001), 120.
178 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 38.
179 For Habermas’ critique of Rawls’ concept of public reason, see Jürgen Habermas, “Reconciliation 
Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 92:3 (1995), 119ff.; and Cristina Lafont, “Political Justice? Implications of the Rawls-
Habermas Debate for Discourse Ethics,” Philosophy of Social Criticism 29:2 (2003), 171ff.
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tiating already shared basic values through the thought-experiment of the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ and by applying them to concrete problems. Instead of a philosophizing 
about the foundations of liberal orders and constitutions, the program of Rawls’ 
revised liberalism is rather a philosophizing based on their foundation.
The contextual relativity of that program is as peculiar (auffällig) as it is perilous 
(anfällig). Does it realize or ruin Rawls’ normative demands? It is certainly no acci-
dent that Richard Rorty attempted to appropriate Rawls’ new doctrine for himself, 
i.e. for his own, expressly relativist liberalism.180 He joyfully recognizes within 
Rawls an unexpected partisan of his view that indeed liberalism offers no universal 
truth, but rather merely reformulates the agreeable customs of the West. Yet Rorty 
thereby clearly overlooks Rawls’ own claim to offer more than merely a copy of the 
political comme-il-faut of occidental democracies.181 Rawls rather seeks a theory, 
which, while independent of philosophical, religious, or moral presuppositions, still 
does not operate merely descriptively.
Rawls looks for this intermediary position on the path of a renewed engagement 
with Kant’s philosophy, which he characterizes as a “comprehensive liberalism.” In 
contrast, he himself wishes to make do with a narrower “political liberalism.” He 
makes the same pronouncement about John Stuart Mill, who in Rawls’ later works 
feature far less than in his earlier ones. Rawls means that Kant, and similarly also 
Mill, provide a theory that employs not purely political, but also rather moral and/
or metaphysical reasons in favor of defending political freedom.182 That, however, 
would resemble arguments based upon religious faith; and these are useless for a 
political theory obligated to the pluralism of the moderns. Moral and metaphysical 
arguments, according to Rawls, are appealing to those who share their premises; 
yet  – wherever inquisitions and forced philosophical conversions are considered 
unfashionable – this never includes everyone.183 It is certainly good and honorable 
to commit oneself as a moral individual to the tenets of Kantian ethics, but this sort 
of thing may not be elevated to the principle of political action. In the same way, 
Rawls again denies that a metaphysical belief may be made into the criterion of state 
action.
In this argumentation, Rawls from now on also includes the “belief” in freedom 
in the Kantian sense. Hence Rawls now formulates – against his earlier concep-
tions – that one may not make the Kantian concept of a person, transcendentally 
hovering above its interests and aims, the foundation of the political/legal under-
standing of persons.184 We can concede this point, as long as we are clear that, with 
these arguments, Rawls does not put Kant out of commission, but only his own, 
deficient Kant-interpretation, which depends upon the erroneous assumption that 
180 See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (New York, 1989), 57.
181 See Farid Abdel-Nour, “Liberalism and Ethnocentricism,” Journal of Political Philosophy 8:2 
(2000), 213.
182 See Rawls, The Laws of Peoples, 156.
183 See Thomas Nagel, “Rawls and Liberalism” in Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls (Cambridge, 2003), 83ff.
184 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 100.
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Kant transferred his metaphysical and moral concept of freedom to the political 
arena. Kant, however, had supported neither the one nor the other (see Sect. 2.1.2).185 
Kant did not at all demand that one make the obligation to obey the law also the 
inner, i.e. moral ground of the determination of one’s will.186 For Kant, the outer 
legal coercion functions as an analytic moment of the principle of law, precisely 
because legal norms must be able to be enforced independently of morality or other 
convictions. Therefore, Kant’s doctrine of right, keeps moral theory – and, even 
more, metaphysics – strictly separated from the realm of rights. Only within the 
doctrine of virtue does Kant declare the fulfillment of legal commitments also to be 
an inner concern of an ethical life; but this is clearly an issue within the ambit of 
morals and without any claims to political validity.
There is, to be sure, nothing objectionable about Rawls’ plan to found rights 
independently of morality and metaphysics. It would just have been better to carry 
out this plan, not against Kant, but rather with him. From giving lectures about 
Kant’s practical philosophy for many years, Rawls actually should have most pre-
cisely recognized the systematic foundations in Kant’s system that demand pre-
cisely such a separation of the moral and the legal realm.187 But, with his identification 
of Kant’s legal freedom with the principle of moral autonomy, Rawls nevertheless 
follows an interpretation that overlooks that differentiation. At any rate, de facto 
Kant’s Doctrine of Right can be understood, just as Rawls claims about his own 
theory,188 as a module whose reduced concept of freedom can be incorporated in the 
most varied wider theories (of a “comprehensive liberalism”).189
This point is expressly stressed here, since the definition of the legal/political 
medium in question concerns something both delicate and central for liberalism as 
a whole: the justification of legitimate coercive force.190 How can a legitimation of 
coercion on the part of the state be implemented without damaging the demanding 
liberal aims of the Rawlsian approach? Because Rawls relegated each and every 
fundamental theoretical determination for concrete political decisions to the discus-
sion of the procedural framework-conditions of his theory, the question concerning 
the potential validity of his approach leads to the following consideration: What 
must occur when those prior clarifications about a valid procedure for arriving at 
185 See Pogge, Is Kants Rechtslehre Comprehensive?
186 See Marcus Willaschek, “Which Imperatives for Right? On the Non-Prescriptive Character of 
Juridical Laws in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals” in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative 
Essays (Oxford, 2002), 68.
187 See Beate Rössler, “Kongenial und aufmerksam. Rezension zu John Rawls: Geschichte der 
Moralphilosophie,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 51:2 (2003), 325–329.
188 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 144.
189 “Rather than presuppose much more than Rawls does … he in fact presupposes much less. He 
makes no appeal to fundamental ideas prevalent in the public culture of his society, nor does he 
insist that persons have certain moral powers and matching higher-order interests in their develop-
ment and exercise, nor does he seek to identify all-purpose means needed for realizing the concep-
tions of the good that citizens of a society like his own are likely to have (Pogge, Is Kants 
Rechtslehre Comprehensive?, 149).
190 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 567.
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political decisions are just not shared by all participants? How, for instance, are we 
to deal with individuals or whole societies, for whom the political common good in 
no way consists in seeking a fair cooperation between the free and the equal in con-
scious contrast to their own ideas of the good and well-being respectively? Or, how 
are those individuals (like feminists, for example), who do not strictly separate the 
private and the public, to be dealt with? Or those (like, for example, certain religious 
groups) who reject drawing a clear line between the holy and profane, the religious 
and the political arena? With people, therefore, who do not wish to roll back and 
limit their ultimate and deepest convictions for the sake of penultimate pragmatic 
deliberations?191 After all, in the eyes of many people the mere demand for such 
lines of separation is already a liberal dogma – and an implausible one to boot. They 
feel imposed upon not only by what results from the limitation of discourse decreed 
by Rawls, but rather already by the structural and materially restrictive precondi-
tions that thus enter into the political discourse.192
How then can Rawls’ liberal proceduralism defend itself against illiberal convic-
tions? How can he counter, for instance, the argument that human beings are in no 
way equal, but rather that a deity has purposefully created differences between men 
and women, between one’s kin and those of another caste, between those of one and 
another skin color, between those of one and another faith, which must also be cor-
respondingly taken into account in the procedures developing the political will – for 
example through a differentiated suffrage? How does Rawls defend his approach 
against the belief that it is sacrilege to consciously bracket one’s commitment to 
individual and collective salvation, or that one’s faith-based knowledge justifies the 
practices of the inquisition in the name of the soul’s salvation? How can Rawls 
answer someone who, in all seriousness, declares that the meaning and purpose of 
the political order is the most radical realization of theocratic ideals – including the 
repression of those of other faiths? And what is to be said when entire states devote 
themselves to such views and therefore completely or partially reject the provision 
of human rights?193
Rawls’ answer to these questions is surprising to put it mildly. He refrains from 
a substantial rejoinder to such conceptions and rejects mobilizing his own philo-
sophical convictions to battle fanaticism.194 Yet he in no way pretends to be a relativ-
ist willing to tolerate fundamentalism either. As long as he knows that a sufficient 
“overlapping consensus” is backing him within his own society, Rawls intends to 
take no notice of such views. Rather, he excludes them from the outset from the 
ranks of theorems worthy of political consideration: Whoever does not comply with 
the presuppositions of argumentative reciprocity and secular tolerance, simply dis-
191 See Banu Kilan, “J.  Rawls’ Idea of an ‘Overlapping Consensus’ and the Complexity of 
‘Comprehensive Doctrines,’” Ethical Perspectives 16:1 (2009), 21–60.
192 See William Arthur Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political 
Theory and Practice (2002).
193 See Steven J. Kautz, Liberalism and Community (Ithaca, 1995), 179f.
194 See Owen, Religion and the Demise of Liberal Rationalism, 120.
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qualifies himself as “unreasonable” and is therefore not allowed to participate in the 
legitimacy-generating deliberations of public reason.
Rawls operates with a strikingly narrow understanding of “reasonable” though; 
even “perfectly rational” arguing subjects are, for him, only “reasonable” insofar as 
they are not led by their particular ideas of the good. They must rather document a 
“desire to engage in fair cooperation as such”195 and aspire “for its own sake” to a 
world “in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can 
accept.”196 Now, this indeed very specific concept of reasonableness surely reflects 
accurately the central content of Rawlsian liberalism: Namely, to position the con-
sensus produced by reciprocal argumentation above every other objective and value 
in politics. Yet this is in no way merely a formal position, but also a material one. 
Under the watch of procedural value-neutrality, a highest value is smuggled in: 
consensus. There appears to be no value resulting from these considerations that 
would deserve giving up the quest for consensus and conflict-free cooperation.197 In 
comparison with that, however, every other value is consequently reduced and thus 
robbed of its potential unconditionality, although nothing at all about values is 
explicitly discussed!198
This background adds poignancy to the question how to deal with persons who 
do not accept such a secular depotentialization – and consequent political restric-
tion – of their values, because they, for instance, believe “that certain questions are 
so fundamental that to insure their being rightly settled justifies civil strife?”199 
Confronted with this question Rawls takes off all his masks and speaks bluntly. If, 
from belief in other highest values, like, e.g. “the salvation of a whole people,” there 
arises a resistance against the conditions of liberal discourse, Rawls declares with-
out hesitation that, “At this point we have no alternative but to deny this, or to imply 
its denial.”200 Evidently, in order to politically devalue their values, for him it is 
enough to prove to such believers that their doctrine is incompatible with the fact of 
plural worldviews. It would surely be preferable to strengthen tendencies or group-
ings within the respective religious communities that already pursue the pluralistic 
openness of society. Yet if these kinds of tolerant tendencies, which Rawls detects 
predominantly within Christianity and – in a few isolated cases – also within Islam, 
are too weak to find broad acceptance, there remains only the exclusion of religious 
speech from political discourse.
In this way, however, Rawls’ talk of the state’s value-neutrality degenerates into 
lip service. Reducing the radius of the space of public reason so drastically, Rawls 
195 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 51.
196 Ibid., 50.
197 See Owen, Religion and the Demise of Liberal Rationalism, 113f.
198 “Rawls seems to suppose that a fundamentalist can believe in the unambiguity of God’s com-
mandments for human life … while nevertheless putting these commandments aside politically.” 
That however demands “a change in ones beliefs concerning God’s will. One must come to believe 
that it is consistent with God’s will that it be set aside in politics” (ibid., 117).
199 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 152.
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3.2 Liberal Distribution (John Rawls)
204
robs political dispute of essential depth. The suggestion that the propositional con-
tents of respective (often religious) background-theorems are, even without includ-
ing their ultimate grounds, translatable into the political medium without losses, 
does not convince precisely those whose ultimate convictions demand a dedication 
without compromise in opposition to the principles of consensus and tolerance.201 
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that Rawls’ project of not at all including 
certain justifications within the process of political decision-making has in no way 
neutral, but rather partisan, consequences: His model procedurally invalidates all of 
those convictions which aspire to a good superior to every conceivable consensus. 
His supposed tolerance towards the religious consciousness thus reveals itself as its 
poorly concealed rejection; which Rawls also tersely vouches: “Of course, we do 
not believe the doctrine believers here assert, and this is shown in what we do.”202
These considerations draw attention to a systematic weakness of Rawlsian liber-
alism. First, Rawls claims to refrain from all qualitative (moral and metaphysical) 
valuations and, with downright positivism, let all rationally pursued preferences be 
quantitatively equal. Yet he then recoils from the ultimate consequence of this move. 
Whenever the going gets tough, because the actually expressed preferences are 
pushing towards undesirable forms of society, Rawls applies the emergency brake; 
the quantitative freedom (of all) to political free speech and participation is thus cut 
back to the qualitative concept (of some) of what reasonable political arguments are 
supposed to be.
Nevertheless, without agreeing with Rawls’ conclusions, one can still support 
the panegyric of a ‘political liberalism’ and the search for an ‘overlapping consen-
sus’ shared by all social groupings.203 Treating political problems as penultimate 
questions whose solutions are not to be deduced from the ultimate grounds of 
human existence, but rather to be worked on by the respective political community 
in a debate considering the reflections of all citizens, does appear compelling. 
Indeed, metaphysics is not the raison d’état.204 Yet this consideration in no way 
automatically compels us to conclude that one may never question the premises of 
freedom and equality, or thematize their validity from, respectively, their own 
world-views. Sending metaphysics into political exile appears to me to be neither 
feasible nor desirable (about which there is more in Sects. 5.2 and 5.3).
Rawls is knitting a common pattern of quantitatively liberal needlework: the pre-
sumption of a value-neutral concept of freedom laced with the thread of mere quan-
tity. Yet because those principles, which liberals actually favor, cannot be secured, 
qualitative criteria are subsequently woven into the quantitative yarn in order to 
attach the postulates of, for example, cosmopolitan tolerance and restrained citizen-
ship. Truly laborious needlework!
201 See Stephen Macedo, “Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of 
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Compare that to Kant’s weaving-technique: Just as sharply as Rawls, he rejected 
all attempts at curtailing the freedom of others for religious or moral reasons. Yet, to 
do so, he did not have to distinguish between politically permissible and political 
impermissible opinions. His concept of law prohibits from the outset projects vio-
lating the individual’s right to freedom from entering into the political decision- 
making. Kant, however, deduces that result directly from a qualitatively outlined 
idea of lawful freedom. It does not indirectly have to be derived via the supposed 
protection of self-interest. This strict determination has liberating, not limiting, con-
sequences for the liberal cause. Kant appears to be thus a more orthodox and, at the 
same time, a more tolerant liberal than Rawls. He is more orthodox because he 
materially defends the doctrine of freedom, for which he also makes use of his basic 
philosophical convictions, for instance, of the priority of freedom over the political 
goods to be established by it. Yet Kant also shows himself to be more tolerant since 
he does not wish to exclude the victory of unpleasant opinions through delegitimiz-
ing political procedures, but rather places confidence in public reason’s ability to 
cope with illiberal demands in and by means of democratic processes.205 While 
Kant, of course, can also not prevent a people from revolting against the religious 
appropriation of the political sphere and/or their individual rights to freedom, at 
least, in contrast to Rawls, his philosophy allows him to reject that as normatively 
inappropriate.206
Rawls, on the other hand, is impeded from the possibility of opposing ethically 
or religiously motivated relativizations of political freedoms by anything other than 
an authoritative dictum, since he, under postmodern conditions, rejects as inadmis-
sible every substantial argumentation for freedom as a political principle. Yet, by 
prescribing, without further substantiation, the West’s liberal political procedures, 
he performatively contradicts his own basic liberal concerns. He presupposes what 
should be justified; namely, that in entering procedures of legal/political decision- 
making something occurs over and above the enforcement of a liberal creed against 
other systems of conviction. Enforcing freedom in this way dogmatizes liberalism. 
At the same time, it relativizes it, since one would consequently also have to make 
friends with illiberal political procedures as soon as social indicators change; a con-
clusion which Rawls, personally, certainly would not have wanted to draw.
205 See Gillroy, Making Public Choices.
206 “Unlike Rawls’ original position … the principle of publicity is not a hypothetical choice situa-
tion in which ordinary citizens will place or imagine themselves. The substantive work of Kant’s 
political philosophy is done not by the constructive procedure of the social contract, but by the 
constructed ideas of publicity and possible political agency. … Kant is not a hypothetical proce-
duralist” (Krasnoff, How Kantian Is Constructivism?, 405).
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3.2.4  Whose Freedom?
In my opinion, the vacillation between a dogmatic and relativist understanding of 
freedom in Rawls’ work is no mere gaffe. Rather, it is characteristic of the unclear 
relation between qualitative and quantitative criteria in his conception. This feature 
not only shows itself – as the last section has argued – when one asks about which 
options, opportunities, or capacities should be maximized in the name of freedom. 
It also emerges when one looks more closely into whose freedoms a Rawlsian soci-
ety concerns itself with. Rawls’ answer to this qualitative question likewise remains 
unsatisfactory.
The problem of appropriately thematizing the rights of the disabled or of future 
generations already shows up within A Theory of Justice. The reason: Within the 
framework of the “original position,” the decisive moves are ascribed to rational 
maximizers of self-interest. Obligations to others must be reconstructed as exchange 
of quantities of private utility or freedom. Under such presuppositions, all parties 
will aim at symmetrical reciprocity, and only provide their due share in cases where 
they can obtain something of a quantitatively equal value. The emergence of fair 
results from exchange is only conceivable insofar as the trading partners act as con-
temporaneous and equally strong subjects “who can play the role of fully coopera-
tive members.”207 But when the benefitting other is an as of yet unborn subject or 
someone severely handicapped, of which one expects nothing or only little in return, 
then – in a calculation of sheer quantitative advantage – granting services makes no 
sense.208 As a result, in the framework of his theory, Rawls could professedly not 
grant animals the status of subjects with rights.209 People with disabilities are an 
analogous case. Perhaps this is why Rawls forever postponed dealing with the rights 
of people with disabilities.210
The rights of future generations, however, had already been addressed within 
Rawls’ Theory of Justice.211 In order to obtain the desired results (a sustainability- 
oriented environmental and financial policy), Rawls first introduced additional 
anthropological assumptions, like, for instance, the assumption of the contract part-
ners’ emotional concern for their own offspring. He thus invites us to think of a 
sequence of interlinked generations. Then, from step to step, a more or less sym-
207 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 24.
208 See Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal 
Doctrines in ‘A Theory of Justice’ by John Rawls (Oxford, 1973); see also Barry, Justice as 
Impartiality.
209 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 504–512.
210 Martha Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice contains a detailed discussion of that difficulty in 
Rawls’ work. She shows that Rawls could only have solved the problem of an equal consideration 
of the human rights of people with disabilities if he were ready to resign himself to modifying the 
essential foundations of his contractualist theory; which he, however, was, as is well known, not 
ready to do. I have nothing to add to this analysis.
211 See Claus Dierksmeier, “John Rawls on the Rights of Future Generations” in Jörg Tremmel 
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metrical utility-exchange could take place as long as one ascribes to the rational 
decision-makers an interest in the wellbeing of their descendants.212 In so doing, 
however, Rawls still owes us a proof of why a policy should not be content to still 
benefit the first, second, and, eventually, third subsequent generation (i.e. those who 
may be born within one’s own lifetime), but not at all consider the interests of the 
seventh and eighth generations (which are not included in that construct).
Moreover, in the eyes of his critics, Rawls is once again guilty of ad hoc meta-
physics: For concern for one’s offspring is certainly not analytically contained in the 
concept of a rational advantage-seeker. But equally unsatisfactory are his attempts 
to protect the legal interests of future generations, without those ad hoc assump-
tions. Rawls, for instance, declares that each generation must sense that it lies within 
its interest to commit itself to axioms of action which it wishes would have been 
considered by earlier generations.213 If we nevertheless concentrate upon a purely 
quantitative exchange of freedom and utility, then current decision-makers will cer-
tainly joyfully welcome that previous generations carefully and sparingly dealt with 
their environment. But why should it enhance their utility to likewise decide in favor 
of a consideration (necessarily remaining unrequited) for those born posthumously? 
Rawls thus proclaims something which de facto is not true: Rational egoism and the 
interests of future generations very often do not coincide – which is exactly why the 
rights of posthumous generations are so often trampled underfoot.214
What is needed is therefore more decency and morality than self-interest and 
advantage-seeking. Whoever sees himself, from unconditional respect for subse-
quent persons, as obliged to treat the planet earth sustainably, follows no utility- 
exchange calculation conditioned by quantitatively symmetrical exchange, but 
rather acknowledges a commitment to another notion of freedom. Only from the 
perspective of a qualitative conception that does not ascribe the same quantitative 
value to each employment of freedom – destroying freedom the same as protecting 
freedom, for instance – can responsibility also for the seventh or eighth subsequent 
generation plausibly be justified.
Rawls’ laborious constructions of intergenerational justice thus unintentionally 
reveal the inconveniences of a theory shielding its qualitative premises: In A Theory 
of Justice he had – in favor of intuitively recognized qualitative and asymmetrically 
directed duties – still engaged in correcting the clockwork of quantitatively sym-
metrical exchange with contingent additional assumptions. After demoting the – in 
A Theory of Justice still serviceable – speculations about the freedom and equality 
of all persons from the status of prescriptive metaphysical universals to that of 
merely descriptive generalizations about liberal societies, such an escape from the 
212 See Jörg Tremmel, “Welche Prinzipien der Generationengerechtigkeit würden Vertreter aller 
Generationen unter dem Rawls’schen Schleier der Unwissenheit festlegen?,” Zeitschrift für poli-
tische Philosophie (2009).
213 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 271ff. and Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 159ff.
214 See Mark Anderson, Mario Teisl & Caroline Noblet, “Giving Voice to the Future in Sustainability: 
Retrospective Assessment to Learn Prospective Stakeholder Engagement,” Ecological Economics 
84 (2012), 1–6.
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logic of symmetrical reciprocity is no longer possible. With quantitative means 
alone, Rawls cannot justify why in certain fields of the political administration of 
law a purely quantitative ratio of the exchange calculi should no longer or not solely 
dominate.
Rawls is lacking qualitative guidelines that secure affected subjects their due 
irrespective of symmetrical relations. Since he refuses to transcend hypothetically- 
reciprocal layers of interest in the direction of categorically-unconditional demands 
for recognition, he must – strictly speaking – refuse to grant rights whenever and 
wherever symmetrical relations cannot be construed, or at the very least accept that 
their actual rejection conforms with his theory. Rawls accordingly acknowledged 
that the rights of future generations and people with disabilities, or even animals, 
could only be integrated with difficulty into his theoretical framework: “While we 
would like eventually to answer all these questions, I very much doubt whether that 
is possible within the scope of justice as fairness as a political conception.”215
This diagnosis may surprise us; it seems to oppose the large amount of liberal 
pathos one finds throughout Rawls’ late work: for instance, an emphatic concept of 
persons, who, grasping themselves and one another to be free and equal, examine 
and, if the occasion arises, transform the rules of the rationality guiding their inter-
est in the light of ethical reason. Indeed: When, at the altar of Rawls’ theory, aspects 
of personality are negotiated and transformed, thick swathes of humanistic incense 
pervade the cold cathedral of his thinking. Yet we should not be deceived into think-
ing that this is anything more than a pleasantly fragranced smoke screen. What does 
not take place is a genuine transubstantiation of symmetry-orientated utility- 
calculations into appropriate normative correctives in favor of inviolable human 
rights.
Rawls in no way counterfactually substantiates his concepts of personality – that 
would all too closely resemble the Kantian metaphysics he desperately avoids – but 
rather only historically, as it is distilled by him from the factually applied principles 
of practical reason at the heart of the liberal state. Rawls only declares that, insofar 
as those principles (recognizing other persons as free and equal individuals as such) 
are historically discoverable, the reason articulating itself within them will encoun-
ter subjects for whom those principles mean something. In that case then there are 
persons furnished with the capacity to distinguish between the (less important) good 
and the (more important) just.216 The two-level ethical orientation his theory requires 
to enable a critique of the private ideas of the good in the light of universal forms of 
justice, thus already exists in practice. This argument is as circular as it is unproduc-
tive. It establishes the validity (Geltung) of these principles only within communi-
ties where they already possess historical authority (Gültigkeit). A concept of 
personality acquired in this way can, however, exert no normative force beyond 
liberal societies. The result is: In attempting to unburden his liberalism theoretically, 
215 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 21.
216 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 107.
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Rawls robs it of precisely the argumentative foundations that a philosophy of free-
dom requires in order to defend its normative demands.217
This point becomes striking in regard to the marginalization of certain people 
and groups from the protected sphere of the social contract in Rawls’ theory of 
international law. From the logic of his earlier theory one may have speculated that 
in international settings he would seek to extend the normative measures of his 
Theory of Justice to the global level, defending postulates of international social 
justice and a global catalogue of personal rights to freedom. But instead, in the Laws 
of Peoples, Rawls proclaims a different policy. He recommends a federation of 
states – largely inactive in questions of distributive justice – in which even nations 
not especially strict on human rights may participate.218
Rawls’ position is: As long as in their external relations illiberal states keep to 
axioms offered by a second order original position of international law, their partial 
non-compliance with demands developed on the part of the first order original posi-
tion in inner relations should be accepted.219 Insofar as these states grant to every-
one at least “a special class of urgent rights,” like, for example, “freedom from 
slavery and serfdom,”220 they are acceptable allies within a global federation. One 
should, after all, not force basic convictions of a “Western individualism”221 onto 
other nations. Therefore one would regrettably have to recognize from nation to 
nation also some inequalities in the attribution and protection of human rights.222 
Though forcefully demanded on the part of the first order original position, from the 
second order original position certain liberal rights to protection (especially, it 
seems, of women) may now apparently be infringed upon, which should be accepted 
within international law out of respect for the internal sovereignty of those states.
We see: The ultimate source of all normativity is and remains for Rawls the 
national community, which Rawls conceives as “a closed system isolated from other 
societies.”223 To it alone, i.e. to the nation state, individuals have to adhere to claim 
their human rights. To prevent an ugly theoretical lacuna here, nations must be con-
ceived as though they one and all provided the presuppositions to satisfy their citi-
zens’ claims to human rights. Yet, with a glance at the reality, one must certainly 
question whether all nation states have at their disposal the necessary (economic) 
and sufficient (political) means to distribute fairly to all people what they are respec-
tively due.
217 See Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 183.
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That attracted the attention of renowned critics. If a certain polis does not give a 
whit about the effects of its policies on foreigners or on the subtleties of human 
rights, then, as Amartya Sen, for instance, complains, the Rawlsian theory knows 
“no systematic way of opening up the reflections in the original position to the eyes 
of mankind.”224 Martha Nussbaum also criticizes the assumption that states always 
fairly represent their populations – in terms of domestic and international policy – 
as “idealism carried to a point at which it loses useful contact with reality.”225 There 
are, after all, governments for whom violations of human rights are not the excep-
tion, but rather the rule, since they are part of their political program. Nussbaum 
poses the eminently important question: Who stands up for the repressed? Who 
protects citizens from (unlawful) states?226 These are concerns to be discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter (Sect. 4.2.4) in connection with Sen’s criticism 
that Rawls provided no “procedural barricade against susceptibility to local 
 prejudices” and thus was himself guilty of just such a narrow-minded and petty 
“parochialism.”227
Rawls thus not only disappointed hopes for the construction of a convincing 
cosmopolitan liberalism.228 With the international limitation of his basic liberal con-
cerns, he also damaged political liberalism on the national level. Ultimately Rawls 
throws into doubt even the prescriptive character of the original position of the first 
order, and thus his tools of justification par excellence. If, as A Theory of Justice 
suggests, the original position is really an illustration of human reason’s normative 
capacity, then its rules must be valid universally – and therefore be binding for every 
state in the world. But if one accepts that only some states meet the criteria estab-
lished in the first order original position, what then? Insofar as (with the late Rawls) 
one recognizes as valid for other states also the procedures of political representa-
tion that, for example, through hierarchical representation lead to the exclusion of 
marginalized strata and women, one thus retroactively devalues the status of the 
original position in liberal societies as well. It consequently becomes downgraded 
224 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 127.
225 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 233.
226 In Frontiers of Justice Martha Nussbaum thus remarks that “Rawls seems to accord legitimacy 
to the status quo, even when it is not fully accountable to people. One of the things people them-
selves might want out of international relations is to help in overthrowing an unjust regime, or 
winning full inclusion in one that excludes them” (ibid., 234).
227 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 127.
228 See: Charles R. Beitz, “Rawls’ “Law of Peoples,”” Ethics 110:4 (2000), 669; Allen Edward 
Buchanan, “Rawls’ Laws of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World,” Ethics 110:4 
(2000), 697; Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 10:1 (2002), 95–123; Andreas Føllesdal & Thomas Pogge, Real World Justice: 
Grounds, Principals, Human Rights, and Social Institutions (Dordrecht, 2005); Andrew Kuper, 
“Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of Persons,” 
Political Theory 28:5 (2000), 640–674; Kok-Chor Tan, “Review of The Law of Peoples: With ‘The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited,’” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31:1 (2001), 113. A – in my 
opinion – unconvincing defense of the Rawlsian standpoint in regard to globalization ethics is to 
be found in Huw Lloyd Williams, On Rawls, Development and Global Justice: The Freedom of 
Peoples (Basingstoke & New York, 2011).
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from a transcendental condition of legitimation for all dominion into merely a 
description of some political conceptions.229 Just as in Rorty then, the liberalism in 
the West is diminished into merely the liberalism of the West.230
The practice of global solidarity thus falls victim to theoretical predilections. 
Instead of – as was suggested by Kant231 and carried into execution by Krause (see 
Sect. 2.3.4) – positioning humanity as a whole as the terminus a quo and ad quem 
of global justice, Rawls remains attached to a methodological nationalism. Beyond 
national states, he does not at all attempt to give the idea of distributive justice a 
place within political practice. In the face of blatant global poverty, Rawls has not 
much more to offer impoverished nations than to shift the essential responsibility 
for their unfortunate position upon themselves:
I believe that the causes of the wealth of people and the forms it takes lie in their political 
culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic 
 structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and coop-
erative talents of its members, all supported by their political virtues.232
The paralyzing consequence is clear: If it lies in the hands of every one nation to 
protect its citizens from poverty, then it is also the responsibility of nobody else.233
An astonishing result both in regard to the past (colonialism, imperialism) and 
the present or future (for example in respect of structural injustices in world- 
trade).234 For, do we really live in a world in which nation states can haggle amongst 
themselves as ‘rough equals’ for economic advantage and political design so that 
the interests and rights of their citizens are adequately protected? Or, is that quasi- 
symmetry not completely fictional in the face of a world that can be unbalanced 
militarily by individual states, economically by a few nations and firms, and finan-
cially by numerous hedge funds and investment bankers?235 The global governance 
system, largely formed by the affluent nations of the world, and the past and present 
economic disadvantages for poorer countries resulting from it, have rather created a 
229 For a defense of the modifications in the concept of the original position see Terence Kelly, 
“Sociological not Political: Rawls and the Reconstructive Social Sciences,” Philosophy and the 
Social Sciences 31:1 (2001), 3.
230 See Martha Nussbaum’s critique of this in Frontiers of Justice, 235ff. and especially 301ff.
231 See Brian J.  Shaw, “Rawls, Kant’s Doctrine of Right, and Global Distributive Justice,” The 
Journal of Politics 67:1 (2005), 220–249.
232 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 108.
233 Martha Nussbaum quite rightly notes in regard to Rawls that one can in no way cover up ques-
tions of global justice with appeals to “thrift and virtue” (Frontiers of Justice, 240). Rawls, on the 
other hand, “ratified philosophically what the powerful nations of the world, especially the United 
States, like to do anyway: they pretend their system is fixed and final, and resist with might and 
main any demand that they change internally, whether in matters of human rights or in environ-
mental matters of economic policy, either in response to the situation of the rest of the world or in 
response to international treaties and agreements […] In the real world, however, we see this tactic 
for what it is: an arrogant mentality that is culpably unresponsive to grave problems. One should 
not grant it philosophical respectability” (ibid., 236).
234 See ibid., 20f.
235 See ibid., 262ff.
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world which for the foreseeable future will be characterized by asymmetries rather 
than symmetries.
Therefore, we must agree with the trenchant analysis of Martha Nussbaum, that: 
“To assume a rough equality between parties is to assume something so grossly 
false of the world as to make the resulting theory unable to address the world’s most 
urgent problems.”236 In contrast, Martha Nussbaum states that “We live in a world in 
which it is simply not true that cooperating with others on fair terms will be advan-
tageous to all.”237 Affluent institutions and states have one-sided duties for the cre-
ation of a more just global (legal and economic) order according to Nussbaum. She 
of course knows: The powerful and affluent of this world “pretend their system is 
fixed and final, and resist with might and main any demand that they change inter-
nally, whether in matters of human rights or in environmental matters or in matters 
of economic policy, either in response to the situation of the rest of the world or in 
response to international treatises and agreements.”238 This kind of thing is to be 
taken seriously politically, but not philosophically. It merely involves an “arrogant 
mentality that is culpably unresponsive to grave problems.” Therefore, with a swipe 
at Rawls, Nussbaum tells us that the only consistent consequence is that: “One 
should not grant it philosophical respectability.”239
This critique emphasizes a general weakness of theories of sociality based on the 
logic of quantitative maximization. Some states on this earth are so indigent that 
self-interest does not drive richer nations to enter into equitable commercial 
exchange with them. Here fails the logic – insisted on by game theories and contrac-
tualism – of a cooperation for the sake of reciprocal advantage. Whoever recognizes 
this also considers neither cosmopolitan anarchy nor a global system of victor’s 
justice to be acceptable and must therefore transform those quantitative calculations 
by qualitative criteria for a fellowship of all world citizens.240 For cosmopolitan 
rights and duties will certainly often lead to living-conditions which immediately 
also benefit the world citizens respecting them, although not always. Quantitative 
exchange-calculations can thus underscore global and intertemporal demands for 
justice but not justify or establish them. They require an independent foundation 
upon the basis of qualitative freedom: In order to defend a consistent liberalism, one 
has to materially and not only formally, qualitatively and not only quantitatively, 
support the principle of freedom. One would have to show, for instance, that and 
why liberalism’s respect extends to the human person as such – and not only the 
members of certain groups, classes, ethnicities, or trading communities. Only in this 
way can the normative force of the ideal of freedom equally relate to all human 





240 Martha Nussbaum likewise pronounces the following verdict upon Rawls’ approach: “So we 




3.3  Results and Implications
Rawls and Hayek are thinkers typically located at opposite extremes of the liberal 
spectrum. This manner of evaluation is orientated, rather superficially, by the politi-
cal tendencies of their doctrines and thereby overlooks the structural similarity of 
both approaches. Both attempt to support a philosophical liberalism without talking 
about the content of freedom: Rawls, because he fears metaphysics, and Hayek, 
because he resists theories of positive freedom. Their premises and aims are differ-
ent, but their methodological approaches are not. Rawls operates from the assump-
tion of a fictional negotiation, Hayek backs real processes of historical development. 
Both, however, mistrust their sources. Rawls keeps his hypothetical decision- makers 
in check by redirecting their maximizing logic through procedural directives, wher-
ever their choices do not suit him. Hayek, in contrast, rejects actual decisions as 
illegitimate, whenever they run contrary to his substantial concerns. Although 
Rawls’ social liberalism and Hayek’s Whig liberalism clearly differ politically, they 
resemble one another in their methodological inconsistency. Both consequently 
ended up in a cross-fire between false friends and genuine opponents: While the 
former prompt them to provide more methodological consistency in undesired 
directions, the latter call for them to revoke their methods in the name of their basic 
convictions. Thus critics and fans agree in rejecting the obvious contradictions 
within the respective approaches.
The studies of Rawls and Hayek thus highlight: In order not to lack all content, 
quantitative thinking must borrow from qualitative presuppositions. Problems 
emerge wherever this borrowing is not admitted openly. Either this undermines the 
consistency and the consequences of the theoretical approach. Then a truly qualita-
tive program is sold as a quantitative one, an essentially positive concept of freedom 
as a negative one, a material understanding of freedom as a formal one, a substantial 
issue as a merely procedural one. The result then is a theory standing in frequently 
unacknowledged contradiction with its premises. Or quantity  – despite all inner 
intuitions and outer observations – is raised to a qualitative category und thus the 
quantifiable is made the sole theme of the philosophy of freedom. Then the result is 
a theory permanently in marked contradiction to reality. Both alternatives damage 
the concerns and reputation of the idea of freedom.
We must therefore move away from the stupefying poverty of option counting, in 
order to be receptive to the stupendous diversity of freedoms. To ward off such a 
move, tenacious followers of quantitative approaches declare that their model would 
indeed be able to reproduce all necessary qualitative differentiations within its 
quantitative matrix. One would merely have to value options in respect of their 
quantitative fecundity.241 If one simply counted the resulting options (second order), 
which a certain option (first order) opens up or forecloses, one would have at hand 
the multiplying factor with which every option of the first order can be assessed 
against competing (only seemingly qualitative) alternatives (of the first order). One 
241 See Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment.
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could thus confidently adhere to the quantitative matrix and at the same time take 
into account qualitative differences in the value of certain options.
Yet, along with Charles Taylor, we can reject this argument as “either vacuous or 
false.”242 The statement that (qualitatively) more valuable freedom is continually to 
be also (quantitatively) estimated more highly, is vacuous and counterproductive; 
that does not strengthen quantitative approaches, but rather expresses the essence of 
qualitative theories of freedom: the conceptual priority of the qualitative. False, 
however, would be the assumption that more quantitative options necessarily imply 
a qualitatively higher-grade freedom. For example, the customary penal laws for 
theft and fraud constrict the room for manoeuver of countless people in many 
spheres of life. Laws against radical political freedom of expression and “fringe 
political activity”243 instead affect far fewer people in more narrowly circumscribed 
fields of action. Nevertheless, we judge the latter, and not the former, to be  especially 
dangerous for freedom. Here, the quality, and not the quantity, of those options 
clearly tips the scales.
Martha Nussbaum therefore urges us finally to recognize unambiguously “that 
some freedoms are central for political purposes, and some are distinctly not […]. 
Some lie at the heart of a view of political justice, and others do not. Among the 
ones that do not lie at the core, some are simply less important, but others may be 
positively bad.”244 As an example of the latter variant she invokes “the freedom to 
harass women in the workplace”245; as an example of the former “the freedom of 
motorcyclists to drive without helmets.”246 In short, some freedoms mean more than 
others: This elementary as well as essential insight forces the rethinking of the fun-
damentals of precisely these quantitative theories of freedom blurring this 
distinction.
The materialist and positivist foundations of quantitative theories of freedom 
must be especially scrutinized. For a concept of freedom only aiming at the number 
of easily realizable preferences all too easily enables one to overlook that freedom 
quite essentially consists in the – idealistically and normatively motivated – reflec-
tion upon, criticism, and change of our preferences. A few (second order) prefer-
ences can critically evaluate and, in the long term, transform innumerable (first 
order) preferences. One thinks, for example, of elementary ethical maxims that keep 
in check a multiplicity of hedonistic predilections. Would our freedom be helped for 
instance if, because of the predominance of the latter, the former would suddenly be 
nullified? Do people, whose capacity for moral reflection is sabotaged, perhaps 
experience in the satisfaction of their then unreflected wants a maximum degree of 
freedom?
242 See Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty? in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 
(Cambridge, 1985), 211–229.
243 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London, 1977), 268.





To clarify this objection, one must not at all fall back on the shrill thought- 
experiments cherished by today’s philosophers (hallucination machines, happiness 
drugs, parallel existences, etc.). We only need think of a society which increasingly 
renounces public media and culture and thus increasingly leaves the cultivation of 
intelligence and taste to the private sector. This could give us citizens conditioned 
by commercial manipulation, who fritter-away their lives by politely conforming to 
consumer madness, and who vote for policies devoted to the permanent extension 
of consumer options. Now, according to the quantitative understanding of freedom 
these people would, however, have to be freer than citizens of other liberal societies, 
who, although autonomously informed and cultivated (plus 1) would have fewer 
consumer options (minus n + 1) to choose from.247 Does anyone seriously wish to 
maintain this?
We must, therefore, avoid turning the freedom of choice into a fetish. And cer-
tainly not only because of the everyday experience that occasionally a little less 
quantitative freedom is quite agreeable since, for instance, before overflowing 
supermarket shelves, there creeps up upon us a longing for a “freedom from 
decision.”248 The critique would also not be primarily psychological and directed by 
the idea that a superfluity of possible choices pressurizing people to be ever more 
individualistic and authentic can make some poor souls depressed.249 No, we should 
quite fundamentally investigate whether it is prudent to reduce freedom to freedom 
of choice and to conceive it as an enumerable commodity.250
So as not to be misunderstood here: That quantitative theories reify freedom into 
a commodity is no innuendo but rather the credo of their proponents. Apologists for 
quantitative approaches present this argument as an ultimate defense of their posi-
tion: Freedom, which from a qualitative perspective appears to be an end in itself, 
is in truth only a means to an end (see the Introduction in this chapter). While our 
freedom of choice is no concrete means (for predefined ends), it is an abstract instru-
ment. And this abstraction constitutes its charm. Like money, freedom thus also 
presents a means to all ends, of which one can never have enough, regardless of 
what one intends to do with it. Therefore, freedom is wrongly held to be intrinsi-
cally more valuable than the goods it brings. Actually, its value is just as extrinsic as 
the value of the former; only – this is the point – quantitatively unequally greater, 
247 See Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 15.
248 Quine thus already points out that we occasionally long for a “freedom of second order: freedom 
from decision” (William van Orman Quine, Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary 
[Cambridge, MA, 1987], 68). Alain Ehrenberg, Das erschöpfte Selbst: Depression und Gesellschaft 
in der Gegenwart (Frankfurt am Main, 2008) treats in detail the psychological dimensions of such 
an escape from the excessive demands of autonomous life.
249 See Axel Honneth, “Organized Self-Realization,” European Journal of Social Theory 7:4 
(2004), 463–478 and Anders Petersen, “Authentic Self-Realization and Depression,” International 
Sociology 26:1 (2011), 5–24.
250 See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 268: “It is very difficult to think of liberty as a commod-
ity.” See also Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, 1989).
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since through said abstractness this commodity also encompasses future – currently 
still indeterminate – uses.251
Whoever thinks of freedom as like – or directly as – money fetishizes it, how-
ever, since, in the glorification of its quantitative exchange-value, its qualitative use- 
value is neglected. Furthermore, in order to satisfy the postulated commensurability, 
the commodity-value of freedom is to be budgeted by a reduction to purely material 
options. Yet, in order to be able to measure and make freedom comparable in this 
way, we must, we are being told, conceive of the entire world, including ourselves 
and our freedom, mechanically: “we need to think of space and time as granular in 
order to produce measurements of ‘the extensiveness of available action.’”252 Then 
alone could all qualitative value judgments be completely reduced to quantitatively 
exactly ascertainable spatiotemporal relations.
What twisted logic: One first commits oneself to viewing freedom purely quan-
titatively. As a consequence, its commensurability – and thus also its measurabil-
ity – has to be postulated. The latter, however, demands a physicalist view of the 
world as well as of ourselves. That worldview, for its part, now allows only quantita-
tive analyses and no qualitative appraisals. Finally, all qualitative aspects of  freedom 
are thus passed off as inessential, and it is maintained that, without any losses, these 
can be reduced to quantitative differences. A circulus vitiosus.
The same is true of the concept of coercion which the quantitative tradition 
would also like to grasp in purely physical terms. Earlier (see the Introduction in 
this chapter), I already expressed doubt as to whether a normatively rich concept of 
freedom could be picked out from a purely physical definition of coercion. Usually 
the experience of coercion is “emphatically and technically contextual”; in real life, 
descriptive and prescriptive aspects are typically intertwined.253 Everyday experi-
ences, normative behavioral-expectations, and situational preconceptions – and not 
only physical aspects – define what are freedom-infracting, coercing acts.
Whoever, for example, breaks into a house and takes possession of someone 
else’s things negates the owner’s freedom of possession. Violent, physical causality 
is present. But that those things were first of all bounded from the appropriation of 
others by fences and walls, likewise presents a physical causality which limits their 
freedom of movement and freedom of appropriation.254 Whoever criticizes the for-
mer causality (criminally directed against private property) must legitimate the lat-
ter causality (effecting protection for private property). Without such legitimation 
there prevails a stalemate between the physical freedoms, i.e. between the coercions 
of the homeowner and those of the intruder: That which the one experiences as a 
minus in freedom, i.e. coercion, the other registers as a plus. Whoever does not want 
to content themselves with this almost Proudhonian stalemate (“property is theft”255) 
251 See Ian Carter, A Measure of Freedom (Oxford, 1999), 50–52.
252 Ibid., 174.
253 See Wertheimer, “Social Theory and the Assessment of Social Freedom,” Polity 7:3 (1975), 
334–360.
254 See Cohen, Self-Ownership.
255 Proudhon, Traité du domaine de propriété, ou de la distinction des biens; considérés principale-
ment par rapport au domaine privé (Paris, 1862), 37.
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has the burden of proof and must justify the legitimacy of the privation of objects 
due to their privatization. But that is clearly not achievable physicalistically, but 
only ethically: through a theory of qualitative freedom.
The theory of quantitative freedom pretends to be value-neutral, but it is not. 
There is, rather, a hidden valuation in its physicalist limitation to the empirically 
enumerable: against, namely, all quantitatively inestimable but nonetheless relevant 
aspects of freedom.256 With what right is it established that only causal effects count 
as limitations of freedom, but not also omissions of services, which could be imper-
ative for the protection or materialization of the freedom of others?257 Can we at all 
define that which is injurious to freedom before we have come to an agreement 
about what our duties in regard to one another are?258 In short, questions of value 
belong to the perception of freedom. Unless they are answered, the radius of free-
dom cannot be outlined, and we cannot specify what we may lawfully defend 
against others and what we are justified in demanding of them.259 A theory of the 
Ought, and not only of the Is, must inform therefore the content of the idea of 
freedom.260
The quantitative imprecision which the turn towards the qualitative entails at 
times is not a loss in acuity, but rather a gain in proximity to the issue at hand. To 
paraphrase Aristotle: One should never be more precise than the topic allows.261 
Otherwise, one exchanges uncertain truths for precise falsities. Whoever investi-
gates an essentially humanistic phenomenon using the methods of the natural sci-
ences should not be surprised if aspects residing outside the material and physical 
realm thereby evaporate. The theory of quantitative freedom is, however, lacking in 
precisely this critical self-reflection. It gives far too much currency to its reduction-
ist picture of freedom as a commensurable commodity.
Yet, wherever freedom is perceived to be a naturally given capacity, fellow 
human beings appear first and foremost to be possible intruders.262 The social con-
struction of freedom is overlooked263 and so the absurd practical consequence 
ensues that, the less individual freedom is socially influenced or co-determined the 
256 See Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 141: “Without the normative point of view from 
which the concept is formed we would have no basis for deciding what ‘descriptive terms’ to 
include or exclude in the definition.”
257 See David Miller, “Reply to Oppenheim,” Ethics 95:2 (1985), 313.
258 See Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 142: “To refuse to bring these considerations 
into one’s deliberations about ‘freedom’ is to deny oneself access to the very consideration that can 
inform judgment about the concept or to delude oneself by tacitly invoking the very considerations 
formally eschewed.”
259 See Kristján Kristjánnson, Social Freedom: The Responsibility View (Cambridge & New York, 
1996), 32.
260 See Richard E. Flathman, The Philosophy and Politics of Freedom (Chicago, 1987), 105.
261 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics I, 3 1094b.
262 “That individual freedom enables every human being to find in other human beings 
not the manifestation, but rather the limits of his own freedom (Karl Marx, Werke [Berlin, 
1988], 365).
263 See Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism (London & New York, 1927).
3.3 Results and Implications
218
better. Freedom must consequently be sought in sovereign independence and every 
regulation of private freedom will be perceived as its potential negation.264 
Accordingly, theories resting upon the logic of quantitative freedom regularly 
exhibit a tendency to push back, as far as possible, the limits of private freedom of 
choice. It is therefore no accident that the conception of a minimal state – carica-
tured in other places as a ‘night-watchman-state’ – enjoys great popularity amongst 
proponents of quantitative freedom.265
Quantitative theories of freedom typically only protect freedoms which one 
already (factually) possesses, and not those to which one perhaps (counterfactually) 
could have a right.266 They orientate themselves (extensionally) towards a freedom 
in its material formation – ownership of the individual’s body and possessions – not 
(intensionally) towards its ideal conceptual meaning. It does not optimize concrete 
opportunities, but rather maximizes abstract options  – embodied in enforceable 
property-rights.267 The political community thus evaporates into a society obsessed 
with property and entitlements which, instead of enabling all-round freedom, is 
committed and obligated to the reciprocal protection of possessions and entitle-
ments.268 Thus, in quantitative liberalism, society loses solidarity with regrettable 
consistency, as became clear with Hayek’s invective against social policy and the 
Rawlsian failure in the face of the challenges of global and intergenerational 
justice.
Yet, from a contractualist viewpoint such outcomes sadly appear logical. Why 
should we take into consideration human beings from whom we expect neither 
advantages nor disadvantages? Consequently, it would appear only consistent to 
limit solidarity within national boundaries, whenever disadvantageous repercus-
sions (e.g. regarding economics or security) are not to be expected, and, conversely, 
no robust advantages are achievable. Therefore, in the framework of quantitatively- 
liberal theories, questions of global and intergenerational socioeconomic participa-
tion are willingly avoided or dealt with unwillingly and unkindly.
Nevertheless, on the horizon we can glimpse a change. While yesterday’s demi-
gods of quantitative liberalism still pray for the transubstantiation of the earthy, 
everyday bread of economic contracts into the sanctified body of freedom,269 based 
on a magic supposedly dwelling within the Roman rule of the market that volenti 
non fit inuria (to a willing person, injury is not done), the symbols of this sacramen-
tal transformation are presently subjected to a sober critique. Obviously, only where 
264 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford & New York, 1991), 8.
265 See Macpherson, Democratic Theory, 91.
266 See Cohen, Self-Ownership.
267 “In the profoundest sense there are no rights but property rights. […] Each individual, as a natu-
ral fact, is the owner of himself, the rule of his own person. Then, “human” rights of the person … 
are, in effect, each man’s property right in his own being, from this right stems his right to the 
material goods he has produced” (Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, 175); see also Murray Newton 
Rothbard, Government and the Economy (Kansas City, 1977), 238.
268 See Harold Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism (London, 1962), 105.
269 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford, 1975), 262ff.
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no “asymmetries of power” distort the interests of the contractual partner can we 
say, that, actually, to a willing person, no injury is done. Genuine economic freedom 
for contracts presupposes “the absence of domination, not just the absence of inter-
ference”; otherwise it all too quickly befits “appalling contractual arrangements,” to 
which we, precisely in the interest and name of freedom, must refuse to agree to.270 
Increasingly, therefore, even the proponents of quantitative theories resist the “lib-
ertarian thesis that only coercion undermines voluntariness.”271 From the long over-
due confession that need can necessitate, there now grows, also in the positions of 
quantitative theories of freedom, a critical reflection upon the nature of economic 
freedom. It is now said that freedom in business in particular may not counter the 
idea of freedom in general; and therefore some Anglo-American liberals even 
demand “that no one may so acquire goods that others suffer severe loss of liberty 
as a result.”272
In the last decades, the idea of the admission of sociopolitical concerns into the 
concept of freedom itself, first introduced into positivist groundwater by Gerald 
MacCallum, found its way into the strata of Anglo-American philosophy. Analytic 
theories became infiltrated by the idea of conceptualizing freedom, not from the 
starting-point of unhindered actions, but rather from the finishing-line of available 
options. Freedom would then need to be measured less by means of the volume of 
the inlets or outlets, but rather by the whole reservoir of liquid options available to 
all. Thus, however, the flow of quantitative liberalism turns against the formerly 
dominant stream of libertarian market-idolatry and thus creates dangerous shallows 
for possessive individualism. While, until recently, the quantitatively-liberal waters 
coolly and quietly flowed past the sandbanks of poverty, some now produce, from 
inlets fed from left-libertarian estuaries, an inverse undercurrent, becoming increas-
ingly stronger, which swirls asunder the once straight conservative alignment of 
quantitative freedom theories.
Perplexed, conservative libertarians find themselves confronted with cheeky 
questions, like, for example: “How is libertarian capitalism libertarian if it erodes 
the liberty of a large class of people?”273 Suddenly, there is talk of a universal 
empowerment to autonomy,274 in accordance with the insight that “a society is as 
free as its underdogs are.”275 This shakes the silent alliance between libertarian 
thinking and a politics directed against social justice. Hillel Steiner, for instance, 
washes down the libertarian assumption that freedom primarily manifests itself 
270 See Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford & New York, 
1997), 65f.
271 See Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market, 149.
272 Cohen, Self-Ownership, 37.
273 Cohen, ibid.
274 If we see “freedom as the non-restriction of options, rather than the absence of impediments” 
(Stanley Benn & W. L. Weinstein, “Being Free to Act and Being a Free Man,” Mind 80 (1971), 
201) then it is also clear that social assistance for the acquisition of freedom belongs to a liberal 
philosophy just as much as the defense of freedoms against impediments.
275 Bay, The Structure of Freedom, 7.
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through rights to possession and disposal – with a shot of socialist logic. If everyone 
has an equal right to object-related freedom, then this right should also be due to all 
of them in more or less equal quantity. Everyone must therefore be able to start out 
in life from a quantitatively comparable starting-point. Since such an allocation of 
goods is unable to come about by itself, corresponding redistributions must be seen 
as producing freedom and accordingly demanded, according to Steiner.276
The prescriptive demand for support for solidarity born out by such arguments 
however clearly contradicts the descriptive methodological ideal of the quantitative 
logic which professedly aims to operate from the negation of the negation of already 
extant freedom-positions. Yet, the thinkers of “left-libertarianism” no longer con-
sider solely the quantitative extension of factually given freedoms, but rather 
demand the establishment of counterfactual freedoms. With that, however, the 
matrix is covertly exchanged. The quality of the freedoms to which all are entitled 
assumes priority over the quantitative logic and consequently demands quantitative 
egality. Thus the plateau changes and – as we have already seen with Hayek and 
Rawls  – we suddenly exchange a factual-quantitative framing for a 
 counterfactual- qualitative one, which examines not only the number, but also the 
nature of our options.277 Covertly, the discourse has moved to qualitative premises.
This objection also affects the now fashionable attempts of libertarian paternal-
ism278 to deflect the anti-libertarian critique through the integration of especially 
popular (social and environmental) policy demands. What is intended thereby is to 
understand the actual interests of individuals better than they themselves. Libertarian 
paternalist believe themeselves justified – until explicitly revoked on the part of 
those affected – even obligated, to bolster through state action the supposed inter-
ests of people (by means of the homo oeconomicus models). Allegedly, one thus 
secures more freedoms for individuals in the long run. Left to themselves, individu-
als would make too many (false) decisions running contrary to their true rationally- 
selfish interests, and thus over time unduly reduce the sphere of their options. 
Observed from this foil of ‘true’ interests orientated towards economic rationality, 
many familiar ways of life end up looking suspiciously ‘irrational.’ These, there-
fore, should in no way be maximized. Implicitly, however, even the explicit concep-
tions of freedom, upon which these lives are built, are devalued too. So, whoever, 
like the libertarian paternalists, prescribes the maxims of a rational maximization 
276 See Steiner, An Essay on Rights, 28.
277 See Cohen, Self-Ownership, 53.
278 About libertarian paternalism see Richard Thaler & Cass Sustein, “Libertarian Paternalism,” 
The American Economic Review 93:2 (2003), 175–179. For the current discussion, see Nick Gill 
& Mathew Gill, “The Limits to Libertarian Paternalism: Two New Critiques and Seven Best 
Practice Imperatives,” Environment and Planning, 30:5 (2012), 924–940; Riccardo Rebonato, 
Taking Liberties: A Critical Examination of Libertarian Paternalism (2012); Mozaffar Qizilbash, 
“Sugden’s Critique of Sen’s Capability Approach and the Dangers of Libertarian Paternalism,” 
International Review of Economics 58:1 (2011), 21–42; Jessica Pykett et al., “Interventions in the 
Political Geography of ‘Libertarian Paternalism,’” Political Geography 20:6 (2011), 301–310; 
Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health and Social Justice (Oxford & New York, 2010).
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of self-interest as an outvotable default position also pursues value-orientated meta-
physics – only secretly.
Dressed up as a qualitative algorithm, there consequently takes place on the part 
of the “left-libertarianism” as well as on the side of the “libertarian paternalism” a 
qualitative selection of supposedly more or less ‘good’ forms of freedom. Howsoever 
one twists and turns the matter, one cannot avoid therefore a substantial discussion 
of what should serve as freedom. The theory of freedom must be qualitatively ori-
entated before it can devote itself to quantitative questions.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
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Our previous studies have shown: Freedom cannot be analyzed from a value-neutral 
standpoint. Whereas the options of robots can be adequately described in purely 
quantitative terms, the freedom of humans requires that we transcend talk of “over-
all amounts,” i.e., the sheer “quantity of freedom.”1 This is increasingly recognized 
today, and the importance of qualitative considerations is thus evermore frequently 
acknowledged.2 Yet, often only as a small concession by a still predominantly quan-
titative way of thinking, according to the motto that one could privately live out 
qualitative moments in that space opened up by a policy orientated by the quantita-
tive conception of freedom.3 One only needs to create enough space for variety to 
let a thousand flowers bloom, including the flower of qualitative freedom. But mani-
foldness is not a quantitative concept. Multiplicity (Vielzahl) is quantitative. Variety 
(Vielfalt), in contrast, aims at diversity in the multiplicity: at a multitude qualita-
tively classified.
This can be illustrated by the example of the relation between public and private 
transport. Whenever, for instance, someone in the USA is thinking about commut-
ing to work, in most cases they only have a choice between different cars; the pos-
sibility of cycling or taking the train frequently does not exist for lack of bike paths 
or efficient public transport options; often simply because the only connection 
between two places is a highway. Assuming that the automobile market in the USA 
is flooded with considerably more brands and models than in Europe, purely quan-
titatively (in the sense of sheer multiplicity), the multitude of options for the free-
dom of private transport would be greater. Qualitatively, on the other hand (in the 
sense of significant variation), the choice appears deplorably narrow. In many places 
there is no real choice between different means of transport. The morale of the story: 
1 Miller, Constraints on Freedom, 83.
2 The idea of “qualitative freedom” has already been taken up in the political discourse. See, for 
instance, the introduction by Christian Linder in Philipp Rösler & Christian Lindner (eds), Freiheit: 
geführt – gedacht – gelebt: Liberale Beiträge zu einer Wertediskussion (Wiesbaden, 2009).
3 See Eric Nelson, “Liberty: One Concept Too Many?,” Political Theory 33:1 (2005), 58–78.
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Whoever wishes for a genuine variety of opportunities is demanding qualitative, not 
just quantitative, freedom. Only the qualitative difference makes colorful variety out 
of colorless multiplicity.
But which freedoms belong within that sphere of possibilities worth protecting? 
All of them? Even destructive ones? There must be a choice4; therefore – as the 
previous chapter has shown – even theories expressly committed to a quantitative 
model of thinking ultimately fall back upon qualitative distinctions. Something 
similar also occurs in the opposed case. Every qualitatively directed theory must 
also pick out certain freedoms which should first be realized from a set of compet-
ing alternatives, and then indicate the extent to which these should be protected and 
the point at which other freedoms should be given a chance. Qualitative freedom has 
therefore to quantify the freedoms with which it deals. Quantitative and qualitative 
conceptions of freedom therefore both complement one another, albeit in different 
ways.
In quantitative thinking one must, without fail, always pick out from competing 
freedoms that one which leads to more options now and in the future. It is a question 
of an absolute measure between options and their assumed consequences. The high-
est numerical value of options is automatically awarded the highest freedom value. 
Yet wherever quality results from quantity alone, the former is ultimately reduced to 
the latter. In the framework of quantitative theories of freedom, quantity turns out to 
be the (only accepted) quality of freedom.
Not so in qualitatively orientated theories. They recommend giving priority to 
those options that fulfill certain material criteria, like, for example, human dignity, 
reasonableness, reciprocity, universalizability, autonomy, promotion of capabilities, 
etc.5 For such a comparison, relative relations of rank suffice. A proponent of a 
qualitative theory must therefore not precisely weigh (abwiegen) the liberty content 
of certain options to the nearest gram; he will, however, weight (abwägen) the 
attractiveness of different possibilities. One can, for instance, meaningfully say that 
the freedom to express a certain opinion is more essential than the freedom to drive 
upon a certain side of the motorway, yet without measuring exactly how much better 
the first option is than the second.
In terms of econometrics, quantitative freedom demands cardinal scales with 
commensurable measures, whereas qualitative freedom establishes ordinal taxono-
mies which also allow for comparisons between incommensurable goods. This 
theoretical difference has noticeable practical consequences. For example (and to 
anticipate the following chapter), while, in the framework of quantitatively directed 
types of freedom, an increase in private options – for instance within a free market 
economy – is to be approved per se, qualitatively directed liberalisms are more dis-
cerning and can also take account of the nature of those options (as well as their 
opportunity costs). Mass is not class, and freedom is therefore also not to be simply 
equated with market freedom.6 While theories directed towards quantitative 
4 See John Christman, “Saving Positive Freedom,” Political Theory 33:1 (2005), 79–88.
5 See Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 32.
6 See Eric MacGilvray, The Invention of Market Freedom (2011).
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 freedom, for instance, normally paint the market as a paradise of economic free-
dom, since it, according to their definition, is nothing other than the location and 
aggregate of voluntary acts of exchange,7 there is something decidedly more ter-
restrial about theories of qualitative freedom. They ask about the quality of market 
transactions and investigate how free those ‘voluntary’ acts of commercial exchange 
really were. Was necessity in play or did manipulation take place?8 Are we also to 
accept voluntary transactions that undermine human dignity?9 How, moreover, do 
things stand with unethical and dishonorable deals?
Because of such reflections, qualitative freedom will not approve of every 
increase of options and will not consistently define economic aims in the sense of a 
purely quantitative growth.10 Rather, a balance between freedoms ought to be found: 
certainly, between economic freedom on the one hand, and political and cultural 
freedoms on the other. Yet also between the economic freedom of this and that citi-
zen, as well as, of course, likewise between different forms of economic freedom, 
for example between economic aims that are short-term or long-term, or are more 
or less ecologically and socially sustainable (see Sect. 5.2). When, accordingly, ten-
dencies of economic maximization are being curtailed, we are not – in contrast to 
common neoliberal and libertarian stereotypes  – witnessing an assault upon 
freedom,11 but rather – as we will presently show from the theories of freedom of 
John Kenneth Galbraith and Amartya Sen – different forms of freedom competing 
with one another.
Qualitatively oriented liberalism demands a primacy of the political and the soci-
etal debate about which targets our economic freedom should satisfy. It thus re- 
establishes upon a liberal foundation the deference of economics to politics and of 
politics to ethics, recognized as mandatory from Aristotle to Adam Smith, but sub-
sequently noticeably displaced in economic thinking. Of course, economic freedom 
is not to be abolished in the name of political freedom.12 Yet, conversely, as Galbraith 
and Sen stress, the freedom of some to engage in wild transactions may also not 
undermine the freedom of all to participate in economic life and sociopolitical 
cooperation. Freedom will only be defended by all, if it fends for the liberty of all.
So, indeed: “Freedom does not only belong to the rich.”13 Some may sleep under 
the open sky, possibly because they are admirers of the firmament, or perhaps also 
because they lack the means for providing a roof over their head. The former have 
the freedom to make use of shelter, the latter not. Therefore, since freedom de facto 
7 See John Thrasher, “John Tomasi: Free Market Fairness,” Public Choice 159:1–2 (2014), 
309–311.
8 See Richard Arneson, “Meaningful Work and Market Socialism Revisited,” Analyse und Kritik-
Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaften 31:1 (2009), 139.
9 See Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 35.
10 See Philip Mirowski & Esther-Mirjam Sent (eds.), Science Bought and Sold: Essays in the 
Economics of Science (Chicago & London, 2002).
11 See Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-death of Neo-liberalism (Cambridge, 2011).
12 See Parijs, Real Freedom for All.
13 See Herzog, Freiheit gehört nicht nur den Reichen.
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depends upon conditions – whoever involuntarily sleeps outside is unfree – the the-
ory of qualitative freedom shifts attention towards the enabling conditions of real 
freedoms and socio-economic capabilities. The philosophy of qualitative freedom 
therefore reformulates the concept of economic freedom so that it comprises not 
only the transactional freedom of some, but rather the participatory freedom of all.
4.1  Fair Freedom (John Kenneth Galbraith)
With Milton Friedman (1912–2006) and John Kenneth Galbraith (1908–2006) there 
passed away, a decade ago, the two most influential U.S. American economists of 
the twentieth century. Although, in the German perception, Milton Friedman played 
a greater role, internationally the title “most widely known American economist of 
the twentieth century” is typically being awarded to his intellectual antagonist, 
Galbraith.14 With his theoretical writings and socio-critical novels, Galbraith 
acquired worldwide fame, from Russia, through India, to Latin America. In public 
life in the USA, he took up the glove for Keynsianism. In the academic world, 
Galbraith made a name for himself through modifying Keynesian doctrine with 
regard to applied economics and organized politics. Furthermore, as US-Ambassador 
to India as well as John F. Kennedy’s ghostwriter and personal as well as political 
advisor, he exerted significant influence upon American politics.
In the last few years, research on Galbraith has been revived.15 Particularly as a 
result of his crystal-clear studies concerning the nature of global financial crises, the 
economic aspects of his works have received the most attention. Galbraith’s contri-
butions to the socio-political philosophy of the present and the relevance of his 
economic theory for the philosophy of freedom have, up to now, been studied less. 
Yet, here too he has much to offer. John Kenneth Galbraith connected economics to 
the discourse on individual freedom and social justice, developing a qualitatively 
directed concept of freedom; not via reflections on abstract philosophical principles, 
but rather by means of an analysis of concrete socio-economic issues.
Galbraith’s theory of freedom takes its departure from a critique of the prevailing 
methodology in economics. His core thesis is that economics could far better grasp 
and employ the potential for economic emancipation if it were only to proceed with 
more self-reflexivity. Neoclassical axioms are to be questioned, in order to scruti-
nize the recommendations for political action of a neoliberal conservative nature 
14 Richard Parker’s biography (John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics 
[New York, 2005]) surpasses in precision and detail all the other presentations of Galbraith’s life 
and work provided up to now; its particular merit lies in its competent arrangement of Galbraith’s 
intellectual biography in connection with recent economic and political history.
15 See Stephen P. Dunn, The Economics of John Kenneth Galbraith: Introduction, Persuasion and 
Rehabilitation (New York, 2010); Blandine Laperche, James K.  Galbraith & Dimitri Uzunidis 
(eds.), Innovation, Evolution and Economic Change: New Ideas in the Tradition of Galbraith 
(Cheltenham & Northampton, MA, 2006); Kevin Mattson, When America was Great: The Fighting 
Faith of Postwar Liberalism (New York, 2004).
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resting upon them. It is imperative to confront those doctrines with a concept of 
economic and political freedom that relates affirmatively to its legal preconditions, 
to its social and ecological obligations, and to its cultural presuppositions, thus aim-
ing to harmonize personal autonomy with economic reality. Galbraith strives for an 
economics, not of quantitative maximization, but of qualitative optimization, which 
orientates the economy not only towards material aims, but also towards aesthetic, 
moral, social, cultural, and ecological goals.
4.1.1  Democratized Economics
According to Galbraith, economics has the noble goal of emancipating citizens so 
that they may autonomously co-determine their economic environment. To that end, 
economics, the doctrine of the economy, must be conducted in such a way that the 
public can form an informed judgment about decisive political and economic ques-
tions. Yet it is precisely with this demand, Galbraith complains, that economics does 
not comply. Instead of providing enlightenment about reality and transparency 
about what’s truly decisive, within the economic guild theorizing often tends 
towards the trivial or fictional. In the constant rehashing of conventional wisdoms, 
academic economics constructs theories, whose popularity can be explained less 
objectively than subjectively, i.e. as resulting less from relevant disclosures than 
from the “vested interest in painfully acquired error” accepted within them. 
Academic economists, Galbraith notes derisively, have been all too willing to pay 
homage to “what is closest in belief and method to the scholarly tendency of the 
people who already have tenure in the subject” (AAL 135).16 Instead of serving the 
truth, they prefer to serve their own careers.
How could this happen? When and where did economics lose its compass? In 
search of an explanation, Galbraith tracks the history of economic thinking and 
shows that, in the endeavor to become more scientific, in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, economics separated from moral philosophy and the social sci-
ences. Economics, which, formerly, as political economy or national economy dealt 
with concrete economic conditions and their legal directives, has, according to 
16 The quotations follow the following scribal abbreviations: AAL: Annals of an Abiding Liberal 
(New York, 1979); AC: American Capitalism: The Countervailing Power (New York, 1993); AP: 
The Anatomy of Power (New York, 1985); AS: The Affluent Society (New York, 1958); AU: The Age 
of Uncertainty: Points of Departure (New York, 1978); CC: The Culture of Contentment (New 
York, 1993); CCC: Capitalism, Communism, Coexistence: From the Bitter Past to a Better 
Prospect (New York, 1988); ED: Economic Development (Cambridge, 1964); EIF: The Economics 
of Innocent Fraud: Truth for our Time (New York, 2004); EPL: A Contemporary Guide to 
Economics, Peace and Laughter (New York, 1971); EPP: Economics and the Public Purpose (New 
York, 1973); GC: The Great Crash 1929 (New York, 1954); GS: The Good Society: The Humane 
Agenda (New York, 1996); LT: Life in our Times: Memoirs (New York, 1983); M: Money, Whence 
it Came, Where it Went (New York, 1975); NIS: The New Industrial State (New York, 1986); VS: A 
View from the Stands: Of People, Politics, Military Power, and the Arts (New York, 1986).
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Galbraith, restricted itself to increasingly abstract questions. The goal of this under-
taking – to work on economic problems free from values and experience, and to find 
universally valid solutions for them – was, however, never achieved, according to 
Galbraith. The reason: Economists followed the wrong paradigm, a scientific model 
inappropriate for their epistemic object, “the economy,” as it abstracts the economic 
life from its historical and socio-political contexts.
In being orientated by a formally quantitative ideal of science borrowed from 
physics, especially mechanics, economics increasingly proceeded to measure the 
scientific status of theories against the ability to quantify their elements and to math-
ematicise their discoveries.17 Yet, this orientation can cloud the view of descriptive 
findings as well as of normative arguments. Certain realities can only be grasped 
qualitatively, and not quantitatively – and yet, in the end, they are no less real or 
meaningful. Some arguments will only be formalized late in the day and others 
perhaps never  – notwithstanding being just as significant. Nevertheless, within 
established economics, as a rule, everything offered in “oral rather than mathemati-
cal” presentation becomes “readily dismissed by the men of scientific reputation or 
pretension” (EPL 96). And that, Galbraith explains, leads to a questionable self- 
immunization against all information that does not fit with prevailing convictions.
In particular, in the face of drastic social changes, the mechanical paradigm of 
conventional economics obscures the view: “Thus does a scientific or pseudoscien-
tific posture direct economics away from accommodation to underlying social insti-
tutional change. And it does so with the blessing of presumptively scientific attitude, 
method and conscience” (EPL 96). Galbraith explicates this by means of the basic 
model of neoclassical economics: The competition of multiple suppliers. While 
instructive for the period from 1750 to 1850, this model unsatisfactorily reflects the 
modern reality of large oligopolies with influence on macroeconomic frameworks. 
Yet Galbraith is keenly interested in those structures of modern industrial society 
and their historical formation, because they led to a transfer of economic power – 
with far-reaching consequences for the moral evaluation and political coordination 
of economic relations.
Galbraith’s critique of academic economics: Instead of being orientated by con-
temporary facts, until far into the 1970s, economic theories preferred to be orien-
tated at bygone constellations, for instance, small agrarian family businesses, which, 
because of their tiny size, are in no position to distort the equilibrium prices (postu-
lated by neoclassicism) on the job market (NIS 411). Yet the marked pressure that, 
in their agreements about collective pay, unions and large corporations exerted upon 
societal price developments, was, for a long time, not studied in detail, or even dis-
missed as theoretically irrelevant. Thus economics denied itself the possibility of 
17 See George Lennox Sharman Shackle, Epistemics and Economics: A Critique of Economic 
Doctrines (Cambridge, 1972), 360; Deidre McCloskey, Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics 
(Cambridge & New  York, 1994), 9ff.; David Colander & Arjo Klamer, “The Making of an 
Economist,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 1:2 (1987), 95–111; Lawrence Summers, Nils 
Gottfries & Birgit Grodal, “The Scientific Illusion in Empirical Macroeconomics,” The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 93:2 (1991), 129–148; Robert M. Solow, “How Did Economics 
Get That Way and What Way Did It Get?,” Daedalus 126:1 (1997), 39–58.
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appropriately describing the actual trends in wages and prices. This adversely mani-
fested itself in the stagflation crisis of the 1970s, when stagnation and inflation 
appeared together, although this was ‘theoretically impossible.’ As a result, this 
crisis intensified as academic economics, guided by unrealistic models, formulated 
policy recommendations highly inappropriate for the actual conditions.
Such clumsy treatment of historical change and political contexts, is, Galbraith 
believes, largely the fault of economics’ aping the epistemic model of the natural 
sciences. The object of physics remains the same; scientific advance thus results 
from an increasingly exact and evermore specialized description of the given. By 
emulating this model, academic economics hoped for a better comprehension of its 
object and sought to force this through by means of an ever-further specialization 
and ever-finer division into sub-disciplines (NIS 411). In the event, however, this 
simply produced an inoculation of the economic disciplines against important infor-
mation from surrounding fields, inside as well as outside economics, and conse-
quently increasingly estranged economists from the facts and facets of real life. 
Quantitative calculations displaced qualitative thinking and mathematical constructs 
supplanted phenomenological reconstructions.
Yet, of course, ‘the economy’ nowhere exists as a timeless and forever estab-
lished entity. In all places, economic activity appears in different forms, subjected 
to manifold, often simultaneously emerging, cultural and political influences. Trains 
of economic events are, furthermore, reciprocal and reflexive in the highest degree. 
Abstracting from all of that is a source of inevitable error (NIS 403). If, for example, 
social change appears at the same time in many economic subsystems, the applica-
tion of ceteris paribus rules must yield to a more comprehensive perspective, which, 
as far as possible, includes all entities undergoing change. If that is not done, the 
actually causal factors become obfuscated and causality is instead ascribed to – in 
and for themselves – irrelevant phenomena. This then results in doubly erroneous 
recommendations for action: Initially, one recommends that factors be acted upon 
which do not at all causally influence events in the hoped-for sense. Finally, from 
the failure of such measures, one concludes that they were not enforced strongly 
enough: moderate measures are intensified; thus producing dramatically accumulat-
ing failures (NIS 405).
A case in point is market theory: A market, where trade takes place under fair 
competitive conditions, does not fall from the sky, but rather is often the result of 
centuries of cultural efforts and legal policies to eradicate individual or organiza-
tional free-rider behavior.18 A theory that, for methodological reasons, obscures all 
such social and cultural influences, however, must make the market appear as a 
quasi-natural phenomenon producing its own equilibrium. When such a market is 
disrupted, one will tend to attribute this to undue interference on the part of society 
and thus seek to optimize the market through deregulation. When this fails to work, 
18 See Marshall David Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Hawthorne: New York, 1972), 85f.; S. Todd. 
Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas: The Classical Greek Tradition (Durham, 1987); Karl 
Menninger, Number Words and Number Symbols: A Cultural History of Numbers (Cambridge, 
MA, 1969), 212f.
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one must conclude that the market was not yet deregulated enough; and that is then 
repeated, until the previously still partially intact market collapses completely. The 
blame for this is consequently (ex post) attributed to grave asymmetries of power 
and information (for example, oligopolies), whose fateful effect, however, was first 
of all (ex ante) made possible by massive deregulation.
Whoever, on the other hand, like Galbraith, includes the market’s social and 
cultural conditions into the analysis, would not strive to reestablish that (at any rate, 
fictional) natural condition of the market. Rather, a socially and culturally embed-
ded economics would demand an adjusting of the framework and environmental 
conditions of markets so that free and fair relations of exchange prevail. Such an 
economics would thus bid rather than forbid economic policies aiming at market 
design.
4.1.2  Democratic Economy
John Kenneth Galbraith wishes to liberate economics from its self-induced alien-
ation from politics. He sees and shows that the mathematical narrowness of eco-
nomic theory is in no way simply a matter of innocent academic abstraction. 
Whenever non-quantitative factors drive economic activity, their theoretical occlu-
sion leads to erroneous conclusions. An economics, for instance, which, through its 
methodological commitments (for instance to the homo oeconomicus as a strictly 
rational pursuer of given preferences) is prevented from understanding how and 
from whom (through advertising, marketing, etc.) citizens are influenced in their 
(often irrational) decisions, does not serve the common interest. It serves, as 
Galbraith never tires of reminding us, identifiable – yet thus far unidentified – spe-
cial interests.
Similarly, the conventional exclusion of the topic of ‘power’ from economics lets 
the influence of organized interests upon economic regulation and redistribution 
vanish only from theory, but not from practice (AL 136). Wherever this influence 
takes place without being thematized, economics does not present  – but rather 
veils – reality. Consequently, economics easily becomes the ideology of the estab-
lishment, or – as Galbraith sharply formulates it – the “influential and invaluable 
ally of those whose exercise of power depends on an acquiescent public” (AAL 
151). Only where economists identify economic power – and the dangers it may 
pose for freedom – can politicians regulate it.
Whoever deceives, robs freedom. False information makes subjects capable of 
autonomy into heteronomously controllable objects. People can effectively pursue 
their own ends only on the basis of a sufficiently adequate picture of reality. Whoever 
manipulates this picture, subsumes persons – as mere means – under the aims of 
others. Illusion is damaging (schädlich), deception disgraceful (schändlich), for the 
first instrumentalizes people unwittingly, whereas the second does so wittingly. 




This flies in the face of the customary refusal of economists even to recognize 
that the object of their investigation is co-created by themselves through concep-
tual constructions.19 The real influence of economics upon the economy and soci-
ety is strengthened through that denial, according to Galbraith, as it leads to 
economics being subjected to far too little skepticism, first by its proponents and 
consequently also on the part of society. Their recommendations, when presented 
as solely ‘scientific,’ appear unpartisan. That is awkward for the social responsibil-
ity of economists: The less economics takes itself to be shaping reality, all the more 
indifferently to the societal consequences of its counsels will it proceed. Economists 
like to let themselves and others believe that they merely describe, never prescribe, 
economic ‘laws.’
Yet since recommendations for economic and political action are supported by 
the theoretical descriptions of economics, it is, according to Galbraith, imperative to 
recast economics as a self-critical social science so as to make it democratically 
accountable.20 Many economists object that they would – and could – not be doing 
normative scientific work. In the course of the Werturteilsstreits at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the majority of economists embarked on a positivist course. 
They sided with the view that economics did not have to consider the aims of eco-
nomic activity, but only served to explain the most intelligent employment of mul-
tiply usable, scarce means for given ends.21 Until today, many economists refuse to 
discuss the appropriate (individual and societal) ends of economic action. This they 
mostly legitimate by an outwardly modest abstinence from ultimate justifications 
and/or a resolute reference to the non-quantifiable nature of the qualitative valua-
tions inevitably involved within determining aims.
According to Galbraith, economics thereby pulls the wool over its own eyes. 
Even if it avoids explicit (categorical) orientations, economics nevertheless must at 
least implicitly (hypothetically) align itself with certain aims and measurements in 
order to make even the simplest strategic recommendations as well as to formulate 
a research perspective integrating its sub-disciplines. That indeed occurs, of course, 
and thus economics opts in general for “more” (in questions concerning supply of 
goods, production, employment, etc.) rather than “less” (NIS 408). After all, it is not 
so long ago that microeconomic success was evaluated predominantly by means of 
the gross domestic product and macroeconomic success measured merely by means 
of a plus in the ‘bottom line.’
19 Galbraith is not alone in holding this view: “In natural science, what is thought is built upon what 
is seen; but in economics, what is seen is built upon what is thought” (Shackle, Epistemics and 
Economics, 66); for more detailed information about this thesis see Warren J. Samuels, “Galbraith 
on Economics as a System of Professional Belief,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 7:1 
(1984), 67–76.
20 Similarly also: Kenneth E. Balding, “Economics as a Moral Science,” The American Economic 
Review 59:1 (1969), 1–12.
21 See, for instance, Lionel Robbin’s classic formulation: “Economics is the science which studies 
human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” 
(Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science [New York, 1984], 
16). See Milton Friedman (ed.), Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago, 1953), 3–43.
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Hiding behind the claim that economics would merely guarantee that society has 
available sufficient means for the ends it pursues, the growth of production was 
advanced as the stealthy aim of economic theory and practice. Thus was an overt 
working hypothesis surreptitiously transformed into a covert economic and political 
imperative. The quantitative premise, however, that lies at the bottom of that 
approach, i.e. the assumption that without exception, human ends are served by a 
‘more’ rather than a ‘less’ in material goods, is tantamount to a qualitative devalu-
ation of all alternative aims. Economists subject political options, for instance, to a 
cost/benefit analysis and typically advise against everything which costs more than 
it accrues. Nevertheless, as only aspects that are quantitatively measurable enter 
into the economic evaluation, these kinds of decision-making processes tend to a 
materialist bias. Ideal entities are generally far more difficult to quantify than physi-
cal things. The sense and meaning of non-instrumentalized natural and cultural 
spheres enter only ever so partially into economic value-calculations. They conse-
quently receive less consideration. For this reason alone, society should be wary to 
proclaim the economist the “highest arbiter of social policy” (NIS 408).
The focus upon more and more production and, consequently, in order to sell it, 
upon more extensive and intensive consumption, represses alternative life-plans. 
Aims like “more sharing of work,” “more relaxed conditions of toil or less air and 
water pollution,” “a large amount of leisure,” etc., which, among other things, would 
depend upon a slowing down of the growth of production (NIS 408), automatically 
fall victim to this commitment. For, through the lens of the gross domestic product, 
a gain in leisure cannot be measured, while an increase in privately possessed goods 
can. Thus, econometrically, the private purchase and maintenance of an automobile 
is equated with a gain in social welfare. Even an absurdly high density of private 
vehicles leads, through the resulting tasks of regulation (administration, traffic- 
safety), the necessary infrastructure (road-building, automatic control technology), 
and the increased consumption of raw materials and measures to overcome damages 
(cost of accidents, environmental damage) to an increased gross domestic product 
(EPL 100). But what for?
The abstraction of the economy from its humane objective therefore leads to a 
“progress toward the wrong goals” (NS 409). Galbraith thus pleads that, in the 
interest of its moral, aesthetic, and political values, society should sacrifice some of 
its economic prosperity (EPL 104). Certainly, in very poor countries, the more nar-
rowly defined economic aims are also the politically most important; every society 
has ultimately to secure the sustenance of its members. But the more affluent a 
society, the less it should surrender its politics and culture to the imperative for end-
less economic growth. Questions concerning the quality of life must increasingly 
retain primacy in the face of the positing of purely quantitative ends (EPL 98). 
Ultimately, the human being is the end of economic activity – and not vice versa 
(EPL 101). Hence Galbraith pleads that economics be open to societal discourse 
about the good life, and develop an economics related to values and the environ-
ment (NIS 407).
The economic guild still demurs. A depotentialization of purely economic goals 
within societies’ priorities inevitably results in economists’ knowledge losing its 
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significance. But economists do not want to become obsolete (EPL 93) and perhaps 
for that very reason, Galbraith surmises, they obstinately hold on to the paradigm of 
growth (EPL 95); a trend which is further reinforced by the increasing privatization 
of the academic sector. Many economists today receive their bread – or, at least, 
very lavish entremets – from the private economy (NIS 373). In addition to the ten-
dency, observable in all sciences, of granting superiority to conventional wisdom as 
opposed to awkward innovations, many economists still tend to repress the expres-
sion of inconvenient truths in order not to bite the hand that feeds them (AP 130).
The greatest chance for a turn away from the idolization of production growth 
thus lies in a general realization of the failure of the prevailing paradigm. Insofar as, 
in the long run, economics is measured by the feasibility of its practical recommen-
dations, it cannot survive a glaring distance from reality and blatant governance 
failures unscathed. If the course of the world would belie the discipline’s “conven-
tional wisdoms” so drastically that an academic career could be made from a call for 
reform, more and more economists might eventually warm to a paradigm shift. The 
“march of events” (AS 13) could thus ultimately compel that which hitherto was not 
to be had by way of collegial criticism and good words: The supersession of the 
neoclassical evangelism of the market.
4.1.3  Critique of Neoclassical Economics
The customer is king! – thus reads the fundamental thesis of those economists who 
believe that the course of commercial events always and only is controlled “from 
below,” i.e. from the free choice of consumers, and, hence, quasi-democratically 
(NIS 210). The philosophical foundations of this view originate with Jeremy 
Bentham (1748–1832) and James Mill (1773–1836). Their economic elaboration 
begins with David Ricardo (1772–1823). It receives canonical form with Ludwig 
von Mises (1881–1973) and, subsequently, protection against contradictory experi-
ence by means of the revealed preference theory with Paul Samuelson (1915–2009). 
One must have this intellectual movement before one’s eyes in order to understand 
precisely why Galbraith deals so severely with neoclassical economics. In nuce, it 
concerns the basic philosophical decision to exclude long-standing debates con-
cerning the (objectively) good from the research field of economics. According to 
British utilitarianism and the subsequently arising Austrian marginalist school, the 
good is that which one (subjectively) holds to be so. End of debate. In Bentham’s 
famous words: “Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts 
and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it 
is more valuable than either.”22
What follows? Since no one knows his ideas of the good as well as the subject in 
question, every externally arising behavioral control must necessarily provoke sub-
optimal results. Insofar as one, like Bentham and his followers, equates without 
22 Jeremy Bentham and John Bowring, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (New York, 1962), II, 253f.
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hesitation the common good with the sum of the pleasure of all individuals, any 
such interventions must impair the common good. The paradoxical result: Whoever 
wishes to promote the common good will damage it; it can only be advanced by 
whoever refers individuals back to their own interests. Under this presupposition, 
any limitations of individual license can only be legitimated insofar as one makes 
the affected subjects appreciate that these are merely clever detours on the path to 
their pleasure – like, for example, legal coordination rules, which, although occa-
sionally burdensome, nevertheless without a doubt aid the avoidance of conflicts. 
Politics, in the sense of wise statecraft, has had its day. It only has to be ensured that 
individuals can direct political actors with their votes so that they, or rather their 
preferences, can play the part of the true sovereign. Accordingly, the best policy 
would be one which reaches the conceivable maximum of freedom of choice 
through a minimum of arbitrary limitations. Voilá, the theory of quantitative free-
dom upon a utilitarian foundation.23
In parallel with this concept of politics, modern economics formulates its theory 
of “consumer sovereignty,” according to which the economy is directed solely by 
consumers through their purchasing decisions (NIS 211). In pursuit of individual 
utility individuals purchase that which pleases them (most, in relative terms) – and 
in so doing inform the market which needs are (most pressing, relatively speaking) 
to be fulfilled. Only consumers have intimate knowledge of the catalogue of their 
needs. Therefore, only they will optimally mobilize their financial means and, cer-
tainly, always in such a way that the marginal utility of all acquired goods is the 
same. For example, one will therefore not be so irrational as to buy an extra quantity 
of salt if an increase in the domestic sugar reserves would produce greater happi-
ness. Every intervention in the purchasing decisions of individuals on the part of the 
government must distort that formula of marginal utility and will therefore per defi-
nitionem distribute the resources of individuals less efficiently, consequently reduc-
ing their happiness and the welfare of society, which is defined as the sum of 
everyone’s happiness (NIS 213). One should thus simply leave the economy alone 
(laissez faire) and not politically interfere with the market.
Following the model a few steps further: Businesses are ‘coerced’ by the return 
of information communicated in prices to attend to fulfilling society’s needs. 
Suppliers compete with one another, after all. In order to survive, they strive after 
the constant improvement and increase in what they can offer. Businesses conse-
quently reinvest their profits in more modern and efficient production-technology. 
And since the competition does not abate, it is a question of maximizing profits in 
order to come out on top in the race towards the best technologies. Unit-costs hence 
continually sink and this saving is, as a further result of the competition among sup-
pliers, given back to consumers in the form of price reductions. The ultimate conse-
quence is that the market therefore always offers for sale at what, at the time, is the 
cheapest feasible price, that which consumers want most of all, and everyone thus 
attains the highest possible maximum of utility. Uninhibited capitalism creates the 
best of all possible worlds.




This model certainly functions on occasions, for instance, if businesses appear in 
the style of late eighteenth century manufacturers working with their own capital. 
Market competition then confirms “Say’s Law of Markets”24: If a commodity is 
overproduced, nothing remains for the producers to do than to constantly reduce its 
price until it again finds purchasers. The falling price informs other producers that 
investing in this commodity is not worthwhile. Overproduction is reduced; and soon 
there prevails a renewed equilibrium between supply and demand (NIS 220). 
Everyone is satisfied.
Similarly, monetary policy can steer entrepreneurial activity in the public inter-
est. If the state artificially reduces the amount of money to cool down overheated 
speculation, entrepreneurs receive capital investment on the financial market only 
against higher prices because of raised interest rates. Many previously marginally 
profitable investments no longer pay their way and are thus abandoned. The market 
cools down. Harmony prevails anew.
Galbraith does not dispute that, even today, there are markets like this: the com-
munal vegetable market of local suppliers for instance. He maintains, however, that 
the “accepted sequence” of “economic control from below” does not at all take 
place in the sphere of industrial and post-industrial production. A “revised sequence” 
is rather to be observed, where the essential control does not lie with consumers, but 
with corporations (NIS 212ff). No longer the isolated choice of consumers, but 
rather the organized power of suppliers, proves decisive, which obviously changes 
the assessment as to whether politics should handle commercial freedom with kid- 
gloves or not. For it is certainly now no longer a question of an increase or decrease 
in economic freedom as such, but rather one of an evaluation of whether either the 
freedom of consumers or the freedom of business is granted priority.
The reasons for the historical shift in market power from consumers to produc-
ers are practical in nature: With continual modernization, both the production and 
sale of industrial commodities have radically changed in the past decades. The 
intensified application of technology has led to a sharply growing need for capital 
and qualified personnel. At the same time, production time and planning require-
ments have considerably increased. An airline carrier, for instance, will produce 
with an incomparably higher, technical, personnel, and financial expenditure than a 
manufacturer of horse-drawn carriages. That brings along important consequences 
for the industrial and political economy, which have to be addressed by economic 
policy (AP 141).
Businesses have reacted to the increasing complexity in the production-sector 
with an internal, functional differentiation. In the place of the private capital pro-
vider who, as a business proprietor, at once acts as founder and director, today the 
financial burden is the responsibility of the shareholders, the technical construction 
the responsibility of a specialist staff, and the leadership of the personnel the 
 responsibility of management. The directors of modern large corporations are sub-
ject to far less financial coercion than a private capitalist. They are not – or are only 
24 See Jean-Baptiste Say, Traité d’économie politique, ou simple exposition de la manière don’t se 
forment, se distribuent, et se composent les richesses (Paris, 1803), 138f.
4.1 Fair Freedom (John Kenneth Galbraith)
236
slightly – liable for the corporation, and that alone already changes their attitude 
towards profit-maximization and leadership (EPP 266). The management can thus 
often and with impunity deviate from the neoclassical postulate of proportionally 
adjusting its wages in proportion to profits, and instead simply decide upon their 
level and composition discretely for themselves (EIF 27). Galbraith believes that 
this helps explain the much-discussed phenomenon that, as a rule, the salaries of 
CEOs still increase, even when their businesses hang in the balance (CC 74).
The shareholders, to whom legally speaking the business belongs, may well be 
frustrated, but are generally powerless.25 That forces a reevaluation of the concept of 
free enterprise (EIF 31). If, in contrast to neoclassical assumptions, their pay cannot 
necessitate managers to specific actions, how are they to be influenced? Outside of 
the ideal worlds of mathematics, managers have very real practical leeway,26 which, 
according to Galbraith, they use in order to fulfil expectations of corporate as well 
as societal roles (identification), or also to adapt the business to their own interests 
(adaption).27
For a long time, the neoclassical theory neglected such phenomena. On the one 
hand, such maxims are “not easily adapted to the simplifications of mathematics 
and symbolic logic” (NIS 146). On the other hand, they upset the argument that 
businesses cannot assume any moral responsibility for their actions, since (pres-
sured by the market and shareholders) they are lacking in freedom. Recognizing, 
however, that management is very much in the position to pursue its own interests, 
not only means to throw into question the neoclassical dogma that private busi-
nesses always provide their consumers with an optimum of quality for a minimum 
of societal costs. Moreover, one must concede: Wherever there exists the freedom to 
detract from the logic of maximization egoistically, there is also a freedom for 
socially orientated commerce. In short: Freedom establishes the obligation towards 
its responsible use.
The demand for Corporate Social Responsibility is thus not – as Milton Friedman 
still wanted us to believe28 – an unruly attack upon the profitability of business and, 
by extension, upon the rights of its shareholders and the interests of its consumers, 
but, rather simply an expression of the socially responsible nature of corporate free-
dom. Management itself often shares this view, Galbraith shows. The corporate 
25 See Richard Michael Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cambridge, 
MA, 1992); Robin Lapthorn Marris, The Economic Theory of “Managerial” Capitalism (London, 
1964); Michael Useem, Investor Capitalism: How Money Managers are Changing the Face of 
Corporate America (New York, 1996).
26 See Stephen A.  Marglin, “John Kenneth Galbraith and the Myths of Economics” in Helen 
Sasson, Derek Curtis Bok and Andrea D. Williams, eds., Between Friends: Perspectives on John 
Kenneth Galbraith (Boston, 1999), 114–138, especially 134.
27 See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Control and Business Behavior: An Enquiry into the Effects 
of Organization Form on Enterprise Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970); Adrian 
Wood, A Theory of Profits (Cambridge, England, 1975); Harvey Leibenstein, Inside the Firm: The 
Inefficiencies of Hierarchy (Cambridge, MA, 1987).
28 See Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits” in New 
York Times Magazine, 33, September 13, 1970.
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bureaucracy of modern large corporations is interested in the stability of their jobs 
and, therefore, in their societal acceptance. An enlightened management will hence 
not always maximize profits.29 For the all too radical pursuit of profit gets business 
into hot water in three different ways: First, it can introduce a perilous price war 
with the competition. Second, an all too aggressive wage-policy (to keep down 
costs) leads to conflict with the (often organized and quarrelsome) workforce. Third, 
if the business all too rabidly sacrifices stakeholder interests for the benefit of the 
balance sheet, it ultimately brings together both legislature and society against it. 
Much to the detriment of long-term business activity and, hence, the job security of 
managers.
Yet, if the corporation pursues profits with more moderation, it can quietly grow 
without fierce competition, street-protests, and clashes with society. Mergers and 
acquisitions secure managers’ professional positions; their personnel increase 
alongside their salary and prestige. Furthermore: Wherever the management consid-
ers the incentives and aims of its stakeholders, it can reduce legal costs, avoid repu-
tation costs, and increase the benefits of its employers and suppliers. Social 
recognition also creates a greater inflow of capital. The success of modern manage-
ment is thus evaluated on capital markets not in the least by the extent to which 
corporate practices mesh with prevalent values. All of this has effects on the balance 
sheet. Ethics, in short, can be profitable.30 Accordingly, management-lead busi-
nesses thus find themselves in no way always in opposition with the workforce and 
the public. Within the management-lead firm, freedom of business has, conse-
quently, not ceased to exist but merely altered its form and appearance. With this 
theory of corporate behavior, Galbraith provides important theoretical foundations 
for current debates about Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Citizenship, 
Social Entrepreneurship, etc., since he explains why it can be viable for firms to 
move away from the axiom of short-term profit maximization in favor of socially as 
well as ecologically sustainable strategies.31
Yet, all is not well. The spheres of activity of management can also be less civilly 
employed – for which the current state of the economy provides many incentives. 
Say’s Law, that with decreasing prices every commodity ultimately finds buyers, 
may still be true of scarce essential commodities. But what today takes place is 
evermore a trade in commodities the consumer does not urgently need, like prestige 
goods, branded products, and home electronics. The subjective opinions of consum-
ers about their assets and the world in general noticeably influences the demand for 
29 Upon its publication, this thesis provoked fierce resistance. See Marris, The Economic Theory of 
“Managerial” Capitalism, 37–45; as well as Eli Goldston & Harold Demsetz, “Discussion,” The 
American Economic Review 60:2 (1970), 479–484. A little later it was, however, empirically and 
analytically supported: See Williamson, Corporate Control and Business Behavior, 93ff.
30 See Geoffrey M. Heal, When Principles Pay: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Bottom 
Line (New York, 2008) and Simon More Elise Webley, Does Business Ethics Pay? Ethics and 
Financial Performance (London, 2003).
31 See Stephen Dunn, “John Kenneth Galbraith and the Multinational Corporation (The New 
Industrial State),” Challenge 48:2 (2005), 90–112 and John Adams, “Galbraith on Economic 
Development,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 7:1 (1984), 91–102.
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such commodities and thus constitutes a share of their objective market value. 
Because of a liquidity preference one sometimes does not purchase even when – and 
often precisely when – prices sink. At the same time, it is incomparably more diffi-
cult for modern corporations to adapt to fluctuations in demand than it was for their 
early capitalist predecessors. Unlike in the pre-industrial era, fluctuations in demand 
for planning-intensive and capital-intensive commodities (like cars for example) 
cannot be controlled by either drastic changes in the quantity or mode of produc-
tion, or by radical price reductions. The obedience to the market postulated by Say 
is, as a result, defied by businesses as well as consumers.
Yet wherever businesses prefer to back a stabilization of demand to maximum 
profits, they must influence the purchasing decisions of individuals as well as the 
whole of society. It is in the systematic interests of businesses to manipulate the 
individual’s ‘free’ purchases, and so to undermine the very consumer sovereignty 
neoclassicism places on a pedestal. We would not have advertising if it were com-
pletely ineffective. Whoever nonetheless wishes to uphold the thesis of ‘consumer 
sovereignty,’ must consequently maintain that advertising is merely informative – for 
instance by increasing the rationality of purchasing-decisions by providing relevant 
information about products (for a better calculation of their utility). But does not the 
advertising industry boast of suggestively appealing to our irrational motivational 
forces, in order to intensify existing wants, as well as to create new ones (EIF 35)?
Consumer-sovereignty is thus undermined twice; first, overtly, in regard to the 
individual purchasing-decision: If, for instance, poorly paid citizens decide to invest 
their limited financial means on a pair of designer sunglasses in preference to a 
healthy diet, they satisfy an artificially created want to the cost of a natural need. 
Neoclassical economics finds that unproblematic. Because of its abstraction from 
questions concerning qualitative values, it equates artificially generated demand 
with all other preferences.32 Yet, even in societies massively overrun with advertis-
ing, consumption of luxury goods only rarely produces the same satisfaction curves 
as the satisfaction of basic needs. And even if, once upon a time, it were otherwise, 
descriptively, the normative question would still remain, as to whether society then 
should equate the one with the other; especially if the satisfaction with luxury goods 
comes at the cost of public goods or brings with it further opportunity costs (AS 
128). Products that are marketable only through advertising ultimately have a 
sharply decreasing marginal utility, for “since the demand […] would not exist, 
were it not contrived, its utility or urgency, ex contrivance, is zero” (AS 131). The 
production of ultimately ‘useless’ goods nevertheless stands in stark contrast to the 
neoclassical postulate that deregulated economic activity automatically leads to 
maximal efficiency in the use of society’s resources (AS 129). It squanders  otherwise 
useful means and consequently reduces the economic freedom of the population as 
a whole.33
32 See George J.  Stigler & Gary S.  Becker, “De Gustibus non est. et disputandum,” American 
Economic Review 67:2 (1977), 76–90. For an opposing view see Kenneth E.  Boulding, “The 
Economics of Pride and Shame,” Atlantic Economic Journal 15 (1987), 10–19.
33 For this reason, I consider Jean Baudrillard’s critique of Galbraith off the mark, according to 
which Galbraith follows a naively naturalistic and/or an equally naively idealistic concept of value 
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Yet – defenders of the status quo argue – can we not emancipate ourselves from 
marketing and refuse to purchase so many advertised products? Occasionally, yes. 
It remains, however, still the case that upon another subtle level, the unrestrained 
effect of suggestive advertising impairs the autonomy of individuals and society, 
insofar as it assaults the social presuppositions of reasonable self-orientation. The 
capacity critically to evaluate one’s own preferences is not innate, but the outcome 
of the formation of mature subjects that can be culturally favored or impaired. Now, 
since preciously little truth can be expressed about the rise in quality of life through 
an ever-larger quantity of products, advertising subservient to the stimulation of 
ever more purchases has much to lie about. “Social distinction must be associated 
with … a swimming pool, sexual fulfilment with a particular shape of automobile, 
social acceptance with a hair oil or mouthwash, improved health with a hand lotion 
…” (EPL 104).
In a society in which all public spaces are flooded with messages promising that 
consumption is the answer to all questions in life, a truthful discourse about the 
good life becomes more difficult. This undermines the cultural presuppositions of 
moral and political autonomy.34 Moreover, the obstruction of all natural and artifi-
cial spaces with appeals to consume ruin the chances of an environment with a 
humane aesthetic. The more we subject our lifeworld to the dictates of commercial 
interests, comfortable consumptions, and effective product-advertising, the uglier it 
becomes (EPL 104); a horrible troll prancing around in the garb of economic 
freedom.
Certainly, people clamor ever louder to be protected from unwanted influences, 
dangerous products, avoidable environmental damage, and the toil of unnecessary 
production-processes. Yet, ironically, that is ignored by an economics that is meth-
odologically premised entirely upon the individual. Neoclassicism reinterprets the 
citizen’s explicit demand for protection as a wish for paternalism, to concede to 
which would mean – according to Mises, Hayek, Friedman, Stigler, Becker, and 
many more – an inadmissible turn away from the principle of freedom. The con-
scious use which citizens make of their qualitative freedom of expression is thus 
(see Jean Baudrillard, La société de consommation: ses mythes, ses structures [Paris, 1970], 
17–26). In his role as advisor to a discursively construed political public, Galbraith recommended 
that which he considered good and correct – in this case a dependence upon biologically provided 
or rationally justified needs. In the ordering of economic priorities to be decided by society, he 
championed relief from hunger and need, recognizing that the satisfaction of such needs had prior-
ity over the desire for luxury goods. This appeal to nature and reason is, however, not naturalistic, 
but rather political. Galbraith recommends such an orientation for societal debates, but does not 
prescribe it metaphysically, while, on the other hand, the neoclassical and neoliberal doctrine 
refuses such a discourse about the quality of freedom by making quantitative freedom absolute. A 
concept of basic human needs that is very similar to Galbraith’s was already employed by, among 
others, John Maynard Keynes in Essays in Persuasion (London, 1931), 358–373.
34 See Richard L.  Lippke, “Advertising and the Social Conditions of Autonomy,” Business & 
Professional Ethics Journal 8:4 (1989), 35–58. Lippke agrees with Galbraith’s argument and 
expands upon it; so does Roger Crisp and Vance Packard: See Roger Crisp, “Persuasive Advertising, 
Autonomy, and the Creation of Desire,” Journal of Business Ethics 6:5, 413–418 and Vance 
Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (Brooklyn, New York, 2007).
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devalued in the name of a merely assumed (and, by many, very consciously con-
tested) unconscious desire for quantitatively unbounded consumer freedom. Honi 
soit qui mal y pense.
Paul Samuelson’s theory of “revealed preferences,” for instance, proclaims (as 
we shall see later in the subsequent chapter on Amartya Sen) that our purchasing- 
behavior always exposes what we mostly aspire to, otherwise we would – as, by 
definition, rational consumers – certainly acquire something else. Nevertheless, it is 
foolish to say that with their purchasing decisions citizens give their blessing to the 
consumerism they are talked into, solely because, with these, they react affirma-
tively to advertising-messages. Galbraith objects that one could just as well fell a 
man with an axe and then maintain that this was quite obviously something which 
he had longed for: ultimately, he has, after all, clearly reacted to the impulse visited 
upon him (NIS 349).
We should prefer to dispel the myth that our current economic system rests com-
pletely upon consumer sovereignty (NIS 218). As long as there persists the illusion 
that the market-economic system merely neutrally expresses the free decisions of 
all affected individuals, a pseudo-liberal pseudo-legitimacy is granted to the prevail-
ing conditions. This, however, stands in the way of political reform; to the disadvan-
tage of the common good – as well as to the advantage of a privileged few. Galbraith’s 
critique of neoclassical microeconomics thus culminates in the demand for society’s 
economic and philosophical self-enlightenment, which should pave the way for an 
autonomous political qualification of its societal freedoms.
4.1.4  Critique of Neoliberal Economic Policy
The modern corporation pursues certain systemic interests which do not automati-
cally converge with the common good. Instead of fantasizing within mathematical 
ideal-worlds about a fictional compulsion towards profit-maximization, Galbraith 
believes economics should give preference to studying the real displays of entrepre-
neurial freedom. Contra neoclassicism, businesses are certainly not machines run 
by algorithms, which can be analyzed and optimized from the outside. Businesses 
are, rather, self-reflexive, idea-driven decision-making systems. To the extent to 
which it is present in the minds of managers, the idea of entrepreneurial freedom 
can affect their actions. So, since economics determines to what degree freedom and 
responsibility are a part of economic theory-construction and pedagogy, it influ-
ences the impact of those ideas upon managerial practice.
That can be illustrated with the example of the entrepreneurial endeavor to mini-
mize planning-uncertainties by the manipulation of demand. Marketing is not only 
geared at individual customers, it is also often aimed at the state and the society as a 
whole as guarantors of aggregate demand. For many firms, erosion of societal demand 
through recession, inflation, etc., is more dangerous than a fluctuation in the purchas-
ing tendencies of isolated market participants. It is therefore essential to influence the 
overall societal purchasing power and, by implication, the state’s economic policies 
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as well. Corporations, especially those in technology-intensive industries, seek prox-
imity to the state. If capital-investments are high and sales opportunities uncertain – 
as, for instance, with new armament technologies  – the producer hardly likes to 
accept the risk of failing demand. For instance, whoever produces a complex missile-
launching system must – on pain of bankruptcy – know that they have definite buyers 
for it. The producer will therefore ensure through all licit (and, occasionally, illicit) 
means that the state will take up in the long-term a foreseeable and possibly growing 
number of goods (CC 136). The upshot is an intricate entwinement of heavy industry 
and armament producers with politics, culminating in co-authoring international pol-
icy on the part of the industrial decision- makers (EIF 54).
But if politics already extensively cooperates with the economy  – as mutatis 
mutandis is also to be observed in other capital-intensive sectors (aeronautical 
industry, construction) – what, asks Galbraith, are we to make of the neoclassical 
and neoliberal demand that politics should keep out of the economy? Why should 
the visible hand of democracy be denied access to an economy which is already 
shaped and molded at pleasure by the invisible hands of lobbyists? Whose freedom 
and which freedom does this actually protect, and why? Contra neoclassicism, 
which categorically separates state and private-economy and likes to close its eyes 
to their factual approximation, Galbraith views the overlapping of the public and 
private sectors as the rule, not the exception, within modern economic practice, and 
thus would not release firms into a policy-free arena (CC 75).
Let us consider the economic background of this argument more closely: Cyclical 
crises constitute an inverted image of the transformed structural conditions of the 
modern economy. On the one hand, it is necessary for every technology-intensive 
production that much is saved on the part of business so that the sums kept aside can 
be handed over by the credit market to corporations and cost-intensive investments 
can be undertaken. Yet, the more that is saved, all the greater is the leverage upon 
economic events, if that money is for once not fed back into the economic cycle.
Only within narrow limits, can large corporations react to falling demand with 
price elasticity. Apart from the already described intricacies of production technol-
ogy, there is also the fact that the stock market as a rule punishes a reduction in the 
rate of profit; consequently, businesses lose investment capital and equity propor-
tional to the amount of shares they hold in themselves. In order to raise its equity 
quota, management will be induced to cut down on operating costs. That can be 
achieved through reducing production as well as redundancies. Rational micro- 
economic action then leads, however, to a suboptimal allocation of resources and 
thus to manifestly disadvantageous macro-economic outcomes: With unemploy-
ment and wage cuts the purchasing power of society is further reduced, which 
 intensifies even more the trends giving rise to the problems. Underemployment 
equilibria result.35
Galbraith thus champions an anticyclical economic policy. Unlike John Maynard 
Keynes (1883–1946), he does not, however, believe that job-creation programs are 
35 See N.  Gregory Romer David Mankiw (ed.), New Keynesian Economics (Cambridge, MA, 
1991), 412.
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a blessing. They work too slowly, and once called into life cannot so easily be 
removed from the world. Yet Keynes precisely presupposed just that: in the case of 
high inflation the state was to slow down the economic cycle artificially. If that does 
not happen, then, in the long-term, stagflation results. Galbraith thinks the state 
fares better when operating with the more flexible system of taxation. As long as 
taxes are progressive, they tend to auto-correct the economic situation. Whenever 
especially large profits appear, progressive taxation siphons off a disproportionate 
share for the state; an overheating of the economy through continuing reinvestments 
becomes, consequently, less likely. If profits fail to appear, on the other hand, then 
the burden of taxation placed upon entrepreneurs is, conversely, disproportionately 
reduced, partially balancing out their loss in investment capacity.
To enable the fruits of taxation to return into the economic cycle, a public sector 
is needed. Galbraith underlines that the times in the twentieth century when the 
public hand intensively interfered in American economic life (during the two world- 
wars and during the moon-race) were also the very epochs when the American 
economy most intensively prospered. Nowadays, he notes, that economic stabiliza-
tion effect falls to the American weapons industry (EPP 284f.). One should, there-
fore, give up the neoclassical illusion that government’s intimate linkage to weapon 
producers and heavy industry would merely constitute a somewhat (too) large form 
of private entrepreneurship with incidentally always filled order-books (AP 142). 
Together with that illusion would then also evaporate the conclusion that the state 
may in no way intervene (EIF 54ff.). If in truth economic policy is made via the 
USA’s military budget, it should also be subject to democratic controls. In this way 
one could then gradually reduce the military budget in favor of investments in civil 
demands, which are just as suitable for stabilizing the economy, yet entail fewer 
questionable results in the arena of international politics.
In general, according to Galbraith, it is a question of translating the abstract 
quantitative freedom of a virtual consumer state (preached in the textbooks) into the 
concrete qualitative freedoms of the real civil society. The economic scandals of the 
previous decades illustrate, however, that quite the opposite occurs. The close coop-
eration of creative bookkeepers, careless private economic auditors, and indulgent 
public supervising committees could only take place because it operated in the dark 
shadows of neoliberal politics and neoclassical economic theory (EIF 50), which 
rejects regulation and control, in principle, as contrary to freedom and detrimental 
to efficiency (EIF 8). The striking coincidence between the deregulation of the 
American security sector and the consequent savings-and-loans debacle, between 
the deregulation of investment banking and the following WorldCom-bankruptcy, as 
well as that between the deregulation of accounting law and the Enron/Arthur 
Andersen scandal, suggest the following lesson36: Government and administration 
36 See David Bailey, George Harte & Roger Sugden, “Corporate Disclosure and the Deregulation 
of International Investment,” Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 13:2 (2000), 197–218; 
Gerald Vinten, “The Corporate Governance Lessons of Enron,” Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society 2:4 (2002), 4–9; C. Richard Baker, “Investigating 




in no way proceed inefficiently per se, and, conversely, businesses do not per se 
present productive entities which one must thus spare from all societal oversight. 
But since, for the proponents of neoclassicism, the free market is “a semireligious 
totem” (CC 135) they close their eyes to the fact that businesses only operate pro-
ductively and in support of the common good under certain conditions, which are by 
no means always a given, says Galbraith.
The conflict between the concept of freedom supported by Galbraith, which 
examines the qualitative value of socially constructed freedoms, and the merely 
quantitatively directed neoclassical concept of freedom, comes especially to the 
fore in the dispute between fiscalism and monetarism. Instead of an anti-cyclical 
fiscal policy which is directly of benefit to citizens and only indirectly (by way of 
strengthening demand) of benefit to businesses,37 a quantitatively liberal agenda 
prefers economic policy favoring monetary measures which directly serve solely 
business (planning security) whose increased profits reach, if at all, the citizens 
indirectly (trickle-down economics).38 In economics lead by monetarism, the poorer 
strata not only continually lose out on relative income, they also thereby gradually 
lose sociopolitical weight in the contest for public opinion as against the active 
financing of politicians and opinion makers on the part of business (EPP 255).
It is therefore especially cynical when – like on the part of the Chicago School 
economists  – monetary policies are attacking fiscal social policy in the name of 
economic freedom. The opposite is much closer to the truth: “Income rising above 
the level of mere subsistence is […] a liberating force. […] It is one of the curiosi-
ties of much social comment that such welfare measures are regularly seen as limi-
tations on freedom  – the freedom presumptively inherent in the free enterprise 
system” (AP 51). Serious liberalism especially protects the freedom of the eco-
nomically weak (CCC 151).
When “countervailing powers” (CCC 128) like trade unions, associations, coop-
erative ventures, charitable organizations, etc. do not succeed in assuring an econ-
omy catering to basic human needs, the law, creating entitlement to a minimum 
wage (EPP 262) and social-security measures, has to support the poor (AP 187). 
Failing that, the “social balance” is forfeited; “private opulence” and “public squa-
lor,” i.e. “public penury and private affluence” come into ever-starker contrast, and 
the community disintegrates, ultimately even politically (EPL 93).39 Nothing 
 damages capitalism’s sustainable success and outlook, Galbraith concludes, as 
much as the regency of its apologists (M 312). Still, the class of the “contented and 
[…] comfortable” constantly opposes the crucial reforms (CC 144). Galbraith thus 
sees himself forced towards the following grim prognosis: “The past age of content-
ment will come to an end only when and if the adverse developments that it fosters 
37 About this, see also: Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Inequality, Growth and Poverty in an Era of 
Liberalization and Globalization (2004), 3–26.
38 See James Bradford De Long, “The Triumph of Monetarism?,” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 14:1 (2000), 83–94.
39 See Thomas Karier, “The Heresies of John Kenneth Galbraith,” Challenge 36:4 (1993), 23–28.
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challenge the sense of comfortable well-being.” This, though, is only to be expected 
of an economic catastrophe (CC 156f.).
What would apt alternatives look like? Certainly, at times policy can ensure that 
businesses internalize the negative external effects they produce. That is successful 
when the legal order – through taxes on expenditure and duties on emissions, for 
instance – brings it about that businesses include the public cost of their production- 
processes in their balance-sheets and are thus urged towards a more careful engage-
ment with the environment. Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of the fact that the 
language-game of the internalization of externalities does not cover one particular 
issue. If society’s only allocation mechanism is merely the market, then that nega-
tively affects all of those commodities that cannot be sold on the market even under 
optimal frameworks. Local environmental damages can be quantified only to some 
extent, and at high taxonomic costs to boot, being implemented in entrepreneurial 
cost-calculations then only via political pressure. Things look even worse for, e.g., 
aesthetic and moral goods, the qualitative nature of which far less allow of quantita-
tive accounting. The hasty answer that these kinds of goods have then instead to be 
procured by society is as correct as it is insufficient. The potential of national laws 
and regulations lags noticeably behind the reality of the world economy. Globalized 
economic-practice over-strains domestic politics’ governance competency, not 
merely selectively but rather structurally.
The formative power for a kind of ‘World Domestic Policy’ (Weltinnenpolitik) 
today no longer lies solely with the world’s states. Rather, a global public engaged 
in all political and economic niches plays an ever more important role. This plane-
tary public operates not at all solely against firms, but also together with a growing 
number of businesses, which in evident seriousness and with striking success try to 
live up to their responsibilities as corporate citizens and are, for that reason, pre-
ferred in the market by mature consumers and selective investors. Which corrobo-
rates Galbraith’s thesis that businesses, when adequately directed, do indeed have 
the requisite space for decision-making and forms of commerce corresponding to 
the responsibility growing out of their economic freedom.
Nevertheless, civil-society initiatives and economic initiatives (e.g. the UN 
Global Compact) cannot completely replace state action. Galbraith believes that the 
enormous inequalities in the global distribution of wealth require a coordinated ini-
tiative on the part of all nations. An alliance of public opinion and enlightened com-
mercial self-interest cannot make state-controlled global economic policy 
superfluous, since, as ultima ratio, they lack the means of legal coercion. Yet, wher-
ever policy has created the conditions for poverty by destroying embedded struc-
tures of governance, it must also accept responsibility for the reestablishment of 
rights. This is true of large parts of the developing world, where previous colonial 
injustice and the accompanying destruction of a formerly autochthonous  community 
enabled the subsequent dictatorship of large corporations. The fact that industrial-
ized nations now point to the limited possibilities of national politics in regard to the 
very lawless conditions they themselves caused, is, in Galbraith’s eyes, but a hollow 
“formula for selfishness” (GS 131). In order to assist the economically disadvan-
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taged on this earth, the wealthy must ultimately be prepared to establish a socially 
and ecologically well-balanced global economic order.
Galbraith thus provides important building-blocks for a timely theory of respon-
sible freedom: His economic philosophy enables the reconceptualization of the 
demands for social and ecological sustainability as qualitative increases as opposed 
to quantitative reductions of our economic freedom. From the perspective of a cri-
tique of its physicalist self-understanding, Galbraith pleads for an economics qua 
self-critical social science. Since the economic sciences directly (via economic 
policy recommendations) and indirectly (by forming opinion) contribute to the real-
ization of their conceptions, they must open up to society’s discourse on values. Yet, 
as long as economics does not reflect upon its practical influence, its effects will be, 
in the best-case scenario, conservative – insofar as it is oriented towards present 
phenomena – and in the worst case, reactionary – when oriented by superannuated 
premises. To correctly grasp and measure the actuality to which it needs to react, a 
change in the prevailing materialistic economic paradigm is required.
In the face of corporations’ organized power to distort the market and to influ-
ence public decision-making – and the correspondingly weakened position of both 
the individual and the state – many of the axioms of neoclassical economics can no 
longer be honestly maintained. An economics doing justice to the real structural 
changes of today can, for instance, no longer trust the market to be a panacea and 
guarantor of freedom. In the structures of economic activity and decision-making 
transformed by multinational corporations, economics finds, though, a new arena 
for the analysis of economic freedom and responsibility. From now on, through 
targeted economic policy and prudent Corporate Social Responsibility, it ought to 
aim at dismantling those conditions which, supposedly in the name of freedom, rob 
humanity – against its express will – slowly but surely of the foundations of a life 
worth living. Therefore, economists should no longer only conceive of freedom as 
the “maximum range of choice” (NIS 217) but rather recognize freedom as reason-
able autonomy. Yet our freedom can only be reasonably orientated when it does not 
methodologically deprive itself of its anthropological perspectives, its psychologi-
cal insights, and its moral views. Therefore, in order to enable an emancipative and 
sustainable economy, Galbraith wishes to advance an economics established upon 
qualitatively orientated freedom.40
4.2  Responsible Freedom (Amartya Sen)
Amartya Sen (1933–) developed his theory of freedom over many years in close 
collaboration with Martha Nussbaum (1947–). Both criticized the inadequacy of the 
current state of liberal political philosophy, looked for alternatives, and thus 
40 See the assessment of Sen, Heilbronner, and Marglin in Helen Sasson, Derek Curtis Bok and 
Andrea D. Williams (eds.), Between Friends: Perspectives in John Kenneth Galbraith (Boston, 
1999).
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proposed the capability approach, which today enjoys worldwide reception. 
Although the historical development of Sen’s work is closely connected with 
Nussbaum’s, I have primarily concentrated upon the former, indicating parallel 
positions in Nussbaum’s work in the footnotes.41 This occurs for two reasons: First, 
for Martha Nussbaum, the idea of freedom is not as significant as it is for Sen. 
Second, in contrast to Nussbaum’s much broader works, Sen’s texts concentrate far 
more upon the very questions of the philosophy of economics that are pivotal for 
our investigation. I thus only examine the relationship between Nussbaum and Sen 
in more detail when dealing with their dispute about how the idea of freedom should 
be specified into concrete concepts of freedom.
Sen’s works seamlessly connect with those of John Kenneth Galbraith. First, Sen 
reinforces Galbraith’s view that economics is not able to be limited to contents and 
questions amenable to quantitative formalization. The object should determine the 
method and not vice versa: Mathematics and logic have to be the servants and not 
the masters of economics.42 Second, Sen, too, is concerned with the economic and 
political emancipation of the public. Like Galbraith, he endeavors to make the struc-
tural contexts of economics so transparent that they can be shaped democratically. 
Third, Sen also wishes to forge a path leading away from an abstractly quantitative 
concept of freedom towards a theory of freedom (“substantive freedom”), which 
investigates the concretely qualitative opportunities of citizens.
Yet Amartya Sen deals with these concerns in a different manner than John 
Kenneth Galbraith. Whereas Galbraith tracks economic upheavals and is led to the-
oretical problems from practical ones, Sen frequently inverts that sequence, concen-
trating, time and again, on the axiomatics of economics. The high practical relevance 
of his works notwithstanding, on the whole Sen’s works focus predominantly on 
theoretical principles. Where Galbraith historicizes, contextualizes, and personal-
izes, Sen generalizes and formalizes.
I reconstruct Sen’s notion of freedom by showing how he developed it in critical 
contrast to traditional economic theories and their underlying concepts of rational-
ity. I then move on to extract the practical consequences of his theory of freedom for 
economics and politics. This sequence follows the system of Sen’s thinking: In the 
course of his academic career, Sen reached a point where he could no longer carry 
out his intended research program without finding a new, freedom-oriented criterion 
for evaluating current economics. His desire to eliminate blind spots from the 
 methodology of the economic sciences ultimately forced him to analyze the eco-
nomic lens as a whole. Sen recognized the intimate relation between a liberal econ-
omy and a critically self-reflexive economics freely choosing its own methods and 
themes. Whoever demands liberal economic practices must promote a freedom-
based economic theory. For the image of the economy arises in our minds. It is there 
41 For more detail about the similarities and differences of both conceptions, see Nussbaum, 
Creating Capabilities.
42 See Amartya Sen, “Galbraith and the Art of Description” in Helen Sasson, Derek Curtis Bok & 
Andrea D. Williams (eds.), Between Friends: Perspectives on John Kenneth Galbraith (Boston, 
1999), 139–146, for the advantages of Galbraith’s qualitatively described economics.
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that economic experiences are selected, sorted, and sequenced. Our thinking directs 
the lenses of economics, and economics should make and employ this very choice 
of perspectives consciously. Economics is not a passive product of its object, but 
rather a construct of active subjects. And as such – as the work of human freedom – 
it should also be studied and practiced, lest it fall victim to the dictatorship of sup-
posed inevitabilities.
4.2.1  Critique of the Neoclassical Paradigm
Many utilitarian and welfarist economists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
attempted to replace the forever contentious debates about the qualitative aim of the 
economy with a quantitative decision-making logic. Sen is skeptical of these under-
takings, since the hereby envisioned maximization of utility stands and falls with the 
functionality of utility-comparisons. From the 1920s on, it became, after all, increas-
ingly apparent to an increasing number of leading economists, like e.g. Alfred 
Marshall (1842–1924), Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877–1959), and John Hicks (1904–
1989), that, strictly speaking, personal utility does not allow for inter-subjective 
comparisons. Therefore, one has since rather defended the postulate of utility- 
maximization analytically (RF 364).43 Paul Samuelson’s (1915–2009) attempt to 
establish on solely conceptual grounds the usefulness of the utility focus through his 
revealed preferences theory (which we already touched upon in the chapter on 
Galbraith, see Sect. 4.1.3) was particularly important.44 Samuelson simply turned 
the tables. Instead of proving that market choices optimally realize the preferences 
of market participants, he postulated it. If it is true by definition that all purchasers 
are rigorously rational decision-makers according to the homo oeconomicus model, 
then their purchasing decisions must reveal and realize their respective preferences. 
Accordingly, Samuelson promoted his theory as being “freed from any vestigial 
traces of the utility concept.”45
The methodological program “to explain behavior without reference to anything 
other than behavior” is, however, according to Sen, comparable to the attempt “to get 
an empirical rabbit out of a definitional hat” (RF 364). People who receive what they 
choose do not always thereby obtain what they desire. The inference from choices to 
desires overlooks that one always has to choose from a set of extant options, whereas 
what is desired may often be outside that set. One must thus consider – in James 
43 Amartya Sen’s works are referenced according to the following abbreviations: (DF) Development 
as Freedom (New York, 1999); (IV) Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York & 
London, 2007); (CWB) “Capability and Well-Being” in Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, The 
Quality of Life (Oxford, 1993); (RF) Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, MA & London, 2002); 
(IJ) The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA, 2009).
44 See Paul A. Samuelson, “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behavior,” Economica 5:17 
(1938), 61–71.
45 Ibid., 71.
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Buchanan’s formulation – not only the choice within constraints, but also the choice 
of constraints.46 If the latter (trans-systemic, i.e. meta-systemic) choice is conflated 
with the former (inter-systemic) choice it becomes difficult to question the status 
quo; it is consequently presumed that everyone who participates in market activity 
therefore eo ipso finds happiness and prosperity. The trick with the “revealed prefer-
ences,” designed as an obsequious theoretical service, thus surreptitiously turns into 
an obnoxious defense of established practice. Just as John Kenneth Galbraith had 
already noticed and denounced (see Sect. 4.1.3).
Besides, the value of options not only lies in their realization, it also consists in 
the fact that they exist at all: they provide people with alternatives.47 Freedom is, 
consequently, in no way exhausted by the sum of manifested choices, but rather also 
encompasses “spurned options” (RF 593n.) and “options forgone” (RF 608). Merely 
measuring the utility of instantiated choices does thus not suffice to attain the true 
value of freedom.
Amartya Sen criticizes furthermore the assumption that subjective perceptions of 
happiness present a necessary and sufficient criterion for objective well-being. The 
poor who accept their lot; the sick who are uninformed about their condition, the 
uneducated who are unable to picture a better life and so accept what fate grants 
them all reconcile themselves to the manner of their existence, perhaps even finding 
modest personal happiness therein (DF 62). But subjective accommodation estab-
lishes neither objective well-being nor genuine autonomy (FR 90f.). The measure of 
“pleasure and desire” is thus “too malleable to be a firm guide to deprivation and 
disadvantage” (DF 63).48 Whoever views individual perceptions of happiness as the 
only measure for welfare-provision, must, consequently, also be ready to reject 
donations to the modest poor, in order to slip them into the hands of the greedy rich; 
people who are unhappy solely because they cannot get enough (RF 82).
According to Sen, one does not escape this objection by combining utilitarianism 
with egalitarianism. Certainly, one can conceive of granting everyone the same enti-
tlement to money as an all-purpose means so that everyone could attain their respec-
tively desired utility. One would acquire bread, the other a mink coat; would not the 
happiness of all thus be served? Could this rescue the old utilitarian and welfarist 
axioms?
Hardly. Welfare-egalitiarianism is frustrated by the “diversity of human beings,” 
says Sen. “Differences in age, gender, special talents, disability, proneness to illness 
and so on can make two different persons have quite divergent opportunities and 
quality of life even when they share exactly the same commodity bundle” (DF 69). 
Disability makes life costlier. The same is true of age and sickness. Furthermore, 
disadvantages are often felt twice, not only from the perspective of costs, but also 
46 See James Buchanan, “The Domain of Constitutional Economics,” in Constitutional Political 
Economy 1:1 (1990), 1–18.
47 See Martha Nussbaum: “Thus the Capabilities Approach departs from a tradition in economics 
that measures the real value of a set of options by the best use that can be made of them. Options 
are freedoms, and freedom has intrinsic value” (Creating Capabilities, 25).
48 See Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 54f.
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from the perspective of income. Because of limited possibilities for employment, a 
disabled person has, as a rule, a lower income. This “coupling of disadvantages” 
(DF 70ff.) must be legally accounted for in distributive processes. Equal distribution 
fails here. To assume that all are the same rather means to treat unequals equally. It 
violates precisely that demand for fairness that egalitarian theories wish to satisfy 
(IJ, 255–259).49
People with disabilities therefore present a special case of a universally valid 
assessment: Individuals are, objectively, too unequally constituted and, subjectively, 
too unequally oriented for measuring them all with the same economic yardstick. A 
humane economics is therefore one which accounts precisely for that difference in 
objective want and subjective need. Hence one has to free oneself of the fixation 
with the distributional aspect of economic means and rather consider which capa-
bilities and life-chances these create for the persons in question; a perspective that 
cannot be attained without recourse to values and norms.
This critique of the foundations of utilitarianism and egalitarianism shakes the 
welfarist superstructure of neoclassical economics which rests on these two pillars. 
For while German economists at the turn of the nineteenth century still allowed a 
Methodenstreit (methodology dispute) as well as a Werturteilsstreit (value- judgment 
dispute), about the status that moral norms and empirically inductive (historical, 
statistical) knowledge should have in economics, Anglo-American economists were 
by the middle of the twentieth century almost unanimously conforming to the pro-
gram of a purely descriptive as well as primarily deductive economics.50 This posi-
tivistic economics was said to operate from a few, clearly defined axioms and 
thereby – it was claimed – describe and make predictable economic behavior in 
accordance with laws similar to those paramount in the natural sciences.
The homo oeconomicus model is at the heart of these aspirations.51 In order to be 
able to construct algorithms it reduces economic behavior to the simplest elements: 
rationality and self-interest. From this foundation, neoclassical economics proceeds 
to explain the economic world at large. Sen has no objection to the axiom of ratio-
nality as a scientific hypothesis, but he does object to its connection with a 
 “presumption of ubiquitous selfishness” (DF 118). Either this prescription does far 
too little and is prognostically unproductive, if one  – as in Paul Samuelsson’s 
“revealed preferences theory” – conflates it with actual market behavior. Or it does 
much too much; i.e. whenever it ventures towards the “highly restrictive and thor-
oughly dubious empirical assumption that people, in fact, choose entirely according 
to their respective personal interests and well-beings” (RF 589). The belief that pure 
49 Authors who insist on egalitarianism, like Thomas Pogge, have of course already reacted to this 
objection by appropriate differentiations and modifications of their “basic goods” theories: for a 
critique of these differentiated positions (and a strengthening of Sen’s core-argument) see 
Johnathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, Disadvantage (Oxford & New York, 2007).
50 For more information, see Claus Dierksmeier, “The Freedom-Responsibility Nexus in 
Management Philosophy.”
51 For a description and defense of the model see Gebhard Kirchgässner, Homo Oeconomicus: The 
Economic Model of Individual Behavior and Its Application in Economics and Other Social 
Sciences (New York, 2008).
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egoism governs the economic world is, empirically, just as untenable as the con-
verse presumption that human beings act only from altruism. Whoever rejects the 
latter view of things as “high-minded sentimentality,” must also, Sen declares, dis-
own the former as a mirror-inverted “low-minded sentimentality” (RF 26).
While contractualists and game-theorists stubbornly attempt “to make us accept 
the peculiar understanding that rational choice consists only in clever promotion of 
self-interest,” phenomenologically there is little to be said in favor of this “remark-
ably alienating belief” (IJ 32).52 Whoever reduces the rationality of the homo oeco-
nomicus to self-interest, construes a “rational fool,” i.e. someone who in the most 
rational manner acts deeply unreasonably. Because this commits the individual 
decision makers to selfish preferences alone, it reduces without need the radius of 
their legitimately “rational” choices. Being self-interested need not be foolish, but 
not to have the freedom to consider whether to be self-interested (and to what extent) 
is a serious limitation of rationality” (RF 7n.). The axiom of self-interest therefore 
does not present a harmless working hypothesis, but rather a misleading “a priori 
prejudice” (RF 26).
Against it, Sen champions a model of economic rationality which includes our 
critically reflexive freedom “to reason about what we should pursue” (RF 46). Sen 
thus takes a position against Lionel Robbins’ almost canonical formulation of eco-
nomics as a “science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends 
and scarce means which have alternate uses.”53 That economic positivism which 
focuses only upon the appropriateness of the chosen means, but not upon their 
goals, is characterized and caricatured by Sen by means of the following image: A 
man who zealously works at cutting off his toes with a blunt knife hardly behaves 
more rationally as soon as he – after analyzing the relative inefficiency of the chosen 
means – finally reaches for a sharp knife (RF 39). He wishes to illustrate that one 
cannot meaningfully talk about economic rationality while avoiding the debate 
about its appropriate goals and ends.
Sen intends “to reclaim for humanity the ground that has been taken from it by 
various arbitrarily narrow formulations of the demands of rationality” (RF 51). He 
holds onto the postulate of rationality but shows that it is thoroughly compatible 
with an ethical reflection upon economic ends: “a selfless person who wants to 
maximize, say, the aggregate social welfare, or some feature of equity or social 
justice, need not, for that reason, depart from maximizing behavior” (RF 37). The 
rationality of human behavior does not depend upon utilitarian or egoistic premises 
but rather could also be retained among other – e.g. moral – indicators.
52 See also Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge, 
MA, 2002).
53 See Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London & 
New York, 1932), 16. A (critical) evaluation of Robbins’ contribution to the development of posi-
tivistic theories within current economics as well as an (affirmative) appreciation of Sen’s oppos-




Sen’s example: At a garden party, we would perhaps prefer to sit in the most 
comfortable seat and snatch the last fruit from the fruit bowl (RF 161). Yet, we often 
hold back out of consideration for others. We not only consider the situation from 
the point of view of our interests, but rather plan our behavior with reference to the 
social context (RF 161). Defenders of the homo oeconomicus model object that 
such considerations might still proceed from self-interest, because, for instance, one 
always has one’s mind set upon one’s own image in the eyes of the other. That is 
possible but misses the point of Sen’s critique. According to him, we commonly 
want something for ourselves only if, in so doing, we do not thereby improperly 
violate the interests of others. According to Sen we thus leave the best chair and the 
last fruit in the bowl to others, not only because we indirectly care about our own 
interests, but rather at least at times also because we take a direct interest in the 
preferences of others (RF 161).
Authors like Gary Becker have also sought to ward off this objection: by postu-
lating some other-orientated, yet nevertheless egotistic, joy in the well-being of oth-
ers. The everyday experience that we are glad about making others happy is thereby 
reinterpreted such as that, first, we wish to be pleased with ourselves and, then, 
mindful of our charitable form of self-enjoyment, are ready to do good for others. 
Self-advantage remains – quod erat demonstrandum – the decisive factor. Sen, how-
ever, counters that sportsmen often only wish to emerge victorious from a game 
insofar as they have fairly won it, regardless of whether they are lauded for this 
self- commitment to fairness or not. Although our desires do not always heed a nor-
mative logic and pursue private benefit solely in forms of decent agency (RF 12), 
often they do,54 and occasionally – and here the logic of self-interest ultimately col-
lapses – even to our own disadvantage.55 We strive for what is normatively correct 
not exclusively because of its advantages for us, but also because we aspired to it in 
itself. The rational agent postulated by economics thus in truth behaves – at the very 
least occasionally – as a reasonable person with moral orientations.56
This has important consequences for economists’ understanding of rationality 
and science:
The first and most direct use of rationality, it can be argued, must be normative: we want to 
think and act wisely and judiciously, rather than stupidly and impulsively. If the understand-
ing of rationality is firmly tied to the systematic use of reason, the normative use of rational-
ity is easily placed aqt the center of the stage. (RF 42)
54 Sen follows the view of Thomas Scanlon that, in general, we (should) be orientated by principles 
“that others could not reasonably reject” (Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other 
[Cambridge, MA, 1998]) in that, along with Scanlon, he localizes the descriptive and normative 
core of current decisions (DF 92).
55 See Paul J. Zak, “Neuroeconomics,” Biological Sciences 359:1451 (2004), 1737–1748; Timothy 
Killingback & Etienne Studer, “Spatial Ultimatum Games, Collaborations and the Evolution of 
Fairness,” Biological Sciences 268:1478 (2001), 1797–1801; Peter A. Ubel, Free Market Madness: 
Why Human Nature is at Odds with Economics – and Why It Matters (Boston, MA, 2009).
56 See Vivian Walsh, Rationality, Allocation, and Reproduction (Oxford & New York, 1996).
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For the justification of this demand, Sen appeals to the work of Hilary Putnam.57 
The latter had – for his part building upon Willard van Orman Quine’s (1908–2000) 
critique of the fact/theory distinction, a staid dogma of analytic philosophy58 – criti-
cally scrutinized the fact/norm dichotomy in economics. According to Putnam, 
physicalism within economics fails, first because of its unsophisticated understand-
ing of physics. The clean separation – still instructive in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries – of empirical observation and analytic statement can hardly be 
maintained today. Witness the not directly observable, but merely indirectly inferred, 
negatively curved time-space continuum (on a large scale) or quantum dynamics 
(on a small scale). As a close study of the wave-particle duality of electrons reveals, 
that which one perceives depends in each case upon how one observes. And results 
from how the respective object is conceptualized. Experience follows observation, 
and this, for its part, is orientated – consciously or unconsciously, willingly or not – 
by theory. In the same way as how in contemporary physics one can seldom speak 
of theory-free events, economics often lacks value-free actions.59 Just as in physics, 
theory (all the more so, the more sophisticated physics becomes) defines what 
serves as a datum, so in economics (implicit rather than explicit) values define what 
counts as a fact.
Those who, overlooking this, attempt to give economic realities a purely positiv-
istic interpretation confuse the hall of mirrors of their own projections with the 
world. The economic positivists see themselves compelled to deprive people of 
motives they possess, and instead to substitute these with preferences that they lack. 
Normativity belongs to the theory of economic facticity, simply because normativ-
ity belongs to the facticity of what economic theory is about. Normative values and 
ego-ideals orientate our life. The Ought has an Is – in our aspirations. It is therefore 
to be objected against the homo oeconomicus that it is not realistic enough, since it 
does not speak idealistically enough about people.
To reiterate: If human rationality were to consist only in cost-benefit calcula-
tions, how is it that we sometimes let our morality cost us something?60 Some 
 economists, it is true, reinterpret peoples’ moral expenditure as refined forms of 
care for oneself – set upon social recognition or transcendent salvation.61 With the 
57 See Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 7–45 and Hilary Putnam, “For 
Ethics and Economics without the Dichotomies,” Review of Political Economy 15:3 (2003), 397.
58 See Willard van Orman Quine, “Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” 
The Philosophical Review 60:1 (1951), 20–43.
59 See also Vivian Walsh, “Fact/Value Dichotomy” in Jan Peil & Irene van Staveren (eds.), 
Handbook of Economics and Ethics (Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, MA, 2009).
60 See Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, “Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game,” Journal 
of Law and Economics 53:2 (2010), 263–287. Francesco Guala, “Paradigmatic Experiments: The 
Ultimatum Game from Testing to Measurement Device,” Philosophy of Science 75:5 (2008), 658–
669. Catherine Eckel, Martin Johnson and Rick K.  Wilson, “Fairness and Rejection in the 
Ultimatum Bargaining Game,” Political Analysis 10:4 (2002), 376–393; Killingback & Struder, 
Spatial Ultimatum Games.
61 See Gary S.  Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago, 1976); Gary 
S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge, MA, 1996); Gary S. Becker & Richard A. Posner, 
Uncommon Sense: Economic Insights, from Marriage to Terrorism (Chicago & London, 2009).
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help of secret motives unknown to the agents, usual altruism is reconstructed as 
unusual egotism. But if such scientifically questionable ad-hoc assumptions are 
required in order to not simply dismiss moral action to one’s own disadvantage as 
irrational, what does that say about the theory employed here? What, asks Sen, are 
we to make of an economics that declares “Ghandi, Martin Luther King Jr., Mother 
Theresa and Nelson Mandela” to be “huge idiots” (IV 21)?
With the dogma of self-interest collapses an essential buttress of neoclassical 
economics. Another stands and falls with the mathematization of all economically 
relevant phenomena. The program of quantitative maximization requires the com-
mensurability of all utility functions. This, in turn, presupposes the exchangeability 
of all goods and services; and that, according to Sen, does not exist. At one and the 
same time people constantly aim for different kinds of – and often incommensura-
ble (hedonistic and moral, material and ideal, practical and aesthetic, etc.) – goods, 
and flexibly evaluate, in each case, which should have priority. This consideration, 
for its part, leads to qualitative questions of value, which, not only in part but in 
principle, transgress the quantitative logic of conventional economics.
Even one and the same person often cannot reduce all relevant aspects of one and 
the same object to a single nominal value. The value of a car, for instance, cannot be 
measured only in terms of either its top speed, or its comfort and safety functions, 
or its environmental friendliness, or its design, look, or brand-status. The different 
criteria of evaluation can also not always be reduced to a common denominator. 
Nevertheless, without fulfilling these conditions of rationality presumed by the 
homo oeconomicus model, we can make more-or-less reasonable purchasing- 
decisions on the automobile market.62 But if individuals do not even make one- 
dimensional benefit-assessments in respect of particular objects, how does it stand 
then with the oveall societal assessment of multiple – intersubjectively relevant and 
independently assessed – goods? Who still seriously believes that, in such scenar-
ios, society could simply adhere to simple cost-benefit comparisons?
The idea of an ultimate incommensurability of economic goods certainly pro-
vokes “anxiety and panic among some valuational experts,” who would prefer to 
live in a world which is “agreeably trivial” so that all-important decisions could be 
evaluated “simply by quantity” (IJ 240). Sen objects, though, that in our everyday 
actions – when shopping for instance – we handle this incommensurability of vari-
ous goods pretty well (IJ 241). To reduce complex societal decisions to simple cost- 
benefit analyses is hence equivalent to a “daydream,” he believes, which one had 
better dismiss with waking eyes: “To insist on the mechanical comfort of having just 
one homogenous ‘good thing’ would be to deny our humanity as reasoning 
 creatures” (DF 77). We should therefore break away from the, in any case, mythical 
maximization of one-dimensional goods in favor of a more realistic balancing of 
multi-dimensional values. Since the economic “cost-benefit-analysis” subjects all 
options to the quantitative dictate “more is better than less,” it has, for its part, to be 
hedged in by “social choice judgments.” Political reason must bring the wayward 
economic ratio to heel.
62 See Nicholas Rescher, Ethical Idealism: An Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals 
(Berkeley, 1987), 55ff.
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The societal role and appreciation of the market is a case in point. The market 
serves well as a discovery process of scarcity and preferences, but only with regard 
to commensurable goods. If the part is taken for the whole here, and the market as 
well as the Pareto-efficient63 it promotes are declared the arbiter of everything, the 
extolled informational capacity of the market founders. It produces misallocations. 
In Sen’s sharp and terse words: “a Pareto efficient outcome may well be thoroughly 
unequal and nasty” (RF 524). Moreover, even within the vocabulary of commensu-
rability the market splutters, when only a select few are getting a say. As indicators, 
markets function the better the more citizens participate through payments in the 
societal discourse about prices. But no pareto-efficient equilibrium achieved by 
unregulated markets can establish the ideally requisite economic capacity of strictly 
all citizens to take part in that communication.64 Left to its own devices, the market 
can neither create nor reproduce its own efficiency-conditions.65
Sen demands the demystification of the market; it should come down from 
heaven to the earth. The “oddly common presumption that there is such a thing as 
‘the market outcome,’ no matter what rules of private operation, public initiatives, 
and nonmarket institutions are combined with the existence of markets” (IV 136) 
must yield to a recognition of the social construction of market-economics. The 
(free) market does not exist; there only are various forms of a socially regulated 
exchange of goods, growing out of a reciprocal play of interests and values. Markets 
and the options they offer are creations of the values inherent in their arrangement 
and environments; without the latter the former could not exist. Markets ought to be 
designed in such a way as to not undermine their own social, cultural, moral, and 
ecological presuppositions. For this market-design, however, purely quantitative 
imperatives are insufficient.
In order to evaluate the pros and cons of markets qualitatively, pre-modern eco-
nomics had recourse to the ethics of theological and metaphysical providence. But 
that avenue is barred, factually and normatively, by today’s plurality of individual 
and social self-conceptions. The fundamentals of our social reality must conform to 
everyone’s free decision about the merits or demerits of their options. Also, in eco-
nomics, there must be no regress behind the idea of freedom (DF 30). The conse-
quence of Sen’s approach is to decide questions of economic orientation through a 
63 The concept ‘Pareto-efficient’ designates (following the economist Vilfredo Pareto) a condition 
of the allocation of goods in which the welfare of some people cannot be improved through redis-
tribution without, at the same time, reducing the welfare of others. A condition beneath this level 
expresses a lack of allocational efficiency (some goods are distributed in such a way that they 
generate less than the maximal aggregated utility and could therefore be substituted with others so 
that some persons are put in a better position, but no one is put in a worse one). Pareto efficiency 
fulfills a minimal demand of technical rationality but says nothing about substantial questions 
(beyond technical efficiency); about this see E.  J. Mishan, “The Futility of Pareto-Efficient 
Distributions,” The American Economic Review 62:5 (1972), 971–976.
64 See Partha Dasgupta, “Positive Freedom, Markets and the Welfare State,” Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 2 (1986).




“‘social choice’ exercise” by means of “public discussion” (DF 78f). Economics 
owes citizens the possibility “to discuss and debate – and to participate in the selec-
tion of – values in the choice of priorities” (DF 30). Economics should therefore be 
open to “public scrutiny and criticism” (ibid.). Everyone must be concerned with 
what concerns everyone.
Democratically agreed upon aims should lead to econometric benchmarks  – 
instead of, conversely, letting technocratic benchmarks dictate economic policy 
(ibid.). The values and aims which should guide policy are not given a priori but 
must be negotiated anew from society to society, from place to place, and from time 
to time. The search for a mix of broadly agreeable values is, Sen admits, sometimes 
“extremely messy.” And he knows that “many technocrats are sufficiently disgusted 
by its messiness to pine for some wonderful formula that would simply give us 
ready-made weights that are ‘just right’” (DF 79). But unfortunately, there exists no 
such “magic formula” which would absolve us from the dispute about the values 
guiding our (economic) life; that’s a matter of “judgment,” not for “some imper-
sonal technology” (DF 79). The freedom of individuals to actively co-design the 
conditions influencing their life-chances must be protected against all the tenden-
cies of economics to hermetically seal itself off and – through “cultivated opaque-
ness” – to hide its indwelling “choice of values and weights,” in the interests of 
simpler procedures of calculation and decision-making (DF 110).
Thus, instead of hiding economic standards of value in the premises and axioms 
of econometrics, they should be debated through “public participation” so as to be 
endorsed or rejected by the society through “responsible social choice” (DF 110).66 
Because these procedures make explicit the implicit values of the discourse’s par-
ticipants (DF 80), this process enables at the same time also their public critique 
(DF 81). It is the burden of freedom that such “social choice”-procedures only pro-
duce workable results when purposes are found or formed which appear acceptable 
to all concerned (DF 79). In this weight (Bürde) nevertheless lies precisely the 
worth (Würde) of those procedures (RF 526). For by means of them one might 
bridge, Sen speculates, the unsightly chasm between the abstract “freedom- invoking 
rhetoric” of some economists and their disinterest in the concrete emancipation of 
indigent individuals (DF 26).
Before economics can successfully remove motes from reality, it must be con-
scious of the beam in its own eye. Since, for the sake of the economy’s targets, those 
of economics are also at issue, economics must free itself from the quantitative 
 paradigm of physics and reestablish itself as a social and humanist science in which 
qualitative “value judgments” neither can nor should be avoided (DF 110). And, in 
order to offer – with the turn from the previous one-dimensional economic targets to 
a multidimensional idea of freedom – precisely that democratic transparency he finds 
lacking in his colleagues, Sen neither wishes nor allows himself simply to impose his 
own set of values. He instead has to justify to everyone the concept of freedom his 
economic theory employs: through a critique of competing concepts of freedom.
66 See Tapas Majumdar, “Amartya Sen in Search of Impure Welfare Economics: Finding New 
Space,” Economic and Political Weekly 33:45 (1998), 2860–2862.
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4.2.2  Critique of Reductionist Concepts of Freedom
Sen worked out his own understanding of freedom in joint seminars and discussions 
with Nozick, Rawls, and Scanlon. At first, he merely wanted to counterbalance the 
one-sidedness of prevailing theories. He set about this, however, so thoroughly that 
out of the sum and unity of those critical strivings a new theory of freedom grew 
which Sen also declared as such in 1998, in his seminal book Development and 
Freedom.67 This theory primarily gains its contours from its opposition to the utili-
tarian and libertarian positions.
Against utilitarian theories of freedom, completely determining the value of free-
dom according to its utility, Sen argues that, although freedom is not the only value, 
it is a value in itself. On one hand, freedom certainly has to relate to objectives, but, 
on the other hand, it is not consumed by them. The respect for freedom as an end- 
in- itself is to be distinguished from its value as a means to reach the goods it can 
achieve (CWB 39). The intrinsic and the instrumental appreciation of freedom are 
to be distinguished.68
Furthermore, freedom extends not only to given first order preferences (like, for 
example, the desire to smoke), but also to “second order preferences,” like, for 
example, the meta-preference “not to have the preference for smoking” (RF 18). 
Instead of robotically pursuing an order of preferences fixed according to the 
strength of desires it comprises, freedom can critically ask, “what preference should 
I have” (RF 619). True freedom does not uncritically maximize what certain desires 
demand, but rather evaluates and optimizes how they ought be consummated.
The idea of freedom thus encompasses two distinctive aspects. First, the internal 
conditionality of preferences. The mere wish to have no craving to smoke cigarettes 
does certainly not immediately extinguish the latter. Second, this very reflection 
throws light also upon the external conditions influencing our preferences: an 
 environment, for instance, which portrays smoking as particularly attractive or 
especially repulsive. Therefore, from the direct demand for freedom, there follows 
an indirect desire to influence freedom’s contexts.
Freedom is, consequently, political from the outset. It manifests itself not merely 
in a choice between (given) alternatives, but rather also always in opting and search-
ing for (better) alternatives.69 For this reason Sen thinks highly of the tradition of 
theories of “positive freedom” (for the genealogy of “positive freedom” in Thomas 
Hill Green and German Idealism see Sect. 1.2.1).70 These contain an  – always 
67 See Malcolm Bush, “Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom,” Social Service Review 75:3 
(2001), 514–517.
68 Martha Nussbaum also agrees with this: “Freedom to choose and to act, however, is an end as 
well as a means, and it is this aspect that the standard utilitarian position cannot capture.” As a 
result, very much like Sen, she thus concludes: “In short, the utilitarian approach undervalues 
freedom” (Creating Capabilities, 56).
69 See Paul Streeten, “Amartya Sen: Rationality and Freedom,” Economic Development and 
Change 52:4 (2004), 889–891.
70 Sen very approvingly refers to Thomas Hill Green (see RF 586 etc.). Sen’s citation-praxis clearly 
reveals his sympathy for proponents of theories of positive freedom; he often approvingly 
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implicit, sometimes explicit – commentary on the value of given options, and con-
sider the societal presuppositions of a life in liberty. In agreement with this tradition, 
Sen does not doubt that social policies securing fair opportunities for all belong to 
freedom in the full sense of the word. After all, the abstract right to the (“negative”) 
defense of property is unhelpful to those who do not possess anything valuable to 
begin with.71 In such cases, curtailing the freedom to property of some in favor of 
the (“positive”) participatory freedom of all would surely be advisable.72
Hence Sen’s demarcation from libertarian positions: Theories of negative free-
dom, Sen holds, misunderstand that the private control over our life’s settings is 
often far less essential than their design.73 Whereas libertarians believe that every 
quantitative increase in state control necessarily propagates a decrease in individual 
freedom, exactly the opposite can be the case. Contrary to the conventional wis-
doms of libertarians, the private autonomy of citizens is surely better protected in a 
district where police patrol than one where citizens, wielding private fire arms, try 
to take care of peace and quiet themselves (RF 397).74 This example illustrates that 
in Sen’s eyes the primary distinction of relevance for freedom does not turn out to 
be quantitative (a plus or minus in state authority), but is rather qualitative: It 
depends upon how and for what that authority is established. Only secondarily to 
this evaluation can one plausibly discuss its quantitative dimensions.
Both demarcations – the one from utilitarian positions just as much as the one 
from libertarian conceptions of freedom – must be kept in view. Against the utilitar-
ian standard of “cumulation outcomes,” i.e. measuring summarily material end- 
states, Sen proposes a concept of “comprehensive outcomes,” which holds on to the 
liberality of the formal procedures leading to the respective results. In this regard, 
then, Sen enters a coalition with defenders of negative freedom, when he, like them, 
denies any eudemonistic dictatorship that grants people opportunities at the expense 
of their civic freedoms (RF 510). Nevertheless, Sen does not wish to thoroughly 
 mentions, for instance: Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London, 1977); Partha 
Dasgupta, The Control of Resources (Oxford, 1982); Partha Dasgupta, “Positive Freedom, Markets 
and the Welfare State,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2 (1986); Alan P. Hamlin & Philip 
Pettit, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford, 1989); Dieter Helm (ed.), The 
Economic Borders of the State (Oxford, 1989).
71 See Ann Nevile, “Amartya K. Sen and Social Exclusion,” Development in Practice 17:2 (2007), 
249–255.
72 “This is a curtailment of a certain kind of freedom of control. But it is motivated by consider-
ations of freedom of another kind: freedom to achieve things” (Partha Dasgupta, “Power and 
Control in the Good Polity” in Alan P. Hamlin & Philip Pettit (eds.), The Good Polity: Normative 
Analysis of the State (Oxford, 1989), 191).
73 See Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 86.
74 “If, as libertarians believe, every individual has the right to own his person and property, it then 
follows that he has the right to employ violence to defend himself against the violence of criminal 
aggressors […] Gun prohibition is the brainchild of white middle-class liberals […]. If we wish to 
encourage a society where citizens come to the aid of neighbors in distress, we must not strip them 
of the actual power to do something about crime” (Murray Newton Rothbard, For a New Liberty 
[New York, 1973], 86–88).
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reduce the idea of freedom to that procedural dimension. Attention to the procedures 
in which rights and commitments are to be spelled out is in no way to be equated 
with an inattentiveness in respect of the foreseeable consequences of those proce-
dures (IJ 232f): “Even if [procedural, C.D.] liberty is given a special status, it is 
highly implausible to claim that it would have as absolute and relentless a priority 
as libertarian theories insist it must have” (DF 67).
The right to property and ownership, for example, “must not necessarily be taken 
as being just as momentous as my right not be tortured and killed” (RF 636). 
Precisely such differentiations are refused, however, when libertarians treat both 
rights on the same level as “side constraints” of liberty (RF 636). Absolute insis-
tence upon the formal dimension of rights to freedom can lead to material losses in 
freedom (RF 511). Against Nozick and Gauthier,75 Sen points out that “institutional 
fundamentalism” (IJ 83), i.e. a protection of freedom which only pays attention to 
the procedure and never the end-results can produce counterintuitive results: “even 
gigantic famines can result without anyone’s libertarian rights (including property 
rights) being violated. The destitute such as the unemployed or the impoverished 
may starve precisely because their ‘entitlements’ – legitimate as they are – do not 
give them enough food” (DF 66).
Yet, who would dare to maintain that individuals who are starving are not losing 
out on freedom, when they are lacking the most elementary of all freedoms, namely, 
the “basic freedom to survive” (DF 15)? Such “sledgehammer reasoning” (RF 561) 
heedless of consequences should thus be thrown into doubt. Robert Nozick per-
ceived the force of this objection. In a (not only by Sen) much-noticed footnote of a 
later edition of his work, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, he qualifies his theory of free-
dom as the sum of all legitimate “entitlements”. To avoid “catastrophic moral hor-
rors,” perhaps sometimes limitations of those “entitlements” might nevertheless be 
legitimate.76 Nozick does not, however, enlighten us about what this exception to the 
rule says about the validity precisely of that rule of a purely procedural protection 
of freedom. Sen comments: “But once such an exception is made, it is not clear 
what remains of the basic priorities in his theory of justice” (IJ 85). For Nozick’s 
statement either marks a genuinely intended relativization of his hitherto absolute 
notion of negative freedom (but then one can confidently pass over his theory and 
turn towards conceptions which – like Sen’s own contribution – attempt from the 
outset to balance out the formal and material aspects of freedom); or  – and this 
certainly seems more probable  – Nozick installs this statement only as a valve 
within his theory so that social pressure cannot explode it. Then this statement 
75 See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia; David P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford & 
New York, 1986).
76 Nozick writes “The question of whether these side constraints reflecting rights are absolute, or 
whether they may be violated in order to avoid catastrophic moral horror, and if the latter, what the 
resulting structure might look like, is one I hope largely to avoid” (Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia, 30). In a personal discussion on April 22, 2008, Sen pointed out that before he had had 
no personal contract with Nozick that might have provoked this concession; and, then, clearly and 
concisely sketched his own position once again with the words: “I am no big fan of property rights. 
Property must be justified by what it does.”
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would be as objectively injurious as it appears subjectively ignominious. In both 
cases, however, the conception of negative freedom turns out to be unsatisfactory.
Why then is the theory of negative freedom, despite its striking flaws, neverthe-
less still so widespread? Like Galbraith (see Sect. 4.1.3) Sen attributes this to exog-
enous grounds. A purely formal concept of freedom is easier to quantify and adjust 
to a mathematicised economics. If one simply enumerates options and identifies 
their increase with a gain in freedom, then one already finds oneself in the familiar 
fields of maximization logic. But one is thus kidding oneself (see also the introduc-
tion to Chap. 3). Whoever views freedom “as a matter of the size of the set from 
which one can choose” overlooks to their own detriment that the extent of individ-
ual freedom cannot be meaningfully judged “without reference to the person’s val-
ues and preferences” (RF 514). A choice must be judged “not just in terms of the 
number of options one has, but with adequate sensitivity to the attractiveness of the 
available options” (DF 117). The quantity of options attains meaning only second-
arily: in terms of the primarily to be evaluated quality of the same (CWB 33f).
A purely formal theory of freedom gets us nowhere. Not only are a few good 
options to be preferred to a choice of innumerable horrible possibilities (RF 13). 
Often only a quantitative reduction of options leads to qualitative improvements 
(RF 602). Autonomously enacted limitations of the “freedom to act” can, for 
instance, produce a gain in the “freedom to achieve” (RF 597). By more people 
coming to coordinate their actions, it becomes possible for all to reach certain com-
mon targets. Collective forms of action and social structures do not only bound 
individual freedom, they also broaden it, by instantiating some possibilities which 
otherwise would not exist. Having access to meaningful options clearly stands and 
falls with the possibility of evaluating one’s own preferences and opportunities in 
coordination with others and of changing them in collaboration with them (RF 12).
Sen maintains that positions solely oriented by negative freedom – the right to 
fend off all interventions into property rights and entitlements – are not sophisti-
cated enough. He instead holds that “both negative and positive freedom can be 
simultaneously valued” (RF 12n.). Still, a clear hierarchy is a presupposition of this 
agreeable harmony. Sen does subordinate the concept of negative freedom to the 
concept of positive freedom instead of merely coordinating it with it – let alone, 
allowing the latter to reign above the former. We should protect negative freedom 
precisely because we respect positive freedom (RF 646).
I have found it more useful to see “positive freedom” as the person’s ability to do the things 
in question taking everything in account (including external restraints as well as internal limi-
tations). In this interpretation, a violation of negative freedom must also be – unless compen-
sated by some other factor – a violation of positive freedom, but not vice versa. (RF 596)
A complete conception of freedom should encompass all socially conditioned 
“capabilities to do things that a person has reason to value” (DF 56). But since the 
twofold distinction between “negative” and “positive” freedom makes the articula-
tion of this idea more difficult, Sen ultimately replaces it with his own threefold 
model. The latter distinguishes an “opportunity aspect,” directed towards our oppor-
tunities, from a “process aspect,” which investigates how these come about. Both 
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aspects are subsequently brought together and conjoined in the concept of a “sub-
stantive freedom.” As a result of this conception, individual and collective freedoms 
inseparably refer to one another. Institutions codetermine the preferences and 
opportunities of individuals. We must therefore also evaluate and reform these insti-
tutions “in the light of their contributions to our freedom” (DF 142). Whoever makes 
use of socially imputed freedom must not refuse collaborating in the social con-
struction of the freedom of others: “we have to see individual freedom as a social 
commitment” (DF XII).77
John Rawls is a thinker who had insisted upon just that. The emancipatory 
moment of his theory of justice consists in the social-liberal preoccupation with 
giving everyone the “basic goods” they require in order to be capable of a real use 
of freedom, both materially and ideally. As was discussed in the previous chapter, 
this attempt was undertaken in Rawls’ Theory of Justice, which is supposed to out-
line how much (quantitatively), within ideal societal institutions, everyone owes 
everyone else so that everyone can live in freedom. But in Sen’s judgement this 
approach fails because Rawls attempts to tie up the idea of freedom with his own 
Rawlsian concept of justice. Sen, however, maintains that Rawls’ search for a per-
fect norm of justice is “neither necessary, nor sufficient” (IJ 15). It is not required 
because – not only an absolute, but rather – a comparative concept of justice suffices 
to address glaring “capacity deficits.” And it is insufficient because even a concept 
of optimal justice does not enable us to evaluate concrete grievances. Sen illustrates 
this critique with vivid examples. Even if one could agree, say, on Leonardo’s Mona 
Lisa being the best painting in the world, that alone would still provide us with no 
appropriate criterion to evaluate the work of, for instance, Picasso and Dalí.78 
Applied to questions of social justice that means: Rawls’ attempt to find a single 
fixed criterion of justice overlooks the fact that different systems of distribution can 
rest upon diverging measures of value – and legitimately so. While differences in 
political forms of justice from society to society will certainly not always express 
legitimate divergences over values, quite often they may (IJ 52ff.).
Freedom is recursive, according to Sen; it must liberate people – also and espe-
cially for finding new and innovative answers to what constitutes or what enables 
freedom (e.g., by means of distributive justice) in any given scenario (IJ 232ff.). The 
capacity and readiness of individuals to examine their values critically from the 
perspective of an unbiased observer (IJ 108, 125, 138) is thus of decisive impor-
tance. It allows the replacement of the rational choice theory Rawls employs with a 
social choice practice. Instead of, like the former, reconstructing the reasonableness 
of the chosen options merely quantitatively, namely “simply as smart maximization 
of self-interest” (IJ 179), the latter can also process qualitative criteria.
77 Just like Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 22.
78 In the same way, Sen also rejects the Platonic doctrine of “methexis” ( = participation) (IJ 16) for 
determining justice, with the following example: Whether one now views white or red wine as the 
ideal, a wine-connoisseur will always prefer his or her second choice to a fusion of the two, 
although as a mixture, it is closer to the ideal. Therefore, it is not always the best method for reach-
ing optimal results to reduce different standards to but one metric.
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Broadening the perspective to encompass qualitative viewpoints is of decisive 
importance. As previously demonstrated (in the Rawls-chapter) in regard to people 
who can never benefit or harm us, the models of quantitatively symmetrical reci-
procity fail. What obligates us is not an abstract thought-experiment in which we 
contractually negotiate conduct advantageous to everyone with all persons con-
cerned. It is rather the very concrete fact that we seriously influence the life of future 
generations (RF 535). We feel obliged to take account of the needs of those people, 
not only in the sense of a “benign humanitarianism,” but rather for reasons of fair-
ness (IJ 129). But neither as “social contractor” nor as “utilitarian in camouflage” 
(IJ 138) can we explain why we imagine ourselves as having such unilateral 
responsibility.
The shipwreck of symmetry-fixated social-philosophies upon the rock of tempo-
rary or geographical asymmetries is a secret blessing for further advances in theory 
(IJ 129, 145ff.).79 It helps us recognize that the idea of freedom requires a normative 
vanishing point lying beyond the “limited – and limiting – framework of social con-
tract” (IJ XI). And that prompts us to also pay attention to asymmetrical interests. 
Distantly dwelling peoples, or those who have yet to be born, do not qualify as 
contractual partners for interactions based solely on quantitative advantage-seeking, 
but they do qualify as claimants from a qualitative concern for fairness. In the place 
of commercial reciprocity there enters ethical mutuality.
But what remains of conventional socioeconomic philosophy if, as Sen demands, 
the self-interest orientated axiomatic of the rational-choice model is extended to 
moral dimensions (IJ 32) and the preference-formalism (and the accompanying 
instrumentalist reduction of freedom to choice) is rejected (IJ 83)? The postulate of 
rationality, i.e. the irrevocable “interdependence of rationality and freedom” (RF 
52), according to which the true quality of freedom can only be outlined in com-
munal, political quests for its reasonable direction (IJ 232ff.). The step from the 
calculations of symmetrical reciprocity to theories of unilateral and asymmetrical 
commitments is, after all, meant to express and not negate reasonable freedom. The 
formulation of such a theory of responsible freedom – by means of which, correctly 
understood, individual freedom when contributing to the emancipation of others is 
not reduced but realized, and not contradicted but completed – requires, however, 
according to Sen, the capabilities approach.
4.2.3  Freedom Through “Capabilities”
Sen complains that libertarians, utilitarians, and Rawlsians have all inappropriately 
conceptualized the “freedom to achieve actual livings that one can have reason to 
value,” which is so decisive for people’s real lives (DF 73). Only Martha Nussbaum 
has achieved this (ibid.). Taking her departure from Aristotle, Nussbaum had closely 
79 See Harry Brighouse & Ingrid Robeyns, Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities 
(Cambridge & New York, 2010).
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scrutinized the various human “capabilities to function” (CWB 32) and investigated 
their respective contribution to an empirically complete and philosophically coher-
ent conception of freedom.80 In this “capabilities approach,” established by 
Nussbaum, Sen welcomes the opportunity to reclaim “some of the old heritage of 
professional economics” (DF 25) in order to reassess the tradition of qualitatively 
directed economy neglected since the end of the eighteenth century (DF 24f.).
Sen explains that: “A person’s ‘capability’ refers to the alternative combinations 
of functionings that are feasible for her or him to achieve. Capability is thus a kind 
of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combina-
tions (or, less formally put, the freedom to achieve various lifestyles)” (DF 75). Rich 
people who fast, for example, may well endure the same privations as poor people 
who are starving. Yet, despite the same “functionings,” both groups clearly have a 
different “capability set”; the former choose that condition, the latter do not (DF 
75). The distinction between “functionings” and “capabilities” is, first of all, epis-
temic: “The two give different types of information – the former about the things a 
person does and the latter about the things a person is substantively free to do” (DF 
75). Second, that distinction is employed to differentiate the “value of choosing” 
(DF 76) from the options between which one chooses. “While the combination of a 
person’s functionings reflect her actual achievements, the capability set represents 
the freedom to achieve: the alternative functioning combinations from which this 
person can choose” (DF 75).
Important is not only the abstract quantity of formally and universally granted 
possibilities, but rather primarily the concrete quality of the life-chances people 
can realize here and now, i.e. the “substantive freedoms  – the capabilities  – to 
choose a life one has a reason to value” (DF 74). And the question concerning 
which kind of increase in freedom certain “functionings” achieve, leads, according 
to Sen, to different answers in different cases: On one hand because persons with 
distinct  objective needs draw different benefits from the same goods, but on the 
other hand because, as a result of subjective preferences, even needs-based alloca-
tions of goods mean something different to different individuals.81
The “substantive freedom” Sen is striving for is characterized by multiple com-
ponents and their interaction. His conception includes “(1) political freedoms, (2) 
economic facilities, (3) social opportunities, (4) transparency guarantees, and (5) 
protective security” (DF 38ff.). Sen thus not only demands traditional rights to free-
dom, he rather at the same time says that these will only come into effect when, for 
example, there exists protection from corruption and fraud (4) and individuals have 
effective access to the economic (2), pedagogical, and medicinal (3) as well as 
80 See Giovanola, Re-Thinking the Anthropological and Ethical Foundation of Economics and 
Business: Human Richness and Capabilities Enhancement; Paul Anhand, Graham Hunter and 
Smith Ron, “Capabilities and Well-Being: Evidence Based on the Sen-Nussbaum Approach to 
Welfare,” Social Indicators Research 74:1 (2005), 9–55.
81 See Douglas A. Hicks, “Gender, Discrimination, and Capability: Insights from Amartya Sen,” 
The Journal of Religious Ethics 30:1 (2002), 137–154; David A. Clark, “Sen’s capability approach 




social (5) conditions necessary for reflexively critical self-determination (ibid.). The 
different aspects of this “substantive freedom” strengthen and reinforce one another. 
The more political freedom a community possesses, the more effectively it can, for 
instance, democratically organize its economic institutions and enable social par-
ticipation. Conversely, a high degree of institutional transparency, for example, 
serves to free the functioning of economic transactions and political deliberations 
from corruption. The various moments of “substantive freedom” are therefore not 
only intrinsically but also instrumentally important (DF 37).
So far, Sen and Nussbaum are in complete agreement. Their views diverge, how-
ever, concerning the status of procedural freedom within those “substantive free-
doms.” For in Aristotle, the spiritual father of her approach, Nussbaum makes out 
“just one list of functionings […] that do in fact constitute human good living” 
(NFC 152).82 Similarly today one would also have to define this one basic set as 
exactly as possible. Nussbaum consequently finds that Sen lacks an “objective nor-
mative account of human functioning.” She criticizes his model for lacking a “pro-
cedure for objective evaluation by which functionings can be assessed for their 
contribution to the good human life” (NFC 176).
Martha Nussbaum views her own approach to capabilities-theory essentially in 
terms of a Rawlsian “commitment to political liberalism” (CC 75); like Rawls she 
wishes to make use only of arguments that she may assume are already backed by 
the “overlapping consensus” of the actual community: “my capability-based theory 
of justice refrains from offering a comprehensive assessment of the quality of life in 
a society, even for comparative purposes, because of the role of political liberalism 
in my theory requires me to prescind from offering any comprehensive account of 
value” (CC 19). She, therefore, on the one hand, finds that Sen’s liberalism goes too 
far in vigorously professing the necessity of “capability fulfilment as freedom,” as 
though it were a self-contained “comprehensive doctrine” (ibid.). On the other hand, 
according to her, Sen does not go far enough, since he does not establish a list of the 
irrevocable basic capabilities (CC 76).
The “capabilities approach,” Nussbaum explains, deals with “substantial free-
doms” (CC 18). It is therefore incumbent upon it to state precisely which these are. 
(Nota bene: As we will later discuss, she does not talk about “substantive freedoms,” 
like Sen, but rather of “substantial freedoms”). According to Nussbaum, Sen simply 
never gives us an answer to the question, “Which capabilities are the most impor-
tant?” (CC 27) Rather than providing one, he simply contents himself with sugges-
tions: “Sen takes a stand on the valuational issue by emphasis, choice of examples, 
but he does not attempt anything like a systematic answer” (CC 27). One gets the 
impression that, although Sen had set off in the right direction, he ultimately failed 
to jump as far as required.
82 Martha Nussbaum’s writings are cited in accordance with following abbreviations: (NFC): 
Martha Craven Nussbaum, Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution 
(Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1988); (FJ): Martha Craven Nussbaum, Frontiers of 
Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA, 2006); (CC): Martha 
Craven Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA, 
2011).
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Sen, conversely, is disturbed by Nussbaum’s elimination of interpretative leeway 
in favor of a fixed conception of “well-being” (CWB 47). For Sen conceives of his 
concept of “substantive freedom” as embracing not only the material results of free-
dom, but also its procedural dimensions. For the sake of this “process aspect” Sen 
wishes to keep the “capability approach” open to diverging answers to the question 
concerning which freedoms deserve priority (CWB 47). The last word about this 
should be had by neither economists nor philosophers, but rather by all concerned. 
Instead of one single answer to the question concerning which “capabilities” place 
people in the position of possessing “substantive freedom,” there should be just as 
many answers as there are political communities: here and now they are possibly 
quite different ones from those at different places and different times. Sen thus 
defends the openness of his approach as one of “deliberate incompleteness” (CWB 
47, italics, CD).
It is certainly not the case, as Sen sometimes suggests, that Martha Nussbaum 
simply sits in an ivory tower drafting a “blueprint” (IJ 232) which once and for all 
declares what every person at every time and place requires to be free – and that’s 
that. But although Nussbaum certainly does establish a list with ten “capabilities” 
(CC 33f) that she claims are essential for any living human being, her approach also 
aims at a certain openness to the respective political and cultural contexts of human 
life: First, she conceives of her list as “open ended” and open to “ongoing revision”; 
second, she is decidedly open to differentiated concretization within different soci-
eties; third, she draws up a “modular” conception which can be applied to the most 
varied “comprehensive doctrines”; fourth, she grants individuals important scope 
for decision-making by typically demanding only that “capabilities,” but not the 
realisation of “functionings,” be safeguarded; and, fifth, she integrates flexible clas-
sical civil-liberties into the list, as well as, sixth, clarifying that she aims more at a 
“justification” of the capability concept than at a blueprint for its “implementation” 
(see FJ 296ff.).
This displays significant flexibility and dynamism. Nonetheless, it cannot satisfy 
Sen’s demand that each and every polis must always be able to opt out of individual 
points on the list and place quite different ones on the agenda. In my view, this 
 constitutes the decisive difference between both thinkers. In Sen’s conceptualiza-
tion, freedom is quite clearly a good through which the basic capabilities enabling 
it are transcended and integrated. Contra Nussbaum, Sen does not see this prioritiz-
ing of freedom above its conditions of realization as a weakness of his theory, but 
rather as its particular strength. Hence the radical procedurality of his approach: The 
procedural freedom defining the concrete freedoms established by a community 
indispensably belongs to the idea of freedom. And that in turn explains why Amartya 
Sen partout does not write up a definitive list of inviolable basic capabilities.
It is from methodological as well as material considerations, therefore, that Sen 
refuses Nussbaum’s attempt “to move on relentlessly until one […] arrives at exactly 
one interpretation of the metaphysics of value” (CWB 48). Methodologically much 
speaks against deciding questions of value before “an agreement is reached on the 
choice of an evaluative space” (ibid.), i.e. before it is clear who has the right to make 
decisions or mistakes. And, in Sen’s eyes, this systematically antecedent question in 
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turn has to be decided democratically, not technocratically. This argument goes 
hand in hand with the material consideration that freedom of choice surely presents 
a good in itself – and certainly not only for liberals, but rather also for teleological 
theorists of “well-being,” for, strictly speaking, the “freedom to choose our life can 
make a significant contribution to our well-being” (IJ 18). Therefore, instead of 
specifying an absolutely optimal canon of substantial freedoms from an ivory tower, 
Sen wishes to ensure that citizens themselves can decide this sort of thing. Only the 
population as a whole is called upon both to determine the procedures by means of 
which they will negotiate and then settle that issue. Sen believes that both deci-
sions – the procedural decision as well as the substantial decision about the manner 
and prioritization of substantial freedoms – must ultimately be decided by the peo-
ple and not by professors.
This indirect access to capability-promotion wishes to ensure that freedom is not 
reduced to one single good and its maximization, but rather is respected as “an 
inherently diverse concept” (DF 298).83 Sen’s idea of freedom allows  – even 
demands – that differences of a social, cultural, political, and institutional nature are 
inscribed into it. This is why Sen does not demand equality in the actual operation-
alization of the idea of freedom, but rather that this be entrusted to liberal, i.e. par-
ticipative procedures. In Sen’s conception, that is, the “capability perspective” 
remains “inescapably pluralist” (DF 76). Sen leaves the concretization of the “capa-
bilities” entirely to the actual political communities (IJ 232). Here, then, lies the 
parting of the ways between the liberal Aristotelianism of Nussbaum and the 
Aristotelian liberalism of Sen.
Sen’s theory consequently operates (in substance, if not in name) with the dis-
tinction, employed within our study, between an (abstractly universal) idea and 
(concretely situated) concepts of qualitative freedom. Yet precisely for that reason 
Sen’s terminology appears unfortunate. The adjective “substantive” certainly 
abstracts more important from less significant aspects, and thus passably serves, 
looked at from a merely lexical angle, to call for a qualitatively differentiated treat-
ment of freedom. But the word is so dangerously close to the word “substantial” as 
to be potentially confused with it or its meaning. For example, as previously 
observed, one finds in Nussbaum’s critique a description of Sen’s position as a the-
ory of “substantial freedoms” (CC 18). Yet, the adjective “substantial” connotes 
independent attributes enduring throughout change. That is to say, it very precisely 
highlights what is at issue with the “capabilities approach” for Martha Nussbaum – 
but less so for Amartya Sen: the establishment of a definite core of basic faculties. 
Formulated differently: Semantically “substantial” is a diametrically opposed con-
cept to “procedural.” The whole point of Sen’s “substantive freedom” was, however, 
to assign the procedural moment a central instead of marginal role.
83 In my view, therefore, Nussbaum’s objection does not ring true: “Sen sometimes speaks as if all 
capabilities were valuable zones of freedom and as if the overall social task might be to maximize 
freedom. He speaks of a ‘perspective of freedom’ – as if freedom were a general, all-purpose social 
good of which the valued capabilities were simply instances” (Creating Capabilities, 70).
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On this reading, it would probably be more expedient to call the idea of liberty 
sketched by Sen qualitative freedom and to contrast it with quantitative approaches. 
The attribute “qualitative,” after all, only evokes a general concern for the content of 
options, yet not certain specific qualities (quiddities). It has, moreover, the connota-
tion of goodness, without the undertone of that being unique and unchangeable (as 
is, however, suggested by the concept of substance). In short, the expression “quali-
tative freedom” achieves what, according to Sen, the “capability approach” was 
meant to provide: insisting upon a meaningful direction of freedom on the one hand 
without, on the other hand, predetermining it once and for all. “Qualitative free-
dom” thus appears to me to be both a simpler and more accurate appellation for 
what Sen means by “substantive freedom.”
Be that as it may, in any case Sen’s approach entails that liberal economics does 
not ontologically deal with goods, but rather axiologically negotiates opinions about 
goods. Its subject matter is not values in themselves, but rather values for us. We are 
to investigate not the economy, but rather our economic activities in this political 
community.84 An economics doing justice to this idea must work with diverse and 
for the most part incomparable information, and therefore stands in express contra-
diction to the methodological ideal orientated by the analytic mechanics of the early 
nineteenth century.85 It has to deviate from the aim of an absolute commensurability 
of all values in favor of a more pragmatic view, and, where necessary, has to 
exchange abstract precision for concrete relevance. As a consequence, economics 
should not strive for the status of a discipline with universal and eternal variables 
and target-figures to the detriment of cultural and historical differences. Rather, 
economics must learn to perceive the change of societal values and institutions in 
freedom.
Such a discipline would arrive at the “conceptualization of ‘needs’” (DF 148) 
democratically, not technocratically. Accordingly, Sen rejects as a “significant mis-
take” the attempt to see the “capacity approach” as expressing or continuing “meth-
odological individualism” (IJ 244). For this overlooks that individuals constitute 
themselves in and through society. Social institutions and collectives make up an 
integral part of the individual’s conception of self and of liberty (IJ 246). Instead of 
atomistic holders of private rights constituting society by negotiating a social con-
tract promoting their respective and unconnected interests, the opposite is the case: 
Subjects find their identity through social roles and political deliberation; only in 
and through society do they develop and articulate their personal interests.
The Other is the interpretative horizon of the Self. “Individual freedom is quintes-
sentially a social product” (DF 31). Through the “interactive formation of public per-
ceptions and collaborative comprehension of problems and remedies” the 
privately- individual sphere and the politically-general realm reciprocally constitute 
themselves. Hence Sen’s theory of freedom culminates in questions concerning how 
much social justice open societies owe themselves and others. That is to say, Sen’s 
philosophical liberalism requires a cosmopolitan culmination. In the commitment of 
84 See Pressman & Summerfield, The Economic Contributions of Amartya Sen.
85 See Dierksmeier, “The Freedom-Responsibility Nexus in Management Philosophy.”
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helping all global citizens to substantial freedom, the idea of freedom rids itself of all 
false arbitrariness and determines itself in and by global responsibility (IJ 138, 248ff.).
4.2.4  Cosmopolitan Freedom
In an increasingly borderless and networked world, ethical theories that only func-
tion under the premise of geographical isolation lose plausibility. This is why Sen 
criticizes Rawls’ premise of a “closed society: […] self-contained and […] having 
no relations with other societies […]” (IJ 151). He counters Rawls’ defense of meth-
odological nationalism – as a device supposedly indispensable for concentrating 
philosophically on the essential – simply with the question, “whether considering 
ideas and experiences from elsewhere are matters of ‘distracting details’ that are 
somehow to be shunned” (IJ 151)?86 Would one not rather have to say that whoever 
lives in a globalized world must also think and act globally?
The undifferentiated universalism of a “gigantic global social contract” (IJ 71) 
espoused by some of Rawls’ disciples is just as unhelpful as globalization-blind 
nationalism. Sen regards the vision of a world-state established by global social 
contract as “deeply unrealistic – now or in the foreseeable future” (IJ 140). Sen, that 
is, rejects globalism just as much as he dismisses local chauvinism, and, in place of 
both, he strives for a cosmopolitanism open to difference. In place of that golden 
mean, however, Sen admits, there is thus far, merely a wide lacuna: theoretically and 
practically (IJ 141). How is it to be filled? Which form of Global Governance should 
humanity strive for? Based on which philosophy?
Sen has doubts about all philosophizing that is not self-critically situated. 
Questions of Global Governance are able to be answered neither simply within 
local parameters nor from a utopian perspective  – for instance in the sense of 
Thomas Nagel’s demand for “position independence” through a “view from 
nowhere.”87 Sen declares himself rather for a middle way, for a theory of “positional 
objectivity,” which proceeds “person-invariant but position-relative” (IJ 157). This 
alternative takes account of the relativity of the respective standpoint in historical 
time and cultural space, without taking it to the extreme of an ethical relativism. 
Although through their integration in roles, geographical locations, and physical 
conditions, people will never be able to gain an absolute, ultimate perception of the 
world, Sen believes a sufficiently nonpartisan thinking for all practical purposes is 
well within reach. Positionality must be distinguished from partisanship; condition-
ality must be differentiated from arbitrariness. The latter always ruins fair judg-
ments, but the former does not.88
Quite the opposite: Sometimes it is precisely concrete positions (cultural regions, 
climatic zones) and stations in life (parenthood, offices, roles, etc.) which make us 
86 See also Rawls, Political Liberalism, 12.
87 See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York, 1986), 5.
88 See Streeten, Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom.
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perceptive and competent for certain questions. One has thus to differentiate 
between legitimate (nonpartisan and general) and illegitimate (privately contingent) 
influences upon our value-judgments. The former survive the critical challenge of 
reciprocity and generalizability tests, whereas the latter do not. Schematic univer-
salism overlooks the former; ethical relativism ignores the latter (RF 469–471). A 
self-critically liberal reason will therefore plead for a kind of globalization which 
does not flatten all local and regional particularities, but rather allows legitimate 
culturally-specific differentiations (DF 18).89
Sen therefore engages his globalization ethics on two fronts: on the one hand 
against the “identity disregard” of crude universalists, but also, on the other hand, 
against cliquish communitarians who think that salvation lies in turning their backs 
on all things global, since they suffer, as he believes, from a “singular affiliation” 
neurosis (IV 20). Their models tend to bleach the colorfulness of human life “in a 
single-minded celebration of only one community” (IV 38). Yet people are “diversely 
different” (IV XIV); they distinguish themselves according to religion, career, sex, 
taste, political convictions, hobbies, etc. That is why the human lifeworld is also 
“diversely divisive” and the classification of the “global population into distinct 
‘nations’ or ‘peoples’” (IJ 141) is neither the only one possible, nor the most impor-
tant category for our thinking about global affairs.90 The philosophy of freedom 
must not reduce the global attachments of peoples only to one single – national or 
religious  – affiliation. It ought to remain open to multiple roles and dynamic 
identities.
One should not, like “many communitarian thinkers,” consider cultural and reli-
gious identity to be static, “as if it were a purely natural phenomenon” (ibid.). 
Instead, Sen stresses the dynamic malleability of our “different affiliations and asso-
ciations” (IV 5). Our passport is not our destiny, our nationality is not our vocation, 
for “the preservation of something with which a person is stamped, simply because 
of birth, can hardly be, in itself, an exercise of freedom” (IV 116f.). People are not 
firmly stuck in their cultures and contexts like sausages in their skin, but rather 
encounter “choices that continue to exist in any encumbered position one happens 
to occupy” (IV 35). To the idea of freedom there also belongs the dimension of a 
“cultural liberty […] to preserve or to change our priorities” (IV 113). That means: 
The value of cultural differences results from an (affirmative or negative) evaluation 
on the part of cultural freedom and not vice versa (IV 116). Because of this cultural 
liberty, we should reject any form of diversity that can only be secured against the 
freedom to question the “cogency and relevance” of particular identities (IV 4). 
Difference does not have dignity in itself; rather the dignity of human freedom 
bestows value on difference.
89 In this connection Sen approvingly quotes the pleas for reasonably justified differences in 
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA, 1985), 133 
and John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (New York, 2000), 139.
90 See also David A. Crocker, Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability and Deliberative 
Democracy (Cambridge & New  York, 2008); Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Sen’s Identities” in 
Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya 
Sen, vol.1 (Oxford & New York, 2009), 488.
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Strictly speaking, therefore, cultural relativism contradicts itself (RF 477). In 
every society there are eventually “dissenters,” “skeptics,” and “minorities” (RF 
476). Whose cultural specificity does the cultural relativist advise us to respect, that 
of the majority or that of the minorities? Which freedom is decisive, the dominating 
or the dissenting one? Whoever does not simply want to battle on the side of suprem-
acy must make sure that the tolerance to let the other be other does not transform 
itself into indolence in the face of their possible intolerance against a third (RF 477). 
If cultural relativism is prepared to become a tolerance of militant intolerance, it sins 
against precisely that cultural freedom it promises to defend. Outright skepticism 
against all “global ideas (such as democracy and personal liberty)” as supposedly 
purely Western creations gets us nowhere (IV 89). A turn from the idea of universal 
human rights, i.e. of rights, which precisely address not the regional- particular 
aspects but rather the transpersonal-universal side of human existence (IJ 143), 
gives expression to the very intellectual provinciality and partiality the cultural rela-
tivists sought to evade. For the universality of human rights arises from the personal-
ity and not the particularity of individuals serving as the basis for their rights.
For this reason, too, Sen pits a cultural history of his own against narratives about 
an alleged schism between Asian and European, i.e. Eastern and Western values (IJ 
227f.).91 “Valuing liberty or defending public reasoning” is not “exclusively 
‘Western’” (IV 84). In a penetrating excursion through intellectual history, Sen 
shows that both values are rather “part of our global past” (IV 84). Instead of suc-
cumbing to the “temptation of solitary identities and priorities” and  – from this 
point of departure – musing about a “clash of civilizations” (IV 99), one should 
rather extricate oneself from this homespun ‘intellectual straitjacket’ (IV 11). 
Otherwise one stands to advance the social entrenchments of such rubrics and the 
antagonisms they feed on (IV 27). Reductionism in the airy heights of philosophy 
can thus aid and abet violent demarcations in the political lowlands (IV XVI). For 
“theories of civilizational clash” – unintentionally perhaps, but no less effectively 
still – do the preliminary work for those who have an interest in “cultural bigotry 
and political tyranny” (IV 105). When academic theories provide ammunition for 
world-views charged with resentment, they share in the guilt of those who extract 
ideological ammunition from them. Hence the “extraordinary naiveté” of mono-
lithic cultural associations “must at once come to an end” in a world of obviously 
plural affiliations (IV 175).
Sen opposes all provinciality of thinking with a plea for its planetary expansion. 
In step with the growing worldwide commerce and encounters, we should strive for 
a globalization of the mind (IV 99) and our sense of justice (IV147). Sen does not 
tire, therefore to take ethical relativism to task, denouncing it, not only theoretically, 
as the “lazy resolution” of a reason in decline (IJ X), but also for being practically 
dangerous. The fatalism of cultural relativism weakens our sense for our duties to 
humanity and thus ushers in a spurious self-righteousness: For instance, starving 
people are not free. It is cynical to interpret their situation as an expression of cultural 
91 See Emanuela Fornari, Modernity Out of Joint: Global Democracy and Asian Values in Jürgen 
Habermas and Amartya K. Sen (Aurora, Colorado, 2007).
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specificity (RF 88). Instead of construing poverty as a form of cultural self- 
determination, its systematic causes – deficiencies in structural justice and the failure 
of global institutions – must be fought.
The impoverished of this world seldom get to taste the carrot of a deregulation of 
financial markets, but they are familiar with the stick of wildly fluctuating specula-
tion (IV 139–141).92 Here lies the decisive problem to be solved, according to Sen. 
And it would be hypocritical to hide behind the argument that, through the past 
course of globalization, the poor would still economically be better off now than 
they were before. Whereas authors like Thomas Pogge question the empirical prem-
ises of this argument based on sound statistical analyses,93 Sen criticizes its logic. 
What is at issue is not whether globalized collaboration brings about better results 
than economic isolation. The decisive question is rather whether, from all the extant 
possibilities for global cooperation, those most appropriate for the poorest have 
been chosen (IV 135). And since the answer to that is an embarrassed No, one may 
in no way content oneself with the status quo:
The consideration on which many of the debates on globalization have concentrated, to wit, 
whether the poor too benefit from the established economic order, is an entirely inadequate 
focus for assessing what has to be assessed. What must be asked instead is whether they can 
feasibly get a better – and fairer – deal with less disparities of economic, social, and politi-
cal opportunities, and if so, through what international and domestic rearrangements this 
could be brought about. This is where the engagement lies. (IV 136)
A truly consistent philosophy of freedom thus leads to the mandate to work for 
fairer conditions of Global Governance. According to Sen, this does not require a 
world-state but certainly a thoroughgoing reform of our global institutions (IV 184). 
So that on the global level the “vexation without representation” comes to an end, 
we must follow up on economic globalization with a political globalization, reckons 
Sen. In particular, an honest democratization of the global decision-making bodies 
is called for (IJ 139). That demand goes along with the hope that, in the future, 
under more favorable geopolitical auspices, global citizens will enter into firmer 
legal connections with one another.94 But at any rate, even within the context of the 
current institutional global governance structures, we must do everything possible 
92 See Nevile, Amartya Sen and Social Exclusion; David B. Grusky, S. M. Ravi Kanbur & Amartya 
Sen, Poverty and Inequality (Stanford, CA, 2006).
93 See Thomas Pogge (ed.), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very 
Poor? (New York, Oxford & Paris, 2007). Pogge shows that intentional or unintentional erroneous 
assessments as well as unjustified changes in assessment standards (undertaken over time) has led 
to an incorrect, disproportionately positive presentation of the development of global poverty in the 
last decades; see also: Brighouse & Robeyns, Measuring Justice.
94 In his publications, Sen is very cautious about questions concerning a possible future global 
government. In a personal conversation (in summer 2008), he nevertheless revealed a preference 
for the ideas of a democratically constituted global government operating federally and subsidiary, 
but at the same time laid down that it is currently more prudent to only speak in favor of more 
global governance instead of a global government, for: (1) one thus concentrates upon something 
achievable and (2) one would endanger such achievable advances in regard to more global gover-
nance with a too open advocacy of the idea of global government, thus inviting conceivable fears 
of a global Moloch.
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to make a life in substantive freedom possible for every person upon this earth (IV 
136). And Sen declares this the responsibility of absolutely all (individuals, institu-
tions, states) that can help – unilaterally, simply since and inasmuch they can. No 
one may argue their way out of this duty to humanity.95
Sen finds it intolerable that we live in a world in which “unprecedented opu-
lence” and “remarkable deprivation, destitution and oppression” exist side by side 
(DF XI). With “constructive impatience” he observes how we do not make full use 
of our technical and political possibilities to alleviate human suffering (DF 11). 
Worldwide misery is not the fault of globalization itself, though, but rather due to its 
mismanagement (IV 121). And the latter is, according to Sen, not least the result of 
misunderstandings about the meaning and end of economic activity. We ought to 
exchange our material concepts of well-being for conceptions directed towards the 
substantial freedom of all people.96 “Freedom – rather than well-being” must assume 
the “foundational role” (RF 9) in socioeconomic philosophy.
The individual and institutional demands of freedom must be brought into a cos-
mopolitan balance so that the freedom of one does not hinder  – but rather pro-
motes – the liberation of the other. Although, or perhaps precisely because, freedom 
is universally desired and experienced (DF 118), one cannot, therefore, simply – 
like in the case of the “Washington Consensus” – globalize one particular concept 
95 What this means in practice becomes clear(er) in the work of Martha Nussbaum. Worldwide 
people vote with their feet against their respective political and economic systems and direct their 
hopes upon the global community. “One of the things people themselves might want out of inter-
national relations is help in overthrowing an unjust regime, or winning full inclusion in one that 
excludes them” (FJ 234). We should therefore not let a false relativism delude us into believing that 
we only have moral obligations towards our fellow citizens. Streams of refugees compel the afflu-
ent world to adopt a cosmopolitan perspective. One cannot practically treat them with fairness 
without being theoretically fair to their human rights. For Nussbaum that entails renouncing the 
naïve belief (fueled by Rawls among others) that every nation is the architect of its own well-being. 
For even when states continue to strive for good governance, they are not always successful. Other 
forces contribute towards their destiny. “The global economic order and the disadvantages it 
imposes upon poorer nations” (FJ 262), for instance, are to be born in mind, according to 
Nussbaum. Global trade federations and the powers standing behind them change and curtail the 
possibilities of national politics. Thus even states adequately governed on the inside, when from 
the outside afflicted by severe economic disadvantages, may fail to provide their citizens with suf-
ficient chances to flourish economically. In addition, there is the influence of powerful “multina-
tional corporations” (FJ 225), whose logistic and financial power outranks many state institutions, 
without being subject to procedures of political legitimation. On a global scale, therefore, the 
contractualist hypothesis that an intelligent striving of all nations for their “mutual advantage” 
alone will suffice to bring about acceptable socioeconomic conditions for all world citizens thus 
fails (FJ 270). Ultimately some states are “just too poor for the richer nations to gain anything from 
treating them as rough equals” (FJ 249). But what should the global community do with societies 
which – observed from a purely economic perspective – appear as a “drag on the whole system?” 
She agrees with Sen about the fact that “different principles will have to be chosen to deal with 
them” (FJ 249). Instead of reciprocal advantage, the principle of global justice should be found in 
mutual recognition, “human fellowship and human respect” (FJ 270).
96 See George Mavrotas, Anthony F. Shorrocks and World Institute for Development Economics 
Research, Advancing Development: Core Themes in Global Economics (Basingstoke & New York, 
2007).
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of freedom and mold all local politics in its image. If one does not wish to circum-
vent methodologically the core concerns of liberal thinking, then one must rather 
always keep in mind that “freedom is an irreducibly plural concept” (RF 585). As 
much as consistent liberalism requires a theory of those “capabilities,” the presence 
or lack of which indicates the degree of substantive freedom a person can access, 
just as little may said theory be simply decreed top-down. It is essential that the 
“capabilities” in question are determined by citizens’ democratic will  – and not 
from the lectern. And with this turn, Sen’s approach subjects itself to precisely that 
reflexive recursivity it demands of others. Sen’s theory thus survives its critical self- 
application and thereby, in form as well as substance, conclusively lives up to its 
claim to be a philosophy of and for freedom.
4.3  Results and Implications
Whereas the previous studies of Hayek and Rawls showed that philosophies based 
on models of quantitative freedom are insufficient and necessarily drift into qualita-
tive distinctions, Galbraith and Sen demonstrate how a modern theory of qualitative 
freedom can be brought into being. Both focus upon the social lifeworld: People are 
dependent upon the help and support of their fellows. Their freedom requires social-
ity in ideal as well as in material dimensions: ideally, in order to ascertain what are 
the true needs and interests of human life – and materially, in order to fulfill these. 
Whereas quantitatively orientated freedom aims to maximize autonomy 
(Selbstbestimmung) and minimize heteronomy (Fremdbestimmung), qualitative 
freedom sets out to optimize personal autonomy through social co-determination 
(Mitbestimmung). It views others and society as spheres rather than limitations of 
individual freedom. It reads the world of societal coordination as the eulogy of 
socially mediated freedom, and not as an elegy about conditions of unavoidable 
coercion.
Galbraith and Sen insist upon a just differentiation of personal and political free-
dom; from this angle, they develop their critique of prevailing neoliberal fashions in 
economics and politics as well as of the libertarian models in economic and politi-
cal theory that buttress them. Galbraith and Sen demonstrate that our practices are 
always already both construed and polarized by theories of freedom. Both stress 
that our socioeconomic realities are not natural constants but vary under the direct 
influence of individual as well as institutional liberties, and thereby, indirectly, also 
from the various theories of freedom determining these. For this reason, it would be 
too simplistic merely to thematize distributive conflicts between factual instantia-
tions of freedom. Rather, counterfactual considerations must also be factored in: We 
need to ask, for example, which alternative freedoms are thwarted by the current 
economic and political status quo and which alternative conceptions of freedom are 
blocked by the intellectual status quo.
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Communitarianism and feminism formulate similar objections against the quan-
titative paradigm of liberal theory. As expressions of the philosophy of the present, 
which take kindly to the idea of freedom while being critical of modern liberalism, 
they too are informative for our project. Both camps criticize liberalism for soaring 
into the airy heights of conceptual abstraction, far beyond the specific concerns of 
the subjects it affects. According to a typical objection, liberal politics often disre-
gards the concrete lifeworlds of those individuals whose freedom it supposedly fur-
thers.97 If regional ways of life, the cultural practices of traditional communities, as 
well as certain behavioral patterns colored by, e.g. gender roles, are illuminated in 
the cold light of a merely functional, quantitatively maximizing rationality, then 
what follows? Does not such abstraction, with its chilly cost-benefit analyses, 
shock-freeze the fluid support of personal freedom and social autonomy (like, for 
instance, through “care” and “community”) ordinarily provided in socially embed-
ded forms of life?
Such concerns mostly attach to the homo oeconomicus-theorem, the central fig-
ure of quantitatively orientated theories like game-theory and contractualism: 
According to feminist critique, under the cover of value-free science, this model of 
a rational utility-maximizer encourages behavioral expectations along a certain, 
selfish line.98 Conversely, it brands socially directed behavior as a “moral failure,”99 
for instance, by depreciating “participation in nonreciprocal relationships; low pri-
vacy needs; a greater willingness to seek the approval of the group, […] and irratio-
nality (defined as a failure to seek utility maximization; in other words, extraordinary 
and even ordinary acts of altruism and benevolence).”100 Feminists therefore support 
the thesis that the homo oeconomicus-doctrine impedes women’s self-assertion 
“with their unchosen dependency relationships with children and others in need, 
their alleged proclivity towards moral decisions based on partial and contextual 
grounds, their putative lack of respect for rights in the face of needs, and their sup-
posed tendency to define identity through relationships with others rather than 
through the values of separation and self-realization.”101
97 See Debra Satz & Rob Reich (eds.), Toward a Humanist Justice: The Political Philosophy of 
Susan Moller Okin (Oxford & New York, 2009); Onora O’Neill, “Justice, Gender, and International 
Boundaries” in Pablo Greiff & Ciaran Cronin (eds.), Global Justice and Transnational Politics: 
Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of Globalization (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 
303–323.
98 See the debate in Ann E. Cudd & Nancy Holmstrom, Capitalism: For and Against (Cambridge, 
2011).
99 See Riane Eisler & Daniel Loye, “The ‘Failure’ of Liberalism: A Reassessment of Ideology from 
a New Feminine-Masculine Perspective,” Political Psychology 4:2 (1983), 375–391 for further 
evidence.
100 See Lisa Cohen Elliot D. Hill, “Homo Economicus, Different Voices, and the Liberal Psyche,” 




Yet, according to the critique, in quantitative thinking, men also would be locked 
into clockwork behavioral patterns through stereotypical role-models.102 For, in a soci-
ety directed by this model all who do not comply with the maximization imperative 
will ultimately have access to fewer resources; and according the logic of the model of 
inherent self-interest, they will then also have to blame themselves for this outcome to 
boot.103 Whether people do not want to conform to that rationality or whether they are 
not able to conform to it, the logic of selfish maximization – even where tempered by 
the welfare state – in effect disadvantages them just the same.
For those unable to play along, it is in no way simply a question of physical dis-
abilities. Mind and character also be factored in. Industriousness does not fall from 
the heavens but is rather acquired upon earth. Its cultivation depends upon social 
and cultural preconditions among other things, to which not everyone has the same 
access. Not only ability but also attitude is in large part a cultural construct. Theories 
suppressing cultural contexts consequently invite a misreading of socially construed 
distinctions, together with the privileges and discriminations they entail, as but nat-
ural delimitations. Thanks to this blunder, inequality easily acquires a Social 
Darwinist alibi  – according to the motto: “The secret of success is hard work!” 
When deliberately ignoring, though, that in a deregulated market-driven society not 
everyone is equipped and positioned to deliver such hard work, the fact becomes 
obfuscated that therefore people do not always deserve what they earn. Economic 
liberalism thus fails its very own ideal of meritocracy.104
The systematic reason for these distorted outcomes lies in the matrix of quantita-
tive thinking. For quantitative freedom aspires towards the maximal realization of 
subjective preferences, i.e. the minimization of their restrictions; and those prefer-
ences are viewed as naturally given. But that is short-sighted according to 
 communitarians and feminists.105 What applies, for example, if a person’s prefer-
ences have been developed under oppressive conditions? A woman born into a cul-
ture that degrades her, so that after decades of socialization she reacts to maltreatment 
with servility, may perceive her situation as hopeless, perhaps even as just.106 Even 
if (for instance, through a move into a society which fosters equality) there is a 
change in her physical options (in the sense of quantitative freedom) for an emanci-
102 See also Okin & Mansbridge, Feminism; Martha Fineman & Terence Dougherty, Feminism 
Confronts Homo Economicus: Gender, Law and Society (Ithaca, NY, 2005).
103 See Jennifer Chan, “Between Efficiency, Capability and Recognition: Competing Epistemes in 
Global Governance Reforms,” Comparative Education 43:3 (2007), 359–376.
104 See Herzog, Freedom gehört nicht nur den Reichen.
105 See Nancy J.  Hirschmann, The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom 
(Princeton, NJ, 2003), 236 f.
106 For the discussion about “adaptive preferences” forced by Sen and Nussbaum see Ann E. Cudd, 
“Oppression by Choice,” Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (2005), 20–49 and Serene J. Khader, 
Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment (Oxford, 2011).
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pated life, she may not necessarily realize, theoretically or practically, the (qualita-
tive) freedom to use these increased options.
Communitarians argue likewise: What applies if the individual’s preferences are 
characterized by corrupt contexts, e.g. in an unlawful state like that of the Third 
Reich? Are such preferences to be respected in the same way as those developed in 
a community characterized by mutual respect and responsibility? Are both types to 
be measured as quantitatively equal? Or is one not forced to switch to a logic that 
can qualitatively differentiate between the formative conditions of subjective prefer-
ences (for example, as helping or hindering autonomy).107
That at least is the argument of the American philosopher, Joseph Raz, who eval-
uates freedom according to its contribution to the development of reasonable self- 
determination.108 Against the assumption of a normatively empty world – prevailing 
in quantitative models of freedom – into which our choices alone first inscribe val-
ues, Raz proposes that the “ability to respond appropriately to (perceived) norma-
tive aspects of the world” essentially belongs to freedom. 109 Freedom does not 
flourish by unleashing individualist caprice, but by acting appropriately to the situ-
ation, and responding justly to the respective ‘nature of things.’ The latter state-
ments are as metaphysically intended as they are worded. Yet that should not startle 
us; these arguments were not formulated as policy papers, but rather as philosophi-
cal contributions to the civil discourse concerning their shared freedoms. According 
to Raz, government ultimately cannot and should not decide which options are 
“valuable or valueless.”110 For that it usually lacks the competence and always lacks 
the legitimacy. It is rather incumbent on society to lead a pluralistic debate from 
which the government can learn which forms of public life more than others 
strengthen the cultivation of individual and institutional autonomy.
At times, after all, it is precisely state coercion and interference with individual 
freedom which grants citizens genuine liberty for “some options one is better off not 
having.”111 Also the deselection of unwanted possibilities contributes to personal 
and political autonomy and its development. The polis has little reason “to provide, 
nor any reason to protect, worthless let alone bad options,” if these do not make 
anyone capable of autonomy (ibid.). For that reason, philosophical liberalism must 
give up its “blind obsession with the avoidance of coercion” (ibid.) as well as the 
quantitative fixation on a content-neutral maximization of options. State action on 
behalf of cultural and regulatory frameworks must obviously respect the freedom 
and autonomy of the individuals they are to foster. Raz therefore limits the state’s 
activity to securing the “background conditions which enable a person to be autono-
107 See Christman, Saving Positive Freedom.
108 See Raz, Morality, 407ff.
109 See Raz, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action (Oxford & New York, 1999), 77.
110 Raz, Morality, 410.
111 Raz, Morality, ibid.
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mous.” Since these are of an intellectual and cultural, pedagogical and medicinal, as 
well as social and material nature the state must, however, many a time be active 
“far beyond the negative duties of non-interference.”112 In this respect, government’s 
role on behalf of freedom is definitely “extensive and important,” while in all cases 
“confined to maintaining framework conditions conducive to pluralism and auton-
omy” (ibid.).
Such liberalism based on qualitative distinctions leads neither to a conception of 
a minimal state nor to the vision of maximal statehood. These quantitative specifica-
tions rather take a backseat in favor of the qualitative deliberation concerning the 
extent of the citizens’ consensus about their obligations to one another and to the 
common good. The state should promote individual autonomy only by measures 
already endorsed by “a large measure of social consensus.” Whoever has freedom as 
a goal must desist from using “coercive and of greatly conforming measures” as a 
means, and thus find “gentler measures,” according to Raz (ibid.). Citizens with a 
zest for political change thus ought to develop a theory of non-coercive forms of 
motivation and recognition, graduated according to the intensity and relevance of 
the freedoms respectively to be promoted; something already demanded by Kant 
(Sect. 2.1.4) and Krause (Sect. 2.3.4) as the culmination of liberal political culture.
Qualitative liberalism is both sensitized to and reliant on the assimilation of con-
textual differences. As a result, it can treat traditional forms of culture and ethical 
communities in a rather relaxed fashion. A qualitative conception of freedom must 
not per se combat communitarian limitations of individual agency. Some of them it 
can affirm  – in the form of voluntary qualifications. To quantitative liberalism, 
though, this sort of thing is anathema. Objections from virtue ethicists and advo-
cates of the common good are devalued in most cases as but expressions of mis-
placed sensitivities or even as narrow-minded attempts to blunt the edge of the 
sword of universalism. But this misjudges the liberal concerns articulated in that 
critique. As we had learned from Kant, freedom consists quite centrally also in 
evaluating and transforming one’s own preferences (see Sect. 2.1.1).
To repeat: Not only first-order preferences, but also their transformation by 
second- order preferences, belong to freedom. Therefore we also have to recognize 
as a genuine object of liberal thinking the social and cultural contexts among which 
such reflexive appeals as well as the capacity for self-criticism and self-control are 
shaped.113 But wherever the inner freedom for self-legislation becomes a theme, its 
descriptive chronicling inevitably also involves prescriptive elements. In order to 
correctly describe freedom, we must understand what we always already prescribe 
to ourselves in the name of freedom. Ultimately, the actuality of freedom can only 
112 All following quotes from Raz, ibid. 407–429.
113 See Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 15.
4 Qualitative Freedom
277
be conceived of from culturally mediated normative goals. Our ideals belong to the 
reality of our freedom.
Whereas the model of quantitative freedom arises from a freedom appealing to 
independence and indifference, which can isolate itself from social, moral, or reli-
gious commitments at discretion,114 from the perspective of qualitative freedom, 
autonomy can also be spotted in dependent as well as interdependent life- 
circumstances.115 That makes a huge practical difference. Questions concerning a 
liberal formation of life-circumstances can consequently no longer be answered by 
the simple qualitative equation: more independence = less dependence = more free-
dom. They rather demand a qualitative answer regarding which forms of depen-
dence and interdependence most aptly promote our autonomy. Some directives may 
curtail permissiveness and yet thereby enable freedom by catering to the integrity of 
our civilization as well as the values and virtues supporting it.
The philosophy of qualitative freedom, consequently, better captures the phe-
nomenon of religious dedication. Instead of a purely quantitative and entirely exte-
rior observation of the options of religious people, the theory of qualitative freedom 
takes seriously the phenomenon of religious self-commitment. Moreover, it views 
the religious urge towards “responsible freedom” as a valuable ally.116 People con-
ceiving of freedom as a gift from above perhaps tend less to measure the value and 
being of freedom solely with the calculi of utility-maximization117 and might find 
themselves ready to promote the freedom of others wherever possible, even when 
and where this appears detrimental to their own self-interest.118 And whoever thus 
conceives of freedom as an obligating mission may wish to help others attain the 
same kind of freedom, as illustrated by the example of Latin American liberation 
theology.119
114 See Christman, Saving Positive Freedom, 123 & 143.
115 See O’Neill, Autonomy, Coherence, and Independence, 212–221, especially 220.
116 See Benedict XVI, Charity in Truth – Caritas In Veritate: Encyclical Letter (San Francisco, 
2009).
117 See Karl Rahner, Freiheit und Manipulation in Gesellschaft und Kirche (München, 1970).
118 See Karl Lehmann, Frei vor Gott: Glauben in öffentlicher Verantwortung (Freiburg i.Br.), 2003.
119 Departing from the works of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), who appealed to the reasonable 
capability of all human beings, even non-believers and those of other faiths, at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century the theologians of the “Escuela de Salamanca” developed a cosmopolitan philoso-
phy and globalization ethics with a view to indigenous peoples. The writing of Francisco de Vitoria 
(1483–1546) and Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) were above all decisive for further theory develop-
ment. Vitoria defended the political freedom and autonomy of the Latin American population 
(Francisco de Vitoria, Luciano Pereña & C. Baciero, Relectio De indis. Carta Magna de los Indios: 
450 aniversario, 1539–1989 [Madrid, 1989]); de Soto also addressed questions of personal property 
and of economic freedom (Domingo de Soto & Venancio Diego Carro, De Iustitia et lure [De la 
justicia Frontiydel derecho] [Madrid, 1967]). Their writings first served as the foundation of a cri-
tique of political suppression and economic exploitation of the native population. Bartolomé de las 
Casas (1484–1566) and Alonso de la Vera Cruz (1507–1548), who both campaigned against colonial 
injustice and for the right to liberal self-determination of the Latin Americans with philosophical as 
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Moreover, when resolving societal problems and conflicts of interest, a spiritual 
hermeneutic often turns out to be a helpful heuristic device even for secular prob-
lems. For since religious conceptions of self and world often declare even the fur-
thest to be the nearest and treat the whole world with a respect grounded by a theory 
of being or creation, they have already for a long time anticipated the present cos-
mopolitan extension of our perspectives compelled by globalized economic rela-
tions and environmental crises. Even politics committed to ideological neutrality 
can derive inspiration from the spiritual answers to questions about the orientation 
of human life.120
Meanwhile, qualitative liberalism adopts a critical stance whenever opportuni-
ties are canceled for supposedly religious reasons. Religious communities must, for 
instance, tolerate divergent world-views and forms of life so as not to negate the 
very freedom they claim for themselves. The perspective of qualitative freedom 
therefore allows a differentiated treatment of spirituality. While quantitative free-
dom fosters suspicion of religions in principle since and inasmuch as they reject 
some options and plead for certain forms of individual or collective self- commitment, 
qualitative freedom only excludes fundamentalist forces aiming to allow freedom 
merely for their own message, but not for that of competing denominations and 
faiths.121 Qualitative liberalism does not pose as a secular judge of religious wisdom 
and belief, but it does examine the procedures of religious decision-making and 
self-articulation according to their compatibility with society’s freedom. Thus reli-
gions are, for instance, obligated to respect that people are free to educate them-
selves and decide about spiritual things for themselves, also and especially where 
this involves that people inform themselves about alternative  – not least, irreli-
gious – world-views, and follow them.
well as political arguments, stand out above all others (see Bartolomé de las Casas, An Account, 
Much Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies, with Related Texts [Indianapolis, 2003] and 
Alonso de la Vera Cruz, De dominio infidelium et iusto bello, I–II [Mexico, 2000]). In the twentieth 
century the liberation movement in Latin America appealed once again to the intellectual heritage of 
a tradition (theologically) viewing human freedom as a gift from God, i.e. (philosophically) encour-
aging all persons to employ their own reason and freedom. That is especially true of the writings on 
liberation theology of Gustavo Gutierrez (Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, 
Politics, and Salvation [Maryknoll, NY, 1973]) and Ignacio Ellacuria (Ignacio Lee Michael Edward 
Ellacuria, Ignacio Ellacuria: Essays on History, Liberation, and Salvation [2013]), as well as of the 
works on liberation pedagogy by Paulo Freire (Paulo Freire & Antonio Fernandez, Learning to 
Question: A Pedagogy of Liberation [Geneva, 1989]) and last but not least the liberation philosophy 
of Enrique Dussel (Enrique D. Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation [Maryknoll, NY, 1985]).
120 See Guilherme Baraúna & Viktor Schurr, Die Kirche in der Welt von heute: Untersuchungen und 
Kommentare zur Pastoralkonstitution “Gaudium et spes” des 2. Vatikanischen Konzils (Salzburg, 
1967). There are similar arguments in Jörg Dierken, Selbstbewusstsein individueller Freiheit: 
Religionstheoretische Erkundungen in protestantischer Perspektive (Tübingen, 2005).
121 See Claus Dierksmeier, Noumenon Religion. A similar standpoint in championed in Martha 
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 182–185.
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Conversely, it belongs to freedom to grant a hearing also to “disparate voices, 
even those who endorse traditional and authoritarian values.”122 But where is the 
limit? Up to what point, does a tolerance of religious forms of life correspond to the 
ideological neutrality of the state, and when does it contradict it? In terms of a quali-
tative liberalism, the answer must run: As long as the formation and expression of 
religious opinions remains free from “hypnotic suggestions, manipulation, coercive 
persuasion, subliminal influence, etc., we have no reason to maintain that people 
with spiritual commitments are less free or more in need of protection than atheists 
and agnostics.123 Liberalism’s mandate to take care of peaceful plurality in the polit-
ical sphere is thus not the same as an imperative to secularization. Liberalism has to 
protect freedom of religion, just as much as it has to protect freedom from religion. 
The theory of qualitative freedom is, consequently, in harmony with self- enlightened 
forms of religiosity.124 Not only secular but also some spiritual self-conceptions, 
after all, demand the ideological neutrality of the state: as an expression of a respect 
for the inviolability of personal convictions.125
Quantitative liberalism, on the other hand, lacks an adequate criterion for such a 
careful demarcation. Quantitative liberalism treats all commitments of a spiritual 
and traditional kind generally with mistrust. For, strictly speaking, quantitative 
thinking allows no differentiation in regard to the application of the idea of freedom. 
More options must be preferred always and everywhere.126 But where cultural or 
religious communities oppose this imperative of maximization with a profile of 
their own comprising fewer options, sooner or later there will be friction. Qualitative 
freedom is more liberal. It limits tolerance only in regard to the tolerance of intoler-
ance. It evaluates the use of freedom according to whether and how it protects and 
increases the disparate but uniform freedoms of others. The criterion for the exami-
nation of religious freedom thus concerns whether and how its respective use leads 
to alternative forms of spirituality being accepted or attacked.
Metaphorically speaking: Quantitative liberalism identifies itself solely with the 
white light of freedom and spots political opponents in each and all other hues of the 
122 See John Philip Christman, The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical 
Selves (Cambridge & New York, 2009), 173.
123 See Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 19.
124 See Claus Dierksmeier, “Bundesrepublikanisches Staatskirchenrecht aus kantische Perspektive,” 
Rechtstheorie  – Zeitschrift für Logik und Juristische Methodenlehre, Rechtsinformatik, 
Kommunikationsforschung, Normen- und Handlungstheorie, Soziologie und Philosophie des 
Rechts 30:1 (1999), 110–112.
125 See Jon Kabat-Zinn and Richard Davidson, The Mind’s Own Physician: A Scientific Dialogue 
with the Dalai Lama on the Healing Power of Meditation (Oakland, 2012); Dierken, 
Selbstbewusstsein individueller Freiheit.
126 See Flathman, The Philosophy and Politics of Freedom, 92: “It makes good sense to talk of more 
and less freedom, but the notion of complete, or full, or perfect freedom is a misunderstanding.”
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color spectrum. Qualitative liberalism recognizes that these spectral colors are but 
aspects of the white light of freedom in the prism of everyday specificity and sym-
bols. While quantitative freedom combats the colorfulness which qualitative 
 freedom celebrates, qualitative freedom directs itself merely against the black of 
fundamentalists.
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Talking about liberalism makes one quite a killjoy these days. Not only liberal poli-
tics is met with increasing skepticism, doubts abound also about the philosophy of 
freedom itself. The political and the philosophical problems are connected. The 
incapacity of political liberalism to clearly take a position on urgent social and polit-
ical challenges also has something to do with the confusion about the actual content 
of the idea of freedom. Since the traditional concepts (especially those of negative 
versus positive freedom) do not get us any further (see Sect. 1.2), I suggested a new 
terminology. In my opinion, the distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
freedom that was developed and tested in the previous chapters provides more con-
ceptual clarity than all previously employed terminologies.
While quantitatively conceived freedom amounts to a “the more, the better” in 
the choice of options, qualitatively orientated freedom emphasizes, “the better, the 
more.” Quantitative freedom describes a fundamental concern with maximizing, 
towards the highest possible number or the greatest possible expansion of individual 
options. The idea of qualitative freedom wishes to sensitize us to the necessary 
assessment, creation, and alteration of those possibilities: We should especially 
promote some more than others. While quantitative freedom reflects upon how 
much freedom to grant the individual, qualitative freedom attends to which free-
doms we grant to one another and whose freedom we enable. Metaphorically speak-
ing, quantitative theories of freedom consider freedom to be like a sheet of paper 
that becomes smaller the more it is shared out to other persons. It seems therefore in 
individuals’ interests to exclude other people from this scarce good in order to 
increase their own share of it. Qualitative freedom, in contrast, tends to see freedom 
as a light, the luminosity of which becomes all the more intense, the more persons 
that it shines upon.
Yet, we are not simply concerned here with conceptualizations, we are also con-
cerned with a new architectonic of liberal thinking that can integrate philosophical 
liberalism’s variant conceptions of freedom. This is achieved by distinguishing 
divergent concepts of freedom (what a community values and defends as freedoms) 
from the idea of qualitative freedom (that this concretization is instantiated). Since 
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the idea of qualitative freedom can combine structural equality with substantive 
diversity in the concepts of freedom, the liberalism underpinned by it is able to 
maintain the unity of its principle alongside plurality in the manifestations.
Both can be safeguarded when in our reflection upon freedom we sharply dif-
ferentiate between a contribution from philosophers to the idea of freedom and 
what emerges from the discourse of citizens as to the concepts – conceptions and 
programs – of freedom. This differentiation should especially be observed in ques-
tions concerning the practical consequences of liberal theory. It makes an important 
difference whether authors (at the level of the polity) employ philosophical reflec-
tions when addressing constitutional or procedural questions, or whether, against 
the background of such considerations, they express themselves as citizens in ques-
tions of political programs (policy) and processes (politics). The former allows 
more certainty and precision; the latter rather demands concreteness and realism. I 
maintain that a decisive advantage of my theory over and above earlier schemes is 
that it enables and defends this differentiation. It can thus prevent political differ-
ences leading to philosophical oppositions and vice versa.
The house of freedom has many rooms; the liberal idea can offer a home to vari-
ous liberalisms. Consequently, divergent kinds of liberal thinking that have arisen at 
different points in history or in different cultures should not be pitted against one 
another but should rather be reconciled by means of their shared fundamental con-
cern. I wish accordingly to expressly draw attention here to the different voices I use 
in the following. While, next, in the review of the previously reconstructed theories 
(Sect. 5.1) I systematize the scholarly results of this investigation, afterwards I will 
speak less as an academic philosopher and more as a citizen and global citizen. By 
inspecting the current problems in economics and politics (Sect. 5.2) as well as also 
in giving a prospectus of future discussions of a cosmopolitan nature (Sect. 5.3), I 
express my own liberal convictions.
This change from the earlier monochrome prose of philosophy towards the ver-
nacular of multicolored life occurs in order to emphasize the practical relevance of 
the previous studies and to encourage interest in the previously studied mental mod-
els. To facilitate the coloration of the academically grey constructions of the phi-
losophy of freedom, I will insert my own economic, ethical, and political views into 
the theoretical frameworks prepared here; not to impose them or to trigger political 
reflexes, but rather in order to stimulate philosophical reflections about political and 
economic affairs.
5.1  Review
In order to account for the idea of freedom’s universal nature, one must demonstrate 
its cosmopolitan suitability – not only in the production of those social, economic, 
as well as ecological and cultural conditions needed to make its global actualization 
durable, but also in respect of its proceduralization. The globality of freedom 
demands that all human beings – persons living near and far, present and future 
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generations – directly or through representation – participate in the concretization 
of the idea of freedom: Without participation there is no codetermination, without 
procedural distinction there is no substantive differentiation of freedom!
For this very reason, discourse about freedom must be open to the values indi-
viduals seek in and from freedom. Freedom is an end in itself, but not the only aim 
of human life. Therefore, in the chapters of this book, we constantly dwelt upon the 
following questions: How can freedom gain in quality through autonomous com-
mitments and self-imposed boundaries? How can we thus leave behind the schema 
of a quantitative maximization versus minimization of options to enable a construc-
tion of the qualitative optimization of freedom? And how can the thinking of free-
dom consequently extricate itself from that scale upon which earlier theories 
constantly moved back and forth between the poles of autonomy and heteronomy, 
without nevertheless ever reaching a generally satisfying unity of self-determination 
and codetermination?
For this purpose, Kant’s philosophy developed a theory of a self-determining 
publicity. In a political imperative, which calls for the public self-critique and trans-
formation of political freedom, Kant presents an early defense of reflexive democ-
racy and procedural politics. Kant questions what empowers individuals to 
participate actively in the public development of societal freedom and to advance a 
politics of freedom. Thus he bequeathed his successors the challenging task of clari-
fying the indispensable cultural, pedagogical, and economic conditions citizens 
require in order to participate in this project of liberal politics.
Kant stresses that freedom entitles and empowers us to be diverse and to mani-
fest the unifying liberal principle differently. The fundamental idea of autonomy 
encourages the most divergent ways of living. That is, Kant aims for a synthesis of 
unity and difference: Unity in respect of the structure of freedom; difference in 
respect of the substantive lifestyles, not predefined by, but certainly able to be evalu-
ated by, the principle of freedom. Our separation between the idea of freedom and 
its procedural restructuring in diverging concepts is inspired by this distinction. 
Kant thereby provides a notion of extreme relevance for intercultural questions. His 
theory can explain and justify human beings obtaining varying understandings of 
freedom according to context and realizing freedom divergently. For the objectives 
of his theory to be accomplished, Kant must therefore not depend on turning every-
one into a disciple of his very own vision of what makes liberal sociality thrive. That 
sets him pleasantly apart from many of his intellectual successors.
Fichte wished to improve upon Kant’s philosophy of freedom. Philosophy is 
called upon to deduce also the specific prerequisites needed for a life in freedom, 
and to dictate to the state how, in the name of true freedom, to realize these – if 
necessary against citizens’ own conceptions of freedom. Fichte’s fundamental 
thought is that freedom requires preconditions. Whoever wants the former must cre-
ate the latter. For him it is above all a question of rescuing freedom from its devalu-
ation through need and dependency. Fichte recognizes that severely asymmetrical 
economic conditions can make a mockery of political and cultural freedom, and that 
liberalism must guard against, not just governmental abuses, but also economic 
power. Even those who disagree with the concrete conclusions Fichte draws should 
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familiarize themselves with this perspective of a socially engaged liberalism. For it 
is hard to keep the center of the political spectrum in focus when one’s left eye is 
blinded.
At the same time, it is striking that, by campaigning under the banner of freedom, 
Fichte ends up with an oppressive model of state and politics. Where, therefore, lies 
the misstep leading from the coherent insight that all freedom has preconditions 
onto the precipitous path of leftist paternalism? When Fichte deduced, in the most 
minute details, the tasks and procedures of a model state of freedom, he meant – but 
did not achieve – merely to draw the socio-philosophical conclusions which Kant’s 
approach overlooked. In the interests of a monolithic metaphysics of freedom, 
Fichte departed from Kant’s distinction between idea and concept of freedom and 
thus squandered the opportunity of accommodating both unity and difference within 
liberalism. Whereas metaphysics was the foundation (Grund) of freedom in Kant, 
for Fichte it is its abyss (Abgrund). In failing to see that one can both defend the 
structural universality of the idea of freedom and entrust its concrete everyday 
implementation to the citizens’ will, Fichte believes that one must choose between 
the rational freedom and democratic self-determination – and ultimately sacrifices 
civil liberties.
In this regard he was followed by Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels 
(1820–1895), with political consequences that often let us forget that they them-
selves also saw their theories as philosophies of freedom. After they – with good 
reason – rejected every theory only advocating “negative” freedom, they ended up – 
without good reason – on the side of a communist version of “positive” freedom. 
Even though anyone who today reflects upon the regimes invocating Marx and 
Engels as their intellectual forefathers hardly ever translates the socialism legiti-
mated by the – rarely authentic – reference to their works into the grammar of lib-
eralism, the philosophical roots of their socialist systems nevertheless lay within the 
struggle for the freedom of all citizens. As long as we do not understand this and fail 
to grasp what went wrong here conceptually, we are ill-equipped to resist a repeti-
tion of this historical mistake.
These mistakes ultimately result from an insufficiently sophisticated theory of 
freedom which does not clearly enough distinguish between the principle of free-
dom and the forms in which it is cashed out. For, ultimately, it is irrelevant whether 
one thinks of freedom from the left or from the right and loads it with communist or 
communitarian meaning. What is important is that the step beyond conceptions of 
“negative” freedom does not come down to simply writing up philosophical wish- 
lists. It is no accident that in most cases conceptions of “positive” freedom fully 
accord with the societal aims of their respective authors, which are then immunized 
against all critique and solemnly promulgated as the constitutional objectives of the 
state. Only when we grasp that this problem is systemic and not merely due to spe-
cific authors – namely, a structural deficit in the terminology of “negative” versus 
“positive” freedom (see Sect. 1.2) – can we systematically obviate it.
The theory of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832), which poses the 
question about which procedure best does justice politically to the distinction between 
idea and concept, helps us with precisely this differentiation. Thus Krause also can 
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steer clear from Fichte’s socialism: Freedom’s ends and means must harmonize. 
Whoever wants freedom should employ coercion only under clearly defined (qualita-
tive) conditions and even then (quantitatively) only as little as possible. Freedom’s 
preconditions are to be established through, not against, the freedom of citizens. 
Philosophy should not simply force-feed people templates of liberal lives. Freedom 
must be the method of philosophy. Citizens are consequently raised from passive 
objects of theory to active participants in the program of a progressively self-deter-
mining reflexive freedom. Krause thus completes Kant’s fundamental thought that 
freedom is its own project, and convincingly explains why freedom is directed 
towards societal aims without itself being completely dissolved within them.
According to Krause, freedom should be both an end in itself and the means to 
this end. Its superordinate intrinsic value does not exclude, but rather includes, its 
subordinate instrumental significance; an idea which has returned today, especially 
in capability-theories (see Sect. 4.2): Capabilities should enable – but not compel – 
functionings. The former find an aim in the latter, but not their raison d’être, which 
is and remains the freedom of citizens. People should not be coerced into liberal 
conditions, but rather should bring them about. The innumerable fascinating inno-
vations of Krause’s liberalism (like, for example, demands for intergenerational jus-
tice, ethics of sustainability, etc.) grow out of this understanding of freedom. As 
much as is possible, Krause bets on participation and involves citizens directly in 
the decision-making process concerning them. Wherever this is (still) impossible, 
for instance in global contexts, he places emphasis upon their indirect participation 
by means of representation. Active world citizenship is the focal point from which 
Krause reorients politics, and so he strictly revokes Fichte’s nationalism while 
directing his philosophical liberalism in a decidedly cosmopolitan manner.
The potential of this self-reflexive philosophy of freedom for transforming the 
lifeworld becomes especially clear when focusing on the development of the con-
cept of property in Kant, Fichte, and Krause. It is no accident that the question 
concerning the legitimation and limitation of private property provides a decisive 
key for understanding what type of liberal thinking one is dealing with. Whereas 
economic liberals enjoy emphasizing how private property enables the freedom of 
the one, social liberals stress how it often hinders the freedom of the other. Whoever 
restricts something to themselves typically excludes others from it. It thus makes 
little sense to declare private property per se as favorable or unfavorable to freedom. 
One ought to make it neither the embodiment of freedom in a libertarian fashion nor 
freedom’s antipode in a communist fashion. The interesting question rather con-
cerns how one reconciles the competing demands which people make on the assets 
of this world.
In response to this question, Kant sought to derive the right to property from the 
right to freedom. Only the human right to freedom is inborn, permanent, and uncon-
ditional. Property, on the other hand, is merely one of its many forms and presup-
positions. Since freedom is therefore always positioned higher than property it 
follows that all human beings have an absolute claim to share the world and mani-
fest themselves within it in a protected manner – to some kind of property therefore. 
However, in all cases human beings only have relative rights to the free use of cer-
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tain properties; rights, that is, which must be placed in relation to the higher-ranking 
human right of all other global citizens to participate in the world. A world in which 
the few possess practically everything and the many possess almost nothing would 
be difficult to justify upon this foundation. In Kant, however, it remains uncertain to 
what extent, with which means, and by which rules, the political communities may 
correct the existing property-distribution.
On this issue, Fichte believed that only the state could lawfully establish and 
legitimate the universal institution of private property as well as particular private 
possessions. Private property thereby becomes entirely subject to political action. 
But since, for Fichte, the state does not look at the concrete individuals, but rather 
respects them as subjects of rights only in their abstract capacity as persons, he 
allows little room for distinctions within property rights. If only abstract persons, 
and not this or that concrete human being are considered, then all individuals are 
equal. If anyone’s right to property rests on one and same foundation, then the dis-
tribution of property must also be more or less the same, according to Fichte. While 
the individualist liberalism of the nineteenth century always let the freedom of the 
poor come to an end at the railings of the rich, Fichte does the precise opposite: for 
him the poor’s right to freedom prevents private riches. Therefore, while Manchester 
Liberalism sees private property as the bulwark of freedom, for Fichte it is commu-
nal property. While the former accepts the social at best as a substitute and safety- 
net of the private, Fichte defines the private as a derivation and subset of the 
universal.
Krause seeks a moderate mean between these extremes. The central concern for 
him is not the quantitative maximization of either individual or collective options 
but instead the qualitative optimizing of concrete opportunities  – for each and 
everyone. Following Kant, Krause wishes to grant everyone access to freedom 
through property and usage rights. Yet it is also clear to him that human beings and 
their lifeworlds are different: The disabled, for example, depend upon assistance in 
order to live a life of dignified freedom. One may not paint, therefore, all global citi-
zens with a single quantitative brush, but ought to respect the qualitative difference 
of their respective circumstances. Moreover, the procedural freedom of all, and not 
a single philosophical doctrine, should define the prerequisites of what makes for a 
free society. Therefore, political procedures are to be devised and justified which, 
through legal norms and solidary action, help everyone attain a materially mediated 
freedom. – Truly everyone? Yes, as the right to property follows from the right to 
freedom of all persons, its regulation falls, strictly speaking, into the remit of 
humanity as a whole. Even the most far-reaching political order can, within the 
reach of its sanctioning powers, introduce only temporary redistributive measures. 
The ultimate say, though, remains the preserve of a future lawful global community 
acting with a view to the rights of coming generations. With this argument Krause 
achieves two things: In local, national, and regional communities one may already 
reform yesterday’s legal conditions in the name of the freedom of all participants, 




The philosophies of freedom of Kant, Fichte, and Krause thus examine the 
opportunities and threats of metaphysical liberalisms encompassing a sphere of 
questions and concerns bearing upon absolutely all persons. In the face of our 
largely globalized world, it becomes increasingly clear that this globality of meta-
physical constructs signifies a welcome opportunity for contemporary philosophiz-
ing. Metaphysical thinking encourages us to transcend narrow spatio-temporal 
horizons and can open up an intellectual eye for perceiving aspects which often 
remain hidden to the naked eye. Not nationalism, but cosmopolitanism, is the 
“default option” of the metaphysics of freedom.
At the same time, metaphysics harbors risks. Fichte’s claim to sole representa-
tion for the practical realization of freedom highlights how quickly the inclusivity of 
a metaphysical idea sometimes turns into the exclusivity of a certain style of life and 
politics. Metaphysics – in the supposed possession of ultimate speculative truths – 
can be misused to devalue alternative perspectives and ward off experimental think-
ing. And since thinkers like Fichte and Hegel became influential especially through 
this doctrinaire strand in their thinking, many subsequent philosophers – once the 
historical and sociological limitations of these doctrines showed – wanted to have 
nothing more to do with metaphysics.
Yet even open metaphysical projects, like Krause’s, unjustifiably fell victim to 
that critique, which, from 1870 onwards, became increasingly intense. One thus 
overlooked how metaphysical thinking, in forever transcending the status quo, can 
make a genuinely liberal contribution. For Krause already illustrated what many 
later thinkers like Popper and Dewey would stress once again: Metaphysical ideas 
and falsificationism, philosophical speculation and pragmatic action, can go hand in 
hand – and thus serve the freedom of all. Instead of establishing our conceptions 
with recourse to certain speculative presuppositions, metaphysics may also keep 
these conceptions open to change  – in anticipation of as yet uncertain develop-
ments. Instead of prohibiting conceptual and practical experiments in the name of a 
higher reality, metaphysics ought to demand these in the interest of a reality always 
capable of improvement.
What prevailed in that era, especially in German universities, were however not 
open, dynamic constellations but closed, static systems of thought. In reaction to 
them, since the end of the nineteenth century, philosophers tried out mainly three 
alternatives. First, a pronounced metaphysical – albeit no longer system-bound – 
philosophy (as, for instance, in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard). Second, a radical – yet 
just as metaphysical  – materialism (from, for instance, Feuerbach, Marx, and 
Lenin). And third, analytical, logical, and empirical approaches. The latter espe-
cially have increasingly set the agenda since the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury – with patent consequences for the theory of freedom. In the course of this 
historical development, the obviously social and cultural idea of freedom became 
increasingly maltreated as though it were but a numerically measurable and algo-
rithmically maximizable entity. The spiritual essence of freedom thus shrank into 
the contours of physical freedom of movement. Humanistic reflections about the 
ideality of freedom were replaced with the mechanistic models of materialism. To 
better understand this new paradigm in the theory of freedom and to analyze the 
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immanent problems of its quantitative methodology we have focused upon two 
thinkers for whom precisely the choice of this methodological guidepost proved to 
be a programatic pitfall.
Friedrich August von Hayek (1889–1992) personifies a central concern of the 
quantitative philosophy of freedom: The state should establish a maximum of indi-
vidual freedom though a minimum of statehood. Since no one can guess the voca-
tion of the other, teleological master plans must be renounced. Hayek thus demands 
something akin to a life-long learning program for politics, backed by social evolu-
tionism, decentralized flows of information, subsidiary decision-making proce-
dures, federal structures, and the promotion of responsible liberty through the 
widest possible range of private autonomy: Institutions may not be absolutized, but 
rather must continually remain transformable and capable of improvement. One 
should not delude oneself into thinking that people’s behavior is ever capable of 
being predicted once and for all. The same holds for the economy. Hayek demands 
a modest economic theory and moderate economic policy. The former should not 
deceive itself into thinking that free economic activity can be captured by mathe-
matical or scientific formulas; the latter ought to dispel the illusion that economic 
freedom can be mapped out by perfect plans.
Hayek maintains that it is an expression of our ethical vocation, as well as being 
in our own well-understood self-interest, to politically establish and legally protect 
an order of free economic competition and of liberal communality. People should 
only be coerced in predictable ways; if they willfully or recklessly violate the rules 
coordinating communality laid down by the constitutional state, but not in order to 
extort a certain good conduct from them. Still, for Hayek, freedom is also always a 
principle directed to its ethical use. In contrast to the opinions of many libertarians, 
Hayek calls for the defense of freedom not only against theories which start out with 
much solidarity pathos and end up suffocating individual spontaneity and self- 
reliance. It must also, he holds, be defended against approaches which, in the inter-
est of serving egotistically-material concerns, misunderstand the value of freedom 
as being purely instrumental.
Hayek, therefore, sees himself as more than simply the advocate of the freedom 
of the rich. In Hayek’s philosophy of law, a concept of freedom manifests itself 
which focuses upon the capacity of all persons to make use of the law and to partici-
pate in politics. This is also reflected in Hayek’s economic philosophy, which argues 
that it is incumbent on the state to create the social preconditions for the indepen-
dent economic activity of all citizens. Both demands nevertheless transcend the 
ideological content of negative freedom and a purely quantitative theoretical utility 
calculus. Wherever it appears necessary or desirable to him, Hayek thus reduces the 
freedom of some in order to optimize the freedom of others. Yet, that contradicts the 
minimalism of his basic assumptions. That is, in Hayek, qualitative leitmotifs (espe-
cially those of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy) are directing the show behind the 
scenes, even though, upon the stage, there is a superficial pretense of the mere quan-
titative maximization of freedom. In contrast to the still prevailing neoliberal inter-
pretation of Hayek’s theory – against which it is not entirely, but in large parts, to be 
defended  – the latter provides in the final analysis, not so much a particularly 
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 conclusive construction of a quantitative concept of freedom, as, rather (see Sect. 
3.1.2), an agreeable, if somewhat unintentional, contribution to its deconstruction.
John Rawls (1921–2002) also has an ambiguous relationship with Immanuel 
Kant. He wanted to inherit some of the contents, but not the methodology, of Kant’s 
doctrine of freedom. In order to avoid metaphysical arguments, he attempted to 
legitimate his qualitatively pursued boundaries of private freedom with quantita-
tively directed utility-calculi. Nevertheless, Rawls’ critics soon informed him that 
his Theory of Justice still made extensive use of a series of unacknowledged meta-
physical assumptions. In his later works, he thus aimed at presenting a justification 
for the liberal social order entirely free of metaphysics. That required renouncing 
any and all substantial directives concerning the nature and vocation of man. Yet, at 
the same time, Rawls did not wish to end up jeopardizing the tolerant, open society 
he envisaged. He therefore employed certain procedural rules in an attempt to con-
dition the choices made by the persons deliberating on the social contract. He curbed 
the citizens’ rational exchange logic in such a manner that eventually, from their 
negotiations about the political framework, only ethically acceptable results could 
turn out to be formally admissible.
This trick of smuggling in content-related qualifications through procedural 
framework-directives is of course already questionable in and of itself. Furthermore, 
it only works for as long as the contractual parties stand together in constant recip-
rocal relationships. Prudent utility-maximizers engage in fair negotiating conditions 
only if they themselves also occasionally require such conditions. Everything there-
fore depends upon an approximate symmetry of the cost-benefit potentials between 
those involved in the exchange. Severely asymmetrically situated subjects  – for 
instance future generations or severly disable people – are, despite Rawls’ counter-
vailing attempts, not convincingly given a chance within such agreements; their 
interests can therefore be neglected with impunity. Yet that runs counter to the gist 
of Rawls’ universally-liberal concerns.
Rawls undermines the binding force of his own Political Liberalism with the 
attempt to rid himself of all substantial foundations – even those from the philoso-
phy of freedom. Within already liberally constituted societies, Rawls wishes to deny 
fundamentalist voices the political ear; conversely, when confronted by fundamen-
talist regimes, he advocates a policy of nonintervention. That produces, as a conse-
quence, an explosive mixture of ethical relativism (in international policy) and 
dogmatic liberalism (in domestic policy). Which shows: Quantitatively and rational 
freedom finds its necessary measure in Rawls not in and out of itself, but rather in 
all cases through implicit qualitative directives which on its own principle it can 
neither make explicit nor affirm.
In regard to the critique of liberalism, the theories of Rawls and Hayek thus oscil-
late back and forth between acceptance and denial; and in that they reflect a charac-
teristic of quantitatively orientated liberalism as a whole. The quantitative 
approach – left to its own devices – does not work and is continually driven beyond 
itself towards qualitative conceptions. The latter are introduced into theories of 
quantitative freedom mostly either as (procedural) side-restrictions (as in Rawls) or 
as (material) exceptions (as in Hayek). This shows that with the means of  quantitative 
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analysis – on the scale of everything, something, or nothing – alone, an answer to 
the challenges of the critique cannot be found. A liberalism, however, that recog-
nizes no critique is dogmatic; one which accepts them all relativizes itself; and a 
liberalism which meanders between these poles at the discretion of its respective 
author remains theoretically unclear and practically ineffective.
On the basis of these observations, we conclude that the theory of quantitative 
freedom is not self-sufficient; it requires qualitative completion and foundation. 
What in any given case promotes or hinders freedom cannot be solely derived from 
the vectors of an imaginary world reduced to physically-quantitative aspects. That 
rather needs to be negotiated time and time again against the backdrop of our respec-
tive worldviews. Hermeneutics and heuristics go hand in hand. Depending on how 
we interpret our lifeworld, we either spot or overlook certain opportunities, and we 
understand certain commitments either as liberalizing ligatures1 or as freedom’s fet-
ters. This very interpretation of life will of course be different for different persons 
in different places and at different times; and that gives metaphysics its appropriate 
role in liberalism.
False fears of metaphysics and its methods (of introspection and intuition for 
instance) have gradually reduced philosophical liberalism into a positivistic physi-
calism, in whose wastelands only the thorny branches of prickly choice can thrive. 
Yet instead of banishing the substantial-normative side of freedom into the filthy 
swamp of supposed “metaphysical pseudo-questions,” this aspect must be spruced 
up, so that liberalism can shine once again.2 Rather than (with Fichte) answering 
once and for all the question how to shape our lifeworld with but one single “big 
metaphysics,” we should sooner, with more modesty and more humanity, engage 
with the many “small” metaphysics emanating from the most varied systems of 
ultimate justification spanning the entire range from folk knowledge to spiritual and 
secular traditions of practical wisdom. If citizens, from their ideas about the good 
life formulate, certain implorations (Anmutungen) to employ freedom on behalf of 
social and environmental responsibility, then, from a qualitative (as opposed to 
quantitative) perspective, these will thus not be understood to be illiberal imposi-
tions (Zumutungen), but rather as suggestions to develop and ready liberal thinking 
for the tasks that lie ahead.
That is corroborated by the last part of our investigation, which underscores that 
freedom cannot simply be identified with the sheer number of possible choices. In 
the same way that every individual always prefers a small number of attractive 
options to a large quantity of unwelcome choices, the political community must 
evaluate the content of freedom’s options. This is especially evident when they con-
flict, like, for instance, the freedom of smokers and non-smokers in enclosed spaces. 
We require legitimate evaluation-criteria which by reflecting on the quality of free-
dom determine their quantitative radius. Thus, correctly understood, the idea of 
quantitative freedom results from the idea of qualitative freedom; the former is to be 
1 See Ralf Dahrendorf, The Modern Social Conflict: The Politics of Liberty (New Brunswick, NJ, 
2008).
2 Charles Taylor, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?, 218.
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dialectically classified and subordinated to the latter as a moment of its fully devel-
oped notion. Quantitative freedom finds its foundation in qualitative freedom; quali-
tative freedom reveals its measure in quantitative freedom.
Section 4.1 reconstructed the theory of freedom of John Kenneth Galbraith 
(1908–2006), as an exemplar of economic and political thinking in the light of qual-
itative freedom. He sought to connect his economics to the social sciences and to a 
practical philosophy focusing on freedom and justice. By pointing to the societal 
malleability of the economy in view of its historical changes, Galbraith wishes to 
provide a public interested in the liberal reform of its lifeworld with conceptual 
tools: Citizens should learn to identify economic power in order to be able to modify 
it. Based upon a critique of neoclassical axioms (homo oeconomicus, perfect com-
petition, etc.) and the neoliberal theories of politics and economics (equilibrium- 
postulate, market efficiency, laissez faire, etc.) Galbraith campaigns for a 
democratization of the economy by means of a reflexively self-critical economics. 
Galbraith strips economics of the vestiges of value-free (natural-)science, which 
conceal its implicit normativity. By contrast he champions disclosing the values 
guiding both the economy and economics. Only thus can we all freely codetermine 
the economic parameters and institutions that shape our lives.
Whoever, with an eye to the relations between individual and state, insists that 
the law secure personal freedom, should also consider the potential of businesses, 
banks, and stock-exchanges to increase or decrease the freedom of global citizens. 
Galbraith shows the powerful role played by economic entrepreneurs in the forma-
tion of opinions, powers, and markets. So that our freedom is not reduced to its 
commercial aspects, Galbraith initiates a debate about the qualitative dimensions of 
freedom (quality of life, etc.) and demands a democratization of economic policy. 
Galbraith thus wishes to balance out with countervailing societal powers the eco-
nomic tendencies one-sidedly directed towards maximizing material goods. The 
latter should serve everyone’s freedom by enabling a life beyond economic cost- 
benefit analyses and strengthening the presence of public goods.
Amartya Sen (1933-) approaches the self-same question about the quality of free-
dom in another way: by reflecting upon individuals’ capabilities. Since Sen is less 
concerned about abstract options, and more concerned with concrete chances, i.e. 
those comprehensive outcomes that result from given economic and political institu-
tions for the life of citizens, he declares himself in favor of a concept of substantive 
freedom. This aims to gather the intellectual light of other theories of freedom in a lens 
focused upon individual opportunities. Sen’s conception of political autonomy is 
directed towards harmonizing the choice of economic aims and criteria of success 
with formally-procedural demands of liberty. Formal and material dimensions of free-
dom should not be played off against one another, but rather balanced out. For, accord-
ing to Sen, no society is excluded from the liberal debate about the preferred qualities 
of freedoms to be politically promoted. A genuine liberalization of our lifeworld pre-
supposes a procedural emancipation of the economy and of the aims materially guid-
ing economic policy. After all, only what is qualitatively defined can quantitatively be 
maximized. Yet that definition should take place democratically according to qualita-
tive criteria, not technocratically according to quantitative scales.
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Galbraith and Sen’s theories of qualitative freedom thus confirm an insight already 
familiar from our studies of the metaphysics of freedom (Chap. 2). Freedom, while 
pursued for its own sake, is not self-sufficient; it must be free in order to be able to 
commit itself, and it must be committed in order to remain genuinely free.3 That is not 
as paradoxical as it may sound. The tension between the two pronouncements 
resolves itself, as we have shown, in the distinction between the idea and concept of 
qualitative freedom. What the idea of qualitative freedom protects (schützt) as an end 
in itself one prizes (schätzt) in the light of concrete concepts of freedom for the sake 
of the aims which one (only) achieves in freedom. Whoever has succeeded for 
instance – to quote Schiller – “to be the friend of a friend”4 will pursue in that friend-
ship, not so much the abstract manifestation of his freedom as the concrete well-
being of this friend and this friendship. Wherever friendship takes roots it also 
individually strengthens the friends by granting them new, deeper, and stronger rela-
tions: It reinforces individuals’ autonomy in relation to themselves, to one another, 
and to the world. Successful friendship can nevertheless not be coerced, it is only 
thinkable in terms of a voluntary commitment. What freedom and friendship can do 
for us we only get to experience when we learn to appreciate them in themselves. The 
instrumental value of freedom cannot be severed from its intrinsic dignity.
The fact that freedom as such (i.e. the universal idea of qualitative freedom) must 
have its content determined, still does not decide what (i.e. the particular concept of 
freedom) should be demanded and promoted in the name of this idea. Since the 
theory of qualitative freedom differentiates between its unified vision and the mani-
fold manifestations, it can integrate the most varied concepts of freedom (negative, 
positive, substantial, emancipative, republican, procedural, etc.). The idea of quali-
tative freedom consequently does not have in mind a “one size fits all” model of 
substantially liberal conditions. In comparison: While quantitative approaches 
prompt everyone to maximize options, the idea of qualitative freedom recommends 
openness and diversity. It allows, for instance, preference to be granted to a smaller 
but variegated set of options than an only numerically impressive but less differenti-
ated quantity of options. Qualitative considerations must therefore precede the 
quantitative measuring of individual and social spheres of freedom and instruct the 
latter. Thus does qualitative freedom implement and adjust quantitative concerns.
A qualitative liberalism strives for a variety of opportunities. And because vari-
ety – as opposed to plurality – already is a qualitative concept the question, “Which 
freedom?”, cannot be avoided. Even libertarians pose this question, albeit confident 
that only their answer is blessed. Such dogmatism constitutes a central problem of 
today’s liberalism. Intellectuals argue against one another about freedom, and not 
alongside one another for freedom; with the result that various groups, while each 
3 This is an idea often found in Catholic social theology since the time of Thomas Aquinas. The 
selecting freedom of choice is dependent upon – and derived from – the ethical freedom of the will, 
i.e. the “freedom of indifference” is dependent upon – and derived from – the “freedom for excel-
lence”; for more details about this see Leo XIII, Human Liberty, Encyclical Letter (New York, 
1941) and Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics (Washington D.C., 1995).
4 Schiller, Werke I, 133 (Ode an die Freude).
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and all celebrating themselves as friends of freedom, condemn one another as ene-
mies of freedom. By avoiding uniformity and encouraging us to try our differing 
conceptions according to the situation and context, the idea of qualitative freedom 
provides a remedy here. For the general postulate of the idea of freedom that the 
quality of freedom must be debated permits various pleas for which freedoms are to 
be striven for within given religious, cultural, and geographical contexts.
Qualitatively conceived, the idea of freedom can relate to its environments as 
critically as it can constructively. The idea of qualitative freedom is relationally 
conceived. For a qualitatively orientated liberalism, therefore, the contextualization 
of freedoms is not an exception to the rule, but rather an expression of its principle. 
For example, to take up an example from Martha Nussbaum, in Germany the con-
stitutional right to freedom of expression does not extend to “holocaust denial.” But, 
conversely, in the face of the persecution of the so-called “degenerate art” in the 
1930s and 1940s, the constitutional right to artistic expression is protected without 
restriction. Against the background of Germany’s experiences with the Third Reich 
both are understandable; and in just the same way it is also understandable that 
other liberal communities have different priorities.5
Consequently, the political dispute about both the meaning of freedom and about 
concrete freedoms is to be welcomed, not bemoaned. It mediatizes and ameliorates 
the normative claims of all societal forces. Through its procedural implementation, 
political freedom thus constitutes and construes itself. Instead of being racked by 
the dispute about the best conception of freedom and its appropriate aims, the politi-
cal community is time and again communicatively regenerated by it.6 Liberal think-
ing thus stands to benefit a lot from the dispute over different versions of freedom. 
Far from continually sensing an attack upon liberal positions, the theory of qualita-
tive freedom encourages the interpretation, where possible, of even conservative, 
ecological, or social demands as efforts on behalf of the sustainability conditions of 
liberal societies. Thus, when politics moves to the ‘middle of the road,’ this may 
often be the most direct route to a freedom conscious of its own natural and societal 
presuppositions, rather than an illiberal detour.
For this very reason, the theory of freedom should not only look towards the state 
and the parties, when aiming at the concretization of freedom. Without civil-society 
being an incubator of new developments – be it in the cooperative agency of the citi-
zenry, through competitive innovation in business, or in the quest for scientific 
truth – politics would lack the experiences and insights requisite for prudently pur-
suing its goals. What society does not get, politics cannot grasp.
Of course, not every concept of freedom can legitimately concretize the idea of 
qualitative freedom. Every liberalism must defend itself against totalitarian defini-
tions. But how? With which procedures should the step from the idea to the con-
cepts of qualitative freedom be taken? Clearly the proceduralization, too, must take 
5 See Claus Dierksmeier, “Die Würde der Kunst – Überlegungen zu Schutzbereich und Schranken 
eines schrankenlosen Grundrechts,” Juristenzeitung 18:55 (2000), 883–889.




place in the light of the idea of qualitative freedom; philosophers tend to speak in 
this regard about the iteration of the idea in its application: The idea of freedom 
demands liberal procedures for its self-concretization. Only procedures open to the 
participation of all whose freedom is in question satisfy this requirement. While the 
fact that freedom is being qualitatively conceived does not establish what is to be 
regarded as qualitative freedom, it does clarify how a society should (not) determine 
this. Inadmissible under the terms of the idea of qualitative freedom are decision- 
making procedures which discriminate against individuals or groups and prevent 
that the minorities of today can peaceably become the majorities of tomorrow.
The idea of qualitative freedom has to remain structurally identifiable in all of its 
concretizations. To test for that, as we learned from our review of the political ver-
sion of Kant’s categorical imperative (see Sect. 2.1.4) as well as from Krause’s 
outline for participatory liberalism (see Sect. 2.3.4), an intellectual “role reversal” 
may be an appropriate procedure: Those who wish, for instance, to exercise their 
physical freedom through the suppression of the physical freedom of others, under-
mine the freedom they employ. Those who realize their freedom in such a way that, 
if the roles were reversed, would lose their freedom, contradict themselves and thus 
undermine the legitimacy of their own claim on freedom. Only such a concept of 
freedom, which withstands its critical universalization and self-application,7 can be 
accepted as a translation of the idea of qualitative freedom. Human self- 
determination, ground and goal of the idea of qualitative freedom, is also the mea-
sure of all concrete concepts of qualitative freedom.
Freedom therefore always also means the freedom of those who live differently. 
A use of freedom that creates hardly reversible path-dependencies requires far more 
justification than one whose effects are easily alterable. Economists have long since 
recognized that whoever uses a temporary monopoly to permanently prevent others 
from market access inadmissibly uses their freedom to the detriment of the freedom 
of others. Does this also hold ecologically? Whoever, for the sake of economic ends, 
ruins the Wadden Sea, for instance, thereby eliminates the countless freedoms to 
other uses of these tidelands, now and in the future. Should such acts be equated 
with actions which encourage or empower the freedoms of others? Surely not.
Since, in its commitment to the right to self-determination of all persons, a clear 
parameter is available for the concretization of qualitative freedom, one need not 
fear that it facilitates a contextual watering down of fundamental liberal concerns. 
In line with this parameter, qualitative freedom can selectively differentiate between 
meaningful criticisms of today’s liberalism and the uncritical adaption of funda-
mental liberal values to changing fashions and tastes. Qualitative freedom therefore 
provides precisely that liberal protection of fundamental rights which many pursue 
with conceptions of quantitative freedom; yet without the burdens hidden within the 
theoretical thickets of quantitative thinking.
7 For the genealogy of this idea from the spirit of the “golden rule” and in respect to a global ethic 
connecting the people of all regions see Martin Bauschke, Die Goldene Regel: Staunen  – 
Verstehen – Handeln (Berlin, 2010).
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Of course, there is no cure against some parading around illiberal plans in the 
name of the idea of qualitative freedom. Nevertheless, the attempt to prevent that by 
hiding behind a minimalistic quantitative concept of freedom is pointless. Whoever 
believes they best protect their friends from attacks by burying them alive make just 
as fatal an error as those on the side of negative and quantitative conceptions of 
freedom who religiously shun all discussion. Freedom needs air to breathe. Whoever 
cuts off this air through all too narrowly negatively-libertarian or quantitatively- 
liberal constrictions, does not strengthen but weakens the power of freedom. 
Whoever from the outset resists a debate about the qualitative aims and precondi-
tions of freedom suffocates the liberal spirit and denies that it proves itself within 
the forum of public discussion. The opposite path promises more success: the open-
ing up of the idea of freedom to people’s concrete aims and needs. Freedoms do not 
only want to be defended, they need to be conquered too. Options for an autono-
mous life must not only be protected, they must also, in many cases, be created for 
the first time and continually acquired again. Quite like deeds, omissions can reduce 
our opportunities. People require the political community not only for the reduction 
of threats, but just as much to pave new avenues for a life in liberty. We should, that 
is to say, not think of liberalism as Atlas, miserably bearing the ever-same burden 
for all eternity, but rather as a happy Sisyphus, for whom the continually new ascent 
towards freedom appears as the best of all goals, as the most beautiful of all paths.
The eventual question, though, concerning which particular political procedures 
are most suitable for which societal and political tasks, should not be answered by 
metaphysicians from a lectern. The directive goal of a politics campaigning in the 
name of freedom shall be to become popular but not populist, striving for as much 
civil-participation as possible and accepting as much statehood as necessary. To get 
this project off the ground is a political  – not a philosophical  – task, for whose 
accomplishment numerous means may be considered: legal proceedings, civil- 
society deliberation, direct democracy, public dialogue, think tanks, focus groups, 
surveys, procedures of mediation, etc.8 In fact, precisely with a view to the appropri-
ate means, there currently still exists a great need for improvement and a gaping 
lacuna in research – namely regarding the most apt forms of codetermination in 
regard to the increasing globalization and virtualization of our lifeworld and prob-
lems. For the forms of political freedom must advance with the times. Technical and 
civilizational innovations obviously alter the experience of freedom and therefore 
also change the demands placed upon its political use.9 If one understands democ-
racy as “humanity’s self-determination”10 it follows that: Where societal concerns 
overtax the competencies of national rights, one has to look for answers beyond the 
8 See Raban D. Fuhrmann, Der Bürger der Bürgergesellschaft: »Bürgergutachten« aufgrund von 
fünf »Bürgergutachtenzellen« nach dem Verfahren »Planungszelle« (Berlin, 1999).
9 See Jürgen Howaldt & Michael Schwartz, »Soziale Innovation« im Fokus: Skizze eines gesell-
schaftstheoretisch inspirierten Forschungskonzepts (Bielefeld, 2010).
10 “Democracy works towards mankind’s self-determination, and only when the latter actually 
exists is the former true. Political participation will then be identical with self-determination” 
(Jürgen Habermas, Über den Begriff der politischen Beteiligung [Neuwied am Rhein, 1961], 15).
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conceptual framework of the state. As a result of the increasing fluidity of conven-
tional patterns of responsibility, policy today can no longer solely depend upon the 
state, within firmly determined geographical boundaries, to be the solution to any 
and all problems.11
A line of thought running from Kant (publicity) via Krause (participation) to Sen 
(procedurality) clearly emphasizes that for a timely realization of the idea of free-
dom we require a democratic policy which supplies participative and/or representa-
tive procedures wherever life demands communal decisions and actions; increasingly 
far from parliamentary spheres dominated by party politics; above and below, as 
well as alongside, the decision-making bodies of nation states and  – ever more 
often – also within the digital lifeworld.12
The idea of qualitative freedom does not resist every codetermination and exter-
nal determination. Yet wherever the defensive function of qualitative freedom is 
employed, it appears with full force. The correct and important concern of negative 
theories of freedom with providing individuals with a certain refuge for experienc-
ing and developing their own autonomy finds unassailable protection in the frame-
work of the philosophy of qualitative freedom. But qualitatively orientated freedom 
philosophy also extends – and this is an important advantage – to asymmetrical 
relations.13 As we have learned, above all from Karl Christian Friedrich Krause 
(Sect. 2.3) and Amartya Sen (Sect. 4.2), it is not contractually conditioned reciproc-
ity that is crucial, but rather morally unconditional universality. We owe protection 
and security also to the rights of people from whom we (could) receive nothing in 
return. Qualitative freedom thus obligates us to a temporal (intergenerational) and 
spatial (global) extension of freedom’s commitments to responsibility as well as to 
their internal differentiation: Demands for morally, socially, and ecologically sus-
tainable economic activity are, from the perspective of qualitative freedom, readily 
respected: as theory-conforming engagements in favor of the chances of present as 
well as future generations for a life in freedom.
But do we not confuse or overburden the idea of freedom with this extension of 
its responsibility dimension? From the quantitative perspective, i.e. according to the 
directive of reaching for a maximum of private options, that may appear to be the 
case. Yet, the theory of qualitative freedom does not at all flirt with the fiction of 
unlimited leeway. It continually scrutinizes the individual range of options in order 
to harmonize it with everyone’s freedom.14 Burdens and boundaries that serve this 
end are thus not looked upon (as in the quantitative logic) as unpopular if indispens-
able limitations of freedom. They should (upon qualitative evaluation) rather be 
11 See Xavier de Sousa Briggs, Democracy as Problem Solving: Civic Capacity in Communities 
across the Globe (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 13.
12 See Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, Und dennoch…: Nachdenken über Zeitgeschichte, Erinnern für 
die Zukunft (München, 2011), 106f.
13 In this it is in my opinion sufficient to follow Brian Barry (Theories of Justice: A Treatise on 
Social Justice [Berkeley, 1989], 163): Justice must be successful under precisely asymmetrical 
conditions; purely symmetrical justice is not justice.
14 See Glenn E. Tinder, Liberty: Rethinking an Imperiled Ideal (Grand Rapids, MI, 2007).
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affirmed as forms for enabling universal freedom: as acts through which freedom 
commits and restricts itself. Qualitative liberalism does not conceive of demands for 
responsibility per se as negative limitations, but rather considers whether these 
could rather be positive determinations of freedom. Often, after all, the options we 
are called to renounce are – sometimes quantitatively, but in all cases qualitatively – 
compensated by opportunities only thus attained. A case in point is the sustainabil-
ity of the presently much imperiled environmental conditions for a life in freedom.
The qualitative viewpoint allows the intellectual and institutional break with ste-
reotypes. For far too long the schemata of quantitative thinking have dried up the 
liberal imagination and insisted upon dichotomies far removed from real life (free-
dom versus coercion, individual versus state, private versus public, etc.). Their theo-
retical paucity and practical insufficiency are obvious. For day-to-day politics these 
antipodes are of little help. Politics rather refrains, for instance, from pursuing its 
goals by way of physical coercion, even if only so as not to lose support in the short 
term and its mandate in the long term. Instead, politics plays ever so subtly on a 
finely-tuned keyboard of varied forms of recognition and encouragement so that 
citizens eventually do on their own accord what is in the general interest. Successful 
societal cooperation within political projects results hardly ever from coercive pres-
sure. It rather arises as a result of the appealing and motivational power of attractive 
concepts and symbols. Accordingly, political liberalism should participate in the 
quest for forms of codetermination and societal coordination with strong appeal. 
Herein lies, in my opinion, a major task for a liberal philosophy of the cosmopolitan 
society of the future.15
The means of liberal politics should – as we saw above all in Krause and Sen – 
correspond to their goals, so that freedom is, wherever possible, attained by freedom 
itself. Substantive and procedural freedom therefore firmly belong together. Every 
society must not only decide for itself about what legal protection, which opportuni-
ties, and what kind of support it wishes to grant its citizens. It must also autono-
mously establish the procedures for such decision-making. The theory of qualitative 
freedom does not, therefore, like many strands of earlier economic and political 
theory, ask technocratically: “Who is right?”, but rather democratically asks “Who 
has the right to decide?” and thus of course also “Who has the right to err?”
The mission of the idea of qualitative freedom, the concern with reconciling 
individual and societal liberties in such a way that everyone can live in freedom, 
thus leads to the concept of democracy – and qualifies it at the same time. Kant 
already summoned democracy from the throne of an end-in-itself and assigned a 
functional place to it as a means to the end of the autonomous life of all world citi-
zens. That is, democracy attains its sovereignty from its tasks. It should provide 
procedures enabling those affected by political decision-making to participate 
within it. It must accomplish no less, but also no more, than the communal tackling 
of shared problems upon the foundation of a deliberative participation and political 
representation of the freedom of all. The idea of qualitative freedom does not there-




fore obligate us outright to push through the parliamentary system everywhere else. 
It does, however, argumentatively insist upon a fair representation (including the 
protection of minorities) of all global citizens; not least in their respective national 
communities.
Parliamentary systems are obviously particularly fitted for that purpose. Yet this 
is a procedural concern on the conceptual level, not a substantial directive upon the 
level of principles. Many communities that differ from the Anglo-American model 
of politics and society in no way compete against the idea of freedom, but rather 
stand up for freedom, if nonetheless in alternate forms. One should not – in over-
zealous liberal imperialism and from supposedly privileged insight into the true 
essence of freedom – brew a ‘liberalization cocktail’ that everyone merely needs to 
down. True liberals must not turn into paternalistically-liberal nannies. Against the 
schematic liberalism of a quantitative type, from the perspective of qualitative free-
dom, we are to recognize that divergence in practice does not have to mean differ-
ence in principle. The procedural model of qualitative liberalism rather has the 
respective civil-societies themselves define in what form they wish to practice their 
political freedom.
With qualitative freedom, therefore, the official pronouncements of philosophy 
end where we transition from idea to concept. When confronted by freedom’s con-
crete concepts, philosophers speak only as citizens, who lack definite certainties and 
are often out-voted in elections. Political debates are not to be replaced by philo-
sophical formulas. We must all engage in interpreting the idea of qualitative free-
dom – time and again. In this process, academic philosophy cannot claim privileged 
knowledge; it may insist, however, upon participating in the societal dialogue.16 For 
wherever within the mass of all politically legitimate options we are to select some 
as preferable to others, concrete judgment, and not knowledge of abstract princi-
ples, is what tips the balance. Politics must – as Gerald Dworkin put it colorfully – 
employ arguments understandable not only by academics, but also by farmers who, 
if without theoretical education, are certainly not lacking in practical experience.17
In political dialogue about the appropriate contours of the freedom within soci-
ety, it is not only liberals and libertarians who speak to one another; rather the 
appropriate arguments are examined from every conceivable political and ideologi-
cal camp. Liberal concerns therefore require an additional justification; one that 
transcends their own argumentative canon. That is a blessing in disguise. After all, 
upon the political stage we rarely find authority-free discourses about lofty princi-
ples, but rather people with ‘skin in the game’ disputing about mundane practices.18 
Freedom’s friends must therefore make their projects appealing to the proponents of 
other ideals and ideologies. And this will only be successful if they can clarify the 
contribution of liberal ways of life to other (conservative, social-democratic, eco-
logical, etc.) conceptions of value. (An instructive example of this is the discussion 
about the reciprocal relation between freedom and social justice promoted by 
16 See Gerhardt, Partizipation. See also Pettit, Republicanism, 57, 59.
17 See Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 17.
18 See Michael Walzer, Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory (New Haven, 2007).
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Amartya Sen, see Sect. 4.2). Precisely for this reason, political liberalism cannot 
avoid the question about more or less meaningful freedom, superior or inferior, and 
more or less beneficial freedoms. Liberals should accordingly not, in the name of 
quantitative freedom, avoid such conversations, but are well-advised rather them-
selves to lead such discussions under the banner of qualitative freedom.
As upon the psychological-pedagogical level, in politics too freedom ripens and 
flourishes by assuming responsibility and being held accountable. Activity and lia-
bility belong together – for liberal reasons. If society complains, for instance, that 
on the part of the finance industry profits are privatized and losses socialized, then 
liberals must therein recognize their own concern: that single individuals and insti-
tutions do not internalize the opportunities of their actions while externalizing their 
risks. Personal as well as organizational freedom finds the criterion of its evalua-
tion – and limitation – within the quality of its contribution to universal freedom.
The idea of qualitative freedom thus openly aims at particularly valuable and 
sustainable options. Yet it would be completely wrong to believe that individual and 
collective choice were to be restricted to such options only. Qualitative liberalism 
rejects, on the one hand, the view of the quantitative dogma that to the philosophy 
of freedom all options must appear equivalent. But, on the other hand, qualitative 
freedom also discards the belief cherished by some religious and metaphysical sys-
tems that freedom only manifests itself in certain – say, especially ethical – prac-
tices. Qualitative freedom wishes to encourage and empower persons as well as 
communities to take care of the common good in responsible freedom, without 
wishing to enforce this. Even though freedom is directed towards qualitatively valu-
able goods and activities, the value of freedom nevertheless transcends (as Kant, 
Krause, and Sen teach us especially) the sum total of the projects it realizes.
Qualitative liberalism therefore views freedom neither as a finished being (as 
does the theory of quantitative freedom) nor as a fixed ought (as do some metaphysi-
cal doctrines and religious dogmas). In the perspective of qualitative freedom, free-
dom is and forever remains a fluid becoming. Freedom must experiment, fail, and 
begin afresh. Just like its being, its ought, too, always requires active design and 
ongoing development. Freedom thrives and survives only when enacted. Freedom 
grasps its mission only by reflecting upon itself: What freedom essentially is and 
ought to be, can only be identified in and through freedom itself. The dispute about 
freedom and its true understanding must therefore be conducted in the midst of 
society: via the dialogue of everyone with everyone else.
On the basis of the previously presented approaches, the conclusion can be drawn 
that quantitative and qualitative freedom do not present equivalent, but instead 
hierarchically- dialectical concepts. Although in most cases theories of quantitative 
freedom explicitly reject qualitative considerations, they cannot function without 
making use of them implicitly. Their reconstruction thus amounts to their decon-
struction – i.e. their dialectical transference into the category of quality. Conversely, 
the idea of qualitative freedom is from the outset directed at the integration of quan-
tities. Qualitative values wish appropriately and proportionately to employ quantita-
tive measures, not replace them. Qualitative freedom does not eliminate quantitative 
freedom, just its absoluteness. While quantitative thinking negates and externalizes 
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all qualitative demands, the quantitative dimension is affirmed and integrated by the 
qualitative approach. The idea of qualitative freedom thus proves itself to be more 
capable of integration and therefore deserves categorical priority.
5.2  Insights
In the last decades, the criticism of liberalism has considerably deepened and wid-
ened. As a result, there is a serious menace to the liberality practiced in open societ-
ies. This menace, as well as the continuing and  – in the age of globality  – still 
increasing meaning of the ideal of freedom, prompted me to write this study. Of 
course, I could not respond to all the branches of said critique, such as those arising 
from epistemological sources (John Henry Newman, George Santayana), as well as 
those arising from theological (Karl Barth, Carl Schmitt), communitarian (Charles 
Taylor, Martin Walzer, Michael Sandel), ecological (Hans Jonas, Franz Josef 
Radermacher), cultural (Herbert Marcuse, Slavoy Žižek, Roger Scruton), postmod-
ern (Jean Baudrillard, George Bataille) and feminist (Nancy Fraser, Susan Moller 
Otkin) directions.19
In the face of the breadth and depth of this critique, two things, though, are to be 
emphasized. First, that this critique is often only applicable to quantitatively orien-
tated theories of freedom. For, it is true that a liberalism without qualitative musical-
ity is deaf to life’s subtler melodies and stomps along to a monotonous rhythm – to 
the detriment, not least, of freedom itself and its differentiated inner harmonies. 
Second, it is also the case that this critique largely misses a qualitatively orientated 
liberalism. For the latter attends to the concerns of such critique, not just for tactical 
and pragmatic considerations, but rather for strategical and principled reasons. With 
a view to the current recommendations of liberal thinkers for economics and poli-
tics, either claim shall now be discussed and illustrated with reference to the differ-
ent anthropological models the respective theories of freedom employ. In the case 
of quantitative thinking, the homo oeconomicus model predominant in economic, 
political, and social theory will be drawn on, and, conversely, I will tap into concep-
tions of human dignity and the conditio humana for qualitatively orientated liberal-
ism. Unsurprisingly, both approaches lead to fundamentally different treatments of 
economic and political institutions.
Already in Sect. 4.2. on Amartya Sen, we dealt in detail with the basic assump-
tion underlying the homo oeconomicus model of a utility-maximizer forever ratio-
nally striving to increase options for the fulfilment of individual preferences. 
Branches of academic economics still continue to defend the homo oeconomicus 
theorem; with the argument, for instance, that it should not serve to describe reali-
ties but to build models, and not bring about certain applications but merely to pre-
pare them. In the end, science must always generalize, abstract, and simplify. So, if 




this theorem still serves as a helpful tool for exact science and the generation of 
accurate predictions, what’s the problem?
Increasingly, though, social psychology, behavioral economics and neuro- 
economics are raising doubts as to whether the model provides useful predictions at 
all.20 Behavioral observations, decision-making tests, as well as numerous anthro-
pological, psychological, evolutionary-economic, and neuro-economic studies con-
clusively show that real people rarely act in accordance with the model.21 They 
conduct their business according to alternate criteria, they expect as well as honor 
behavior contrary to the model, and make investments in pursuit of different objec-
tives. Actual economic behavior rather has the characteristics of “bounded 
rationality,”22 “bounded will power,”23 and “bounded self-interest.”24 Social research-
ers today describe people not as pure utility-calculators, but instead as persons con-
cerned about their community, environment, and posterity, who have an intense 
interest in moral behavior and – as fMRI-Scans of the reward-centers in the brain 
colorfully illustrate – even gladly (!) make sacrifices in its pursuit.25
The homo oeconomicus model reduces human behavior so much that it fails, 
more often than not, to make sound prognoses. Nevertheless, it still is a hallmark of 
economic pedagogy. According to its proponents, moral behavior and social emo-
tions are not valid objections against it: They view them as exceptions to the rule of 
self-interested rationality and then add them as modifiable variables to the enduring 
constant of rational self-interest. The data nevertheless suggest the exact opposite: 
Fundamentally, human behavior seems socially embedded and morally grounded; 
exceptionally it takes on atomistic and egoistic traits. (By the way, this is exactly the 
way pre-modern philosophy of economics, up to and including Adam Smith, had 
always seen it.26).
No matter, some apologists say that neither description nor prediction are impor-
tant! Even if the model neither explains what happened yesterday nor foresees what 
will happen tomorrow, it could nevertheless suggest what is to be done today. The 
logic of self-interest allows us to find loopholes in our legal and social institutions 
handing out rewards and sanctions. Because of the pressure of competition, these 
loopholes will be exploited at first by some – but soon increasingly more – persons, 
until eventually the last remaining honest person will be the hindmost taken by the 
20 See Jennifer Arlen & Eric L.  Talley, Experimental Law Economics (Cheltenham, UK & 
Northamption, MA, 2008).
21 See Daniel McFadden, “Free Markets and Fettered Consumers,” The American Economic Review 
96:1 (2006).
22 See Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought (New Haven, CT, 1979).
23 See Richard H. Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics (New York, 1991) and Thomas C. Schelling, 
Choice and Consequence (Cambridge, MA, 1984).
24 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, “A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics,” Stanford Law Review 50:5 (1998).
25 See Ernst Fehr & Antonio Rangel, “Neuroeconomic Foundations of Economic Choice – Recent 
Advances,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 25:4 (2011).
26 See Hühn & Dierksmeier, “Will the Real A. Smith Please Stand Up!”
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devil. Ultimately, our societal institutions are destined to collapse as a result of pro-
gressive undermining. The homo oeconomicus model can thus function as a useful 
sensor for precisely such a fraying of the social fabric, alerting us to abuses of the 
system.27
At times, that might work indeed. But beware: This mental model does not really 
behave passively like a merely observing sensor, but rather actively like an aggres-
sive acid. In laboratory tests, acids reliably expose certain inorganic structures, but 
only by dissolving all other materials. Analogously, the homo oeconomicus model 
disintegrates all conceptions of the human being dissimilar to it, for example those 
characterized by ethical criteria and values. For a long time, there have been alarm-
ing reports that students of business and economics display less moral responsibility 
than their peers.28 For one thing, they rate the chances of success for moral behavior 
as lower and tend stronger towards materialistic and hedonistic goals than those 
who are graduating in other disciplines. That also affects their behavior. For exam-
ple, such students allow themselves more “free-riding,” are less ready to share, more 
likely to deceive others, and cheat more in exams. Also, later in their professional 
life, they more often display opportunistic – through to criminal – behavior. They 
circumvent, for instance, standards of health and safety more frequently, and accept 
bribes more often, etc. Conversely, they display less readiness to invest in public 
goods or to operate philanthropically.29
Students of business and economics differ from students of other disciplines both 
theoretically in terms of their conception of the human being and practically in 
terms of their behavior. Are they less attached to morality first and then sign up for 
economics courses (self-selection effect) or is it the economic teachings which 
entice them away from morality (indoctrination effect)? The gathered empirical 
data evinces a small self-selection effect; to a far greater extent, however, these test 
results can be traced back to indoctrination through their studies.30 What does that 
27 See Karl Blome-Drees Franz Homann, Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik (Göttingen, 1992).
28 An excellent survey of these studies is provided in Juan Elegido, Business Education and Erosion 
of Character (2009)
29 See Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, “Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments 
on the Provision of Public Goods, IV,” Journal of Public Economics 15:3 (1981); John R. Carter & 
Michael D. Irons, “Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
5:2 (1991); Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich and Dennis T. Regan, “Does Studying Economics 
Inhibit Cooperation?,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:2 (1993); Charles Bram Cadsby & 
Elizabeth Maynes, “Choosing between a Socially Efficient and Free-riding Equilibrium: Nurses 
Versus Economics and Business Students,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 37:2 
(1998); Bruno S.  Frey & Stephan Meier, “Are Political Economists Selfish and Indoctrinated? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” Economic Inquiry 41:3 (2003); Ariel Rubinstein, “A 
Sceptic’s Comments in the Study of Economics,” The Economic Journal 116:510 (2006); Donald 
L. McCabe, Kenneth D. Butterfield & Linda Klebe Treviño, “Academic Dishonesty in Graduate 
Business Programs: Prevalence, Causes, and Proposed Action,” Academy of Management Learning 
& Education 5:3 (2006).
30 See Neil Gandal et  al., “Personal Value Priorities of Economists,” Human Relations 58:10 
(2005); Sumantra Ghosal, “Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management 
Practices,” Academy of Management Learning & Education (4/2005).
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tell us? For one thing that economics affects practice; for another thing that it does 
so in a hardly desirable manner – which is not even desired by the management and 
economics professors themselves31: The students of economic disciplines are more 
skeptical in their judgment and much more cynical in their behavior. That is to say, 
attitudes not conforming to the cold rationality of self-interest are weakened by the 
prevailing economic pedagogy. This impedes the assertion of a morally, socially, 
and ecologically responsible economic theory and a humane economic practice 
based upon it.32
An important cause for that finding lies, in my opinion, in the quantitative man-
ner of thinking of the homo oeconomicus anthropology. Why? Between moral phi-
losophers and moral psychologists the consensus prevails that self-images influence 
self-assertion.33 People who believe they are free and able to act morally sooner 
succeed than those doubting their creative possibilities.34 When one models this 
freedom, however, in accordance with assumptions derived from the (highly unreal-
istic because extremely reductive and, yet, for that very reason, readily mathemati-
cizable) homo oeconomicus theory, things look quite different; like for instance in 
the principal/agent-theory still popular in management theory.35 Students are then 
deceived into thinking that people also behave in accordance with the model (i.e. 
opportunistically) outside of those model worlds.36 But what happens if one recog-
nizes in the “agent” a thoroughly self-interested, only financially driven, but other-
wise unwilling contractual partner of the “principal.” Do not the sanctions (within 
the corporation: complete surveillance, conditioning, incentivizing, etc., − and out-
side of it: strict disciplining through quarterly reports for the financial markets) 
demanded and pursued by such theory inexorably lead us into a downward spiral? 
Do they not consistently intensify and provoke the presupposed opportunistic 
behavior in practice?37 Experience shows just that38; which, incidentally, prompted 
31 See Dirk C.  Moosmayer, Die Intention betriebswirtschaftlicher Hochschullehrer zur 
Beeinflussung von Werten: Konzeptionelle Entwicklung und globale empirische Überprüfung 
(Frankfurt am Main, 2013).
32 See Henry Mintzberg, Managers not MBAs: A Hard Look at the Soft Practice of Management 
Development (San Francisco, 2004); Henry Mintzberg, Robert Simons & Kunal Basu, “Beyond 
Selfishness,” MIT Sloan Management Review 44:1 (2002); Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories 
Are Destroying Good Management Practices.
33 See John Dewey, Democracy and Education: Freedom and Culture (Denver, 2009).
34 See Dierksmeier, “The Freedom-Responsibility Nexus in Management Philosophy” and Michael 
von Grundherr, “Selbstwirksamkeitserwartung und die Rolle von Vorbilden in der Ordnungsethik,” 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik 15:3 (2014).
35 See Michael C.  Jensen & William H.  Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3:4 (1976).
36 See Arne Manzeschke, Veronika Drews-Galle & Marburger Arbeitskreis Theologische 
Wirtschafts- und Technikethik, Sei ökonomisch! Prägende Menschenbilder zwischen Modellbildung 
und Wirkmächtigkeit (Berlin, 2010).
37 See Chris Argyris, Increasing Leadership Effectiveness (Malabar, Fla, 1984).
38 For the influence of the financial markets upon the decision-making processes in business see 
John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, “The Economic Implications of Corporate 
Financial Reporting,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 40:1–3 (2005).
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the father of the principal/agent-theory, Michael Jensen, to depart from his own 
model – unlike, unfortunately, the majority of his guild – and to now, conversely, 
direct all his pedagogical energy towards theories of integrity and authenticity.39
Also, society as a whole incurs collateral damage wherever the homo oeco-
nomicus is viewed as an image of economic rationality and the spirit of the model is 
translated into a directive (or excuse) for selfish behavior.40 If one replaces real 
people with the fictional homo oeconomicus and lets the latter romp around in imag-
inary perfect markets – i.e., excluding power-asymmetries, access-barriers, and path 
dependencies, but including information that is complete and free of charge – then 
the pursuit of maximum efficiency may suggest: Wherever everyone takes care of 
themselves, all are taken care of. On the chalkboards of economics that may be 
feasible; but in the real world this produces dissatisfied cynics en masse. Honest 
persons, for fear of being duped, then perpetuate what in game theory is called “pre-
ventative defection.”41 That is, they prefer to break with the precepts of decency 
themselves before others – eventually – can do the same. But they thus encourage 
others to follow and emulate them. The phantom created by a dubious theory thus 
turns into a phenomenon masquerading as the theory’s indubitable illustration – and 
announces that, in order to survive in this world, one must behave selfishly: Quod 
erat demonstrandum?
Yet experience follows observation, and the latter is  – consciously or uncon-
sciously, willingly or unwillingly – influenced by theoretical models. There is no 
practice without theory because actuality is never perceived independently of men-
tal models. Whoever does not wish to be tormented by homespun fantasies must 
learn to grasp their own personal contribution to their own worldviews and the con-
structions guiding their lives. That is especially true in economics. The socioeco-
nomic anthropology which up to now has been wholly focused on quantitative 
maximization sees its object – human commerce – through a grossly distorted lens 
constantly providing skewed pictures. Whoever does not take that into account, con-
fuses the projections generated within their own hall of mirrors with the world. As 
long as people orient themselves according to distorted models, their models’ theo-
retical deficiencies will translate into real-life practical deficits.
A false theory taken to be true deceives us into systematically acting without 
reference to reality. Included therein is, for instance, the widespread and powerful 
belief that one must simply accept egoism as a fact about reality, whereas altruism is 
but an idealistic fiction. What an optical illusion! Egocentric as well as altrocentric 
interests are both values as well as facts, even if their normative evaluation and their 
empirical allocation differ. Yet their difference does not consist in the fact that self-
39 An especially striking text in this regard is Werner Erhard, Michael C.  Jensen and Kari 
L. Granger’s working paper, “Creating Leaders: An Ontological Model” (2010): http://hbswk.hbs.
edu/item6570.html
40 See Wolfgang Amann et  al. (eds.), Business Schools under Fire: Humanistic Management 
Education as the Way Forward (Basingstoke, U.K., 2011).




ishness dwells in the world of being, from which the love of one’s neighbor would 
be per definitionen excluded. One is in no way more realistic the more selfishly one 
thinks and acts, one rather thus just drops one – contestable – value judgement!
The homo oeconomicus model thus resembles a badly done-up zipper. It sug-
gests temporary closure but will split open under pressure from real conditions. 
Even though we do not only pursue private utility in forms of morally correct action, 
we often do; and sometimes we even do so to our own disadvantage.42 The good is 
in no way striven for simply because of its advantages for us – as the proponents of 
the homo oeconomicus model like to suggest43 – it is rather sometimes also striven 
for in itself. That must not be overlooked by any anthropology to be operationalized 
economically or politically. Otherwise it is ideology and not science, spreading illu-
sions rather than producing knowledge.
Conventional economics suggests, for instance, that one can count upon no inter-
est in morality from one’s fellows (customers, coworkers, stakeholders), where this 
is not to their immediate financial advantage. This theoretical approach conceals 
important opportunities for successful action beyond self-interested calculation. 
That is not just academically deplorable, it is also economically unprofitable. 
Unseen opportunities remain unexplored. A business case which is overlooked as a 
result of the homo oeconomicus model can have no positive impact.44 We can see 
this clearly in regard to the presently perhaps most exciting proponents of innova-
tive business: the social entrepreneurs, who strategically let themselves be guided 
by moral values,45 and their twin brothers in conventional firms, the social intrapre-
neurs.46 Both groups direct, not only certain areas of their business-policy, but their 
entire business model ecologically, socially, and/or morally – and in so doing earn 
good money in both senses of the word, and as a result obtain access to 
 sustainability- orientated financial capital.47 What works out for these innovators is, 
in principle, open to all. Reality proves possibility. That principles can lead to profits 
and that businesses catering to the natural and cultural environment can be thor-
42 See Zak, Neuroeconomics; as well as Killiongback & Studer, Spatial Ultimatum Games.
43 See Gary S. Becker, Economic Theory (New Brunswick, NJ, 2007); Gary S. Becker, Accounting 
for Tastes; as well as Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with 
Special Reference to Education (Chicago, 1993).
44 See Dierksmeier, “The Freedom-Responsibility Nexus in Management Philosophy.”
45 See André Habisch, “Gesellschaftliches Unternehmertum – Blinder Fleck wirtschafts- und sozi-
alwissenschaftlicher Gemeinwhohltheorien,” in Helga Hackenberg & Stefan Empter (eds.), Social 
Entrepreneurship – Social Business: Für die Gesellschaft unternehmen (Wiesbaden, 2011); John 
Elkington & Pamela Hartigan, The Power of Unreasonable People: How Social Entrepreneurs 
Create Markets that Change the World (Boston, MA, 2008).
46 See Ronald Venn & Nicola Berg, “Building Competitive Advantage through Social 
Intrapreneurship,” South Asian Journal of Global Business Research 2:1 (2013); Walter Baets & 
Erna Baets-Oldenboom, Rethinking Growth: Social Intrapreneurship for Sustainable Performance 
(Basingstoke, 2009); David Grayson, Heiko Spitzeck et al., Social Intrapreneurism and All That 
Jazz (Sheffield, 2014).
47 See Heiko Spitzeck, Michael Pirson & Claus Dierksmeier, Banking with Integrity: The Winners 
of the Financial Crisis? (Basingstoke & New York, 2011).
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oughly profitable is shown by many “case studies,” even from conventional firms, 
within many industries and economic sectors from all over the world.48
Precisely for this reason, moral theories should be accepted and not rejected by 
economic theory, and brought into the center of research as opposed to being pushed 
into the margins of curricula. Instead of continually bypassing reality with the homo 
oeconomicus model, a more appropriate alternative would be to analyze the actual 
conditio humana oeconomica. Realism creates relevance! We have to reconstruct 
the essence of the human being in terms of the symbolic systems that constitute its 
world: Religion, science, art, morality, etc.49 What human beings are becomes visi-
ble in that which they create and achieve.50 The moral ought has its being in our 
endeavors and is reflected in our ethics, religions, codes of conduct, customs, and 
conventions. An unabridged doctrine of humankind therefore also looks at these 
symbolic worlds. It understands that ideal, spiritual, and metaphysical architectures 
likewise belong to being human and to housing humanity. A successful long-term 
business strategy is consequently best built upon an anthropology informed by all – 
including ethical – human drives.
Economic value creation (Wertschöpfung) grows not least from human apprecia-
tion (Wertschätzung) and moral commitment (Wertbindung). While to many practi-
tioners this might sound obvious, for economically informed, or rather deformed, 
academics it is still news. For up until a few years ago, the haute couture of eco-
nomic ethics was designed for the narrow walkway of the homo oeconomicus. The 
results were those extremely narrow-cut corsets of compliance management, plus a 
corporate social responsibility doctrine painstakingly wedged between carrot and 
stick. Can one really blame the many entrepreneurs eager to rid themselves of these 
costumes restricting their every freedom of movement? Is it any wonder that these 
programs often failed to be successful?
Slowly but surely, however, the prevailing design is changing to allow firms more 
leeway for moral motion. The rigid stays of the quantitative corset eventually give 
way to rather loosely woven threads that allow the fabric to incorporate patterns 
qualitatively desired by customers. The recent fashion of business ethics at the 
moment introduces a procedural design which more closely corresponds with the 
contours of qualitative freedom.
Customers and the public increasingly expect from business a behavior that can 
lead to a race to the top51; especially when NGOs (non-governmental organiza-
tions) cooperate as competent intermediary trustees.52 In the last few years, much 
48 See Ernst von Kimakowitz et al. (ed.), Humanistic Management in Practice (New York, 2010).
49 See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (New Haven, 1953); Donald Phillip 
Verene, The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Kant, Hegel, and Cassirer (Evanston, 
2011).
50 See Helmuth Plessner, Conditio humana (Frankfurt am Main, 1983).
51 See Sebastiaan Princen, “Trading up in the Transatlantic Relationship,” Journal of Public Policy 
24:1 (2004).
52 See Shaomlin Li et  al., “Corporate social responsibility in emerging markets,” Management 
International Review 50:5 (2010).
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was achieved through sector-specific programs (like the Kimberly Process in the 
diamond industry or EITI in the extractive industries), through industry-spanning 
institutions (for example Transparency International and the World Wildlife Fund), 
as well as through institutions with a cosmopolitan mandate (UN Global Compact), 
by means of soft sanctions (organized publicity, reputational damages, rejection of 
cooperation) despite the lack of lawful sanctions on a global level.53 Similar steering 
effects come from ethically directed cash injections on the part of private investors 
(from Socially Responsible Investing to Impact Investing and Venture Philanthropy) 
as well as national and international public institutions (like, for instance, the 
Government Pension Fund of Norway and the World Bank).
From numerous firms backing social, moral, and ecological sustainability, it can 
easily be seen that businesses increasingly work with differentiated criteria of suc-
cess. Success is already ever more often defined via a triple bottom line directed 
towards the harmonization of social, ecological, and financial interests (people, 
planet, profit).54 It also appears that in management circles concepts like “network 
governance” and “stakeholder management”55 are finding more and more accep-
tance. All this is qualitative freedom in application: a firm will only allow itself to 
be co-governed by its network if it understands that as a gain rather than a loss in 
freedom. And stakeholder-dialogues can only be productively conducted if one 
does not believe one already knows all about the antagonists’ concerns. Unlike the 
fictional homo oeconomicus one’s fellow human beings are irreducible to algo-
rithms. One must engage in an open dialogue with them and one’s stakeholders 
must wherever possible also participate in the strategic corporate responsibility – if 
they are not to mistake such parleys as mere PR stunts.56
I abandon this fashion show of business ethics here: The business models of 
Social Entrepreneurs and Social Intrapreneurs in all cases clearly demonstrate that 
theories are in error, which – orientated by the premises of the homo oeconomicus 
model and quantitative freedom – conclude that ethical business is unprofitable. In 
practice, an entrepreneur must by no means choose between the Scylla of a relativist 
“anything goes” and the Charybdis of a negotiation logic based solely on selfish 
53 For example, in the last years, the effect of Transparency International has broken the interna-
tional dominance of bribery as an acceptable means of initial business contact. On the basis of 
exemplary data research, Transparency International provided reliable information about the level 
of national corruption. This information was used by both public and private sponsors for invest-
ment-decisions and thus provides incentives for economic integrity. See Michel van Hulten (ed.), 
Transparency International (Leiden, 2009). For information about the global compact see Klaus 
M. Leisinger, Aron Cramer & Faris Natour, “Making Sense of the United Nations Global Compact 
Human Rights Principles,” in Andreas Rasche & Georg Kell (eds.), The United Nations Global 
Compact: Achievements, Trends and Challenges (Cambridge, New York, 2010).
54 See Klaus M. Leisinger, “Capitalism with a Human Face,” Journal of Corporate Citizenship 28 
(2007).
55 See R. Edward Freeman, “The Stakeholder Approach Revisited,” Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und 
Unternehmensethik 5:3 (2004).
56 See Jon Burchell & Joanne Cook, “Stakeholder Dialogue and Organizational Learning: Changing 
Relationships between Companies and NGOs,” Business Ethics: A European Review 17:1 (2008).
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maximization. Both approaches allow, in the best case, sub-equilibria of coopera-
tion, and lead, in the worst case, to the erosion of the social, cultural, and natural 
foundations of economic collaboration. That is why, for a long time already, the 
connection between ethics and success is the daily bread of many  – especially 
medium-sized – firms and family-businesses, and by no means only a matter for the 
Social Business sector. In the real economy and in the financial economy there are 
plenty of business models reconciling principles with profit.57 The goal of economic 
pedagogy should be to explain and demonstrate their success, which occasionally 
even exceeds that of conventional business models, so as to teach how and why 
“decent business”58 works.
The fulfilment of this directive, however, first requires a management-theory 
which places real people at the center of economic doctrine. Economics must even-
tually grant moral potentials the same status in theory that, because of their impact, 
they have in practice. Morality reduces the costs of conflicts and transactions, helps 
firms through the voluntary unremunerated support on the part of their stakeholders, 
and inspires entrepreneurs towards strategic innovation. Economic training must no 
longer obfuscate the actual opportunities which make possible a strategically 
directed Corporate (Social) Responsibility. One cannot shape, after all, what one 
cannot see. Only when the idea of freedom constitutes the foundation of economics 
will responsibility unmistakably appear to be the natural correlate of all economic 
activity instead of its burdensome “side constraint.”59 We must no longer educate 
generations of economists who by permanently staring at theoretical fictions become 
blind to the practically necessary perception of the factuality of morally, socially, 
and sustainable economic activity.60 In business curricula the modelling of dead, 
mechanical production factors must be replaced by the fundamental principle of all 
economic activity: vibrant and free human activity. Instead of mechanistic econom-
ics we need humanistic management.61
What holds for the microeconomic level, also applies to macroeconomic theory. 
Although, for a homo oeconomicus, the rational goal of economic policy may well be 
quantitative growth of the gross domestic product, for flesh-and-blood human beings 
that is not necessarily the case. They can and must qualitatively consider whether 
ever more production and consumption actually helps them attain a freer and more 
dignified life.62 It is thus to be welcomed that in macroeconomic debates people now 
begin to distance themselves from one-dimensional quantitative standards like GDP 
57 See Heiko Spitzeck, Michael Pirson & Claus Dierksmeier, Banking with Integrity.
58 See Hans Küng, Anständig wirtschafen: Warum Ökonomie Moral braucht (München, 2010).
59 See Dierksmeier & Pirson, “The Modern Corporation.”
60 See Dierksmeier, “The Freedom-Responsibility Nexus in Management Philosophy.”
61 For the history and theory of “humanistic management” as well as the publications on this topic 
see: http://humanisticmanagement.org/.
62 See Domènec Melé & Claus Dierksmeier (eds.), Human Development in Business: Values and 
Humanistic Management in the Encyclical in Veritate (New York, 2012).
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and draw on a range of alternative parameters for orientation.63 The quantitative con-
ception of economic freedom that has predominated up to now (namely that of the 
Chicago School of Economics) is gradually giving way to a conception of economic 
freedom qualitatively orientated by the social, moral, and ecological conditions of its 
own sustainability. To strengthen economic responsibility in practice requires this 
turn in theory; especially when trying to inspire successful collaboration within unfa-
miliar constellations across cultural boundaries.64
The same is true of political theory. Here also, in the last decades, much havoc 
has been wrought by the decontextualized modelling of human behavior via the 
axiom of a rational maximization of self-interest; here, too, this lens’s focus upon 
the isolated individual has provided a distorted picture of reality. Aspects which 
only appear from a perspective open to the natural environment and the social fel-
lowship of human life, systematically ended up out of view. Thus, it is also in the 
interest of a more realistic and for that reason more relevant political theory to sup-
port another anthropology and to show that humans are beings essentially directed 
to alterity.65 Being free presupposes being integrated. Freedom is not an isolated 
faculty. Fellowships, customs, conventions, lifestyles – they all support or constrain 
individuals’ opportunities in life. Freedom not only thrives in exclusive privacy, but 
flourishes also and especially in the inclusivity of autonomous commitments and 
communities. Consequently, the social bond – the friend, the family, the association, 
the firm, the federation, etc.  – does not artificially have to be bolted on to the 
 individual’s existence, it is rather always already a natural form of how human free-
dom manifests itself.66
Unlike in contractualist theories, real life is not always strictly functional, but 
replete with spontaneous value creation and non-instrumental self-expression. 
63 Here is a small selection of such criteria (including, in brackets, the administering institutions): 
Human Development Index (The United Nations Development Program), The Global Gender Gap 
Report (The World Economic Forum), The Index of Social Health (Fordham University), American 
Human Development Report (The Social Science Research Council), The Calvert-Henderson 
Quality of Life Index; Child Development Index (Save the Children), The Child and Youth Wealth-
Being Report (The Foundation for Child Development), State of the World Population Report 
(United Nations Population Fund) System of National Accounts (The United Nations), The Civic 
Health Index (The National Council on Citizenship), Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress Counting on Care Work (University of Massachusetts), 
The Gender Equity and Quality of Life Report (The Center for Partnership Studies), Genuine 
Progress Indicator (Redefining Progress), Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being (Bard 
College), Missing Dimensions of Poverty Data (Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative), National Accounts of Well-Being (The New Economics Foundation), Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development Index of Statistical Variables Real Wealth Indicators 
(The Center for Partnership Studies), The (Un)Happy Planet Index 2.0 (The New Economics 
Foundation).
64 See Claus Dierksmeier & Anthony Celano, “Thomas Aquinas on Justice as a Global Virtue in 
Business,” Business Ethics Quarterly 22:2 (2012).
65 See José Ortega y Gasset & Helene Weyl, Concord and Liberty (New York, 1946).
66 “What, indeed, could be less scientific than to construct the notion of man, in abstraction from 
society, and then to explain society in terms of his desires?” (John Petrov Plamenatz, English 
Utilitarians [Oxford, 1958], 152).
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Human beings in no way only require and use one another in order to reciprocally 
remedy defects, they also unite together for more noble ends. Beyond compensating 
for deficiencies, individuals also aspire to perfect themselves and their environment. 
Sociability does not only arise as a result of the contingency of coexistence, but 
rather – as Krause in particular shows (Sect. 2.3.3) – also as a result of voluntarily 
chosen cooperation and collaboration in the free pursuit of aims that are considered 
to be of particular qualitative value. Such dimensions of sociability transcending 
any quantitative utility-calculus are particularly accentuated by the theory of quali-
tative freedom. Instead of  – like contractualists and game-theorists  – rationally 
reconstructing all personal commitments, qualitative liberalism focuses on the 
human desire for sociability in and for itself, i.e. upon the human propensity for 
cultural exchanges, symbolic communication, spiritual contemplation, and the free-
dom for ethical commitment.
Let us ascertain and retain the following: Individual freedom is in many cases 
complemented and completed by collective action. Although liberalism will never 
be collectivism, it need not end up in privatism and libertinism.67 In contrast, since 
human beings are relational life forms and voluntarily integrate themselves within 
certain social associations, these and their norms possess a special status in philo-
sophical liberalism: They explicitly give expression to the implicit sociality of free-
dom  – as forms and functions of the manifestation of freedom.68 For example, 
someone marooned upon an uninhabited planet, even if plentifully supplied with 
food and drink, will hardly experience themselves as being especially free, although 
they can pursue the fulfilment of their preferences physically unhindered as well as 
socially and morally unconstrained. The libertarian’s dream of unhindered and 
quantitatively unlimited freedom proves to be, if radically fulfilled, nothing but a 
nightmare.
Integration is indispensable to the unfolding of personal freedom.69 Society has 
forever privileged certain forms of freedom and for the most part subordinated the 
freedom for destruction to the freedom for creation or the freedom for protection. 
And for good reason: Without symbolic forms and their norms, human beings 
degenerate and their freedom decays. Yet, by taking responsibility for its contexts, 
freedom furthers and fulfils itself. Freedom only survives within cultures which 
affirm and support it and should therefore contribute to their flourishing.70
In this sense, a qualitatively conceived liberalism respects and reinforces that 
everyone must be employed in ensuring that each and everyone can be free: whether 
in standing up for education and training, in defending private  – yet socially- 
67 See Leonhard Trelawny Hobhouse, Liberalism (New York, 1911); Hobson, The Crisis of 
Liberalism: New Issues of Democracy (London, 1909).
68 See Dahrendorf, The Modern Social Conflict; Avital Simhony & D.  Weinstein, The New 
Liberalism: Reconciling Liberty and Community (Cambridge, 2001).
69 See Benn, A Theory of Freedom, 181: “Someone who had escaped such a socialization process 
would not be free, unconstrained, able to make anything of himself that he chose; he would be able 
to make nothing of himself, being hardly a person at all.”
70 See Di Fabio, Kultur, 75.
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obligated – property as the foundation for self-subsistent living, or in charitably 
caring for others; whether in engaging in the protecting of the natural resources 
enabling future generations to live freely, or in working in solidarity with the poor 
and socially-excluded of today. Just as our freedom is enabled by others, we are to 
enable the freedom of others.
Freedom has necessary preconditions. On that all of the thinkers analyzed in this 
study concur. On one hand, that means the removal of barriers. It lies within the idea 
of freedom to battle any discrimination which (based upon race, sex, class, religion, 
etc.) privileges the liberties of some above the freedom of others. Thus, from time 
immemorial, liberalism was a bastion of protective rights (Abwehrrechte). 
Nevertheless – as all the liberalisms treated here also agree – that is clearly not 
enough. On the other hand, the preconditions for personal autonomy must be 
actively promoted by the community since neither market nor nature ensure that 
everyone attains the economic or educational preconditions of autonomy. The 
demand of individual responsibility and the promotion of its prerequisites must 
accompany one another to ensure that people’s destiny is not sealed merely by the 
location of their cradle.
The idea of qualitative freedom therefore imposes tasks on both the individual 
and the community: To free oneself from self-incurred dependency (selbstverschul-
dete Unmündigkeit) – as Kant showed paradigmatically – is something everyone 
owes to themselves. But – according to Fichte and Krause, and, later, Galbraith and 
Sen  – the liberation from outwardly imposed dependency (unverschuldete 
Unmündigkeit) is something everyone owes to each other, both materially and ide-
ally. It is cynical to demand respect for private property from the starving, and uto-
pian to expect entrepreneurial prowess from the illiterate. Only those who grant 
everyone genuine opportunities are defending a fair freedom. Instead of viewing 
society as a contract for the reciprocal insurance of having, we should understand it 
as a covenant for the all-round enabling of being.
Freedom does not grow on trees, but flourishes in society. Without a social sub-
text, we may but theoretically refer back to a reservoir of metaphysical freedom, but 
without serious opportunities for its practical cultivation in life. Freedom therefore 
requires not only the absence of the violation of rights, but also the presence of 
certain conditions: For instance, freedom needs a socially active state empowering 
everyone’s autonomy as well as effective environmental protection, an attentive 
civil-society, and a cultural community for the dissemination of values. For acts of 
freedom, the adage holds that what goes around comes around. How societies treat 
nature and culture, space and time, shapes customs: who or what merits attention; 
whether people are more or less willing to take on responsibilities; to what extent 
unwritten as well as legal rules are observed willingly or only in view of threatened 
sanctions.71 The practice of freedom rests upon preconditions that it can influence. 
Care for our social and natural surroundings is liberal, because freedom is relational. 
71 See Robert Levine, A Geography of Time – On Tempo, Culture and the Pace of Life: The Temporal 




Qualitatively orientated freedom therefore proceeds economically and ecologically 
with caution. Precisely because liberal thinking imposes upon no-one the ultimate 
goals of their lives, it must – in the face of finite resources and the infinity of present 
and future human aims – advise us towards a precautionary use of our shared life-
world and the Global Commons.
In my view, a liberalism appealing to the idea of qualitative freedom should also 
demand a humane provision of and universal access to public goods, like education, 
health, culture, and transport. Liberals should strive for a balanced allocation of 
assets – not directly and motivated from an interest in material equality, but rather 
indirectly and interested in an equitable access to the presuppositions and condi-
tions of autonomy. Neither the secession of the rich nor the exclusion of the poor 
(accompanying extreme material inequality) can be tolerated by an idea of freedom 
which campaigns for a (global) society in which everyone contributes to the digni-
fied life of all.72
Unlike some theories of positive freedom, however, the idea of qualitative free-
dom – like the “capability theory” championed by Amartya Sen – establishes an 
important procedural boundary when it comes to the implementation of this notion. 
While the universal enabling of qualitative freedom is legitimately a high priority 
of the social and cultural state (Sozial- und Kulturstaat), the specific organization of 
that dimension of freedom remains exclusively a matter for the citizens themselves. 
There is also a right to distinguish oneself from others through one’s own work. 
Performance should be rewarded if and inasmuch as doing so honors everyone’s 
equal right to unequal advancements.
Applied to current political circumstances, qualitative freedom demands not only 
the social embedding and cushioning of market-activities, but also – presupposing 
the latter – their free operation. Fair liberalism is therefore neither market-obsessed 
nor market-repressed. It respects the results of the free market economy as the 
expression of individuals’ evaluations and aspirations insofar as the market – a con-
dition never to be forgotten and often violated – is organized so as to heed the voices 
of the many instead of merely the valuables of a few.73 Consequently, the idea of 
qualitative freedom straddles the usual left-right schematizations germane to the 
logic of quantitative thinking and their blunt assertion that more equality/solidarity 
= less freedom. Normally, social democrats show up upon the left side of that 
 spectrum together with their alleged quest for achieving, with as much freedom as 
necessary, as much equality as possible. At the right end of the spectrum then reside 
neoliberals and libertarians trying to achieve, with as much equality as necessary, as 
much freedom as possible. Somewhere in between classical liberalism scuffles with 
new liberalism for the sovereignty over the definition of the golden mean.74 
72 See Parijs, Real Freedom for All.
73 That is, especially in regard to the global market, unfortunately a condition that is all too often 
violated, which makes the economic policy of free-trade – which (under ideal conditions) is poten-
tially a blessing – a (when under real conditions) scourge of the poor, see Agus Pakpahan, Freedom 
for Farmers, Freedom for All (Bogor, 2007).




Underlying this quantitative scheme is the superstition of a fundamental conflict 
between equality and freedom, according to which gains upon the one side are reg-
istered as loses on the other: a zero-sum game.75
It is not only in extreme cases that this model fails: Wherever no kind of equality 
prevails there is typically just as little freedom and vice versa. Anarchic and tyran-
nical conditions for the most part deny citizens both freedom and equality. This 
practical deficiency has its ground in the theoretical deficit of concise categories. 
The “alleged conflict between equality and liberality” is in truth “a category 
mistake.”76 Even libertarians want equality, albeit limited to formal and procedural 
aspects. Socialists also want freedom, albeit through plan-based economic redistri-
bution. Consequently, the ideas of freedom and equality do not at all find them-
selves in an insurmountable tug-of-war; merely some concepts of freedom need to 
be reconciled with demands for material equality.77 So, wherever quantitative free-
dom declaims an abstract stalemate of ideas, the question concerning the concrete 
quality of respective freedoms finds a way forward: The integration of certain 
aspects of equality as genuine demands of the liberal idea. While, from the quantita-
tive perspective, liberals view social-democrats as arch-enemies, from the qualita-
tive perspective one sees them both as struggling for forms of equality which support 
and conform with freedom.
The same is true of liberalism’s ecological focus. For many years, upon both sides, 
a false antagonism between liberal and green movements was paraded around. Today 
it becomes obvious, though, to ever more people, that the idea of freedom includes 
the principle of sustainability. As soon as liberalism turns its back upon the quantita-
tive fixation with utility-calculi and, in aiming to protect the rights of future freedom, 
opens itself up to the qualitative notion of an obligation also committed to strictly 
asymmetrical relations, imperatives of sustainability will immediately be recognized 
as indispensable components of a liberal program. Conversely, it should be obvious 
just how much green politics profits from liberal axioms. A credible demarcation 
from eco-dictatorial positions will only succeed by means of a marked commitment 
to freedom as the primordial foundation for the evaluation of all lifestyles. Only as 
freedom’s devisee can a politics of sustainability accept its bourgeois inheritance.
The philosophy of qualitative freedom does not define the spectrum of liberalism 
between the abstract antitheses of left and right, but rather in accordance with the 
actual tension between freedom’s prerequisites and freedom’s goals. Politics, in the 
sense of qualitative freedom, must continually mediate between freedom’s particu-
lar intentions and its universal conditions  – through a constant back and forth 
between the dimensions of responsible and fair freedom. Responsible freedom hon-
ors worthwhile goals, while fair freedom preserves the presuppositions of personal 
autonomy. A qualitatively orientated liberalism can thus, for example, call upon 
cooperation between both progressive and conservative forces. In the name of 
responsible freedom, one might suggest the (“conservative”) cultivation of family 
75 See Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics 98:1 (1987).
76 See Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA, 1992), 23.
77 See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 270–273.
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values which give the freedom of individuals meaning and direction, but also – and 
for the same reason – the (“progressive”) defense of non-traditional lifestyles in 
which individuals likewise develop into authors of their biographies.
Never in isolation, but always in dialectical unity only, must fair and responsible 
freedoms express the idea of qualitative freedom. Social policy, for instance, must 
aspire towards a balance between subsidiary responsibility on the one hand and soli-
dary fairness on the other. Whoever only backs solidarity in social policy quickly 
turns it into the paternalism of comprehensive welfare. Conversely, sheer subsidiar-
ity makes the opportunities of the poor dependent upon the privatism of donors. 
Neither paternalism nor privatism is liberal. The idea of qualitative liberalism is not 
shaped by the one-sided – but by the unified – use of responsible and fair freedom. 
Solidarity can be responsibly handled only in subsidiary form, and subsidiarity is 
only fair when solidary. Subsidiary solidarity and solidary subsidiarity should 
therefore be the lodestars of liberal social policy.
A society that wants freedom must forgive mistakes. Just as we, in private rela-
tions, continually give people second and third chances so that their (and our) free-
dom can forge new paths instead of grinding to a halt in the cul-de-sacs of the past,78 
so we should also do so in economic affairs. Everyone requires opportunities to work 
and participate in the economy in order to be able to take care of themselves and their 
own. Whoever – by their own fault or otherwise – becomes unemployed must receive 
new chances to said participation. The state of qualitative freedom does not hand out 
alms, but it does provide opportunities. In an economic order which, in the interest of 
the common good, depends on individual risk-taking, the state has the duty to ensure 
that individuals always retain the capacity to contribute to the whole. Freedom for 
economic risks has to be accompanied with freedom from the risk of social exclu-
sion. People grasp economic opportunities much more readily when the state helps 
them to a new beginning in cases of failure.79 The state can count on the efforts of 
individuals if they can rely on social security by the state. Taxation to finance this 
backstop does not ruin our economic freedom, but rather enables and conditions it.80 
Whoever preaches responsibility must empower people to take on responsibilites.
On the flip side, it needs to be reiterated that freedom obligates. Today’s liberal-
ism would benefit from the ancient insight that freedom manifests and enriches 
itself as virtue. The encomium of freedom should not sound like a hymn to baser 
instincts and the lowest common denominator. But precisely in this – in the qualita-
tive distinction between the true face of freedom and the false grimace of the per-
missiveness of hedonistic consumerism – the West’s politics has recently shown 
itself to be just as ignorant as inept. In the drunken belief in the redeeming power of 
unlimited growth, it was overlooked that a freedom, which only thrives quantita-
tively, gradually loses its qualitative determination as well as its orientation towards 
the common good. It was premature to reject, as an allegedly improper curtailment 
of the private sphere, the res publica as the true focus of freedom.
78 See Klaus-Michael Kodalle, Annäherungen an eine Theorie des Verzeihens (Stuttgart, 2006).
79 See Parijs, Real Freedom for All, 28.
80 See Pettit, Republicanism, 66, 110 & 273.
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Freedom depends more on the class than on the mass of our options.81 Self- 
reflective liberalism philosophically is thus not only bent upon the quantitative enu-
meration of abstract options but focuses in the first instance rather on the qualitative 
evaluation of concrete opportunities. For, when quantitative thinking treats all free-
doms without differentiation, liberalism leaves people indifferent. For that reason, it 
is to be stressed that, the more essential a freedom, the more strongly should we – as 
against alternative possibilities – promote it. The qualitative evaluation therefore 
precedes the quantitative enumeration; for, in some cases (for example, in regard to 
unsustainable practices), less can actually be better. On occasions, freedom shows 
itself in the reduction of options.82 This holds especially for liberalism’s ethical 
orientation.83 Because the idea of qualitative freedom links individuals’ freedom 
with universal freedom it sees the acceptance of responsibility for others as not an 
external negation but rather an internal manifestation of freedom.
From a qualitative perspective, then, liberalism has to take up much unfinished 
business of emancipation and ought to take on long-overlooked dimensions of respon-
sibility. We everywhere need a more inclusive liberalism than the one provided by the 
symmetry-fixated hypotheses of contractualism and game-theory. To achieve fair and 
responsible freedom, a shift within liberal discourse is necessary: a turn away from 
the neoliberal and libertarian concepts of freedom and back towards the forever quali-
tatively orientated progressive roots of the Anglo-American liberalism as well as the 
qualitatively orientated ordo-liberal tradition of German liberalism.
Today’s liberalism requires, in nuce, a philosophy of freedom in the genetivus 
objectivus – as a philosophy for freedom; as well as also in the genetivus subjecti-
vus – as a freely self-developing philosophy. We find this philosophy arising from 
the idea of qualitative freedom. In regard to the tension between the aims of indi-
viduals and of communities, qualitative freedom wishes to reconcile them (to pre-
serve freedom), to coordinate them (to shape freedom), and to inspire people to use 
their personal freedom on behalf of the autonomy of others (to spread freedom).
5.3  Outlook
The freedom of the other not only defines the boundary of our own, but also deter-
mines one of its noblest goals. Not only do we demand freedom but also freedom 
makes demands on us. It calls for liberation: internally, for the emancipation of 
ourselves, but also externally, for the liberation of everyone else. Since neither mar-
ket nor nature can ensure that everyone can lead an autonomous life, the demand of 
individual freedom and the promotion of its general presuppositions must go hand 
in hand. Consequently, liberals should not only defend possessions already held and 
81 See Claudia Mills, “Choice and Circumstance,” Ethics 109:1 (1998).
82 See Robert Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty (New York, 1986); 
Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.
83 See Brian Morris, Bakunin: The Philosophy of Freedom (New York, 1993).
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liberties already secured, but also everyone’s claim to receive access to property and 
rights. Personal property secures participation in the world; and there is a human 
right to such participation. Since we are entitled to freedom only as a result of rea-
sons applying to everyone, it follows that, as long as there is but one single human 
being who lacks freedom, everyone’s freedom is imperfect.
The idea of qualitative freedom is thus per se neither local, nor national, but 
global; it does not exclude anyone, yet includes everyone. Race, sex, and religion, 
but also spatial-temporal distance, in no way diminish the validity of a demand for 
freedom. The citizens of distant countries and members of future generations have 
just as much a human right to the conditions enabling a free life as persons with 
whom we interact or trade directly. A consistently realized idea of freedom extends, 
therefore, not only its protective dimension to asymmetrical spatial and temporal 
relations but also the obligation towards capability building. Only a globally soli-
dary liberalism is a consistent liberalism.
Our work has demonstrated that a liberalism arising from a theory of qualitative 
freedom must reflect upon precisely this obligation towards worldwide solidarity. 
Freedom revealed itself as an ongoing task for humanity charged always to tran-
scend its historical achievements anew. Yet this mandate does not provide liberal 
thinking with an instruction manual for its world-historical mission. The precise 
way in which a cosmopolitan liberalism operating in the name of qualitative free-
dom is to develop can ultimately only be decided by the global citizenry and not 
academic philosophy.
Precisely because the claim to freedom extends to all persons, there will be dif-
ferences from place to place, not only in the manner freedom is lived, but also in the 
way it is conceptualized – and that includes the respective interpretation of its global 
responsibility. The unity of freedom must be realized, not through uniformity, but in 
multiplicity. At the same time, the global claim of the idea of freedom as universal 
entitlement to the presuppositions and conditions required for an autonomous life 
helps every liberalism ‘on the ground’ to establish the locally appropriate forms of 
freedom qualitatively (for example by the prioritization of competing claims) and 
quantitatively (for example in respect to the magnitude of individual versus institu-
tional freedoms, the extent of societal codetermination, etc.). This is not the place to 
anticipate this worldwide dialogue about the future shapes and forms of freedom, 
but solely to prepare for it. Instead of drafting that impending form of qualitative 
freedom, I would like to conclude by outlining the questions and challenges that 
such discourse about the globality of freedom must confront.
In the face of the severely tattered global image of the idea of freedom, it seems 
more than doubtful at the moment that the people and peoples of this world will 
want to unite under the liberal banner. There is skepticism and mistrust against free-
dom. And not without reason. After the collapse of the ‘real-existing socialism’ it 
was loudly proclaimed that finally the idea of freedom had been victorious and that 
now the history of the human species was about to fulfil its destiny.84 Today, though, 
84 See Christopher Bertram & Andrew Chitty (eds.), Has History Ended? Fukuyama, Marx, 
Modernity (Aldershot, UK & Brookfield, VT, 1994); Timothy Burns, After History? Francis 
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this interpretation of history, which repeated Hegel’s fulminant thesis that “the 
History of the World is nothing but the development of the Idea of Freedom,”85 has 
lost much of its luster.
Two decades ago, however, the course of history seemed to justify such liberal 
optimism. The revolutions in Eastern Europe were indeed characterized by a desire for 
civil liberties. With the sweeping victory of democratic freedoms over socialist com-
mando-economies, the world appeared to exit from a centuries-old labyrinth of politi-
cal and economic confusions. Intellectual interpreters like Samuel Huntingdon or 
Francis Fukuyama proclaimed in unison with less intellectual politicians like George 
W. Bush that under the banner of freedom the world could and should be mended.86 
The way towards a better future, to a world of affluence and peace, towards a second 
Garden of Eden, would, it seemed, be paved by freedom, i.e. the individual freedom to 
activate personal potentials and their economic power as well as the collective freedom 
for cooperative corporative and democratic-participative organization.
This optimism soon fell flat. The champagne of democratic autonomy of the 
1990s quickly lost its fizz right after the turn of the century. Fermented by corrup-
tion on the inside and heated by crises from the outside, in Eastern and Central 
Europe, the sparkling wine of liberal self-government soon fermented into the vin-
egar of bitter systematic constraints. And especially the most recent global eco-
nomic crises had a sobering influence upon liberals across the world. The intoxication 
of rapidly globalizing freedom was followed by the stubborn hangover of cosmo-
politan responsibility and global sustainability problems.
On the part of the West, military violations of international law and economic 
incursions into sovereign national spheres – cynically, stupidly, or perfidiously per-
petrated in the name of freedom – have considerably damaged the liberal idea.87 
The ‘liberalization’ of markets pushed through as a result of, for instance, the 
Washington Consensus88 visited severe economic dependency upon many people 
and peoples. Certainly, this program of deregulation originated within the camp of 
Fukuyama and his Critics (Lanham, MD, 1994); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the 
Last Man (New York, 1992).
85 Georg Wilhelm Hegel, TWA 12, 539f. Translated in Georg Wilhelm Hegel, The Philosophy of 
History (New York, 1956), 456.
86 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New 
York, 1996); Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man; George W. Bush, Our Mission and 
Our Moment: Speeches since the Attacks of September 11. (Washington D.C., 2001).
87 See Carl Mirra, Enduring Freedom or Enduring War? Prospects and Costs of the New American 
21st Century (Washington, D.C., 2005); Aziz Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom 
(Cambridge, MA, 2010); Anthony Bogues, Empire of Liberty: Power, Desire, and Freedom 
(Hanover, NH, 2010).
88 See Shahid Javed Burki & Guillermo Perry, Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions 
Matter (Washington, D.C., 1998); Ben Fine, Costas Lapavisas and Jonathan Pincus, Development 
Policy in the 21st Century: Beyond the Post-Washington Consensus (New York, 2001); A.  K. 
N. Ahmed, Washington Consensus: How and Why It Failed the Poor (Dhaka, 2004); Narcis Serra 
and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global 
Governance (New York, 2008).
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the libertarians89 and neoliberals,90 and only rarely finds support by liberalism’s 
classical authors or the German ordo-liberals, and not at all by the progressive lib-
erals in the USA or the new liberalism in Britain. Nonetheless, the idea of freedom 
as a whole suffered collateral damage. Many blamed not only the actual actors, like 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
for the mistakes of these programs, but the liberal ideology as such. Many, who 
were stretched upon the rack of economic liberalization in the last few decades, 
blame the dislocations they suffered on the notion of freedom itself and not only on 
its libertarian overextension.
What is more, there is a widespread perception that the recently experienced 
economic crises are not only economic but also societal, not only financial but also 
moral, and not really accidental but rather inevitable.91 As a result, the call for sys-
temic reform and – prior to that – systematic reflection becomes ever louder. The 
economic crisis smoldering since 2008 significantly contributed to a worldwide 
shift in consciousness by devaluing as outdated many of the old-fashioned prescrip-
tions of liberal politics – less state, laissez faire, deregulation, monetarization, and 
incentivization.92 Accordingly, the liberal camp currently sings the credo of liberal-
ization more quietly.
This must unsettle neoliberals and libertarians, since for quite a long time they 
have directly connected the striving for freedom and the striving for profit: The rac-
ing car welded together from the axioms of neoclassical economics and neoliberal 
political theories, after all, has had a good run a while! That vehicle of deregulated 
quantitative freedom accelerated by Thatcher, Reagan, and their successors, with 
89 For information about the terminology of varying libertarian [libertärer und libertarischer] posi-
tions in philosophy and political science see footnote 115. A concise comparison between liberal 
and libertarian thinking is provided by Samuel Freeman, “Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism 
is Not a Liberal View,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 30:2 (2001).
90 A short note about the use of the concept “neoliberal”: The appellation “neoliberal” first surfaced 
amongst ordoliberal thinkers (Eucken, Röpcke, Müller-Armack). In the journal “Ordo” they above 
all criticized as “paleoliberal” almost exactly those minimal-state attitudes (radical privatization, 
deregulation, laissez faire, etc.), which one today often writes off with the label “neoliberal.” In 
contrast, they supported under the rubric “neoliberal” an ordoliberalism also vigilant in regard to 
social concerns. The use of the concept “neoliberal” based upon German etymology today, how-
ever, hardly finds any imitators, since, internationally, this fact is still largely unknown. In global 
discourse, the concept “neoliberal” thus rather outlines the – Mises and Hayek inspired – Chicago 
School of Economics’ (and the political theories inspired by it) turn away from the moral as well 
as social and democratic elements of the classical liberalism of Hume and Smith in favor of an 
advancing deregulation and privatization. “Neoliberal” is also used here in this far more usual 
sense. For this “deutschen Sonderweg” in etymology see Viktor Vanberg, “‘Ordnungstheorie’ as 
Constitutional Economics: The German Conception of a ‘Social Market Economy’” in Walter 
Eucken (ed.), ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 39, 1988.
91 See Rowan Williams & Larry Elliott, Crisis and Recovery: Ethics, Economics, and Justice (New 
York, 2010); Kean Birch & Vlad Mykhnenko (eds.), The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism: The 
Collapse of an Economic Order? (New York, 2010).
92 See Olivier J. Blanchard et al., In the Wake of the Crisis: Leading Economists Reassess Economic 
Policy, 2012; Adair Turner, Economics after the Crisis: Objectives and Means, 2012.
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the gas of deregulated economies seemed to glide almost effortlessly over political 
burdens, cultural barriers, ecological problems, and religious sensitivities. But upon 
the home straight towards a state-bereft global society, the sleek sports car lost trac-
tion, ended up skidding on the oil of speculative finance, and crashed into the brick 
wall of reality. Now that it is only fit for scrap metal, no one admits to having had 
their hands on the wheel.
Libertarians (like Hillel Steiner) smarten-up leftist cantilevers; economic liberals 
return to shock-absorbers from moral philosophy (like those in Adam Smith); and 
in the camp of ordo-liberalism tools critical of the market (of, for instance, Wilhem 
Röpke) are brought out of storage. At home and abroad one suddenly remembers 
the insight of classical liberalism that the selfish cruising of the few needs to be 
slowed down by making basic provisions for the many and ethical rules for all. 
Admirable though these insights are – above all as indirect admissions of guilt on 
the part of those who negligently or deliberately forgot all this for far too long – they 
do not suffice to set things in gear again. The crash was ultimately not an accident 
but due to the fact that the unfortunate liberal-economic vehicle was controlled by 
an understanding of freedom that systematically obstructed sideways glances upon 
the ecological, social, and moral crash barriers of the economic route. In order to 
make freedom’s vehicle road-worthy again, the cause of the crash – the quantitative 
tunnel-vision – must above all be remedied. Otherwise future accidents are already 
predestined.
Against the idolization of the market on the part of quantitative liberals (in their 
talk of ‘market society’, etc.) a qualitative basic principle should be adhered to: The 
freedom for self-determination should be realized, and not undermined, by the mar-
ket. The market has to serve people and their freedom – not vice versa.93 Qualitatively 
thinking liberals therefore promote a global trade that gives everyone the chance to 
develop autonomously. We must maintain that, only fair trade is truly free trade. 
Only when all parties to an economic transaction are so positioned that they can 
refrain from “humanly intolerable exchanges” may one conclude that formal volun-
tariness implies the material legitimacy of transactions.94 To ensure a fair and square 
deal for all parties, it is advisable to differentiate, as in sports, between weight 
 categories. Small states and weak economies sometimes need protective rules; lib-
eral solidarity demands that we help them obtain these. For equally treating the 
unequal is quite as unjust as unequally treating the equal.95
Some liberals falsely see critics of globalization per se as opponents of their 
cause. However, those (like the proponents of the Washington Consensus) who pre-
scribe that freedom is only to be quantitatively understood, i.e. as the maximization 
93 See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and the Practice of Equality (Cambridge, 
MA, 2000).
94 See Vivian Walsh, “Amartya Sen on Rationality and Freedom,” Science and Society 71:1 (2007), 
63.




of – especially economic – options, themselves violate that very freedom for civic 
self-determination held aloft by all liberals. It is rather the profoundly liberal con-
cern – political autonomy for all – which is recognized by the critics of globaliza-
tion who avowedly struggle for the freedom for regional and local self-determination. 
Accordingly, a qualitatively orientated liberalism may not stand idly by when forms 
of economic activity are internationalized, while the legal and political means for 
influencing it remain limited nationally. For otherwise ecological, cultural, and 
social liberties soon become the victims of economic freedom.
Whose freedom is served if the profits of international business primarily go to 
rich nations and large corporations while the negative externalities chiefly haunt 
poor countries and smaller civic and economic units?96 Here, not only the principle 
of justice, but also the cosmopolitan dimension of the idea of freedom, is violated. 
Liberals should therefore protest when the postulates of free-trade and competition 
are asserted only if and inasmuch they coincide with the interests of affluent nations. 
Qualitatively directed freedom not only campaigns against discriminations contrary 
to human rights where such advocacy may bring political or other advantages (the 
opening of markets, new alliances, etc.). To loosen the grip of economic power 
through rule-governed competition was forever the concern and pride of the ordo- 
liberal school97; a notion we must return to today on a global scale.
Qualitative liberalism has to engage itself also and especially where this means 
coming into conflict with today’s centers of power – dictatorial, hegemonic, oligar-
chic, and plutocratic structures. Under the flag of quantitative freedom, however, 
such battles were rarely fought. And, in my opinion, that explains a good part of the 
worldwide unease about the idea of freedom. Today many harm the banners of cos-
mopolitanism because of disingenuous and dishonorable campaigns in the name of 
universalism. Since the ideas of human rights and of freedom were often defended 
too one-sidedly, they are now challenged from every side. The idea of freedom 
therefore urgently requires new strategists (strategoi) and more successful  – 
 qualitatively orientated – strategies. We must rethink freedom from the ground up, 
in order to leave behind the division of the world into friends and foes of freedom – 
for being erroneous on the part of either perspective.
While quantitative theories tend to outsource into the realm of private morality 
all forms of global responsibility that contribute to the augmentation of their respec-
tive options, the idea of qualitative freedom fundamentally comprises and insists 
96 See J. Timmons Roberts & Bradley C. Parks, A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-
South Politics and Climate Policy (Cambridge, MA, 2007); Stephen M.  Gardiner, “Ethics and 
Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114:3 (2004); JoAnn Carmin & Julian Agyeman (ed.), 
Environmental Inequalities beyond Borders: Local Perspectives on Global Injustices (Cambridge, 
MA, 2011); Flavio Comim, “Climate Injustice and Development: A Capability Perspective,” 
Development 51:3 (2008).
97 See for example the contributions in Walter Eucken et al., (eds.), Freiheit und wettbewerbliche 
Ordnung: Gedenkband zur Erinnerung an Walter Eucken (Freiburg, 2000) as well as in Eucken’s 
original: Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Bern, 1952).
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upon a responsibility for the whole. As individuals’ rights to freedom are not rooted 
in their subjective particularity, but rather in their personality, a qualitatively orien-
tated philosophy of freedom necessarily culminates in cosmopolitanism: with the 
task of helping everyone achieve autonomy. Qualitative freedom begins and ends 
with global citizens and their actual opportunities in life. Nationalistic egotism is 
thus foreign to a qualitatively directed liberalism. Instead of being on the defensive, 
liberals are proactively to advance the free self-determination of everyone and stand 
up for the emancipation of all global citizens.
But who is this global citizen? Just as in the search for the essence of the human 
being, this question cannot simply be answered materialistically or empirically. 
Neither the human being as such nor the global citizen as such can be laid down 
naked upon a spectrometer so that we can then precisely read off their anthropological- 
metaphysical mass. Of course not; since humans are relational beings, one cannot 
analyze them in abstraction from their relations. At issue is less the biological skel-
eton and more the symbolic framework of the human lifeworld. The worlds created 
artificially from science and religion, morality and law, economics and politics, 
within which human beings develop their future selves, demonstrate that it is in the 
nature of human freedom to be at work; and its works are not only material but also 
ideal. Metaphysics belongs to the human condition just as much as monuments do; 
humanity gives expression to its ideals through edifices of the spirit just as much as 
by way of physical buildings. Before the eternal background of religion’s and meta-
physics’ ultimate questions, humanity ever anew ponders what, in its time and day, 
might be adequate answers to the penultimate questions of politics and economics, 
law and morality. It is therefore not very modern but rather very naive to expect or 
desire that human beings at long last renounce metaphysics, religion, and 
spirituality.
Principles so comprehensive that, even in cases of conflicting interests, the global 
community still turns to them for normative orientation never can be externally, i.e. 
heteronomously, imposed on people. They must rather be suggested to people from 
within their own worldviews and made plausible by means of their own reason. I am 
thus skeptical about the attempts of academic philosophy to solve the problems of 
global ecology, global economy, and global politics by reinventing the moral wheel. 
One does not have to be a gourmet to find unappetizing the idea of a ‘global dish’ to 
feed all people everywhere. And the notion of a ‘global ethics’ (Weltethik), which 
once and for all, down to the smallest detail, would prescribe to everyone every-
where what they should do, seems to me to be just as unattractive. I believe it more 
plausible, as well as more in keeping with freedom’s procedural guidelines, to rather 
seek a convergence of those values global citizens already espouse.
The philosophy of freedom must thus leave the ivory tower and make its way 
within the streets of this world and pick up on what forms of responsible freedom 
find respect in the various cultural communities.98 Thus it will encounter people as 
constantly self-interpreting and morally self-examining persons. Yet only a few 




people orientate their normative ideals of self solely by means of secular mental 
models. Most people abundantly supplement their cognitive diet with spiritual 
accoutrements. A liberalism unable to digest this side-dish will thus sooner or later 
become enfeebled.99 Unlike theories of quantitative freedom (see Sect. 4.3), any 
liberalism concerned with the actual homo sapiens must therefore also be able to 
understand spiritual and metaphysical orientations and relate these to its own values 
and tenets. And only within the framework of a theory of qualitative freedom can 
this be accomplished; albeit – as the philosophies of Kant and Krause clarified – 
never in a manner that imposes more – or other – forms of reflection upon ultimate 
questions than the citizens themselves request.
Qualitatively orientated liberalism thus inherits selectively  – and critically  – 
humanity’s metaphysical and spiritual traditions. If religious citizens formulate 
political maxims as a result of their spiritual convictions, such arguments are not 
suspect simply because they are guided by spiritual premises. Nevertheless, when-
ever these religious convictions make the claim immediately to instruct collective 
action and political decision-making, one must examine the extent to which those 
arguments could also convince non-believers or those of other faiths.100 Therefore, 
in a qualitatively liberal political system, religiously or metaphysically founded 
truths do not directly carry weight, but at most do so indirectly: when and insofar as 
they formulate values affirmable also by alternative world-views.
The latter is all the more the case the more precisely the respectively mobilized 
values agree with fundamental convictions of all human beings, like, for instance, 
the Golden Rule.101 With such principles, the transformation of spiritual wisdom 
into secular validity easily succeeds; with other values (for instance when looking 
at certain sexual norms) that is far less the case. Yet, wherever a stable, intercultural 
agreement in certain fundamental values does result, it can work in the background 
of political discourse as a subtle filter for the proposals being foregrounded. For 
instance, political projects of religious (as well as secular) interest groups and com-
munities that move within that intersection of globally converging values, may thus 
enjoy greater approval and thereby better chances of being realized than others.
But is there at all such a humane consensus and wherein could it consist? In the 
last years, this question was intensively pursued within spiritual,102 agnostic,103 and 
secular104 contexts, especially under the auspices of the Global Ethos Project 
99 See Di Fabio, Kultur, 8.
100 See Todd Hedrick, Rawls and Habermas: Reason, Pluralism, and the Claims of Political 
Philosophy (Stanford, CA, 2010).
101 See Bauschke, Die Goldene Regel.
102 See Fethullah Gülen, Toward a Global Civilization of Love & Tolerance (Somerset, NJ, 2004).
103 In this regard we must above all think of the recent publications of the Dalai Lama, for instance: 
Beyond Religion; Ethics for a Whole World (Boston, 2011).




(Projekt Weltethos) founded in 1990 at the University of Tübingen.105 Over the last 
25 years, scholars there have undertaken research into the fundamental values which 
interconnect people of all nations and regions and have produced a body of scholar-
ship encompassing thousands of pages. As well as comprehensive monographs on 
the common ethical values of Judaism,106 Christianity,107 Islam,108 in Daoism and 
Confucianism,109 and in the spiritual life of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism,110 
Hans Küng and his team also traced this convergence of values in the field of inter-
cultural literature111 and philosophy.112
The central result of these studies was that two formal principles and four sub-
stantial values were recognized – although, of course, not always observed – to be 
morally binding by humanity across all spatio-temporal boundaries.113 First, the 
Golden Rule of reciprocity (known through directives like “Do unto others what you 
would have them do unto you!”) and the principle of humanity, to treat human 
beings humanely, i.e. to not treat subjects like objects. Second, when applied to the 
everyday lifeworld these two formal principles lead to four substantial basic values 
which likewise enjoy worldwide approval: truthfulness, justice, partnership, and 
peacefulness. Together, these rules and values constitute the kernel of an ethical 
attitude which has always and everywhere inspired people towards ethical behavior, 
precisely a global ethos.
Since these values have always found comparable expression in incomparable 
cultural contexts, that is to say, because the global ethos (Weltethos)114 belongs to 
the foundations of human self-orientation, one can view it as the kernel of a realisti-
cally idealistic anthropology. It represents the legacy of all human traditions: Thus, 
within and throughout the concrete plurality of cultures, we find a reflection of the 
105 See Hans Küng, Projekt Weltethos (München, 1990).
106 See Hans Küng, Das Judentum: Die religiöse Situation der Zeit (München, 1991).
107 See Hans Küng, Das Christentum: Wesen und Geschichte (Zürich, 2007).
108 See Hans Küng, Der Islam: Wesen und Geschichte (Zürich, 2007).
109 See Hans Küng, Tracing the Way: Spiritual Dimensions of the World Religions (London, 2002).
110 See Stephan Schlensog & Hans Küng, Der Hinduismus: Glaube, Geschichte, Ethos (München, 
2006).
111 See Karl-Josef Kuschel, Im Ringen um den wahren Ring: Lessings “Nathan der Weise” – eine 
Herausforderung der Religionen (Ostfildern, 2011); Karl-Josef Kuschel, Jesus im Spiegel der 
Weltliteratur: Eine Jahrhundertbilanz und Einführungen (Düsseldorf, 1999).
112 See Hans-Martin Schönherr-Mann, Globale Normen und individuelles Handeln: Die Idee des 
Weltethos aus emanzipatorischer Perspektive (Würzburg, 2010); Hans-Martin Schönherr-Mann & 
Hans Küng, Miteinander leben lernen: Die Philosophie und der Kampf der Kulturen (Zürich, 
2008).
113 A good overview of this and what follows is provided in: Küng, Gebhardt & Schlensog, 
Handbuch Weltethos.
114 See Hans Küng & Karl-Josef Kuschel, Wissenschaft und Weltethos (München, 1998); Helmut 
Reinalter, Projekt Weltethos: Herausforderungen und Chancen für eine neue Weltpolitik und 
Weltordnung (Innsbruck, 2006); Schönherr-Mann, Globale Normen und individuelles Handeln: 
die Idee des Welthethos aus emanzipatorischer Perspektive.
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conceptual unity of the ethical nature of humanity. The global ethos thus resembles 
an invisible union of all civilization and cultures. That union cannot of course sup-
plant the visible efforts on its behalf. Yet it instructs people of all backgrounds about 
how they can theoretically unite and practically cooperate. The key idea of the 
Global Ethos Project is that, as a result of the convergence of elementary values, 
persons of the most diverse backgrounds can, through dialogue, develop shared 
ideas and meaningfully cooperate.115
Clearly, for them to have obligatory power, the values of the global ethos need 
not only spiritual but also secular foundations. Secular reasons must be adduced so 
that they can bring together both believers and unbelievers beyond all spiritual 
foundations. These can be of historical as well as of systematic nature. One may 
perhaps more easily reach agnostics and atheists with the historical argument that 
conceptions of an ethically self-committed freedom, along with the values identified 
by the Global Ethos Project, have constantly arisen over the centuries. Across all 
historical and geographical spheres, people have time and again agreed on these 
basic norms of coexistence; in different forms, of course, from place to place and 
from time to time: in the spritual teachings of China and India, in the philosophies 
of northern Europe and South America, as well as in the poetry and reflections of 
African culture.116 Systematically, though, it needs to be shown furthermore why a 
way of life orientated by those values expresses the reasonable self-commitment of 
human freedom consistently and coherently.
Although people differ about what they celebrate as the highest quality of free-
dom, our study could demonstrate that they can very well agree that and about how 
human freedom should be ethically orientated. From this perspective, the values of 
the global ethos can be seen to manifest qualitative freedom via the mandate to take 
on responsibility for the dignified autonomy of all fellow humans. The perpetual 
quest of the world’s cultures for a good, true, and meaningful life, viewed through 
the lens of a qualitative conception of freedom, appears to be as essential for a ful-
filled human existence: as an expression of our freedom’s ethical autonomy. This is 
why a qualitative liberalism must treat the traditions of all peoples, both spiritual 
and secular, with respect.
Of course, the rules garnered by the Global Ethos Project are of an expressly 
general nature and must, according to the context of their application, be further 
determined. The Global Ethos Foundation (Stiftung Weltethos) set about concretiz-
ing the meaning of these values and norms for questions of, for example, global 
115 See Hans Küng, “We Need Bridge-Builders  – No Survival for the World Without a Global 
Ethic” in East-West Divan in Memory of Werner Mark Linz (London, 2014).
116 See Christel Hasselmann, Hans Küngs Projekt Weltethos interkulturell gelesen (Nordhausen, 
2005); Hans Küng, Ein Weltethos für die neue Weltepoche (1998); Hans Küng, Weltordnung 
braucht Weltethos  – Interkultureller Dialog als Schlüssel zu friedlicher Koexistenz (1997); 
Dierksmeier, Humanistic Ethics in the Age of Globality.
5 Conclusion
325
politics,117 rights,118 economy,119 science,120 culture,121 pedagogy,122 sport,123 
sustainability,124 etc. The shared goal of both the Global Ethos Foundation as well 
as the Global Ethos Institute (Weltethos-Instituts), which was founded at the 
University of Tübingen in 2012, is to continue and develop this work in the most 
inter-culturally inclusive manner possible.125 Nevertheless, the Global Ethos Project 
neither can nor wishes to issue exact instructions for all actions (Handlungen) 
through a universally binding “global ethic,” it rather uncovers the shared ethical 
attitudes (Haltungen) behind humanity’s divergent systems of morals. The goal is 
the orientation and coordination, not the equalization and standardization, of behav-
ior so that, in the light of their basic convictions, people in all places together find 
appropriate solutions, for their respective time and context, to the problems they 
share.
The “global ethos,” inductively derived from humanity’s greatest ethical reposi-
tories, is not only to be pragmatically preferred to a philosophically deduced “global 
ethics” for departing from people’s beliefs rather than sending them on an arduous 
intellectual path towards abstract philosophical ratiocination. Its most decisive 
advantage is in terms of principle. While a “global ethics” can all too easily under-
stand itself as an ultimate answer to all questions, the Global Ethos Project stands 
for the precise opposite: for the beginning of an intercultural conversation that, in 
light of those shared attitudes and convictions, allows people to address what sepa-
rates them as well as to cope with conflicts and problems. In the light of the global 
ethos, culturally conditioned differences in values are likely to be discussed and 
117 See Hans Küng, “Weltpolitik und Weltethos,” Evangelische Akademie Bad Boll: Aktuelle 
Gespräche 43:4 (1995), 30–35; Hans Küng, “Zur Problematik von Weltpolitik, Weltstaat und 
Weltethos” in Stefan Gosepath & J. C. Merle (eds.), Weltrepublik Globalisierung und Demokratie 
(München, 2002).
118 Hans Küng, “Menschen-Rechte und Menschen-Verantwortlichkeiten” in Hans Küng (eds), 
Dokumentation zum Weltethos (München, 2002).
119 See Hans Küng, Klaus M.  Leisinger & Josef Wieland, Manifest Globales Wirtschaftsethos: 
Konsequenzen und Herausforderungen für die Weltwirtschaft (München, 2010); Hans Küng, 
“Weltethos und globale Führungsverantwortung,” in Uto Meier & Bernhard Still (ed.), Führung. 
Macht. Sinn: Ethos und Ethik für Entscheider in Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Kirche (Regensburg, 
2010).
120 See Küng & Kuschel, Wissenschaft und Weltethos.
121 See Hans Küng, “Weltmusik  – Weltreligionen  – Weltethos. Interkulturelle Kommunikation 
durch Musik” in Christine Büchner et al. (ed.), Kommunikation ist möglich theologische, ökumen-
ische und interreligiöse Lernprozesse, Festschrift für Bernd Jochen Hilberath (Ostfildern, 2013).
122 See Stephan Schlensog & Walter Lange (eds.), Weltethos in der Schule: Unterrichtsmaterialien 
der Stiftung Weltethos (Tübingen, 2008).
123 See Hans Küng, “Welt  – Sport  – Ethos. Weltethos” in Eckhard Nagel (ed.), Deutscher 
Evangelischer Kirchentag Hannover 2005 (Gütersloh, 2005).
124 See Hans Küng, “Nachhaltige Entwicklung und Weltethos” in Heidi Bohnet-von der Thüsen 
(ed.), Dekanstöße ‘99 Ein Lesebuch aus Philosophie, Natur- und Humanwissenschaften (München, 
1998).
125 More information about the institute’s work can be found at www.weltethos-institut.org/.
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resolved, instead of – as is to be feared of the perspective of a global ethics – being 
silenced and repressed.
Qualitative liberalism and the Global Ethos Project converge in the basic insight 
that freedom will flourish insofar as it helps people overcome worldwide ethical 
challenges. Thus, when the Global Ethos Project demands cosmopolitan responsi-
bility from individuals’ freedom, the image that should come to mind is not that of 
a prison cell, but that of a body’s skin. Said responsibility is a boundary conferring 
shape and individuality on freedom, not a limit hindering it. Our investigation has 
shown: Values – and the global dialogue concerning them – belong in the center of 
the liberal self-image. In the face of the spatial globality of our lifeworld and in the 
time-spanning countenance of generations to come, from care for our natural and 
social surroundings, as well as from concern for what we leave behind, both with a 
view towards the ideal of the integrative tolerance and faced with the reality of 
exclusionary intolerance, mindful of the material foundations of life as well as of its 
spiritual transcendence, a freedom finding its measure and mean in the global ethos 
brings people together in calling upon the freedom of each and every person to 
advance the freedom of all the world’s citizens.
Attempting to navigate by the light of its lodestar, a qualitatively orientated phi-
losophy of freedom finds in the Global Ethos Project an ethical inspiration of kin-
dred spirit. A philosophically crafted theory of qualitative freedom likewise provides 
important secular support to the Global Ethos Project. A qualitatively oriented lib-
eralism can explain why the spiritual traditions detailed in the Global Ethos Project 
may also inform secular perspectives. For human beings are what they become, and 
people become what they strive for; and thus the cultural and spiritual aspirations of 
humanity– of all human beings – belong to the definition of homo sapiens.126 Human 
beings are cultural by nature insofar as they realize themselves by means of the 
symbolic worlds and meanings they themselves create. As beings seeking for mean-
ing they essentially live in a world of values. Thus considered, moral command-
ments and the vast cosmos of contemplative or meditative practices and religious 
symbols belong to humanity just like the flora and fauna which populate our bio-
logical environment.127 Instead of having to create out of nothing the values for the 
orientation of human freedom within daily life, they can be picked up from the 
wealth of spiritual and secular designs and historically developed practices.128
With the critical sampling of values and with the selection of programs suitable 
for the problems of the future, it is as ever the task of philosophy to analytically 
examine the (metaphysical, moral, political, and religious) concepts introduced by 
its interlocutors, and to square them with the demands of reason. The procedural 
dimension of qualitative liberalism – as worked out especially in the chapters on 
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause and Amartya Sen – ensures that this return to tradi-
126 See Ernst Cassirer, Freiheit und Form: Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte (Berlin, 1916).
127 See Helmuth Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch: Einleitung in die philoso-
phische Anthropologie (Berlin, 1965).
128 See Arnold Gehlen, Anthropologische Forschung (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1967).
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tion, via a lively exchange of religious and philosophical, spiritual, and secular 
arguments, remains within the confines of a wholesome pluralism. For, after all, 
only those values may be put into practice which both survive their critical self- 
application (see Sect. 4.3) and are honored by the citizens as a liberal form of col-
lective self-commitment. Through liberal procedures, freedom can thus be reclaimed 
as a morally appealing and aspirational ideal without, however, restricting the idea 
of freedom to but a single set of ethical goals.
This optimistic vision of a reciprocal self-examination of freedom’s demands 
taking place in the public sphere with the aid of values broadly affirmed by human-
ity, and, proceeding by means of a “cosmopolitan conversation”129 about the collec-
tive mastery of the problems besetting global citizens, does not find applause with 
secular and spiritual fundamentalists. The former dislike the notion of spiritual 
foundations penetrating into public judgments. The latter are displeased about their 
religious fundamentals being subjected to critical examination – that would be to 
faithlessly enthrone reason as a judge over God. The religious fanatic is never satis-
fied with the demand for tolerance – i.e., with maintaining one’s faith as true inter-
nally, while externally neither representing it as absolute nor imposing it ruthlessly 
on others.130
We have already (see Sect. 4.3) rebutted the secular fundamentalism (for instance 
of Rawls). The spiritual fundamentalism must of course be countered as well. 
Certainly, in plural societies, the views of religious fundamentalists are nowadays 
modernized and mediatized as a rule. Yet even where the stability of civil tolerance 
is not in peril, it exists against the will of the fundamentalists and is often only the 
eventual result of century-long bloody confrontations.131 For inner-societal and 
inter-societal peace, it is therefore important to indicate to religious fanatics that an 
absolutization of their own viewpoint is contrary to that very stance – and not just 
contrary to the liberal procedures of open societies. The true strength of the plural-
istic worldview lies in this argument: Religious fundamentalism contradicts the true 
essence of religion; fanaticism is irreligious.132
Whoever views religious proclamations as signs with binary indicators – here the 
sign, there the signified – misunderstands them. Holy texts do not function as sign-
posts equally valid for and equally indifferent to every observer. Religion rather 
communicates symbolically in a tertiary relation, where in the middle, between the 
sign and signified, the believers enter (or do not enter). Without their interpretation 
the process of communication from sign to signified is broken and no intellectual 
spark is transmitted. Religious electricity can only flow when the believer person-
ally produces that interpretative connection. The spiritual fundamentalist therefore 
129 See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton, NJ, 2005).
130 See Hans Küng, Existiert Gott? Antwort auf die Gottesfrage der Neuzeit (München, 1978).
131 See Heiner Bielefeldt, “Universalism Versus Relativism on the Necessity of Intercultural 
Dialogue on Human Rights” in Kai Hafez & Mary Ann Kenny (eds.), The Islamic World and the 
West: An Introduction to Political Cultures and International Relations (2000).
132 For more information about the following issue see Dierksmeier, Noumenon Religion.
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performatively contradicts himself when he precisely denies to others that which 
religiously electrifies him: the individual appropriation and interpretation of 
 religious symbols. He can only account for the truth of his faith in a manner which 
he – if he wants to lead them into faith – must grant to others. The people which the 
religious fundamentalist wants to convert will only become relays of spirituality by 
way of their very own hermeneutic  – or never reach authentic religiosity. The 
uniqueness of religious truth in the inner perspective and its plurality in the outer 
perspective are, correctly understood, one and the same. Consequently, with the 
demand for the toleration of adherents of other faiths, religious freedom is not cur-
tailed but confirmed.133
Since secular fundamentalism misses the mark and spiritual fundamentalism 
contradicts itself, the metaphysical question concerning the identity of the global 
citizen whose freedom qualitative liberalism is committed to can be answered by no 
one other than the global citizen himself. And, of course, religious and spiritual 
voices will enter into this answer too. That is why we require a liberalism which is 
also spiritually literate. Instead of secularly determining once and for all what con-
stitutes freedom under the aegis of qualitative freedom, discussion must be encour-
aged about what – here and now – we should safeguard as freedom. The best way 
for society to secure freedom of and from religion is by allowing and tolerating 
debates on spiritual questions, not by suppressing them. Let us trust in the power of 
procedural reason asserting itself precisely in such controversies to discover the best 
arguments!
The idea of qualitative freedom can integrate cultural specificity without a rela-
tivistic submission to local values. All normative claims fighting politically for their 
validation are always to be evaluated critically by a standard of legitimacy whose 
apex is the conceptual totality of all present and future persons. In terms of political 
implementation and realization, the path towards a cosmopolis of freedom runs 
through all those local and regional bilateral and multilateral institutions into which 
people and peoples gather together to protect their current interests. In terms of 
validity, however, the idea (preempted by Kant and, for the first time, systematically 
worked out by Krause) of a general federation of humanity is decisive. Endeavors 
that cannot be advocated in the name of humanity, will not find the support of quali-
tative freedom. Qualitative liberalism is thus especially amenable to post-national, 
supranational, and transnational as well as intergovernmental politics, since its idea 
of freedom, constraining itself with this very argument, consistently leads to the 
conception of universal human rights.134
133 See Heiner Bielefeldt, “Misperceptions of Freedom of Religion or Belief,” Human Rights 
Quarterly: A Comparative and International Journal of the Social Sciences, Philosophy, and Law 
35:1 (2013).
134 See Heiner Bielefeldt, Philosophie der Menschenrechte: Grundlagen eines weltweiten 
Freiheitsethos (Darmstadt, 1998); Heiner Bielefeldt, “Historical and Philosophical Foundations of 
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Some hold, however, that without a firmly established global government, no 
globalization of the right to freedom is possible.135 Is that true? Do we need a global 
state, a global federal state, or at least a global federation of states, in order to assure 
freedom global respect? Is the imperative, continually repeated up until today by 
teachers of natural law, to leave the legally unregulated state of nature (“exeundum 
est e statu naturali”) also true at the level of global law?
In my opinion there is an important difference between a hypothetical state of 
nature among individuals (before and apart from all societal organization) and an 
analogously conceived state of nature between states.136 Most global citizens are 
already legally integrated in (mostly national) communities so that – conceptually – 
an immediate membership of all people in a state of global citizens is not required 
in order to satisfy the call for universal security through laws.137 This does not, 
however, vitiate the demand for the actual protection of human rights. Nevertheless, 
there exists the possibility that the real conditions in practice will one day suffi-
ciently correspond with the ideal demands of theory. Then, however, the universal 
recognition of human rights must also be reliably enforceable, so that the affiliation 
of individuals to certain political communities leads to their systemic realization, 
and not (as in corrupt regimes) to their systematic suppression.
Nevertheless, as is well known, there are currently many places which norma-
tively and/or actually do not meet this demand for a cosmopolitan protection of 
human rights.138 Where the present powers cannot secure a satisfactory protection of 
human rights (as in failing states) or do not want to (as in the IS terrorist state), the 
global community must come to the fore; especially in regard to violent conflicts. 
Religiously motivated civil wars and genocides are not something which one can 
put aside with reference to the national sovereignty of the respectively concerned 
territorial states.
Notwithstanding, it does not immediately follow that we must advocate a global 
government furnished with universal sanctioning powers. The historical genesis 
and the systematic validity of global acts of law are two different things. On the 
timeless level of philosophical validity, all global citizens are granted the uncondi-
tional protection of their human rights. Historically, however, we face the question 
about the respectively suitable conditions under which this demand could be most 
efficiently realized. A concretization and optimization of the existing institutions of 
global governance could, for example, at the moment present the most appropriate 
means for approximating towards this end. Perhaps the norm of universal human 
rights is presently better honored with certain networks and institutions, which in 
135 See James A. Yunker, Political Gloabalization: A New Vision of Federal World Government 
(Lanham, MD).
136 See Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 237. See also: Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and 
Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship (Cambridge & New York, 2011).
137 See Shaw, Rawls, Kant’s Doctrine of Right, and Global Distributive Justice.
138 See James W. Nickel, “Is Today’s International Human Rights System a Global Governance 
Regime?,” The Journal of Ethics 6:4 (2002).
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their combination span the globe, than in prematurely grasping for supranational 
legal constructions that at the moment are not (yet) desired by the international 
community. Maybe humanity finds itself now already upon the path towards such a 
gradual expansion and differentiation of transnational norms and values when it 
comes to establishing and implementing sustainable social and environmental stan-
dards. The outcome of this process remains to be seen.
Many complain that hitherto the under-regulation of the global market enabled a 
race to the bottom: firms move to production locations where a lack of adequate 
legal guidelines leads to reduced costs for doing business with negative externali-
ties; competitors feel forced to follow suit; economic sites consequently enter into a 
negative competition for the lowest ecological and legal standards in order to gener-
ate or maintain the flow of oversea investment-capital and thereby jobs and tax- 
revenues.139 Are we inevitably heading for a downward spiral, which, in the worst 
case scenario, only ends when all economic assets are privatized and the entire 
economic and social cost is socialized? Will the snowball of excessive profit- seeking 
grow into an unstoppable avalanche on the slope of an unbalanced global economic 
order?140 The empirical data does not entirely corroborate this prediction.141 The 
actual result of globalization for freedom and human rights turns out to be not quite 
so negative.142 We also see upward spirals. Benefitted by the technical facilitation of 
physical and informational commerce, a critical global public has emerged, the 
sheer existence of which has a normative effect. Pragmatic imperatives of business 
thus today often result in some firms, even in under-regulated societies, signing up 
to demanding transnational standards of corporate governance in order to, for 
instance, be attractive to global investors.143
Nevertheless, the regulation of the global public sphere can ultimately of course 
not only be entrusted to the discretion of economic organizations and non- 
governmental institutions with insufficient democratic legitimation.144 Even the 
shrewdest incentive scheme cannot replace institutions of mandatory law. Not every 
conflict can be settled by mediation, not every tension can be bilaterally or multilater-
ally lifted, and not every outrage can be overcome by naming, blaming, and shaming. 
139 See Andrea Amaro & William Miles, “Racing to the Bottom for FDI? Changing Role of Labor 
Costs and Infrastructure,” The Journal of Developing Areas 40:1 (2006).
140 See Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, “Toward a Political Conception of Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Business and Society seen from a Habermasian Perspective,” Academy of 
Management Review 32:4 (2007).
141 See David M. Konisky, “Regulatory Competition and Environmental Enforcement: Is there a 
Race to the Bottom?,” American Journal of Political Science 51:4 (2007).
142 See Jagdish N. Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York, 2004).
143 C. Lattemann, “On the Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices in Emerging Markts,” 
International Journal of Emerging Markets 9:2 (2014).
144 See Sangeeta Kamat, “The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a 
Neoliberal Era,” Review of International Political Economy 11:1 (2004).
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That has been unpleasantly confirmed by the global governance crises of recent 
years. While, that is, for some aims of humanity, the flexible approach of a creeping 
regulation through global governance proves to be perfectly appropriate, other aims 
are, in my opinion, better provided for through classical government institutions, 
which is why the speculation about an institutional optimization of humanity’s global 
legal representation in no way appears idle.145
In every case, a global domestic policy practiced by everyone in the name of 
freedom has to press for inclusive participative procedures. If, for instance, the prin-
ciple of “one man, one vote” holds true on the national level, why not – we need to 
ask from a liberal perspective – also apply it on a global level?146 Certainly, there are 
many pragmatic reservations (in rich countries), as to what might happen if one 
involved every global citizen equally (including those of poor countries) in the 
decision- making about questions of global governance. Yet, the ethical validity of 
these reservations seems questionable to me,147 especially so far as we postulate 
freedom – procedural and substantial – as a basic right of every single person as 
such. In short: “Everybody matters.”148 I believe that the creditability of liberalism 
stands and falls with the resoluteness of liberals to strive for the globality of auton-
omy and, on the global level, to speak up for a “solidary liberalism.”149
From a liberal and cosmopolitan perspective, therefore, we must strive for a 
global order which can cope with those ramifications of individual, corporative, and 
state action that affect the global sphere.150 For while problems arising within the 
state’s territory (can) often become neutralized by national legislation (that is, via 
the so-called internalization of negative external effects) this is yet to be accom-
plished on the global level. Liberals should thus fight decidedly for a global eco-
nomic law and for a global penal law with sufficient sanctioning powers, in addition 
to striving for an effective political representation of the world’s entire population. 
The current global economic and legal order’s legitimacy-deficit, the non-binding 
nature of its regulations, and its inability to sanction, clearly opposes the idea that 
all people should be able to autonomously determine the quality of their freedom.
Through whichever procedures and processes the global community seeks to 
make headway with these questions, the guiding perspective for selecting appropri-
ate means to advance its ends can be outlined with clarity: Instead of a world of 
quantitatively boundless possibilities where only a few can attain everything, we 
145 On this, see the observations of the World Federalist Movement (http://www.wfmigp.org)
146 See Parijs, Real Freedom For All, 228f.
147 Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven, CT, 2002).
148 “Everybody matters: that is our central idea. And it sharply limits the scope of our tolerance” 
(Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 144).
149 See Parijs, Real Freedom For All, 232.




should strive for a world of qualitatively meaningful realities where significant 
chances are available to everyone. I believe the fascination for freedom will grip 
everyone, once we assert its indivisibility and assume the cosmopolitan responsibil-
ity this requires. The world was, is, and remains, the common property of all human-
ity  – and it should be treated so as well: in the service of the promotion of the 
qualitative freedom of all.
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